Adaptation to Temporal Shocks: Influences of Strategic Interpretation and Spatial Distance

Even when shocks in a firm's environment are predictable, their consequences are not. Using the relocation of the Dallas Cowboys Stadium as a rich case of such a disruption, we investigate how combinations of strategic interpretation and spatial distance influence incumbent business owners' decisions to pursue temporal adaptation as a response. Temporal adaptation (TA) comprises timing rather than content changes by the firm seeking to adjust to the reconfigured environment. Survey data from 168 business owners show that strategic interpretation directly influences TA decisions. However, the effect of strategic interpretation on the TA decision is moderated by the spatial (geographic) distance of the incumbent firm from the locus of the disruption. Furthermore, results suggest that through strategic interpretation, spatial distance also indirectly affects the business owners' decisions to make temporal changes. Data collected 1.5 and 4 years later suggest that TA responses are related to performance and may be indicative of a particular type of TA, organizational entrainment (OE), which concerns the synchronization of organizational activity cycles with cycles in the environment.     

Sustainable development and the firm: Organizational innovations and environmental strategy

Sustainable development is increasingly receiving attention from proactive firms. A consistent economic framework which could be used as the economic foundation of both sustainable development and firm strategies towards sustainable development is developed here. It is shown that organizational innovations play a crucial part. Sustainable development requires organizational innovations which could change the business perspective dramatically. Time seems to be a crucial factor when business decisions in accordance with sustainable development are to be made. The content and meaning of sustainable development are briefy discussed. The analysis focuses on the economic interpretation and ecological consequences; some empirical data used to evaluate the future of sustainable development are considered. A model for the economic basis of long-term development is presented.     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

建筑工程项目无标底招标行为的经济博弈分析

运用博弈方法对建筑工程项目无标底招标行为展开模型化研究,剖析各投标人的出价策略以及招标人的期望收益,演绎其博弈特性和博弈均衡.在实证中提出建筑工程项目无标底招标行为博弈所需满足的条件,设计可操作的建筑工程项目无标底招标博弈机制,规范建筑行业经营及行政管理部门提供决策支持.     

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player’s belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. We also show that all regular equilibria of smooth non-atomic games are strategic. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.     

A game theoretic analysis of interactions between law abiding citizens and criminals with respect to ownership of guns

In this paper, it is recognized that there are criminals and law abiding citizens in any society, and that their decisions to own guns are based on rather different, through interdependent, motives. These ideas are used as a conceptual basis for a game theoretic model which is used to analyze one isolated interaction and two forms of repeated interactions. The Nash equilibrium is the main results in the static form of the game. It is concluded from the analysis of the dynamic forms that this equilibrium in globally stable. The presentation proceeds to the study of possible consequences of direct and indirect policy interventions regulating the proportion of law abiding citizens and of criminals that own guns. The paper concludes with some observations on the model's limitations and some suggestions for its improvement.     

DIVISIONALIZATION,DECENTRALIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF LARGE UNITED KINGDOM COMPANIES 1

Questionnaire survey data from 144 large U.K. firms are used to describe and discuss the nature of organization design in major companies. It was found that the majority of firms were multidivisional. However a considerable variation in internal operating procedures was found which emphasized that many multidivisional companies do not behave in the way that the strategy/structure literature predicts. Empirical testing of the relation between structure and financial performance also emphasizes that divisionalization is not necessarily the key to a superior profit performance. Rather it would appear that organizational procedures need to be reconsidered in the light of recent divisional structures established in many companies. It is argued that a powerful divisional head office may weaken overall performance and that instead greater attention should be paid to the opportunity to decentralize operating decisions to the individual business units within each division.     

Why Do Strategic Alliances Persist? A Behavioral Decision Model

Strategic alliances are considered a flexible form of organizing, yet they are often long‐lived. Even when systematic benefit–cost analysis suggests that their organizational form should be changed or terminated, some alliances still persist. Drawing on behavioral decision theory, we propose a theoretical model that explains this phenomenon. Decision makers are subject to a variety of biases that can lead to the overvaluation of the net benefits of an alliance and, hence, inhibit the change or discontinuation of underperforming alliances. Our model illustrates how decision‐making biases at the individual, interpersonal, organizational, and interorganizational levels are moderated by the design of an alliance and the tools employed in the decision‐making process. This behavioral decision perspective advances our theoretical understanding of the longevity of strategic alliances and their embeddedness in complex decision‐making contexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A methodological proposal for a strategic design investigation

This article presents the decisions that are presented in the transition from theoretical to methodological, as a means to establish coherence and validity in an investigation that addresses strategic design’s contribution to organizational transformations. A coherent methodological proposal is presented between the ontological posture (intersubjectivity), epistemological posture (pragmatism), and research method (mixed) required to address the object of research in strategic design, and to consistently select the various techniques and procedures required. This proposal is pertinent to respond to the research question of what the role fo strategic design might be, as related to organizational transformation, to the extent that it provides competencies (human capital), processes (structural capital), and a relationship model (relational capital).

     

The Visible Hands of Hierarchy within the M‐Form: An Empirical Test of Corporate Parenting of Internal Product Exchanges*

ABSTRACT In this paper, we dismiss the traditional contingency argument that corporate staff should have minimal involvement with the decisions that its divisions make, because predictability, which underlies this contingency logic, is erroneous for most large corporations at this time. We offer an alternative theory of corporate involvement for the M‐form: under unpredictable environments greater interdependence of corporate staff with divisional operating decisions may be necessary to create value for the corporation. Since corporate staff cannot be involved in all divisional affairs, we empirically explore when corporate involvement is most likely. Building on transaction cost economics and the strategy literature, we reason that corporate staff may selectively involve itself in business level strategy and operating decisions when product characteristics signal threats to effective inter‐divisional coordination as well as opportunities for value creation. To explore this topic, we surveyed corporate managers of Fortune 500 companies. The results suggest some initial support for our theoretical argument: corporate staff is more likely to involve itself in business‐level decisions for uncertain products. We further find that when corporate staff is responsible for the capital investments used for the divisional venture, it is more likely to guide and influence product strategy decisions and inter‐divisional conflicts. We do not find, however, consistent evidence that specialized assets or brand‐name reputation trigger corporate involvement. Implications and limitations are further discussed.     

Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior

Rivalry restraint has received a lot of attention as a theory of profits in recent research on business strategy. Its economic rationale is explained as the consequences of either exogenous or endogenous anticompetitive forces present in different industries. In this paper, we use a dynamic oligopolistic industry model and show that rivalry restraint emerges as equilibrium behavior among firm owners who delegate decisions to managers. In the corresponding two‐stage game, managers choose optimal production rates in a dynamic Cournot market and owners set incentives for managers, acting sequentially rational. Equilibrium incentives correspond to rivalry restraint, that is, managers are less aggressive in the product market with lower outputs and increasing profits for all firms in the industry.     

Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)

The strategic market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the competitive limit. However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions that rule out “pathological” no trade equilibria. This paper studies a strategic market game with limit prices. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations of this game converges to the set containing all competitive equilibria and no-trade, when players are replicated. Moreover, two rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies eliminate the no-trade equilibria. Hence, replication paired with two rounds of iterated dominance gives a clean prediction of competitive equilibrium.     

Incentives,Capital Budgeting,and Organizational Structure

Divisional managers compete for financial resources in what is often referred to as an internal capital market. They also have a common interest in maximizing corporate profits, as this determines the resources available to the firm as a whole. Both goals are powerful motivators but can at times conflict: while the amount of resources available to the firm depends on corporate performance, divisional funding depends upon the division's performance relative to the rest. We propose a model in which organizational form is endogenous, divisions compete for corporate resources, and managers have implicit incentives. We show that organizational design can help companies influence their divisional managers' potentially conflicting goals. Our analysis relates the firm's organizational structure to the source of incentives (external vs. internal), the nature of the incentives (competition vs. cooperation), the level of corporate diversification, the development of the capital market, and to industry and firm characteristics.     

DIVERSIFICATION WITHIN AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE

This study examines diversification of the activities of business organizations. The meaning of diversification has been ambiguous in many studies that have used the concept as a way of describing strategic resource allocation decisions within firms. Many previous studies of diversification have suffered from a number of deficiencies. Some studies have observed the consequences of firms’ resource allocation and made inferences about the influence of organizational and external environmental factors on managers’ decisions affecting diversification. Other studies, that have been concerned with investigating diversification from a focus within the firm, have often adopted a molecular approach, being concerned with a limited number of organizational or environmental characteristics. In an attempt to redress these deficiencies, a contingency theory framework is used to describe and, in part, explain the formulation of decisions affecting diversification. This involves developing an unambiguous definition of diversification, and identifying organizational and external environmental characteristics that may be used to aid understanding of why firms diversify their activities in different ways.     

会计制度变迁的寻租博弈

会计制度作为一种公共物品，具有经济后果。其变迁的过程会诱发各相关利益集团的寻租博弈活动。经过充分博弈后，会计制度会达成纳什均衡，并且一旦出现新的诱因，又会引发新的寻租博弈活动，如此反复循环，向会计制度的理想状态——帕累托均衡逼近，实现社会资源的最优配置。     

国家审计监督抑制国企盈余管理行为的演化博弈分析

基于目前国有企业的盈余管理行为较为普遍的现状,在我国以审计全覆盖为战略目标的大环境下,综合运用行为经济学及演化博弈论的方法对国家审计监督抑制国有企业盈余管理行为进行研究。首先运用有限理性理论分析国有企业盈余管理行为动机,进而运用演化博弈论构建国家审计部门与国有企业之间的博弈模型,并以央企的相关数据为基础进行数值仿真分析,得出影响国家审计部门及国有企业双方策略选择的有效因素,最后基于演化博弈仿真的结果及国有企业盈余管理的行为动机提出国家审计监督策略的优化建议。     

Cost-sharing in directed networks: Experimental study of equilibrium choice and system dynamics

This study reports the results of an experiment on directed networks with positive externalities induced by cost-sharing. Subjects participated in a network game in which they had to choose between private and public transportations. If a player chose public transportation, then she shared the travel cost equally with other players making the same choice, whereas if she chose private transportation, then her travel cost was fixed. Travel costs on the private route were manipulated across the two experimental conditions. In one condition, these costs were homogeneous among players; in the other condition, they were heterogeneous among players and only privately known. We found that half (none) of the player groups in the homogeneous (heterogeneous) condition converged toward the efficient equilibrium. Examination of the system dynamics shows that convergence toward efficiency was facilitated by: (1) the existence of an intermediate equilibrium choice; and (2) strategic teaching by which a farsighted player chooses strategies with poor short-term payoff in order to shift group decisions to the efficient equilibrium and thereby increase her own long-term benefit.     

ENVIRONMENT, ORGANIZATION AND EFFECTIVENESS: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH[1]

Answers to the question of what makes an organization effective have proved elusive despite more than 20 years of intensive theorizing and research. Yet the search for answers, which gained momentum with Lawrence and Lorsch's (1969) Organization and Environment, clearly has had salutary effects on students of organizations and their work. This paper offers an approach to analysing organizations explicitly based on two of those benefits. The first is the shift toward a more dynamic orientation for explaining organizational configurations and outcomes. The second is the identification of strategic decisionmaking as the key link between organizational environment, structures, and effectiveness. By merging these two, we construct a biographical approach to the study of organizations. This approach sees organizations as evolving through time in response to, or in anticipation of, both external and internal forces. We view effectiveness as the outcome of a variety of decisions taken by one or more groups of organizational actors - elites or coalitions - in the context of bounded rationalities and environmental and structural constraints. So decision processes underpin observed configurations of environmental and structural features and link these configurations to effectiveness. An organization's biography - the pattern of its evolution - can be conceptualized as a succession of decisions and their consequences, with some decisions having a major long-term influence on the direction taken by the organization and its effectiveness, while others have but an incremental influence. This article is an initial effort to make concrete our ideas. The opening section discusses organizational decision-making and organizational effectiveness. This is the core of our approach: a basis for categorizing organizational decisions and in particular for singling out those which can be regarded as strategic. It is our contention that significant decisions vary across organizations and that it will embrace rather than ignore history and context. And ultimately, it will enhance our understanding of organizational effectiveness.     

The role of complementary products on platform adoption: Evidence from the video console market

This paper studies the importance of the interdependences within platform-based markets. Specifically, the work examines the influence of complementary product portfolios on the adoption of platforms by individuals. The study analyzes data from a panel of 17 video game platforms in three regions (the US, Japan and Europe) for the period between 1989 and 2011. The results suggest that platform adoption is driven by the availability and users of complementary products. The study also finds that this impact is stronger when platform providers jointly manage the in-house complementary product portfolio and the platform. These findings reveal that decisions on complementary products act as strategic drivers of adoption in platform-based markets.     

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC DECISIONS

This study examines the process of upward influence in a variety of strategic decisions. The study provides a list of categories and supporting data for the agents, methods, perceived outcomes, and perceived causes of success and failure of upward influence interactions that impact upon the strategic decision-making process in organizations. The results suggest that: (a) middle-level managers (MLMs) deal directly with their superiors and use rational or persuasive arguments in their upward influence interactions in strategic decisions; (2) MLMs are very successful in their influence interactions and attribute their successes to internal causes; (3) MLMs and their superiors view the influence episode similarly; and (4) upward influence activity in strategic decisions is quite similar to upward influence activity in non-strategic decisions. The study also examines individual and organizational factors that are associated with success and failure in influence activity in strategic decision-making.