合约实施效率与中国地区产业比较优势

文章讨论了中国合约实施效率的地区差异对地区产业比较优势的作用机制。文章研究表明,由于中间品合约的不完全实施导致事前专用性投资扭曲和最终产品价格上升,因此,相对于合约实施效率较低的地区而言,地区合约实施效率较高地区,专用性中间品密集使用产品的相对价格较低,从而在专用性中间品密度使用产业上具有比较优势。本文利用中国2006年各地区分产业数据所做的经验研究支持了这一观点,即合约实施实施效率是显著导致地区比较优势的重要因素。认为合约实施效率的改进是地区产业经济结构调整和地区之间经济协调发展的前提,它有助于促进地区贸易结构的改善。     

合约实施制度与国际贸易文献综述

本文围绕制度和贸易主题,从新制度经济学的视角,对非正式合约实施制度与国际贸易;正式合约实施制度与贸易流量;合约制度与比较优势三个层面的相关最新文献做了梳理,突出了合约实施问题对于一国贸易规模和内生比较优势形成的重要性。     

论保险合同的不完全性与履约障碍

现代合约理论认为导致合约不完全 ,主要有 5个方面的原因。商业保险合同具有行为上的最大诚信原则、形式上的附合性、保障性、经济补偿性和射幸性等特性。它的不完全性和本身特性并存将无可避免地导致一系列的履约障碍     

制度与国际贸易关系研究述评

制度与国际贸易之间的关系正成为国际贸易理论研究的热点和前沿.目前,该领域的主要研究方向聚焦于金融发展和合约实施这两个制度因素,对一国国际贸易比较优势来源、贸易结构和贸易利益分配所具有的影响效应和作用机制.文章从理论和实证两个角度对该领域已有文献进行详细梳理,初步解读了金融发展和合约实施这两种制度因素对一国国际贸易所具有的影响与作用效应.这对于重新理解与解读类似于中国这样的发展中国家的国际贸易扩张、优势来源以及国际贸易发展效应,应该能够提供一个独特的借鉴与分析视角.     

我国现行农地制度缺陷与重构的分析

国土资源部颁布了《关于坚持依法依规管理节约集约用地,支持社会主义新农村建设的通知》,意味着农村集体土地直接入市已露出一角。但一个重要的问题是,我国农地合约不明确导致的产权界定不完整,势必造成入市的种种困难。这也是农村非农用地和耕作用地共同存在的一个问题。文章从产权、合约、交易成本的角度分析了我国现行农村土地制度的缺陷,并给出了理论和政策上的合理化建议。     

中国公共服务部门所有权激励制度安排的经济学分析

公共服务部门为社会提供公共服务产品,具有和私人产品部门完全不同的特点和激励结构,因此公共服务部门的改革面临着更复杂的问题。本文基于不完备合约理论,通过一个简单的公共服务部门所有权激励模型发现:私有制的公共服务部门更努力地减少运行成本,具有生产效率;国有制的公共服务部门则在公共服务的产量上具有优势,能够实现公共服务的有效供给;同时,对于国有制的公共服务部门来说,增加其自由裁量权(或剩余控制权)可以有效地激励公共服务部门降低成本、提高公共服务的质量。     

供应链知识共享代理关系及其支付机制

作为供应链整合知识资源,知识共享是提高整体竞争力的重要手段,本质是供应链企业间的一种合约关系。由于信息的不对称性,导致了市场条件下供应链知识共享制度的失灵。运用委托代理理论,供应链中需求知识的企业和供给知识的企业在合约中不同权利的安排,建立一种有效率的知识共享制度,构建供应链知识共享的支付模型,旨在实现不同信息结构下合约的最优支付机制。     

跨国银行国际营销渠道的比较与选择

代理行和海外分行是银行国际分销渠道的两种主要模式。从合约理论来看,代理行是一种市场合约,海外分行是一种企业合约。本文运用合约理论分析和比较了这两种分销渠道的交易特征,并利用博弈论模型探讨了这两种分销渠道的运用环境和适用条件。     

基于合约理论的政府预算与国家治理关系研究

以合约理论为视角分析了政府预算与国家治理的关系。 一是政府预算编制制度是国家治理体系的关键组成部分,但表现出预算控制与预算合约相背离、预算签约成本高,以及代理人的逆向选择产生了负外部性等问题;二是政府预算执行过程是国家治理能力的集中体现,然而在政府预算履约环节不同主体之间呈现出道德风险,产生较高的治理成本和事后的机会主义行为等问题。 因此,政府预算应该建立合约化的治理预算,并且以合约交易中合约制订与执行的效率为基础,构建预算治理机制,以实现政府预算服务于国家治理的责任和职能,做新时代人民满意的“善治”政府。     

试析佃农理论对解决我国农地产权问题的启示

本文旨在探讨佃农理论对解决我国农地产权问题的启示，通过分析和归纳《佃农理论》的主要内容与核心思想，总结我国农地产权制度中尚存在的问题，最后得出结论：要解决我国农地产权问题，必须明确界定土地产权，明晰产权主体，选择适当的合约，提高经济效率，完善相关法律制度，调动农民生产积极性。     

内生性财务契约研究范式转换:从完备契约观到不完备契约观

现代公司财务契约理论研究范式经历了三次转换:由外生性的新古典完备财务契约范式转换为内生性的完备财务契约范式,再转换为内生性的不完备财务契约范式。而作为最新的研究范式,不完备财务契约研究也先后经历了静态控制权理论范式和动态控制权理论范式的演进。内生性不完备财务契约研究范式将交易费用、制度、产权、契约等因素正式纳入公司财务理论研究视野,弥补了传统财务理论研究范式内生的制度性缺失。该范式也大大促进了我国公司财务理论研究,为解决经济转型阶段我国公司尖锐的财务冲突提供了更合理的解释和指导思路。     

退耕还林中的目标传递与政府行为选择

对于造林目标选择、传递、演进提供解释框架,分析地方政府在政策执行中可能的偏差及来源。通过建立双任务委托——代理模型,证明人工林质量降低主要来自于工程实施中的激励不相容。通过地方政府禀赋价值与市场价格变动的分析,提出林业产品市场价格波动、科技收益的不确定性以及质量标准的模糊使工资契约出现了激励不相容,弱化了地方政府造林质量努力的动机。对建立活立木市场、推行生态购买等提出了政策建议,以期提高退耕还林工程的生态效益。     

论无权抵押条件下第三人利益的保护

无权抵押的行为是指无权处分人以自己的名义在他人财产之上设定抵押的行为。该行为分为签订抵押合同的行为和履行抵押合同的行为。根据现代民法物权债权法理论和立法实践,抵押合同的生效与抵押权的生效是两个不同的概念。在无权抵押的条件下,抵押合同的效力应根据第三人的主观善恶,分别确定为有效和效力待定两种情况,以保护善意第三人的利益和交易的安全。     

INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING

Contractual incompleteness has been understood in the literature as the conditions under which contracts are insufficiently state contingent due to non‐observable and/or non‐verifiable states of the world. The term incomplete contracts has been used in different meanings: to denote both proper contractual incompleteness (in a complete contracts context) due to various types of information problems, which can be contractually solved through a suitably designed mechanism and a context (an incomplete contracting context) where ex ante states of nature that are too expensive to describe prevent a contractual mechanism being designed. We examine these significantly different interpretations in both methodological and formal terms. We argue that, as long as relationship‐specific investment conditions occur, an incomplete contracting context is an innovative paradigm to the extent that it permits analysis of issues that in a complete contract context cannot even be broached, namely the recognition of non‐contractible inefficiencies and the possibility of non‐contractual solutions to such inefficiencies.     

Promotion and Prevention Contracts in Distributor–Supplier Relationship Using Matched Dyadic Data

ABSTRACT

Purpose: This article aims to introduce and distinguish two features of contract design – prevention and promotion contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism within the distributor–supplier relationship. It also examines the moderating role of ex post contract enforcement strategies.

Methodology/approach: The authors test the proposed theoretical model by collecting matched data from distributors and suppliers in China. Moreover, partial least squares regression is used to analyze the data and test the hypothesis model.

Findings: The results show that a prevention contract leads the distributor to vigilantly avoid mistakes and punishments, thereby deterring him from behaving opportunistically. Alternatively, a promotion contract motivates the distributor to make an effort to attain potential long-run payoffs instead of short-term profits, subsequently restraining his opportunism. Overall, the promotion contract is more effective in curbing distributor opportunism than the prevention contract. In addition, the inhibitory effect of a prevention contract on opportunism is reinforced along with a severe contract enforcement strategy. By contrast, a promotion contract effectively mitigates opportunism with a swift contract enforcement strategy.

Originality/value/contribution: This study untangles two distinctive features of contract design – prevention-framed and promotion-framed contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism management. This study also provides a profound understanding of contract effectiveness by revealing the interaction effect between ex ante contract design and ex post contract enforcement.

Research implications: Researchers are encouraged to explore contract effectiveness from a framing perspective. In particular, ex post contract enforcement strategies should be included in research frameworks related to contract governance. Suggestions for further research on the effects of prevention and promotion contracts on different forms of opportunism are also proposed.

Practical implications: This article provides several insightful implications for managers in designing and enforcing contract in business-to-business marketing. Managers can strategically achieve control and motivation effects by consciously making framing decisions in the contract design, further curbing opportunistic behaviors. Moreover, managers can select a contract enforcement strategy in accordance with the contract type to maximize the effects of the specific contract.     

农业企业制度效率的理论分析与实证检验

农业企业制度安排及其经济效率是经济运行中一个值得关注的问题。基于农业企业制度安排的现实,可以将农业企业合作生产和剩余分配的制度安排概括划分为固定工资契约制、分成地租契约制和固定地租契约制等三种形式。针对这三种形式,文章在运用逻辑推理、边际分析等方法进行理论分析的基础上,对这三种企业制度安排进行了历史考察、统计分析和实验检验,以说明和论证这三种企业制度安排的经济效率。文章认为,马歇尔税收等价理论和张五常佃农理论有关农业企业制度安排的研究并非完全对立,这两大理论可以在一定程度和范围内协调;关于这一协调,本文在垄断竞争市场的背景下,提出了融合这三种制度安排的激励效应理论,认为农业企业制度安排经过协调后会提升经济效率,并通过对农业企业的实证检验在理论分析层面证实了这一观点。     

不完全契约、不对称信息与银企金融交易

对不完全契约理论和不对称信息理论的分析表明,我国银企金融交易中存在的逆向选择和道德风险行为,主要源自于银企之间的契约不完全和信息不对称,而且这种不完全和不对称程度越大,企业发生违约和道德风险的可能性就越大。在WTO背景下,积极探索改善我国银企之间信用关系,营造互相信任、共同合作的经营氛围,已成为当前我国金融体制改革和经济可持续发展的基础性工作。     

Contract Enforcement and Trade

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of contract enforcement on trade in a large sample of developing economies. The effects of three separate measures capturing contract enforcement (the time required to enforce a contract; the costs to enforce a contract; and the number of procedures required to enforce a contract) on trade were tested using the panel corrected standard errors method of estimation. The results show that the three measures of contract enforcement are negatively and statistically significantly correlated with trade. The findings lead to the conclusion that the ease of contract enforcement is crucial in order to facilitate the speed of trade in the developing group of countries.     

International Franchising Decision-Making: A Model for Country Choice

The present study examines how a number of market conditions may drive diffusion of franchising. It considers a sample of 63 Spanish franchisors operating through 2321 franchisee outlets across 20 different Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Venezuela in January 2011. Results conclude that geographical and cultural distance between the host and home country, as well as the level of the host country's uncertainty avoidance, individualism, political stability, unemployment rate, market potential, and efficiency of contract enforcement, may drive the spread of international franchising. Results reinforce previous research on country choice as to the association between international franchising and the host country's unemployment rate and cultural distance, but also identify differences from other regions in some issues such as political stability. Moreover, new insights relative to the effect of market potential, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and the efficiency of contract enforcement on international franchise diffusion are also shown.