TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper discusses public abatement financed by pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue and investigates the welfare consequences of a tariff. The main result of this paper is that under certain conditions a tariff reduction results in an improvement in welfare through an increase in public abatement and a decrease in pollution. This result may guide policy for countries that wish to harmonize trade liberalization and the environmental protection demonstrated by both the private and the public sectors.     

A NOTE ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper extends Haibara (2006) in order to focus on the welfare consequences of a pollution tax and foreign aid financed for public abatement. The main finding is that environmental protection as a result of increasing a pollution tax by the aid recipient increases the optimal value of foreign aid chosen by the donor and reduces that of a tariff chosen by the recipient. This implies that international environmental cooperation is possible between the donor and the recipient.     

Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Beladi and Chao (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) considered the role of environmental policy on the decision whether to privatize a public firm in different market structures. This paper re-examines whether privatization improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed duopolistic framework with differentiated product and pollution abatement. It is shown that, due to privatization, less attention is paid to pollution abatement by all the firms coupled with less environment taxes levied by the government in a differentiated duopoly, and the environment is more (less) damaged when the product is less (more) substitutable. When the product is highly substitutable, industry profits increase because this softens the intensity of the product market, but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with the path of privatization because the loss of consumer surplus and tax revenue exceeds the increases in profits, even if the environment is less damaged.     

NO x Emissions and the Use of Advanced Pollution Abatement Techniques in West Germany

This paper concentrates on the integration of pollution abatement techniques for NO x emissions into the environmentally enlarged input-output model PANTA RHEI II for West Germany. The use of available abatement technologies is explained by emission prices, investment and technological factors for different sectors and energy carriers. Simulation runs to the year 2005 show the economic, environmental and technological effects of a tax on NO x emissions, when revenues are recycled via reductions of employers' social security contributions. A cut of emissions by almost one third against the businessas-usual level is reached. In particular, the use of advanced pollution abatement techniques and structural changes prevent negative economic effects on the macro level. Lower real wages even induce higher employment.     

The optimal carbon tax mechanism for managing carbon emissions

Along Pigouvian lines, the carbon tax not only exceeds the carbon emission damage imposed on society, but ignores the potential cost from deliberate carbon abatement, which in turn challenges the stability and optimality of the Pigouvian solution. For correcting these distortions, this paper amends the standard Pigouvian version by using piecewise tax functions to approximate the social damage curve of carbon emissions. An optimal carbon tax mechanism is designed, where the tax is endogenously determined from social welfare maximization. With the help of a modification instrument, the carbon tax corrects emitters’ non-optimal individual decision and the social optimum is implemented efficiently. How to put the carbon tax into practice is examined under both the deterministic and stochastic modeling settings. In both cases, we demonstrate the structure and effectiveness of the carbon tax in detail. Moreover, a flexible adjustment tax scheme is proposed, which may produce the double-dividend effect that reduces carbon emissions and relieves financial burden of carbon abatement simultaneously. These may improve the application of market-based carbon-reducing tools in public management and pollution regulation.     

Abatement R&D,market imperfections,and environmental policy in an endogenous growth model

We develop an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections. We compare the economic performances under three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling. It is found that the benefit arising from private abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is greater. With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.     

Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting

This paper examines various circumstances under which decentralized pollution policies can be efficient both in federal settings and in multi-region settings with labor mobility. We consider a model in which pollution control policies are set by regional governments non-cooperatively and pollution damages are borne by the residents of all regions. We characterize the efficiency of pollution policies, and of population allocation among regions, in a variety of scenarios, including when pollution policies are enacted before interregional transfers are determined by the federal government and before migration occurs; when migration decisions are taken before policy decisions; in the absence of a central government if regional governments can make voluntary interregional transfers; when decisions over pollution control policies are followed by voluntary contributions by regions to a national public good; when regions can commit to matching the abatement efforts of each other; and when regions can commit to specific levels of abatement contingent on the emissions of other regions not exceeding some maximum level.     

A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION VIA OPTIMAL POLLUTION TAX

This paper reexamines the environmental consequences of trade liberalization in a general equilibrium model of a small open economy facing trade and environmental distortions. I show that, under certain conditions, trade liberalization achieved by reducing trade barriers increases the amount of pollution through change in the optimal pollution tax. This result is worthy of consideration in regard to countries that pursue trade liberalization, and the subsequent environmental cleanup.     

State-imposed solutions to negative externalities: employment impact of pollution abatement policy

Musgrave was acutely aware that many private activities, both consumption and production, generate negative externalities. Advocates for an active government rely on this concept to justify public sector regulation of private activities. Regulations and mandates, along with penalties for non-compliance, are the primary instruments used by government to bring about the “correct” level of output whenever private output gives rise to negative externalities such as environmental pollution. This study in effect offers a case study of the Clean Air Act on employment, i.e., it empirically investigates whether pollution abatement costs have had a negative impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Conventional microeconomic theory suggests that there is a trade-off between environmental protection outlays and manufacturing activity, i.e., higher pollution abatement compliance costs borne by industries may contribute to plant shutdowns, lower production levels and lay-offs, and/or lack of investment, thereby leading to diminished manufacturing employment. Existing studies fail to offer a clear conclusion as to the impact of existing environmental protection measures on manufacturing activity. Using state-level data for 2001, this study finds that government-imposed pollution abatement costs have had a statistically significant negative impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Richard J. Cebula, Shirley and Philip Solomons Eminent Scholar.     

What is the potential impact of a taxation system reform on carbon abatement and industrial growth in China?

Economists have long argued that market-based environmental policy such as an environmental tax is beneficial to abate pollution emissions. This study aims at investigating the impact of carbon tax levy on carbon dioxide (CO₂) abatement and industrial growth in China. To this end, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of industrial CO₂ emissions is estimated as the benchmark of setting the carbon tax rate by using the directional distance function (DDF). This paper employs the polynomial dynamic panel model to forecast the impact of carbon tax levy on target variables such as sectoral value-added and CO₂ intensity. The results reveal that the levy of a CO₂ tax has a negative impact on industrial output only in the short term. In the long term, the impact of CO₂ tax levy on output will become positive. The levy of a CO₂ tax is always beneficial to reduce CO₂ intensity. Corresponding policy suggestions for an environmental taxation system reform are given in the concluding section.     

The environmental and macroeconomic effects of socially responsible investment

We analyze the effects of socially responsible investment and public abatement on environmental quality and the economy in a continuous-time dynamic growth model featuring optimizing households and firms. Environmental quality is modeled as a renewable resource. Consumers can invest in government bonds or firm equity. Since investors feel partly responsible for environmental pollution when holding firm equity, they require a premium on the return to equity. We show that socially responsible investment behavior by households partially offsets the positive effects on environmental quality of public abatement policies.     

TAXING LAND VALUE IS JUST ANOTHER QUESTIONABLE TAX

There has recently been much public debate about the introduction of a land value tax. To its supporters such a tax promises to achieve several goals simultaneously. On closer inspection, however, the arguments in favour of land value taxation are not convincing. On the contrary, the economic foundations on which proponents of this tax rely are dubious, and there are significant legal, moral and practical problems with land value taxation.     

The decision to ‘bid for business’: Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements

We investigate the timing of local economic development incentive offers by estimating duration models of the time to adoption of the first manufacturing property tax abatement offered by a municipal government. The effects of municipal characteristics, incentive prevalence measures, and fiscal stress indicators on the duration of non-abatement regimes are investigated using data for 112 municipalities in metropolitan Detroit during 1974–1992. Median household income and the local property tax price of local public services are found to affect the hazard rates. Most importantly, there is evidence of positive duration dependence, or an emulation effect, with first-time abatement offers.     

Pollution,mortality and time consistent abatement taxes

We study dynamically consistent policy in a neoclassical overlapping generations growth model where pollution externalities undermine health but are mitigated via tax-financed abatement. With arbitrarily constant taxation, two steady states arise: an unstable ‘poverty trap’ and a ‘neoclassical’ steady state near which the dynamics might either be monotonically convergent or oscillating. When the planner chooses a time consistent abatement path that maximizes a weighted intergenerational sum of expected utility, the optimal tax is zero at low levels of capital and then a weakly increasing function of the capital stock. The non-homogeneity of the tax function along with its feedback effect on savings induces additional steady states, stability reversals and oscillations.     

HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION?

European governments are currently engaged in an assault on tax havens, to stamp out what they call 'unfair tax competition.' This article examines and rejects the arguments they use to justify this action and shows that tax competition is (like all forms of competition) beneficial, except perhaps as practised by European governments themselves.     

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND DOUBLE TAXATION

This paper examines international tax competition, with respect to both corporate income tax rates and tax rules for double taxation. Unlike existing studies, this study assumes that governments set non-discriminatory tax rates on domestic- and foreign-sourced corporate income and can choose no tax allowance as the tax rule. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium outcomes contradict the intuition underlying previous studies: no tax allowance is chosen as the tax rule where world economic welfare can be maximized. A capital-exporting country gains whereas a capital-importing country loses, compared to the case where there is a tax allowance of any kind.     

Frames of reference, the environment, and efficient taxation

The effects of both habit formation and status concerns are analyzed within a model with short-lived households and a long-lived public good, environmental quality. Status seeking induces households to raise consumption of goods and leisure, and pollution, and to lower environmental quality. Habits exacerbate the social costs of status seeking. Efficient tax programs exist and are analyzed. Status seeking and habits are shown to raise efficient consumption and income tax rates. Moreover, an allocation induced by a sequence of short-lived governments is considered. The more important habits and status, to more mistakenly short-lived governments set tax rates relative to efficient rates. However, in case there exists a long-lived institution, when governments are short-lived, the competitive economy can be induced to attain the efficient allocation by a specific tax-transfer program.Received: January 2004, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: H23, D62, D91, Q20Ronald Wendner: I am indebted to Kurt Annen, Karl Farmer, Nicolas Guigas, Christian Klamler, the participants of the Environmental Workshop at Stanford University, and two anonymous referees for insightful debates on a former version of this paper. The author thanks the Economics Department at Stanford University for hospitality provided during the formative stages of this research.     

TAX COMPETITION AS A CAUSE OF FALLING CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Abstract Since the mid 1980s, tax rates on corporate income have declined in most industrialized countries. Tax competition between countries for mobile capital has frequently been mentioned as an explanation for this development. A vast empirical literature dealing with tax competition for mobile capital has emerged. This paper categorizes and summarizes the existing empirical studies on this issue. Particular focus is placed on the isolation of the substantive implications the quantitative study outcomes convey. Given the empirical evidence surveyed, it appears that tax rates indeed decline due to tax competition between countries, and in particular due to competition for profits. In addition to summarizing the substantive implications of the existing empirical literature, the paper addresses the question of whether the existing studies can convincingly isolate tax competition as a driver of falling corporate income tax rates.     

RETHINKING TAX POLICIES: NEW IDEAS FROM A DEAD ECONOMIST

Economic analysis of tax policy has tended to follow a macro approach in which the state is the focal point and the individual taxpayer is marginalised. An alternative micro approach, exemplified by the classic work of Wicksell, leads to an analysis of the seemingly inexorable growth of the public sector in a democracy and the constitutional constraints necessary to safeguard economic prosperity and individual liberty.     

INTERACTION OF LAND POLICY AND LAND-BASED TAX POLICY: THE VERMONT LAND GAINS TAX

In 1973, the State of Vermont became the first jurisdiction in the United States to enact a land gains tax. The tax had two purposes: raising revenue and deterrring land speculation and subdivision, which were changing the rural, village character of the state's landscape. The land gains tax derived from many of the same forces as Act 250, Vermont's 1970 land use planning and environmental control legislation. Both measures had many positive effects during the 1970s and 1980s, but, following continued growth, land speculation and subdivision, and loss of farmland in the state in the mid-1980s, both the land gains tax and land use planning and regulation were readdressed by the legislature in 1987 and 1988.