Impact of Outsiders on Firm Performance over Different Generations of Family‐Owned SMEs

From the perspective of agency, resource‐based view, and resource‐dependence theories, we explore the impact of the presence of outside directors on firm performance in family small and medium‐sized enterprise (SMEs). Using survey data from 369 Spanish family SMEs, our findings show an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the proportion of outsiders on the boards of first‐ and second‐generation family firms and firm performance. The results show that a balanced presence of outside directors contributes to value creation in family SMEs and confirm that the composition and the roles of the board of directors differ from generation to generation in family firms.     

Not all family firms are equal: The moderating effect of family involvement on the political risk exposure of the foreign direct investment portfolio. Preliminary evidence from Spanish multinational enterprises

We investigate the effect of political risk (PR) exposure and family control on the internationalization strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) using social capital theory. Our results from a negative binomial cross‐sectional analysis in 2007 of Spanish MNEs show family ownership or the limited presence of family members on the board has no effect on internationalization. However, when the conceptualization of family firms (FFs) includes majority ownership and board presence, we find a direct negative effect on their internationalization scope but a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the exposure to PR and internationalization scope. FFs have some specific advantages suitable to be employed in their corporate political activity allowing them to develop long‐lasting relationships with relevant political actors. By disentangling the effects of family control on internationalization and PR, this article explains how FFs can be simultaneously risk‐willing and risk‐averse.     

Nonfinancial Goals,Governance, and Dividend Payout in Private Family Firms

This paper uses insights from behavioral economics to explain dividend policy in private family firms. Based on a sample of 501 Belgian firms, our results indicate that dividend payout is low when a family chief executive officer (CEO) leads the business and in the presence of a family‐dominated board. The tendency of a family CEO or family‐dominated board to retain earnings appears to be stronger in earlier generational stages compared with later generational stages. The findings are consistent with (1) socioemotional objectives being important drivers of funding decisions in private firms where families possess important decision and control power and (2) these objectives being more predominant in early generational stages.     

How Does the Largest Shareholder Affect Dividends?

Focusing on the legal protection of minority shareholders in Japan, which suggests that manager‐owned firms are better governed than corporation‐owned firms, this study presents a new test of two dividend models: the substitute model and the outcome model. In support of the latter, I find that manager‐owned firms pay higher dividends than corporation‐owned firms. The paper also examines the association between ownership by the largest shareholder and dividend payments. I find an inverted U‐shaped relationship for manager‐owned firms and a U‐shaped relationship for corporation‐owned firms between them. These results can be explained by the benefits and drawbacks of concentrated ownership.     

Family Firms and Labor Productivity: The Role of Enterprise‐Level Bargaining in the Italian Economy

We investigate the role of Italian firms in labor productivity performance. We find that family‐owned firms have lower labor productivity than their non‐family counterparts. In a second step, we estimate the role of firm‐level bargaining (FLB) to determine whether family‐controlled firms that adopt this type of bargaining may partially close the gap in terms of labor productivity with their non‐family competitors. Our results, obtained through IV estimation to control for endogeneity bias, suggest that enterprises under family governance achieve significant labor productivity gains—greater than those achieved by their non‐family counterparts—when they adopt firm‐level bargaining.     

Non-family chair and corporate performance

Using a sample of Chinese family firms listed from 1999 to 2014, we investigate the relationship between non-family leadership and firm performance. We find that firms with a non-family member as board chair perform significantly worse than firms whose chair belongs to the family. Moreover, we show that the underperformance of nonfamily-chair firms is more pronounced when firms are under weaker outside monitoring and when the controlling families care less about family business longevity. The negative effect of a non-family chair is robust to a variety of endogeneity tests. We also dismiss alternative explanations other than concern for reputation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the social norms regarding family reputation are important in shaping the controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and firm performance.     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Does the Type of Family Control Affect the Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Firm Value?

Our objective is to disentangle which family business characteristics enable family ownership to be an effective corporate governance mechanism. To this aim, we investigate whether the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is moderated by the type of family influence. This study shows that family control positively affects performance, primarily when family members serve on the board and when the founder is still influential. Our findings hold when we control for the general blockholder effect and they are robust to a battery of tests. We conclude that the impact of ownership concentration on firm value differs across family firms.     

Non-family chair and corporate performance

Using a sample of Chinese family firms listed from 1999 to 2014, we investigate the relationship between non-family leadership and firm performance. We find that firms with a non-family member as board chair perform significantly worse than firms whose chair belongs to the family. Moreover, we show that the underperformance of non-family-chair firms is more pronounced when firms are under weaker outside monitoring and when the controlling families care less about family business longevity. The negative effect of a non-family chair is robust to a variety of endogeneity tests. We also dismiss alternative explanations other than concern for reputation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the social norms regarding family reputation are important in shaping the controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and firm performance.     

Do Firms Spend More on Suppliers That Have Environmental Expertise? An Empirical Study of U.S. Manufacturers’ Procurement Spend

Stakeholders expect focal firms to improve their environmental performance. While firms may be able to accumulate the environmental expertise needed to achieve this goal internally, doing so may require significant time and resource commitments. Alternatively, buyer firms can leverage their suppliers’ existing environmental expertise and gain access to such expertise when they purchase products and services from these suppliers. The purpose of this study was to develop and test theory regarding under what conditions suppliers’ environmental expertise influences a buying firms’ procurement spend with these suppliers. We ground our study in transaction cost economics and agency theories and empirically test our hypotheses using a unique buyer–supplier dyadic data set. We find that buyer firms are willing to increase their overall business spend with suppliers that have strong environmental expertise, particularly when the buyer firms are more profitable and have higher levels of absorptive capacity. However, we find the opposite effect when the buyer firm’s executive compensation is linked to the firm’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Likewise, we also find that the buyer firm’s environmental concern ratings negatively moderate the relationship between the supplier’s environmental expertise and the buyer’s procurement spend with the supplier.     

Revisiting the Effect of Family Involvement on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Behavioral Agency Perspective

This paper sheds light on the incongruent findings concerning the relationship between family involvement and firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). While prior studies have mainly taken the perspective of families’ socioemotional wealth preservation, we approach this relationship from the perspective of behavioral agency theory, highlighting the important role played by CEOs’ family memberships. Specifically, we posit that family firms are more likely to invest in CSR when their CEOs are members of the controlling families. Furthermore, we examine how family firms can employ long-term incentives to encourage non-family CEOs to act in the interests of the controlling families to preserve SEW and thus enhancing family firms’ CSR performance. We tested our hypotheses using hand-collected data of family firms included in the S&P 500 index, in the period of 2003–2010. The empirical findings support our hypotheses that (a) family firms with family members as the CEOs have better CSR performance and (b) family firms tend to provide a high level of long-term incentives to non-family than family CEOs. In addition, long-term incentives strongly motivate CEOs to improve firms’ CSR performance, regardless of their family memberships.     

Family Involvement in the Board of Directors: Effects on Sales Internationalization

Previous research shows that family involvement in the board of directors can be both positive and negative for sales internationalization. The ambiguous nature of this relationship has hindered theory building on this important phenomenon. Integrating stewardship, stagnation, and upper echelons perspectives, we propose a nonlinear, J‐shaped relationship between family involvement in the board of directors and sales internationalization. Results from running ordinal regression analysis on data drawn from 203 U.S. family businesses confirmed our conjecture. We discuss the implications of our findings for family business theory and practice and indicate avenues for future research.     

Founding Family Firms,CEO Incentive Pay,and Dual Agency Problems

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.     

The Impact of Goal Alignment on Board Existence and Top Management Team Composition: Evidence from Family‐Influenced Businesses*

Using a sample of 714 private family influenced businesses in Germany, we investigate the relationship of goal alignment between owners and managers and the existence of a board of directors. Agency theory and stewardship theory serve as theoretical bases for our study. We find that firms with relatively high levels of goal alignment are less likely to have a board of directors. Our results provide support for the substitution hypothesis of formal by social control mechanisms. Furthermore, the findings show that firms without a board and with relatively low levels of goal alignment have less family members in the top management team. This circumstance might in turn be a trigger for owners to install a board.     

Corporate environmental performance and financing decisions

We investigate the financing strategies of environmentally responsible firms to understand how they set target capital structures and make incremental financing decisions. Literature shows that firms with better environmental performance have lower risk and better access to financing. However, it is not obvious how these firms choose to finance their investments. Using an extensive data set of U.S. firms, we find that firms with superior environmental performance have significantly lower debt ratios and use mostly short‐term debt for temporary financing needs. In doing so, environmentally responsible firms are able to achieve more tax savings and experience lower costs of financial distress. Our results provide new empirical facts about environmental performance and financing decisions, and they help explain the observed relationship between environmental performance and economic performance.     

董事会结构与公司治理绩效的实证分析

独立董事制度为公司的权益资本和管理雇佣契约提供了更为安全的治理措施。但分析表明,那种认为董事会独立性越强,公司治理效率越好的想法是不恰当的。信息获取能力的约束以及非执行董事和执行董事之间的博弈水平使得董事会结构与公司治理绩效之间存在显著倒U型关系。     

The Impact of Family Involvement on SMEs’ Performance: Theory and Evidence

By complementing agency theory with behavioral assumptions, we explore the effects of family involvement on small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) performance. We identify three separate dimensions of family involvement and hypothesize nonlinear, direct, and interaction effects on the performance of an SME. The evidence on 787 SMEs suggests that an inverted U‐shaped relationship exists between family ownership and performance, and ownership dispersion among family members negatively affects performance. Balancing family and nonfamily members in the top management team (TMT) is found to be beneficial to SMEs’ performance, but the family ratio in the TMT becomes crucial only at high levels of family ownership.     

Women on board and performance of family firms: Evidence from India

This paper provides empirical evidence on the effect of woman directors on performance of family firms in the context of an emerging economy. Using data from India covering periods prior to and post institution of gender quotas, we find evidence that the presence of woman directors on board leads to higher firm performance. However, this positive effect is driven by independent woman directors. Further this effect gets attenuated when family members occupy key management positions in the firm. We conclude that governance structures of firms in emerging economies matter for the impact of woman directors on firm performance.     

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.     

Board Composition in Small and Medium‐Sized Family Firms*

This study focuses on the determinants of board composition in Belgian small and medium‐sized family firms. It extends the empirical literature on board composition in private small and medium‐sized family enterprises by integrating several dimensions of the “family component” in the research model. Furthermore, using a multinomial logit model, we examine in which circumstances family firms opt for (1) a family board, (2) an inside board, or (3) an outside board. Results suggest that family‐related contingency variables are far more important than CEO‐related or control variables, giving support to the argument that board composition in family firms is a reflection of the family characteristics and objectives. Moreover, the results suggest that a resource dependence and added value perspective explain more of the variation in board composition than agency considerations.