危机企业财务治理模式该如何选择？

对危机企业而言，是该选择“破产清算”还是“重组自救”呢？从利益相关者的角度，通过对危机企业财权的重新配置，帮助危机企业“重组自救”无疑是最佳的选择。因为只有通过适当的财务治理手段，给危机企业一个“自救重生”的机会，最大限度维护资本市场的稳定和企业利益相关者的利益诉求，才能最终实现危机企业利益相关者的和谐共生。     

利益相关者视角下的财务困境成本与收益

本文认为,传统的财务理论仅从企业的角度考虑负债所导致的财务困境成本与收益,忽视了负债经营对债权人、客户、供应商、雇员及竞争对手等利益相关者交易行为的影响。企业财务杠杆过高会给潜在的债权人、客户、供应商和雇员带来了隐性成本,而理性的利益相关者通常可以事先预见到这些成本,最终将由负债企业承担。企业财务杠杆过高还会导致竞争对手趁机掠夺其市场份额,从而使企业未来利润大幅度下降。尽管有企业可以利用财务困境获得一些收益,但是相对于其财务困境成本,这些收益通常是微不足道的。     

公司避税成本解析——利益相关者理论的应用

利益相关者理论为我们研究企业避税动机及避税成本提供了一个较好的分析框架。企业在进行避税时,不仅要考虑到避税给所有者带来的收益与成本,还要考虑避税给其他利益相关者带来的收益与成本。因此, 在进行避税成本测算时,要考虑到避税给所有利益相关者带来的成本,包括所有权成本、监管成本、政治成本、债务契约成本等。有些企业在权衡利弊后选择放弃避税,这说明避税的成本大于或等于可能的避税额,这给避税成本的测定提供了一种方法。     

利益相关者理论下的企业财务目标

企业财务目标是公司财务管理理论框架研究的逻辑起点，也是公司财务管理工作的出发点和归宿。企业财务目标是社会经济发展到一定阶段的产物，它随着社会经济的发展和企业制度的变迁而不断发展变化。从历史上看，企业目标经历了由股东利益至上到利益相关者利益至上的过程，与之相对应的企业财务目标也由股东利益最大化发展到利益相关者利益最大化。企业拥有众多的利益主体，     

基于相关者利益最大化探究企业财务战略

本文将利益相关者理论引进企业财务战略中,对基于相关者利益最大化的企业财务战略加以探讨。对相关者利益最大化财务战略与股东财富最大化企业财务战略进行对比,分析新时期企业财务战略的理性选择,对相关者利益最大化企业的财务战略特点作一综述。根据相关利益最大化企业财务战略的提出,明确战略选择与实施的主要方向,为相关者利益最大化在企业财务战略中的应用提供理论基础与实践依据。     

企业财务目标浅论

企业财务目标一直以来是财务理论研究的中心问题或起点。尤其近期发表于各种报刊杂志的关于财务目标的讨论,更激起我们对已有的曾经以为牢固的财务目标观念重新思考和理解。我们认为,现代经济和企业管理理论发展都使我们在考虑财务目标时没有理由将相关利益者排斥在企业财务目标之外。也即现代企业财务目标应当以利益相关者的利益追求为目标。同时,利用公司自由现金流量折现模型反映的企业价值是符合现代经济下衡量利益相关者利益的最佳选择。     

谈破产清算企业财务报表

<正>为进一步规范企业破产清算的会计处理,加强破产企业会计核算,提高向人民法院和债权人会议等提供企业破产清算期间的相关财务信息质量,财政部于2016年12月20日发布《关于印发企业破产清算有关会计处理规定的通知》,要求相关单位予以贯彻执行。一、破产清算企业财务报表概念企业财务报表分为破产清算企业财务报表与持续经营企业环境下财务报表不同。持续经营环境下企业财务报表是指反映企业一定日期财务状况、一定时期经营成     

基于利益相关者理论的企业社会责任的战略培育

一、问题的提出 长期以来，传统的企业理论所关注的企业经济责任是追求股东利益的最大化，但现实中企业与其利益相关者总是存在着直接或间接的相互利益关系，如果企业片面追求股东利益的最大化而忽视承担利益相关者的社会责任问题，其结果除了造成巨大的社会成本外，也会影响企业自身的可持续发展。利益相关者理论认为，在现代市场经济条件下，企...     

财务危机与企业融资结构的选择研究

财务危机一般是指企业丧失偿还到期债务的能力，它是金融、财务领域中的重要研究课题。企业由于各种原因发生财务危机甚至最终导致破产，这使学术界和实务界在研究预测企业财务危机发生可能性的同时，也非常注重企业财务危机化解方法的研究。而财务危机与融资结构的选择，即选择合理的融资结构可以预防企业财务危机的发生，它是企业财务危机事前管理的主要方法。基于此，本文首先简要论述了企业财务危机的管理方法；然后在权衡理论的基础上，分析了财务危机与企业融资结构之间的关系——探讨了企业如何选择合理的融资结构，以预防财务危机的发生；最后以Gregor Adrade的潜伏期判据为基础，并结合中国资本市场的实际数据对上述研究结果进行了实证分析。     

如何实现企业财务目标

企业财务目标的综合表达主要是利润最大化。这种观点是指通过对企业财务活动的管理，使生产资源的成本最低。产品售价最高，从而获得利润最大。企业以利润最大化作为自己的目标，就必须讲求经济核算，加强管理，改进技术、降低成本、提高劳动生产率。企业的财务目标应当是利益相关者利益最大化。而企业利润最大化能够满足或达到利益相关者利益最大化的目标。     

财务困境成本研究综述

财务困境成本包括直接成本和间接成本,对财务困境成本尤其是间接成本的计量是个难题。本文在回顾了国内外对财务困境成本的估计、财务困境成本的影响因素及财务困境成本和相关决策的关系等方面的文献,分析了国内在财务困境成本研究领域的现状和问题,以其为该领域的研究提供参考。     

Shareholder Loans and Earnings Smoothing – Empirical Findings from German Private Firms

This paper analyzes the interplay between shareholder loans and earnings smoothing in German private corporations. Shareholders who grant loans have a dual stakeholder role, being both equity holders and creditors. Those loans could be lost, because bankruptcy law requires their subordination in the event of bankruptcy. We therefore expect shareholder loans to mitigate agency problems of debt. This reduces the need for debt covenants and earnings smoothing. Moreover, the interest payments from shareholder loans tend to lower payout volatility which also reduces the need for dividend and earnings smoothing. We expect and find that private firms with shareholder loans exhibit significantly lower levels of earnings smoothing than other private firms. We find that with a 10 percentage-point increase in the shareholder loans to total assets ratio, earnings smoothing decreases by about 10% of the mean value. We also find that this substitution effect usually occurs in case of managerial ownership and tends to be slightly weaker in the event of dispersed ownership. The results are robust for different econometric specifications, including different measures of key variables and propensity score matching. The paper suggests that financial reporting by private firms responds to the dual stakeholder role of shareholder loans.     

Asset sale,debt restructuring,and liquidation

This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower financing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower cash flow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders׳ incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs. The possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure.     

The dynamic financial distress prediction method of EBW-VSTW-SVM

Financial distress prediction (FDP) takes important role in corporate financial risk management. Most of former researches in this field tried to construct effective static FDP (SFDP) models that are difficult to be embedded into enterprise information systems, because they are based on horizontal data-sets collected outside the modelling enterprise by defining the financial distress as the absolute conditions such as bankruptcy or insolvency. This paper attempts to propose an approach for dynamic evaluation and prediction of financial distress based on the entropy-based weighting (EBW), the support vector machine (SVM) and an enterprise’s vertical sliding time window (VSTW). The dynamic FDP (DFDP) method is named EBW-VSTW-SVM, which keeps updating the FDP model dynamically with time goes on and only needs the historic financial data of the modelling enterprise itself and thus is easier to be embedded into enterprise information systems. The DFDP method of EBW-VSTW-SVM consists of four steps, namely evaluation of vertical relative financial distress (VRFD) based on EBW, construction of training data-set for DFDP modelling according to VSTW, training of DFDP model based on SVM and DFDP for the future time point. We carry out case studies for two listed pharmaceutical companies and experimental analysis for some other companies to simulate the sliding of enterprise vertical time window. The results indicated that the proposed approach was feasible and efficient to help managers improve corporate financial management.     

COMPETITION AMONG STAKEHOLDER GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE OVER BUSINESS REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE UK PENSIONS INDUSTRY

This paper applies a stakeholder perspective to estimate various types of costs (taxes) and benefits (subsidies) affecting stakeholder groups whose constituents are most affected by recent, major reforms to the public regulation of the UK pensions industry. Both direct and indirect subsidies and taxes arising from regulation distinguishes groups representing both sophisticated and vulnerable investors. The analysis suggests that financial intermediaries, and industry regulators, are all effectively subsidised by other stakeholder groups.     

Heterogeneous beliefs and the choice between private restructuring and formal bankruptcy

We present a theory for the puzzling issue regarding why certain firms in financial distress, prefer a costlier formal bankruptcy procedure over direct renegotiations. We show that claimholders’ heterogeneous beliefs about the results of a formal plan and about judicial discretion may lead to such a preference. The proposed model predicts which resolution would be chosen under claimholders’ beliefs about the determinants driving the outcome of a formal procedure, such as the extent to which firm value is affected by bankruptcy, the likelihood of deviation from the absolute priority rule, and the probability of the court adopting a reorganization plan.     

Financial distress and bankruptcy prediction: An appropriate model for listed firms in Vietnam

This paper aims to develop a comprehensive model, the first of its kind in Vietnam, for the purpose of predicting financial distress and bankruptcy at Vietnamese listed firms. The period 2003–2016 is used to study the likelihood of financial distress in different scenarios. Various factors are utilized, including (1) accounting factors in the emerging market score model; (2) market factors in the distance-to-default model; and (3) macroeconomic indicators. The area under the receiver operating characteristics (AUC) curve is used to compare the usefulness of various models that predict financial distress and bankruptcy. Empirical findings from this study show that accounting and market factors, together with macroeconomic fundamental factors, both affect financial distress when they are considered in isolation. However, in a comprehensive model, the effects from accounting factors appear to be more significant than those from market-based factors. The default prediction model, which includes accounting factors with macroeconomic indicators, appears to perform much better than the model comprising market-based factors with macroeconomic fundamentals.     

Predicting corporate financial distress: Reflections on choice-based sample bias

Financial distress precedes bankruptcy. Most financial distress models actually rely on bankruptcy data, which is easier to obtain. We obtained a dataset of financially distressed but not yet bankrupt companies supplying a major auto manufacturer. An early warning model successfully discriminated between these distressed companies and a second group of similar but healthy companies. Previous researchers argue the matched-sample design, on which some earlier models were built, causes bias. To test for bias, the dataset was partitioned into smaller samples that approach equal groupings. We statistically confirm the presence of a bias and describe its impact on estimated classification rates.     

Corporate risk management and asymmetric information

We discuss the effect of information on corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the insider and the market. We suggest an explanation for previous contradiction between existing theories and empirical findings, which state that fewer small firms choose to hedge. We consider two different scenarios of information revelation to the market, and find hedging cost is not the main reason preventing firms from hedging. Rather asymmetric information plays the decisive role in a firm's risk management policy. One of the empirical implications we find is that cash flows with high variances may discourage firms from hedging even when they face high financial distress costs.     

Determinants of financial distress and bankruptcy in highly levered transactions

Prior literature on highly levered transactions (levered buyouts or levered recapitalizations) has emphasized either changes in governance or the structuring of their financing in helping these firms avoid financial distress or bankruptcy. Observing a sample of HLTs over time, we observe that debt composition is a more critical influence than proposed changes in governance for the likelihood of an HLT avoiding financial distress or bankruptcy. Such evidence is consistent with the [Chemmanur, T. & Fulghieri, P. (1994). Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt. Review of Financial Studies 7, 475–506] model and suggests that the critical factor is the ability to informally renegotiate debt terms with a few lenders.