Examining the Return–Volatility Relation for Foreign Exchange: Evidence from the Euro VIX

We compare the return–volatility relation for the euro currency to the equivalent relation for the equity market, examining the sign, symmetry, and strength of the relation. We employ the euro‐currency exchange‐traded fund (FXE) and its associated option implied volatility index (the EVZ), whereas previous studies only employ equities and/or realized volatility. The equity studies find a negative asymmetric return–volatility relation for implied volatility, with a strong relation when large market movements occur. We find that the euro return–volatility relation can possess either a positive or negative sign, is asymmetric, and has a weaker relation. Thus, the sign and strength of the euro relation differs from the equivalent equity relation. Our quantile regressions show that both the positive and negative contemporaneous returns of the euro result in increased volatility in the extreme quantiles of the conditional distribution, with the contemporaneous effect showing a stronger relation when the euro depreciates. We also find that the volume of the euro‐currency ETF options affects the return–volatility relation for the euro ETF. Overall, the results here expand the concept originally restricted to equities, with the surprising results that the return‐implied volatility relation is weaker and the asymmetric return sometimes is positive for the euro currency. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 34:74–92, 2014     

From dollarisation to euroisation

In the past the dollar has been so dominant as an international currency that the term ‘dollarisation’ has become a synonym for currency substitution, i.e. the voluntary use of a foreign currency instead of the respective country's own legal tender. This article addresses the question as to whether the euro may be expected to partly replace the US currency in this function, focusing on the former's use as a substitution currency in countries on the periphery of the euro zone. Some policy conclusions are drawn for both the ‘euroised’ economies and Euroland.     

The “Euro Illusion”: Illusion or Fact?

The changeover to the euro elicited an upsurge of research on the effects of the new currency on consumers’ conversion strategies, price estimates, price evaluations, choices, and purchases. This research includes longitudinal surveys, interviews, and controlled experiments, both natural and in the laboratory. The present article starts with an overview of this research after which it more specifically focuses on research showing an influence of the nominal value, as expressed in different currencies, on price evaluations and consumer choice. For most countries, the transition to the euro led to a lower nominal value currency. A bias known as the “euro illusion” has been documented such that the subjective value of money is influenced in the direction of the nominal value (i.e., in most countries prices and salaries seem smaller when expressed in euros than in the old domestic currency). Although the term was coined in connection with the euro changeover, the nominal representation of a currency has been shown to influence the subjective value of money in unfamiliar currencies other than the euro. Thus, tourists travelling abroad may frequently be subject to such an illusion. Different mechanisms have been proposed to account for the euro illusion. One is the numerosity heuristic and another the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic in conjunction with biased conversion strategies. The size of the euro illusion is influenced by trade-offs between accuracy and effort. Consistent with this hypothesis, task importance, time constraints, familiarity with the conversion strategy, complexity of the conversion strategy, mood, and attitude towards the country or the currency all influence the size of the euro illusion.     

Does a Common Currency Promote Countries’ Growth via Trade and Tourism?

The main aim of this study is to contribute to the debate on the effects of a common currency. In particular, the impact of a common currency on growth via trade and tourism is explored for a panel dataset which includes 179 countries as destination and 30 OECD countries as origin over the period 1995–2006. This research contributes to previous work in three ways: (i) tourism is included as an additional channel for a common currency to promote growth; (ii) the heterogeneity of countries is addressed by dividing the sample into three groups of countries by income; and (iii) up‐to‐date data including the case of the euro are considered. The results obtained suggest that a common currency strengthens economic growth by promoting not only international trade but also tourism.     

The US Dollar and the Euro as International Currencies

For many decades the US dollar has remained unchallenged as the world’s dominant international currency. What is behind its persistent pre-eminence in the international monetary system and can this be expected to last? Could the euro rival or even surpass the dollar as the leading currency? If it did, what would be the consequences for Euroland?      

Does Monetary Integration Reduce Exchange Rate Pass‐Through?

There are several theoretical arguments for why the adoption of a common currency (either a currency union or a currency board) may reduce the exchange rate pass‐through (ERPT) to domestic consumer prices. This paper examines a broad panel of 101 countries over the period 1976–2006, using two‐stage instrumental‐variable estimation techniques in order to resolve the potential endogeneity problem. The main result is that ERPT indeed tends to decline in countries participating in a common currency arrangement. In particular, there has been a strong reduction in pass‐through in the member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) since the launch of the euro. Currency boards do not appear to be different from currency unions – both reduce the pass‐through from depreciation to inflation. Furthermore, the negative impact of common currencies on ERPT is at work in both high‐income and low‐income countries. Finally, most of the reduction in pass‐through to consumer prices under common currency arrangements happens somewhere along the pricing chain between the border and the supermarket shelf.     

Differences in Information Requirements among European Citizens: More Psychology than Socio-Demographics

A review of recent research indicates that the socio-demographic characteristics of the citizens of the EU countries can explain differences in the attitudes towards the new common currency, the euro, only to a quite limited extent, and that the relationship between particular demographic characteristics, such as age, and attitudes varies substantially from one country to the next. Thus, in choosing target groups for information campaigns in connection with the introduction of the euro as well as in choosing the themes for the campaigns, other considerations have to brought to the fore. It is suggested that more attention be paid to national values, including the role that the currency plays as a source of national identity and pride; also here, substantial differences are found among countries. Furthermore, former behavioural experiences -- which also vary among countries -- must be taken into account. Likewise, information about micro-economic and macro-economic consequences has to be adapted to the the different attitudes and beliefs prevalent in the various European countries.     

Euro Stories: The Irish Experience of Currency Change

This paper presents an overview of an interview study carried out in the Republic of Ireland approximately 1 year after the introduction of the euro in January 2002 and also compares the Irish experience to that of the other initial Eurozone countries. The new currency seems to have been rather more positively received in Ireland than elsewhere. Irish adults had a generally more positive attitude towards the new currency and seemed to have adapted to it rather well. Nevertheless, they shared some common experiences and problems with citizens of other countries, such as the perception that the introduction of the euro raised inflation more than it actually did, confusion of notes and coins and the use of coping strategies involving price conversion to the former currency. The implications of the Irish experience for policy are discussed.     

The Unifying Role of the Single Currency

Perhaps the single most tangible symbol of the European Union is its single currency, the euro. Within the European Economic and Monetary Union, it was seen as a tool to ensure that European integration would be truly irreversible. However, the euro has also contributed to cleavages and asymmetries. This article reviews whether the euro can fulfil the unifying role envisioned for it, examing the importance of the euro in four crucial European relationships.     

Interaction effects of mood induction and nominal representation of price on consumer choice

The transition to the euro in several European countries causes consumers to make mistakes in economic transactions. One mistake referred to as the “euro illusion” is the tendency to evaluate prices on the basis of their nominal representation, thus overestimating or underestimating how expensive products are. Investigating effects of the euro illusion on consumer choice as well as moderating effects of mood, three laboratory experiments were conducted employing convenience samples of students. In Experiment 1 a bias toward the nominal representation was demonstrated when participants chose an unfamiliar (fictitious) large-unit currency (small numbers) for paying the price of a consumer product but chose an unfamiliar small-unit currency (large numbers) for obtaining a salary. The bias was larger for participants who were induced to feel positive and deactivated (calm and relaxed) than for participants who were induced to feel negative and activated (anxious and jittery). The difference in frequencies of choice of currency were replicated in Experiment 2. No effects were, however, found of natural mood assessed by self-report ratings. In Experiment 3 choices of more expensive consumer products with additional features were more frequent when the prices were expressed in the large-unit currency than when expressed in the small-unit currency. Neither in this case did self-reported natural mood affect the choices.     

The Euro Illusion in Consumers’ Price Estimation: An Italian–Irish Comparison in the Third Year of the Euro

The euro illusion is a transient phenomenon that consists of currency-related asymmetries in the intuitive judgment of product prices made by consumers. The results of a cross-country study in the third year after the introduction of the euro show a strong price estimation asymmetry in a country with an extreme exchange rate (Italy) and a weaker effect in a country in which the nominal values of the new and the old currency are much closer (Ireland). These results rule out proposed explanations of the euro illusion in price estimation that assume the sole influence of plausible anchors (reference prices stored in memory within the plausible price range), supporting instead accounts also endorsing the role of implausible anchors (reference prices outside the plausible price range). Beyond contributing to our theoretical understanding of the euro illusion, this research starts to unveil the interplay between structural factors (i.e., the currency exchange rate) and psychological mechanisms that produce long-lasting difficulties for consumers after a monetary changeover.

Vier Jahre Eurokrise: Wege zu neuem Systemvertrauen

Political gridlock, violations of European law and inconsistent political communication have turned the euro crisis into a crisis of confidence in public policy. To re-establish trust in the system, Europe needs a comprehensive approach consisting of three elements. First, rules can invigorate societies if they provide for cross-border competition in a revived single market and abstain from top-down provisions. Second, new growth perspectives — e.g. by reassigning major parts of the EU budget — can enhance the selfconfidence of societies. And finally, a pan-European debate on common goals and values can help answer the essential question of Europe’s sense and purpose. As the euro can only ever enjoy as much trust as the institutions governing the euro area, the solution of the European confidence crisis is crucial to the fate of the common currency.     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.     

The franc zone of West and Central Africa

In the francophone countries of West and Central Africa a currency system has long been in place which was originally based on the French franc and is now based on the euro. A look at how this system has operated over the years may highlight some useful experiences for the countries on the eastern and southern periphery of the euro area that are now considering pegging their national currencies to the euro and could help to clarify the opportunities and risks arising for both these countries and the present participants of European Monetary Union.     

Who Can Adjust to the Euro?

This study estimates potential exchange rate variation among 26 European countries during 1992–1998, as a proxy for the potential magnitude of adjustment they face to euro‐block membership, using the instrumental variable (IV) method, applying least squares cross‐section regression analysis based on optimal currency area theory. A currency union among Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia is found to entail a relatively light burden of adjustment for its members. The current membership of other countries in the euro‐block is potentially very demanding on their societies in the long term. This study also compares currency boards and independent central banks as alternative monetary frameworks for disinflation policies. Based on a pooled time‐series, cross‐section dataset of the same countries and years currency boards are found to be more effective in reducing inflation in all countries except Belgium. Balancing EMU's credibility gains against its adjustment costs, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain seem like unstable members of the euro‐block. For all new EU member states except the Czech Republic, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia the advice is to stay out of the euro‐block until their economies are liberalised and flexible enough to withstand major adjustments, and their societal interest groups supportive enough of these adjustments.     

Can the Euro Survive?

One of the fascinating aspects of the European debt crisis has been the resilience of the euro. For much of 2011, the euro was a key reserve currency, oblivious to the chaos ravaging European economies. Now, however, the gravity of the crisis is finally dragging down the euro. As the Euro zone debt crisis enters its third uncertain year, the question about whether the euro can survive rises. This paper argues that the euro can survive given policymakers still have in hand various tools. These tools include creating exit rules, implementing new stabilisation rules and instruments, adopting new fiscal policy, introducing conditional Eurobonds, using inflation differentials and providing more independence to the European Central Bank.     

Business Cycle Desynchronisation: Amplitude and Beta vs. Co-movement

A high degree of correlation among the business cycles of individual countries is usually seen as a key criterion for an optimum currency area. However, the elasticity with which countries react to the common cycle is equally important. A country with a non-unitary growth elasticity relative to the common area will experience cyclical divergences at the peak and trough of the common cycle. Despite being characterised by highly correlated business cycles, the euro area suffers from widely differing amplitudes.     

Consumer Adaptation Strategies: From Austrian Shilling to the Euro

On 1st January 2002, in 12 countries of the European Union, euro notes and coins replaced existing national currencies. The currency changeover required citizens to adapt in various ways. They had to learn to handle new coins and notes, and evaluate prices in the new currency. Data on how these tasks were performed by Austrians are presented. In particular, Austrian consumers applied four different strategies to establish price intuition for the euro: a conversion strategy, an intuitive strategy, an anchor strategy, and a marker value strategy. Data on these strategies show that their application varies across socio-demographic characteristics, differs with purchase situations, relates to euro attitudes, and changes over time. Although the introduction of the euro took place about 5 years ago, the adaptation process is still ongoing.     

Intraday price‐reversal patterns in the currency futures market: The impact of the introduction of GLOBEX and the euro

This article assesses the intraday price‐reversal patterns of seven major currency futures contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange over 1988–2003 after 1‐day returns and opening gaps. Significant intraday price‐reversal patterns are observed in five of the seven currency futures contracts, following large price changes. Additional tests are conducted in three subperiods (1988–1992, 1993–1998, and 1999–2003) to examine the impact of the introduction of electronic trading on GLOBEX in 1992 (to assess how a near 24‐hour trading session might impact the next‐day opening and closing futures prices) and the introduction of the euro in 1999 (to assess its impact on price predictability in other futures markets). It is found that the introduction of the GLOBEX in 1992 significantly reduced pricing errors in currency futures in the second subperiod, making the currency futures markets fairly efficient. However, the introduction of the new currency, the euro, and the disappearance of several European currencies in 1999, resulted in significant price patterns (mostly reversals and some persistence) in most of the currency futures, indicating inefficiencies in the third subperiod. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:1089–1130, 2006     

20 Jahre Binnenmarkt

In 1992 the European Single Market was to have been completed. But there is still no truly integrated market in many fields — the EC has to overcome many obstacles yet to make this happen. Based on different EU integration indexes, it is shown that internal market integration has developed since the introduction of the euro. At the same time, the internal market linkages are different from country to country. Internal — but also external - trade and wealth have grown. However, whether there would have been more or less success without the internal market is a question that must be answered. A single market probably does not require a common currency.