Vertical structure and the risk of rent extraction in the electricity industry

This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, retail prices, and welfare in the electricity industry. Analyzing a model in which demand is uncertain and retailers must commit to retail prices before they buy electricity in the wholesale market, we show that welfare is highest if competition in generation and retailing is combined with vertical separation. Vertically integrated generators choose excessively high retail prices and capacities to avoid rent extraction in the wholesale market when their retail demand exceeds their capacity. Vertical separation eliminates the risk of rent extraction and yields lower retail prices.     

The Cyclicality of Markups in a Model with Adjustment Costs: Econometric Evidence for US Industry

In this paper we investigate the impact of demand fluctuations on market power in US manufacturing industries. We impose on a model with adjustment costs the minimum structure necessary to recover a measure of markups. Markups are allowed to vary with both the state and future evolution of demand and estimates of price-cost margins are obtained from the Euler equation for capital. We conduct the empirical investigation for US two-digit manufacturing industries using annual data covering the 1952–1985 period. We find that markups are inversely related to current demand. However, given the state of demand, they vary directly with expectations of future demand changes.     

Modeling regional electric power markets and market power

This paper develops a nonlinear, mathematical programming model for estimating production decisions in an open access, regional power market. Our approach allows one to estimate competitive power market equilibrium prices, which in turn offers empirical conclusions about marginal generation facilities, transmission interconnection congestion, and most importantly, load pockets and market power. Sensitivity analyses are conducted by subjecting the model to changes in production costs, peak hour demand, power imports, and transmission interconnection price assumptions. We then consider the issue of a firm's ability to exercise market power and the implications it may have on regional equilibrium power prices. The Louisiana power market is used as a case study for our work. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of vertical integration and investment in generation capacity in electricity markets: The case of the bidding game

The aim of this work is to assess the impact of (partial) vertical integration between generators and retailers on generation capacity choice and its subsequent welfare consequences. We present a framework in which final demand is perfectly inelastic and stochastic. Nevertheless, wholesale demand is elastic because of the existence of outside opportunities (mainly international transmission capacity). The model is a three-stage game. Neither transmission nor retail costs are taken into account.

In the first stage of the game, generators choose capacity only knowing distribution of demand and thus maximizing their expected profit. The second stage of the game represents the competition for market share between retailers in a market where consumers have switching costs. The former face unknown demand and maximize their utility based on two factors: the expected profit and a risk element. Finally, generators submit bid functions to the system operator given known demand and maximizing their profit during the last stage of the game. Retailers and generators interact in the wholesale market, which is cleared by the system operator whose function is to match supply (represented by the bids of the generators) and demand through a system of single price auctions. The wholesale market is the only means to buy and sell energy; there are no bilateral contracts between firms, except if they are vertically integrated.

We compare fully disintegrated and partially vertically integrated structures using a comparative statics approach. In this paper, the analysis will focus on the last stage of the game: the bidding game. We find that partial vertical integration between generators and retailers tends to lower wholesale prices but not unambiguously. Depending on which firm (vertically integrated or disintegrated generator) has installed the higher capacity and depending on level of demand, prices can stay unchanged or even rise.     

Price discrimination and the emergence of secondary markets

A frequently used explanations for the emergence of secondary markets for live entertainment and the ability of resellers to charge a markup over face‐value prices is that promoters do not price discriminate optimally. We test this hypothesis empirically, using instrumental variables techniques on a sample of 45 popular music concerts and find that secondary market markups are not caused by the level of price discrimination used by promoters on primary markets. The experience and success of the artist drive both primary market pricing and secondary market markups, which are consistent with theories of social influence and pricing of complementary products.     

Jumps in equilibrium prices and market microstructure noise

Asset prices observed in financial markets combine equilibrium prices and market microstructure noise. In this paper, we study how to tell apart large shifts in equilibrium prices from noise using high frequency data. We propose a new nonparametric test which allows us to asymptotically remove the noise from observable price data and to discover jumps in fundamental asset values. We provide its asymptotic distribution to decide when such jumps occur. In finite samples, our test offers reasonable power for distinguishing between noise and jumps. Empirical evidence indicates that it is necessary to incorporate the presence of jumps in equilibrium prices.     

Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import-competing market

We examine the endogenous determination of a vertical market in an import-competing market with import tariff. We show that if firms commit to vertical organization before the government's commitment to trade policy, the home and foreign firms choose vertical separation and vertical integration, respectively, at equilibrium under Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium entails both firms separating their retailers. Comparing profits between Bertrand competition to Cournot competition, we find that upstream manufacturer's profit can be higher under Bertrand competition with integration than under Cournot competition with separation when comparing foreign upstream manufacturer's profit.     

The cyclical nature of markups in Canadian manufacturing: A production theory approach

In this paper the effects of cost and demand characteristics on the magnitude and cyclical behaviour of markups in Canadian manufacturing are measured within a production theory framework. Price to marginal cost ratios for various manufacturing industries are computed, and the impact art their secular and cyclical trends from changes in capacity utilization, scale economies, variable input prices, import competition, unemployment and other exogenous market and technological determinants are explored using adjusted markup indexes and elasticities. The measured price margins seem weakly procyclical. Further, evaluation of the determinants of these cycles suggests that the procyclical nature of markups is primarily related to exogenous factors affecting costs such as energy price ‘shocks’, and that cost characteristics underlying scale economies provide a countercyclical influence that counteracts the profitability arising from markups.     

When to haggle,when to hold firm? Lessons from the used‐car retail market

Though haggling has been the conventional way for auto retailers to sell cars, the last two decades have witnessed the systematic adoption of no‐haggle prices by many large dealerships, including the largest new‐ and used‐car dealership chains. This paper develops a structural empirical model to estimate sellers' profits under posted price and haggling, and investigates how market conditions affect sellers' optimal pricing formats. The model incorporates a simple class of bargaining mechanisms into a standard random‐coefficient discrete‐choice model. With the extension, the product‐level demand system is estimated using data with only list prices, and the unobserved price discounts are also recovered in the estimation. The counterfactual experiments yield a few interesting findings. First, dealers' adopted pricing formats seem superior to the alternative ones. Second, dealers enjoying larger market power through vertical differentiation and carrying a large number of models are more likely to have posted price as their optimal pricing format.     

When are prediction market prices most informative?

Prediction markets are a popular platform for the elicitation of incentivised crowd predictions. This paper examines the variation in the information contained in prediction market prices by studying Intrade prices on U.S. elections around the release of opinion polls. We find that poll releases stimulate an immediate uptick in trading activity. However, much of this activity involves relatively inexperienced traders, meaning that the price efficiency declines in the immediate aftermath of a poll release, and does not recover until more experienced traders enter the market in the following hours. More generally, this suggests that information releases do not necessarily improve prediction market forecasts, but instead may attract noise traders who temporarily reduce the price efficiency.     

Variable markups in the long-run: A generalization of preferences in growth models

This paper introduces variable markups in a horizontal-differentiation growth model by considering a larger class of preferences that nests the classic “CES” specification usually present in the workhorse love-for-variety models. Our first result is to obtain a generalized characterization of the Euler condition for this broader class of utility functions: in our model, the Euler rule features a supplementary term aiming at compensating the consumer for variations in the preference for variety along the consumption level. We are then also able to demonstrate that in our generalized framework, the economy’s balanced growth path displays both endogenous markups and a strictly positive growth rate of the number of available varieties (being the engine of growth). Finally, we show that under endogenous markups, the economy’s growth rate and firms’ market power can display a negative correlation, as opposed to the standard result obtained in the CES framework.     

Tacit Collusion Under regulation in the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services

Analysis of seven wholesale and retail markets for long-distance telephone services since the AT & T divestiture indicates that service provider concentration declined in the later 1980s and then stabilized in the 2990–1993 period. In addition to this stability in market shares, a number of other conditions established since 1990 have been conducive to the development of market sharing rather than significant price competition. The most important of these conditions has been the tarifing process of the Federal Communications Commission by which MCI and Sprint replicate ATGT's price announcements. As market shares stabilized and became more equal, and as regulation formalized the price-setting process, the price-cost margins of the three large carriers increased and became more nearly identical. These results are consistent not with price competition but rather with emerging tacit collusion among AT&T, MCI, and Sprint.     

Evolution and market behavior with endogenous investment rules

In a repeated market for short-lived assets, we investigate wealth-driven selection among investment rules that depend on endogenous market variables, such as current and past prices. We study the random dynamical system describing prices and wealth dynamics and characterize local stability of the long-run equilibria in which one or a group of traders dominate. Multiplicity of stable and unstable equilibria, leading to path dependency and persistent heterogeneity, turns out to be a common phenomenon generated by two different mechanisms. Firstly, conditioning investment decisions on endogenous market variables implies that the relative performance of investment rules, in terms of average growth rates, may be different for different prevailing prices, so that the market may fail to select a global winner. Secondly, the feedback existing between past asset prices and current investment decisions can lead to a form of deterministic overshooting.     

Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring

Based on the universe of rate-regulated electric utilities in the U.S., we examine why firms alter their financing decisions when transitioning from a regulated to a competitive market regime. We find that the significant increase in regulatory risk after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, state-level restructuring legislations, and divestiture policies have reduced leverage by 15 percent. Policies that encouraged competition, and hence increased market uncertainty, lowered leverage by another 13 percent on average. The ability to exercise market power allowed some firms to counter this competitive threat. In aggregate, regulatory risk and market uncertainty variables reduce leverage between 24.6 and 26.7 percent. We also confirm findings in the literature that firms with higher profitability and higher asset growth have lower leverage, and those with more tangible assets are more levered. Firms with greater access to internal capital markets and those with a footloose customer segment use less debt, while those actively involved in trading power in the wholesale market use more debt.     

Detecting speculative bubbles in an IT-intensive stock market

Using a battery of unit root test procedures and cointegration analysis with alternative null hypotheses we find some evidence of speculative bubbles in the Finnish stock market for monthly data on industry portfolio stock prices and returns from the 1990s. When analyzing the time series behavior of stock market prices and returns against the development of certain macroeconomic fundamentals, the bubbles seem to be present especially in the information technology (IT) prices and only during the latter half of the decade. (JEL C22, G12)     

Departures from marginal-cost pricing in the American automobile industry: Estimates for 1977–1978

How are prices set in the American automobile oligopoly? This paper seeks empirical estimates of the extent of departure from marginal-cost pricing and of the effects of foreign competition. The model estimated has product differentiation, multiproduct firms, and heterogeneity in consumer tastes. The estimation presumes that product type (proxied by engineering specifications) is exogenous to the price/quantity market equilibrium. Cross-section results for the 1977 and 1978 model years yield price-cost margins around 10%. Import competition has the effect of lowering equilibrium margins for compact and subcompact models.     

The VIX,the variance premium and stock market volatility

We decompose the squared VIX index, derived from US S&P500 options prices, into the conditional variance of stock returns and the equity variance premium. We evaluate a plethora of state-of-the-art volatility forecasting models to produce an accurate measure of the conditional variance. We then examine the predictive power of the VIX and its two components for stock market returns, economic activity and financial instability. The variance premium predicts stock returns while the conditional stock market variance predicts economic activity and has a relatively higher predictive power for financial instability than does the variance premium.     

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

Abstract.  The types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer–retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price. In addition to setting per unit prices, manufacturers and retailers also revert to non-linear pricing and non-price instruments. These instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and slotting allowances. The use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers. This paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices, market structure, efficiency and welfare.     

Long‐run relations in European electricity prices

This paper analyses the interdependencies existing in wholesale electricity prices in six major European countries. The results of a robust multivariate long‐run dynamic analysis reveal the presence of four highly integrated central European markets (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria). The trend shared by these four electricity markets appears to be common also to gas prices, but not to oil prices. The existence of a common long‐term dynamics among electricity prices and between electricity prices and gas prices can be explained by the similarity of the market design across Europe and by the same marginal generation technology. Since standard unit root and cointegration tests are not robust to the peculiar characteristics of electricity prices time series, we also develop a battery of robust inference procedures that should assure the reliability of our results. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic interaction of risk–return trade-offs between oil market and China’s stock market: An analysis from the risk preferences perspective

The risk–return trade-off refers to the compensation required by investors for bearing risks, which can be viewed as the risk preference of investors in a market. The current study investigates the dynamic interdependence of risk–return trade-offs between China’s stock market and the crude oil market from the perspective of risk preference of investors, which is designed to explore the transmission process of investors’ risk preference in both markets. Specifically, this study applies the time-varying parameter GARCH-M model, namely TVP-GARCH-M model, to characterize the time-dependent risk–return trade-offs (investors’ risk preferences) in the crude oil and China’s stock markets, then examines their relationship through Granger causality tests. Results show that a variation in risk preferences of the oil market investors can dramatically cause a variation in risk preferences of the Chinese stock market investors, while the risk preference of investors in the Chinese stock market does not lead to that in the crude oil market, which is in accordance with expectations. The dynamic effect of investors’ risk appetite in the crude oil market is further examined by the TVP-VAR model. The findings of this work suggest that there generally exists a positive impact of investors’ risk preference in the oil market and that the effect is time-varying to a greater degree during the short and medium term. Moreover, responses of the Chinese stock market investors’ risk preference were more significant during the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, the empirical results remain robust when applying alternative crude oil prices and China’s stock prices.