CEO retirement compensation: Is inside debt excess compensation or a risk management tool?

CEOs face constant scrutiny over their compensation packages. This scrutiny has only intensified amid discussions of CEO-to-employee pay ratios and income inequality nationwide. CEO retirement packages are criticized as camouflage compensation used to award excessive compensation to CEOs and were, prior to 2006, less transparent than they are now. Thanks to the transparent disclosures now required by the SEC, we have a better understanding of the types and amounts of compensation owed to CEOs after they depart or retire, termed inside debt. I investigate whether all CEO inside debt components share similar incentive effects and offers some thoughts on how companies might structure these packages to be most effective. I discuss the structure and incentive effects of the two primary components of inside debt: deferred compensation and supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs). I explain why inside debt, particularly CEO SERPs, may actually help companies manage firm risk. Finally, I outline the best ways to structure inside debt so that it functions as a resource to manage firm risk and foster a long-term perspective rather than mirroring the incentive effect of equity, increasing risk, and encouraging a myopic focus.     

Dollars and sense: The implications of CEO compensation for organizational performance

Crafting a compensation package for an organization's chief executive officer (CEO) that will help the firm maximize its performance is a vexing challenge for a board of directors. Management theory offers boards several practical hints. A board can put its CEO and the firm in the best position to be successful by (1) creating strong incentives for the CEO to act in the firm's best interest at all times; (2) benchmarking a CEO's performance and compensation relative to that of very high performing CEOs in the industry; (3) diagnosing and responding to CEOs’ feelings about equity relative to their peers; (4) paying a CEO with uniquely valuable knowledge, skills, and ability at the top of the market; (5) offering retention incentives if a proven performer with unique skills is leading a company; (6) resisting the temptation to simply mimic the compensation packages that work for leading firms; and (7) considering candidates’ social ties when recruiting a new CEO.     

The Moderating Effect of Supervisor’s Behavioral Integrity on the Relationship between Regulatory Focus and Impression Management

The desire to control how others see us is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Decades of research have suggested that the results associated with how others see us are too great an influence to ignore. The tactics we use and behaviors we engage in to control how others see us is known as impression management. This study examines the relationship between regulatory focus and the use of exemplification or supplication impression management tactics. We use regulatory focus theory to examine this phenomenon. First, we investigate the main effects that occur between prevention-focused individuals and exemplification, and between promotion-focused individuals and exemplification and supplication. We then introduce supervisor behavioral integrity as a moderator between regulatory focus and impression management. Our findings suggest a positive relationship between prevention-focused and exemplification, and between promotion-focused and exemplification and supplication. We also find that behavioral integrity strengthens the relationship between prevention-focused and exemplification and promotion-focused and supplication, but not promotion-focused and exemplification. Implications and future research directions are discussed.     

Do the Right Thing: The Imprinting of Deonance at the Upper Echelons

This study expands the application of deonance theory into organizations’ upper echelons by examining how CEOs imprinted with a sense of duty can influence managerial decision-making. We hypothesize an imprint of bounded autonomy, an ought-force that constrains their decision-making and understanding of behavioral freedom, influences duty-bound CEOs to self-report errors in past financial reporting. We test deonance theory propositions of instrumentality for behavioral expansion, namely loss avoidance and gain attainment, related to institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership. We use CEOs that are graduates of U.S. service academies as a proxy for duty-bound executives and find firms they lead are more likely to issue a financial restatement to correct a previous reporting error. This finding is robust to alternate explanations such as being error-prone, earnings management, auditor oversight, and risk behaviors. We also find evidence that deonance may be subject to behavioral expansion. The likelihood of issuing a restatement decreases as institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership increases. This study shows imprinted deonance within the C-suite influences important organizational outcomes.

     

Earnings Quality in Private SMEs: Do CEO Demographics Matter?

This study investigates the impact of CEO demographics on earnings quality for private SMEs. Using a 2012 sample of 30,476 French firms, we first find strong empirical support for a gender effect: female‐run firms engage in less earnings management than do male‐run firms. This result is consistent with female CEOs being more risk averse than their male counterparts are when making financial decisions. Second, CEO age is negatively correlated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and the relationship between gender and earnings quality is stronger for older CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that CEO demographics affect the quality of accounting information.     

Keep it vague? New product preannouncement,regulatory focus,and word-of-mouth

This paper aims to examine the interaction between firm's new product preannouncement (NPP) strategies and consumers' regulatory foci on their WOM intention and the underlying mechanisms. In three experiments, we find that (1) the promotion-focused (prevention-focused) consumers have higher WOM intentions for vague (specific) NPP; (2) curiosity (outcome expectancy) mediates the effects of the NPP strategies on WOM intention for promotion-focused (prevention-focused) consumers; and (3) brand familiarity plays a moderating role, such that the interaction effect between NPP strategy and regulatory focus on consumers' WOM intention holds for a low-familiarity brand only. Our research contributes to a better understanding of NPP strategies and provides actionable strategic support for firms to conduct NPP.     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.     

奖励类型与调节聚焦对顾客推荐意愿的影响研究

文章旨在研究推荐奖励计划中奖励类型（享乐性赠品和实用性赠品）和调节聚焦（趋进型和规避型）对顾客推荐意愿的影响。结果表明：在推荐奖励计划中,具有不同调节聚焦属性的顾客,其推荐意愿也存在差异。具体来说,与规避型顾客相比,趋进型顾客的推荐意愿较高。此外,调节聚焦与奖励类型对顾客推荐意愿存在交互作用。具体来说,对于趋进型顾客来说,与实用性赠品相比,当奖励为享乐性赠品时,其推荐意愿较高;而对于规避型顾客来说,与享乐性赠品相比,当奖励为实用性赠品时,其推荐意愿较高。最后,文章为企业制定推荐奖励计划提出了几点建议。     

Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation.     

Innovation-based strategic flexibility (ISF): Role of CEO ties with marketing and R&D

In this research, using a capability perspective, we first define innovation based, strategic flexibility (ISF) as consisting of three lower-level capabilities- market sensing, resource reconfiguration, and proactiveness; then link it to new-product/innovation outcomes, and develop a new metric of ISF that is input–output based. This metric captures a firm’s realized flexibility in translating market opportunities into innovation output. We then examine the role of CEO ties with marketing and R&D in driving a firm's ISF. Combining survey data of 191 CEOs with objective performance data, we find that (a) ISF is positively influenced by the frequency and duration of the CEO's relationship with the two functional units, but negatively influenced by CEO's relationship closeness, and (b) ISF contributes to future profit growth of firms. We test the robustness of our findings to the potential violation of sequential-ignorability assumption as defined in the causal mediation literature and find the results to be robust. The results provide insights into the role of CEO characteristics in driving innovation, and upper echelon’s contributions to marketing.     

CEOs’ regulatory focus and firm internationalization: The moderating effects of CEO overconfidence,narcissism and career horizon

While the international business literature has mainly focused on the firm- or industry-level antecedents of internationalization strategies, scholars have recently advocated a greater focus on the microfoundations of firms’ strategic decisions. Building on the regulatory focus theory, this study focuses on how CEO promotion and prevention foci impact firm internationalization. Looking into dispositional and situational attributions, this study also theorizes how these factors moderate the relationship between a CEO’s psychological motivations and firm internationalization. Using data from publicly traded US firms listed in the Fortune 500, the findings of this study show that a CEO’s promotion focus is positively associated with the extent of a firm’s internationalization, whereas a CEO’s strong prevention focus limits the extent of a firm’s internationalization. The findings also reveal that the relationship between a CEO’s regulatory focus and the extent of a firm’s internationalization is moderated by a CEO’s overconfidence, narcissism, and career horizon. These findings have important research and managerial implications for firms engaged in international business.     

Digital buying behavior: The role of regulatory fit and self-construal in online luxury goods purchase intentions

Drawing on regulatory focus theory, this study examines how consumers’ promotion and prevention focus influences luxury purchase intentions in an online domain. The research further investigates the interactive effects of regulatory focus, goal orientation, and self-construal through four studies. Study 1 shows that promotion-focused versus prevention-focused consumers have a greater tendency to purchase luxury goods online and in-store. Contrary to extant research regarding the compatibility between message frame and consumers’ regulatory focus, using varying manipulations, Studies 2 and 3 find the primacy of prevention-framed messages in influencing online luxury purchase intentions for promotion- and prevention-focused consumers. Further, unlike prior studies, Study 4 shows no significant interaction effect between regulatory focus, goal orientation, and self-construal and adds a possible boundary condition by demonstrating how regulatory focus and self-construal effects differ for luxury purchase online. Overall, the studies offer important contributions to theory and practice relating to luxury consumption in cyberspace.     

Political Affiliation and Pay Slice: Do Blue CEOs Accept Less Green?

We examine the relationship among CEO political alignment, compensation, and pay disparity (relative to other high‐earning executives) and find that Democratic CEOs accept less pay and a significantly lower pay slice. That is, left‐leaning CEOs put their money where their mouth is regarding the Democratic ideology of economic and social equity. This smaller pay gap is not a function of variations in managerial ability; if anything, Democratic CEOs are more talented than Republican CEOs. Results suggest that Democratic CEOs may be more effective at running firms in which collaboration among top executives is more valuable than are the potential gains from tournament incentives.     

Corporate Social Performance and Economic Cycles

This paper examines the influence of CEO career horizon problems on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We assume that as CEOs are getting older, they tend to disengage in CSR due to their shorter career horizons. We further argue that high levels of industry-level discretion (ILD) and blockholder ownership amplify the negative effects of CEO age on CSR. Using a panel sample of US-based firms over 2004–2009, we do not find the main effect of CEO age on CSR, but find support for the moderating effects, such that CEO age is negatively associated with CSR when there are high levels of ILD and blockholder ownership. Therefore, results suggest that CEO career horizon problems matter for CSR when (1) CEOs have sufficient discretion over the firm’s strategic decisions and (2) outside blockholders put more pressure on CEOs to engage in financial earning management.     

CEO经验及个性对企业动态能力的影响分析

在动态能力的理论框架下,不同CEO的经验和个性对企业运用和发展动态能力的影响不同,现探索不同CEO的经验和个性对企业适应环境变化的战略行为会产生哪些影响。实证研究表明,跨国工作经验和专业领域经验的CEO则对企业运用和发展动态能力具有显著的正向影响。具有外向性、开放性和情绪稳定性特征的CEO对企业运用和发展动态能力具有显著的正向影响。另外,CEO的跨国工作经验和专业领域经验对企业适应环境的变革行为具有调节作用。     

Redemption time for coupons with limited duration: role of regulatory focus and product type

Firms spend a lot on coupon promotions and are concerned with their profitability. The characteristics of coupons are associated with success of coupon promotions. This research explores how consumer’s regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention) and product type (material vs. experience) affect when consumers prefer to redeem coupons (coupon redemption time). Results from two studies show that people’s prevention goal strength is negatively related to redemption time consumers prefer. Besides, a fit between people’s regulatory focus and product type leads to earlier redemption than unfit condition. Specifically, experiential purchases are compatible with promotion-focused consumers and material purchases are compatible with prevention-focused consumers. We discuss the findings in the contexts of coupon research and theory on regulatory focus, and further posit managerial implications for the design of coupon promotions or other marketing activities with limited duration.     

Managing institutional distance: Examining how firm-specific advantages impact foreign subsidiary CEO staffing

Based on the insight that superior access to knowledge can help foreign firms overcome liabilities of foreignness, we examine whether possession of firm-specific advantages shifts foreign firms’ CEO staffing strategies from local managers, who provide host-market insight, toward expatriates, who possess knowledge transfer and coordination capabilities. We find that, as institutional distance increases, firm-specific advantages from multinationality, regional agglomeration, and host-country experience substitute for the host-market insight of local CEOs. Foreign firms with such advantages instead staff the CEO role with expatriates. Our results are practically relevant to MNCs seeking to allocate a limited talent pool across different institutional contexts.     

Women’s Leadership and Firm Performance: Family Versus Nonfamily Firms

We evaluate the relationship between the appointment of women to CEO or Chair positions and firm performance, and shed light on the differences between family and nonfamily firms. By using a propensity score matching approach on a sample of 394 French firms over the period 2001–2010, we find major discordances between women’s leadership style and family business expectations relative to firm performance, as measured by return on assets and Tobin’s q. Notably, our results support the conjecture that family firms, which are more conducive to transformational leadership, offer women a more appropriate climate for exercising the function of Chair than that of CEO. In contrast, women CEOs perform better in nonfamily firms. Our findings move away from the predominant focus on barriers and stereotypes images about the female leadership and support the contingency theory of leadership, which states that the effectiveness of a leadership style depends on the organization and culture in which leaders operate, and on task-related positions     

Stock options,restricted stock,salary, or bonus? Managing CEO compensation to maximize organizational performance

CEO pay has gone through remarkable changes over the past two decades. The most striking new features have been the increased use of stock options in the early 2000s, and of restricted stock since then. Both forms of stock-based compensation are intended to resolve the agency problem that occurs when CEOs do not act in the best interests of stockholders, but each has its advantages and limitations. In this instalment of Organizational Performance, we discuss the history of their use and similarities and differences between the two, and argue that both are often overused. Bonuses based on strategic goals, on the other hand, may be underused. We conclude with a contextual approach to guide boards of directors in making choices among the forms of CEO compensation—stock options, restricted stock, salary, and bonus—to incentivize CEOs to work toward maximizing organizational performance. Briefly, stock options are most appropriate for growth firms, and restricted stock for stable firms. Both forms of stock-based compensation are more appropriate for new than for long-tenured CEOs.     

The influence of leader regulatory focus on employee creativity

Brockner and Higgins (Brockner, J., Higgins, E. T. 2001. Regulatory focus theory: Implications for the study of emotions at work. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 86(1), 35–66.) suggest that a leader's behavior may be perceived as an organizational endorsement of promotion-focused or prevention-focused concerns and that this perception will influence employee behavior by eliciting a congruent state of regulatory focus. We tested this hypothesis using matched pairs of leaders and employees from a Chinese firm and found that employee creativity is positively associated with the promotion focus of the supervisor's behavior. Consequently, through their actions, promotion-focused leaders may increase the likelihood of entrepreneurial action in their firms by eliciting a promotion-focused state of eagerness from their employees.