控制权转移的内幕交易案例研究——基于私有收益获取的视角

股权分置改革后,并购重组中的内幕交易已成为损害投资者利益的重要形式和证券监管的主要矛盾,黄光裕收购中关村科技后发生的内幕交易是此类案件的典型。通过对此进行事件研究,分析了我国制度背景下控制权转移交易过程中、交易完成后资产重组事件内幕交易的可能性与收益。研究结果表明,并购方通过控制权转移后的内幕交易获取私有收益是控制权转移到重要动机。     

我国终极控制人控制权转移相关问题研究——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文通过选取我国A股市场1997-2006年间发生的140起控制权协议交易作为研究样本,测度我国上市公司控制权转移私有收益的大小程度,检验控制权转移私有收益的影响因素,并对终极控制人控制权转移私有收益对公司绩效的影响进行实证分析。     

内幕交易的经济学分析——基于大宗交易的事件研究

本文以一个新的角度,定义上市公司的大宗交易作为重要事件,分析这一重大事件前股票的超常收益以及累积超常收益,同时结合内幕交易效应和公告效应判断内幕交易是否存在。和过往的研究结论一致,本文的结论是我国证券市场存在内幕交易。并提出一些治理内幕交易的政策建议。     

上市公司控股股东私有收益影响因素实证研究

通过对我国上市公司控股股东私有收益规模的测度,并对影响控股股东私有收益的因素进行多变量线性回归分析发现,我国上市公司控股股东的平均私有收益水平为26.89%,其控制权私有收益的规模较大,明显地高于市场经济发达的国家。实证研究表明,股权转让比例对控股股东私有收益有正向影响,而公司规模和公司财务状况对控股股东私有收益有不同程度的负向影响,资产负债率的影响不显著。     

股份公司控制权私有收益实证研究

本文对股份公司控制权私有收益进行了界定,探讨了股份公司控制权私有收益的研究途径,阐明了上市公司摄取控制权私有收益的途径及影响因素,对股份公司控制权私有收益进行了实证研究。     

我国股市中的内幕交易与大股东私有收益的获取

在我国证券市场上,愈演愈烈的内幕交易、庄家操纵股票市场的违法活动几乎成了一个公开的秘密。本文首先介绍了我国内幕交易的现状,指出内幕交易在我国是比较普遍的。之后,剖析了内幕交易对股价的影响——既造成股价水平的上升也会导致股价的波动。最后,笔者从内幕交易与大股东私有收益的关系出发,阐述了大股东实施内幕交易的步骤。     

上市公司控制权私人收益获取途径、扮演角色及度量研究

近年来,研究者发现:不但股权高度分散的美国存在适度集中的现象,而且大部分国家(地区)都具有集中的所有权结构。控股股东不但能获得控制权共享收益,而且能获得不为全体股东享有的控制权私人收益。本文对控制权私人收益获取途径和扮演的角色进行了研究,并对控制权私人收益进行了度量,包含:接管溢价收益、操纵股价收益和经营期间的转移收益三部分收益。     

控制权私有收益、银行贷款对企业过度投资的影响研究

本文针对我国经济高速发展过程中出现的企业过度投资问题与控制权私有收益进行了研究。以委托代理理论、控制权理论、以及预算软约束理论为基础,结合我国特殊的经济体制和产权差异,分析控制权私有收益、银行贷款与过度投资之间的联系。控制权私有收益加剧企业过度投资程度,这一促进作用在国有控股上市公司表现尤为明显。银行贷款作为负债融资对企业过度投资的治理作用失效,整体上表现为促进作用,其中长期贷款与过度投资表现出显著的相关关系。     

上市公司控制权私人收益及计量--以我国国有股权转让为例

本文以 2 0 0 3年上半年发生的国有股权转让交易为样本 ,以受让方是否成为第一大股东和受让的股份数量与上市公司前十大股东其他股东持有的股份数量的比值代表受让方对受让公司的控制权 ,分析了我国上市公司控股股东控制权的私人收益问题。实证研究结果表明 ,我国上市公司控股股东的控制权具有较高的私人收益 ,这反映了我国法律体系对中小投资者缺乏足够保护。     

大股东对小股东利益侵占与企业投资的关系研究

本文通过分析认为,在我国公司中大股东与小股东存在利益冲突。大股东更多地采取分离收益权和控制权(投票权)的做法来获得控制权的私人收益。分析发现大股东在企业内的控制权与收益权分离度越大,控制权越大,选择私有收益越大而总体收益相对较差的投资项目的激励越大。企业这种投资行为的结果是降低了企业的价值,从而也降低了市场对企业的评价。     

控制权收益与企业融资方式选择——基于Myers-Majluf模型的分析框架

将控制权收益引入Myers-Majluf模型中,本文建立了一个企业融资方式选择模型。模型预测,由于控股股东和外部投资者的利益冲突,选择股权融资的上市公司存在过度投资行为,而选择负债融资的企业一般不存在过度投资行为;进一步的研究表明,控股股东的控制权收益加剧了企业股权融资偏好和过度投资行为。     

The Impact of Fraudulent False Information on Equity Values

There are two types of stock price manipulation examined in the theoretical literature: (1) insider trading, which involves private information that is true and (2) the public spreading of fraudulent false information. While there is a large empirical literature on insider trading, this is the first empirical article to examine the impact of false, fraudulent public information on stock prices and trading volume. We find that such false information, even after being denied by a credible source such as the SEC, generates both abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume. We also find that the effects of the false information on security returns and volume can be persistent for at least 2 weeks. In addition, we show that perpetrators of false news attacks can make potentially large profits from such market manipulations.     

Where Should the Line Be Drawn on Insider Trading Ethics?

Finance ethics have drawn increasing attention from both government regulators and academic researchers. This paper addresses the issue of insider trading ethics. Previous studies on insider trading ethics have failed to provide convincing arguments and consistent results. In particular, the arguments against insider trading are based primarily on moral and philosophical grounds and lack empirical rigor. This study intends to establish and examine the relationship between the ethical issue and economic issue of insider trading. We argue that the ethics of insider trading is in essence an economic rather than a moral issue. It is so far not clear to what extent insider trading may increase or decrease shareholders wealth. Until then, we must take care to avoid over-regulating insider trading.     

Recent SEC prosecution and insider trading on forthcoming merger announcements

While trading on nonpublic information is illegal, the enforcement of this law has been elusive, particularly in the area of trading in advance of merger announcements. We examine the impact of insider trading on daily stock price changes for firms identified by the SEC in the Antoniu-Newman insider trading case. Using residual analysis, the abnormal returns occuring prior to the announcement are calculated and compared with a sample of 188 typical merger candidates not identified in the Antoniu-Newman case to determine whether or not there was an unusually large market reaction prior to the forthcoming merger announcement on the subset of merger candidates involved in the court procedure.     

The market response of insider transferring trades and firm characteristics in Taiwan

This paper reports the announcement effects of insider transfer trades and relates these with firms' characteristics. Regulations in Taiwan specify that insiders give three days prior notice to the competent authority of stock transfers and this news can stimulate market participants' investment decisions. We find both the positive and negative abnormal returns exist following insider transfer trade announcements, especially for smaller firm. However, smaller firm sizes associate with larger magnitudes of negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, the connection between smaller firms and those with higher book-to-market ratios strengthens for larger negative abnormal returns.     

Two-stage models for the analysis of information content of equity-selling mechanisms choices

Extant research offers mixed empirical results on if private placement firms are undervalued. [Hertzel, Michael G., and Smith, L. (1993), “Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately,” J Finance 48, 459-485] suggest that private placements convey favorable information. On the other hand, [Hertzel, Michael G., Lemmon, M., Linck, J., and Rees, L. (2002), “Long-Run Performance following Private Placements of Equity,” J Finance 57, 2595-2617] show that, similar to public offering firms, private placement firms experience significant negative long-run post-announcement stock price performance. This paper develops the two-stage estimation models to explore the information content of equity-selling mechanism. This paper uses estimated residuals from insider trading regressions (proxy for abnormal insider trades) to measure private information. The result shows that the probability of making private placements increases with abnormal insider purchases and decreases with abnormal insider sales. This suggests that, relative to the public offering firms, private placement firms are undervalued.     

资产注入——利益输入或利益输出?

文章重点关注面向大股东的定向增发而大股东又是以资产作为对价支付过程中的利益输送问题。到底是大股东向上市公司的利益输入呢?还是上市公司向大股东的利益输出呢?文章从两方面加以分析,一是资产质量,二是资产评估增值率。就资产质量而言,无论是单变量分析还是综合检验都显示,资产的较长期收益率是普遍下降的,说明大股东注入的并非是优质资产。从增值率上分析,结果显示资产评估增值率普遍高于行业平均水平,而评估方法和控股股东背景是影响非正常增值率的两大重要因素,审计委员会设置能起到一定的制约作用。在资产注入定向增发过程中,大股东确实存在机会主义行为,实现了利益输出。     

关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量

Controlling shareholders pursue benefits of control (private benefits and shared benefits) via related party transactions, which result in different levels of earnings quality. Using data from all A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets in the year 2001 and 2002, we found that when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%, they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions, giving rise to deterioration in earnings quality. By comparison, when the share ratio is more than 50%, controlling shareholders prefer pursing shared benefits of control through related party transactions, which improve earnings quality as a result.      

上市公司控制权溢价与中小投资者保护

上市公司中控股股东往往会利用控制权溢价为自己谋求私利,从而损害了中小股东的利益。在运用2002-2006年的样本数据,对中国上市公司控制权的隐性利益水平所进行的实证分析,结果表明中国上市公司的转让溢价与转让比例呈正相关,与转让溢价水平与净资产收益率、现金比率、流通股数和公司规模均呈负相关。同时,随着转让比例的上升,一开始溢价比例会增加,当转让比例增大达到一定程度时,溢价比就会随之下降。用法律或制度安排保护中小股东以及或者形成较为分散的股权结构对于保护中小投资者权益更为有利。     

The Issue of Insider Trading in Law and Economics: Lessons for Emerging Financial Markets in the World

Growth of the private sector and privatization of state companies around the world have led to the emergence of various stock markets, some of which are depicted by insider trading. Law literature uses the arguments of unfairness, breach of fiduciary rights and damage to others to define and rule against insider trading. Economic literature can be used to interpret insider trading from other perspectives. This study argues that the question of insider trading in developing markets can be resolved by the extent stock markets generate externalities and are public goods. It advocates structural changes in the developing markets and examines the conditions under which the Coase Theorem would work.