Monetary policy in a small open economy with fixed exchange rate: The case of Macedonia

This paper empirically applies the New Keynesian model for monetary policy analysis in a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate. Official reserves are included in the interest rate rule to account for the constraint that these impose on monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed. Also, the foreign interest rate is included in order to reflect the necessity of following the foreign monetary policy. The model is applied to Macedonian data from the period 1997 to 2011. In general, results indicate that monetary policy has been focused on domestic objectives during this period, despite the fixed currency. In addition, there seem to have been significant differences in the conduct of the monetary policy in the first and second half of this period. The response to inflation has been more aggressive in the earlier period, at a time when reserves appear less important, while the output gap is found to be important only in the latter period, possibly due to the stronger monetary policy transmission. Finally, results indicate that the monetary policy has likely moved from adaptive in the first period to rational in the second period.     

Negative nominal interest rates: Three ways to overcome the zero lower bound

The paper considers three methods for eliminating the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and thus for restoring symmetry to the domain over which the Central Bank can vary its official policy rate. They are: (1) abolishing currency (which would also be a useful crime-fighting measure); (2) paying negative interest on currency by taxing currency; and (3) decoupling the numéraire from the currency/medium of exchange/means of payment and introducing an exchange rate between the numéraire and the currency; this exchange rate can be set over time to achieve a forward discount (expected depreciation) of the currency vis-à-vis the numéraire when the nominal interest rate in terms of the numéraire is set at a negative level for monetary policy purposes.     

A framework for stabilizing the euro/yen/dollar triplet

The current debate on exchange rate regimes is shaped by the so-called inconsistency triangle. In this paper I show that the discussion has overlooked a “third way” which combines capital mobility with monetary policy autonomy, and an exchange rate path determined by interest rate differentials. My scheme relies on interventions that are always carried out by the central bank with the strong currency, and a full sterilization of interventions with the instrument of a deposit facility. Thus the G3 central banks could set a band for their bilateral exchange rates with the floor and the ceiling defended by the respective strong central bank. As exchange rates bands are adjusted according to short-term interest rate differentials, there are no sterilization costs for the intervening central bank. Over the medium and long run interest rates are mainly determined by inflation differentials. Thus, the exchange rate band would follow a PPP path.     

Internal and external transmissions of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU

With the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the sovereignty of national monetary institutions has been replaced by a common monetary institution, the European Central Bank (ECB) and national currencies have been replaced by a common currency, the euro. EMU therefore implies the loss of national monetary policy autonomy and internal exchange rate flexibility inside the EMU area. However, external exchange rate adjustment, i.e. adjustment of the euro exchange rate, remains a feasible adjustment mechanism. This paper analyses how internal and external exchange rate flexibility affect macroeconomic adjustment in EMU and non-EMU countries. To do so, a model is constructed in which three countries interact: two countries that decide to form a monetary union and a third country that does not participate in the monetary union. Numerical simulations of a representative example are used to characterise the adjustment dynamics induced by monetary and fiscal policies before and after the start of the EMU.     

中国货币条件指数构建及与经济增长的实证分析

货币条件指数作为反映一个国家货币政策松紧程度的指标,自1994年由加拿大银行首次提出后,引起了国际社会的普遍关注。本文选取1998年1季度～2011年3季度间共55个季度的实际利率、实际有效汇率、实际信贷规模缺口作为解释变量,选取实际产出与潜在产出之间的缺口作为被解释变量,使用单方程估计法,通过构造总需求曲线,利用最小二乘法计算各解释变量的权重,得出中国的实际货币条件指数。并通过分析对比中国汇率、利率、信贷规模变动与宏观经济增长之间的关系,验证中国实际货币条件指数对实体经济变动的解释能力。     

零准备金制度下的货币政策操作框架研究

目前世界上越来越多的国家取消了对商业银行的法定准备金要求,不仅于此,英国、加拿大和澳大利亚等国家的中央银行还采用了通货膨胀目标制的货币政策框架,从而主要通过调控短期名义利率来实现既定的目标通货膨胀率,如此操作不但较好地实现了对宏观经济的调控,而且,相比较正法定准备金制度下的货币政策操作,在零准备金制度下,货币当局主要通过引导市场主体的预期来实现政策目标,从而在减少货币政策操作成本的同时,也使得中央银行有了更大的政策实施空间。     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

Deviations from rules-based policy and their effects

Rules-based monetary policy evaluation has long been central to macroeconomics. Using the original Taylor rule, a modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and an estimated Taylor rule, we define rules-based and discretionary eras by smaller and larger policy rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the federal funds rate prescribed by the three rules. We use tests for multiple structural changes to identify the eras so that knowledge of subsequent economic outcomes cannot influence the choice of the dates. With the original Taylor rule, monetary policy in the U.S. is characterized by a rules-based era until 1974, a discretionary era from 1974 to 1985, a rules-based era from 1985 to 2000, and a discretionary era from 2001 to 2013. With the modified Taylor rule, the rules-based era extends further into the 1970s and there is an additional rules-based period starting in 2006. We calculate various loss functions and find that economic performance is uniformly better during rules-based eras than during discretionary eras, and that the original Taylor rule provides the largest loss during discretionary periods relative to loss during rules-based periods.     

THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MONETARY UNION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Abstract.  With the 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) having set the objective of adopting a common currency for the year 2018, an expanding empirical literature has emerged evaluating the benefits and costs of a common-currency area in Southern Africa. This paper reviews that literature, focusing on two categories of studies: (1) those that assume that a country's characteristics are invariant to the adoption of a common currency and (2) those that assume that a monetary union alters an economy's structure, resulting in trade creation and credibility gains. The literature reviewed suggests that a relatively small group of countries, typically including South Africa, satisfies the criteria necessary for monetary unification. The literature also suggests that, in a monetary union comprising all SADC countries and a regional central bank that sets monetary policy to reflect the average economic conditions (e.g. fiscal balances) in the region, the potential losses (i.e. higher inflation) from giving up an existing credible national central bank, a relevant consideration for South Africa, could outweigh any potential benefits of trade creation resulting from a common currency.     

Combining monetary policy and prudential regulation: an agent-based modeling approach

This paper explores the interaction between monetary policy and prudential regulation in an agent-based modeling framework. Firms borrow funds from the banking system in an economy regulated by a central bank. The central bank carries out monetary policy, by setting the interest rate, and prudential regulation, by establishing the banking capital requirement. Different combinations of interest rate rule and capital requirement rule are evaluated with respect to both macroeconomic and financial stability. Several relevant policy implications were drawn. First, the efficacy of a given capital requirement rule or interest rate rule depends on the specification of the rule of the other type it is combined with. More precisely, less aggressive interest rate rules perform better when the range of variation of the capital requirement is narrower. Second, interest rate smoothing is more effective than the other interest rate rules assessed, as it outperforms those other rules with respect to financial stability and macroeconomic stability. Third, there is no tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stability associated with a variation of either the capital requirement or the smoothing interest rate parameter. Finally, our results reinforce the cautionary finding of other studies regarding how output can be ravaged by a low inflation targeting.

     

Managed Floating as a Monetary Policy Strategy

Although there seems to be a broad consensus among economists that purely floating or completely fixed exchange rates (the so-called corner solutions) are the only viable alternatives of exchange rate management, many countries do not behave according to this paradigm and adopt a strategy within the broad spectrum of exchange rate regimes that is limited by the two corner solutions. Many of these intermediate regimes are characterized by significant foreign exchange market interventions and a certain degree of exchange rate flexibility with non-preannounced exchange rate targets. While academic research in this area usually concentrates on some specific aspects of intermediate regimes (such as the effectiveness of interventions or institutional aspects), managed floating has rarely been analyzed as a comprehensive monetary policy strategy. In this paper, we present a monetary policy framework in which central banks simultaneously use the exchange rate and the interest rate as operating targets of monetary policy. We explain the mechanics of foreign exchange market interventions and sterilization and we explain why a central bank has an interest of controlling simultaneously the two operating targets. We derive the monetary policy rules for the two operating targets from a simple open economy macro model in which the uncovered interest parity condition and the monetary conditions index play a central role.     

Central Bank or Monetary Authority? Three Views on Money and Monetary Reform

The global financial crisis triggered profound changes in the conduct of monetary policy, with ultra‐low interest rates and asset purchases becoming the main policy tools. This represents a major shift towards interventionism that even ten years after the global financial crisis has not been reversed. In this article, I assess three views on money and monetary reform. I argue that a central bank regime with a narrow focus on refinancing property at market interest rates remains an attractive alternative to the current regime and provides an essential benchmark to assess the progress of monetary normalisation.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The package that was announced just as we completed our June forecast has, for the time being, produced a more stable financial position. The exchange rate has stopped falling and by mid-July the Smithsonian index had reached 62, the highest level since March. Short- and long-term interest rates have stopped rising. We still emphasise, however, that control over DCE and the money supply has been achieved artificially through direct controls on the banks. The government has achieved short-run consistency between its fiscal and monetary policy, but in the longer term its fiscal policy is inconsistent with its hopes of keeping inflation in single figures. No incomes policy will succeed unless it is accompanied by policies designed to achieve a consistent exchange rate path. The issue has been given prominence by the recent proposals for a European currency system. In the June Economic Outlook we argued that the maintenance of exchange rate stability with the Deutschmark (unless West Germany can be persuaded to increase the growth of its money supply) would require major cuts in the Budget deficit over the next three years. The same monetary constraints would apply whether we joined a fixed exchange rate system or unilaterally decided to hold the exchange rate. If the government seriously wants to control inflation a reduction in the Budget deficit will be essential.     

Monetary policy,financial uncertainty,and secular stagnation

A monetary policy framework describing how to cope with a financial crisis might alleviate a recession; however, it might also result in subsequent secular stagnation. Based on an empirical New Keynesian model with financial uncertainty, this study investigates how monetary policy can avoid sluggish economic recovery in response to financial shocks. The results show that a protracted sluggish response of an output gap to a financial shock is triggered by inflation targeting, without considering interest rate variations. In such a policy, the uncertainty causes additional sluggish behavior after a sharp reduction in the output gap. In contrast, in a speed limit policy, the output gap recovers rapidly, regardless of the central bank’s approach to interest rate variations, and the uncertainty mitigates reductions in the output gap. Finally, the results are robust under several alternative settings.     

Impact of Currency Boards on Fiscal Policy in Central and Eastern European Countries

The paper focuses on the impact of currency boards on fiscal policy in transition economies. Starting with an overview of theoretical and empirical studies in the related area, it tests for the interaction between monetary policy regimes and fiscal policy in Central and Eastern European countries who aim for the membership in the European Union. The theoretical background of this study lies in the model of Tornell and Velasco (1998). They demonstrate that fiscal transfers do not ultimately depend on the chosen exchange rate and monetary policy, but only on the worlds real rate of interest and the rate of time preference of the fiscal authority. A sample of 10 accession candidates constitutes a group of countries which go through similar macroeconomic stabilisation processes but have chosen different nominal anchors. The paper investigates whether there are any systematic differences between those countries with a currency board arrangement and those without. The empirical evidence suggests that currency boards enhance fiscal discipline in Central and Eastern European countries.     

Hungary's entry into the euro area: Lessons for prospective members from a monetary policy perspective

This paper evaluates the conduct of monetary policy in Hungary using standard Taylor rules as well as extended rules that incorporate real exchange rate effects. Moreover, we explicitly consider the impact of future euro area entry by estimating instrument rules that permit an influence from Maastricht Treaty inflation requirements via the estimation of Markov switching models as well as by estimating a differential rule vis-à-vis the existing euro area. Lastly, the paper also considers the impact on policy rules from the large data revision that affects real exchange rate and output estimates. I find that interest rate setting behavior in Hungary does not resemble that of the euro area. Also, counterfactual experiments reveal that the potential macroeconomic costs of entry into the euro area sooner rather than later may be lower than if membership in the single currency area is delayed beyond 2008.     

Can money matter for interest rate policy?

In this paper it is shown that money can matter for macroeconomic stability under interest rate policy when transactions frictions are non-negligible. We develop a sticky price model with a shopping time function, which induces the marginal utility of consumption to depend on the (predetermined) stock of money held at the beginning of the period. Equilibrium stability and uniqueness are then ensured by a passive interest rate policy, whereas activeness is associated with an explosive equilibrium. By reacting to changes in beginning-of-period real balances, the central bank can restore stability. Interest rates further depend on lagged real balances even if the central bank acts in an entirely forward-looking way, as under discretionary optimization. If the model is revised such that end-of-period money provides transaction services, money can in principle be neglected for a stabilizing interest rate policy. Discretionary monetary policy is, however, likely to be associated with equilibrium indeterminacy, which can be avoided if interest rates are set contingent on beginning-of-period real balances.     

基于市场利率波动测度的货币政策操作风险研究

在货币政策操作过程中,中央银行对宏观经济形势的认识偏差,货币政策工具及政策调控时机的选择不当,以及政策信息的披露不及时等,都有可能误导公众预期,增加市场不确定性,从而引致货币政策操作风险。文章通过利用中国货币市场上同业拆借和债券回购的利率数据进行实证,结果表明,中央银行政策操作透明度不高以及对宏观经济形势进行判断的前瞻性不足,是引致我国货币政策操作风险的重要原因。     

The expectations hypothesis and decoupling of short- and long-term US interest rates: A pairwise approach

The link between short-term policy rates and long-term rates elucidate the potential effectiveness of monetary policy. We examine the US term structure of interest rates using a pairwise econometric approach advocated by Pesaran (2007). Our empirical modelling strategy employs a probabilistic test statistic for the expectations hypothesis of the term structure based on the percentage of unit root rejections among all interest rate differentials. We find support for the expectations hypothesis and provide new insights into the nature of interest rate decoupling which are of value to policymakers. The maturity gap associated with interest rate pairs negatively impacts on the probability of stationarity, and also on the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. We further show that the speed of adjustment has become more sensitive to the maturity gap over time.     

Monetary policy credibility: A Phillips curve view

The paper investigates the presence of monetary policy credibility in eight countries by filtering the residuals from an “augmented” Phillips curve. Two of the eight countries (US and New Zealand) exhibit robust credibility effects across samples. Two countries (South Africa and the UK) exhibit credibility effects in the sample involving the 1990s, but these effects disappear in the sample beginning in 2000. The rest of the countries do not exhibit monetary policy credibility. Given that seven of the eight countries have adopted an explicit inflation-targeting framework, we conclude that there is very weak evidence that this framework enhances monetary policy credibility. These results are however sensitive to how inflation and the output gap are measured.