The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: EARNINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAR INDUSTRY: THE BEST AND WORST OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

The Chancellor has described the cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment of getting inflation down as ‘well worth paying’. Yet the trade-off so far is a miserable 1.25 per cent off the underlying rate of growth of earnings for an unemployment increase approaching 600,000, some 2–3 per cent off the underlying rate of inflation for a 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 7 per cent fall in manufacturing output. The question is clear: why is it that in the UK we seem to have to pay such a high price in terms of lost output and higher unemployment to make only modest progress on reducing wage and price inflation? One possible answer is in terms of the NAIRU; another stems from the way in which we measure retail price inflation. Using the example of the car industry as a backdrop, we examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation and ask whether there is a role for government to play in improving the trade-off. Our conclusion is that the present non-interventionist stance is probably appropriate but that the government should be doing more to educate both sides of the wage bargain - a challenge picked up by the Prime Minister in his recent speech to the CBI. This is especially appropriate at the present time, because price inflation is falling but wage inflation is lagging behind. It is not a cut in real wages that is required but an equi-proportionate deceleration in both wages and prices. By joining the ERM, we will ultimately obtain German rates of inflation; low wage settlements would both shorten the time-scale and reduce the unemployment cost of convergence.     

A New Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting under learning

This paper provides a study of the implications for economic dynamics when the central bank sets its nominal interest rate target in response to variations in wage inflation. I provide results on the existence, uniqueness, and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibrium for alternative specifications of the manner in which monetary policy responds to economic shocks when nominal rigidities are present. Monopolistically competitive producers set prices via staggered price contracts, and households set nominal wages in the same fashion. In this setting, the conditions for determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium differ from a model where only prices are sticky. I find that when the central bank responds to wage and price inflation and to the output gap, a Taylor principle for wage and price inflation arises that is related to stability under learning dynamics. In other words, a moderate reaction of the interest rate to wage inflation helps to avoid instability under learning and indeterminacy.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor

We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where wage and price setting are subject to Calvo-type staggering. This is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions. However, the problem is significantly simplified if we, in line with empirical evidence, assume that prices can be changed whenever wages are. We show that the price- and wage-setting relationships are substantially altered by the introduction of firm-specific labor. Specifically, the inflation response is substantially dampened, whereas the wage inflation response is increased as compared to models with freely mobile labor. These distinctive features of the model with firm-specific labor are supported by empirical evidence from a structural VAR.     

THE 1990-91 WAGE ROUND

The 1990-91 pay round could hardly have started against a less propitious background. Retail price inflation -still the principal target for wage negotiators despite its unreliability as a measure of inflation -is at 10 per cent and rising. The shock to oil prices will boost prices and add to wage demands -the natural desire to seek recompense in higher wages will be little impressed by the economist's argument that it is not possible to offset the real income shock to oil consumers by raising nominal incomes. And while cost pressures are pushing up prices, almost every other factor is working in the opposite direction. Domestic demand is at last responding to high interest rates, while the recovery in the pound has worsened UK competitiveness by 10 per cent since the start of the year and this is now taking its toll of exports, hitherto the only buoyant component of demand. The CBZ is warning forcibly that recession is beckoning. How will wages respond to a situation where a backward-looking view points to higher settlements but a forward-looking view indicates the need for wage moderation?     

THE REAL WAGE GAP

Over the past year a gap has opened up between the growth of manufacturing productivity and that of real wages. This gap cannot persist indefinitely, but it can be closed in many different ways. The best that can happen is that wage settlements fall while output and productivity accelerate. The worst outcome would be continued stagnation of real output and no deceleration of wages, in which case the required productivity improvement would have to come about through renewed labour shedding. There are worrying signs that this has started to happen. An intermediate solution might involve a fall in the exchange rate, with some improvement in competitiveness boosting real output (so that UK producers get a larger share of buoyant consumer spending) and some rise in prices holding back real wages.
We continue to believe that the most likely outcome is a rise in output and a fall in the rate of wage settlements. In our June forecast this occurs despite a fall in the real exchange rate. In these circumstances we expect the growth of unit labour costs to fall back from its current high level so that the current 3 per cent inflation rate becomes a true "core" rate. But a moderate fall in the real exchange rate may prove hard to achieve, especially if the oil price continues to weaken. We therefore explore what would happen if the required depreciation happens more rapidly, so that interest rates have to remain high to prevent it getting out of control. In this case we would expect lower growth and higher inflation than we forecast in June.     

On the desirability of nominal GDP targeting

This paper evaluates the welfare properties of nominal GDP targeting in the context of a New Keynesian model with both price and wage rigidity. In particular, we compare nominal GDP targeting to inflation and output gap targeting as well as to a conventional Taylor rule. These comparisons are made on the basis of welfare losses relative to a hypothetical equilibrium with flexible prices and wages. Output gap targeting is the most desirable of the rules under consideration, but nominal GDP targeting performs almost as well. Nominal GDP targeting is associated with smaller welfare losses than a Taylor rule and significantly outperforms inflation targeting. Relative to inflation targeting and a Taylor rule, nominal GDP targeting performs best conditional on supply shocks and when wages are sticky relative to prices. Nominal GDP targeting may outperform output gap targeting if the gap is observed with noise, and has more desirable properties related to equilibrium determinacy than does gap targeting.     

POST-BUDGET ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF OIL PRICE CHANGES

In this Forecast Release we update our February forecast to take account of the Budget and other new information, particularly about oil prices and the exchange rate. This updated forecast is then used as the basis for a set of three simulations in which we explore the consequences of lower oil prices, a fall in the exchange rate and a tightening of fical and monetary policy. The main conclusions are first that the Budget (the contentr of which we broadly anticipated) has not significantly changed our assessment of the short-term prospects for output and inflation. However, a detailed examination of the Government's revenue and expenditure estimates suggests that fiscal policy in 1983-4, though broadly in line with the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, has been loosened compared with 1982-3 by rather more than appears from the PSBR projections. We ako believe that there is a risk that the PSBR will be significantly higher than officially forecast in 1983-4.
Our simulations show the size of the PSBR overshoot in the event of a further sharp fall in the oil price. I f this were accompanied by a fall in the exchange rate, inflation would quickly be back in double figures. Whether the exchange rate falls or not a lower oil price gives significant output gains. However, if the authorities reacted by tightening fiscal and monetary policy, inflation would be broadly the same as in the Post Budget forecast, but there would still be output gains from the lower oil price.     

HOUSE PRICES AND THE ECONOMY

UK house prices more than doubled from 1985 until 1989, with house price inflation over the previous year peaking at 34 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1988. The ratio of house prices to average incomes reached levels which surpassed even those experienced during the 1972-73 house price boom. This sharp increase in housing wealth has been a major factor in the fall in the savings ratio over the past three years. This forecast release examines the prospects for future house price movements, discusses the sources of the recent house price boom and finally considers the possible impact on consumer expenditure.     

Price Inflation in the UK: Has Anything Changed?

Since leaving the ERM, the UK has had low inflation while unemployment has fallen substantially. This suggests that wage and price behaviour may have changed over the recent past. In this article, Ken Coutts and Brian Henry review the evidence for such change, particularly in pricing behaviour, but find little convincing evidence of a major structural shift. Rather, low inflation can be attributed to the effect of weak demand and low capacity utilisation on prices (and wages) which are larger and longer lasting than is generally believed, together with beneficial effects from low world inflation. On leaving the ERM, the government also instituted a classic combination of expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing policies which played an essential part in promoting recovery without increasing inflation.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The world recovery, now three years old, has proved more resilient than many expected and will be sustained in 1986 by lower oil prices. Fears that the early-1985 slowdown would turn into renewed recession have proved unfounded, as output in both the United States and Europe picked up in the second half of the year. The improvement stemmed from lower interest rates, falling inflation and weak commodity prices and was further helped by the sharp correction to the value of the dollar following September's G5 agreement. To these factors, which will remain supportive this year, is now added a lower oil price. The recovery in world output has not produced an increase in oil demand and, as the oil price rise of 1979-80 gave a further boost to supply from non-OPEC sources, a severe imbalance has emerged in the oil market. To maintain a £26 marker price (itself cut from £29 last July) has required a cutback in production of ever-increasing magnitude from Saudi Arabia in its role as OPEC's swing producer. Now that Saudi Arabia has abandoned this role in favour of stabilising its market share, oil prices have fallen sharply. We assume that the oil price will fall to £20 by the end of this year, a fall in real terms of 30 per cent. As a result the world recovery is given renewed impetus and output accelerates over the next twelve months. A cyclical peak in activity emerges in 1987, after which output growth settles at 2%-3 per cent and inflation at 4–5 per cent.     

ELUSIVE PERSISTENCE: WAGE AND PRICE RIGIDITIES,THE NEW KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE AND INFLATION DYNAMICS

Abstract We review the main New Keynesian inflation equations that have arisen as a result of aggregation from individual firms' price rigidities. We find that, on the whole, they cannot account for inflation persistence, a key feature of the empirical dynamics of inflation, and with important policy implications. The only exceptions seem to be when indexation is allowed in price setting or when price stickiness is combined with wage rigidity and staggering.     

The cost of living,threshold bargaining and incomes policy1

For trade union bargainers one of the infallible laws of political economy is that wages lag behind prices. This means that in an inflationary era the real value of the wage to which their members are entitled will be eroded, and some compensation will have to be made for this at the next round of wage negotiations. Therefore, changes in the cost of living since the last settlement will be regarded by trade unions as one of the most important factors to be taken into account in arriving at a new settlement. This is implicit in the statement made by the TUC in 1971 that “it requires pay increases of at least 10 per cent simply to restore the real disposable pay of a union's previous settlement 12 months earlier”. Economists, on the other hand, argue that once an inflation is under way, then economic agents will develop an inflationary psychology—that is, they will expect it to continue and will adjust their behaviour accordingly. If this is correct, trade union bargainers will attempt to anticipate inflation by trying to fix the money wage at a higher level than they would aim for if the price level were more stable.     

A small linear model of wage- and price-inflation in the Norwegian economy

This paper presents a model of inflation in a small open economy which features both wage-wage linkages and a wage-price spiral. Hence we have a simultaneous structure which contains the conventional Scandinavian model of inflation as a special case. Full system estimation results are reported. Great emphasis is placed on data coherency and on parameter stability. One interesting finding is that both wage growth and the wage level in the exposed (E)-sector are strongly influenced by the outside wage. This contradicts the predictions of the Scandinavian model, which defines the wage-leading role of the E-sector by the absence of outside wage effects in E-sector wage formation. Another result is that the speed of adjustment to exogenous shocks is greater for prices than for wages. This finding may be important in explaining real wage flexibility, which is often seen as the hallmark of low unemployment economies such as the Norwegian.     

Assessing DSGE model nonlinearities

We develop a new class of time series models to identify nonlinearities in the data and to evaluate DSGE models. U.S. output growth and the federal funds rate display nonlinear conditional mean dynamics, while inflation and nominal wage growth feature conditional heteroskedasticity. We estimate a DSGE model with asymmetric wage and price adjustment costs and use predictive checks to assess its ability to account for these nonlinearities. While it is able to match the nonlinear inflation and wage dynamics, thanks to the estimated downward wage and price rigidities, these do not spill over to output growth or the interest rate.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The current economic outlook is dominated by fears of continued industrial unrest and uncertainty regarding wage increases. The key issues for output and expenditure will be the outcome of the almost inevitable conflict between the monetary objectives and wage inflation. The most recent indicators provide some evidence of the type of problems the economy will face during 1979. The figures for industrial output and consumption suggest that, by end of 1978, the growth of output was slowing down and the figures for wholesale and retail prices suggest that inflation was picking up. Adherence to the monetary targets is already, on a short-term basis, requiring little or no growth in the real money supply and accompanying high interest rates. The latest official longer-term indicators also point to a slowdown in domestic demand.
Inflation would probably have increased by now had it not been for the recent tight monetary policy and the resulting stability of the exchange rate. We have earlier argued that earnings increases of about 12% will be consistent with the current financial background. But earnings increases of 15% or more will put extreme pressure on the company sector and would bring into sharp focus the choice between finanacing wage increases and letting the exchange rate fall with resulting higher inflation rates: or holding the monetary targets and accepting the short-term consequences for output and unemployment.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.     

House Prices, Housing Investment and Demography Forecasts from the LBS/Abbey National Model of the UK Housing Market

A new housing sector has been incorporated into the London Business School model. This article outlines the new housing model, summarizes the research which has gone into its construction, and presents a forecast of the UK housing market. Using the new housing model, we forecast a moderate recovery in the housing market in the later part of 1991 and 1992. This recovery is however short-lived and does not result in such high rates of house price increase as previous house price booms (Chart 1).
Cuts in interest rates following entry to the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS prompt a recovery in house prices from the middle of 1991. House price inflation then peaks with an increase in average UK house prices in 1992 of 11 per cent over the previous year. Increases in real personal disposable income are modest, by the standards of the 1980s, and for this reason the recovery does not develop the momentum of previous house price booms. House price inflation moderates again in 1993 falling back to around 7 per cent. Housing starts and housing investment recover only slightly from their present depressed levels.
the recovery in house prices is weaker than that foreseen in our April Forecast Release. This is because real personal disposable income is now forecast to grow more slowly during 1991. Sterling's membership of the ERM is followed by a fall in interest rates, but it is the timing of interest rate cuts rather than their magnitude which differs from the earlier forecast. The changed profile of interest rates has altered the house price forecast only marginally.     

The UK housing market and the monetary policy transmission mechanism: An SVAR approach

I estimate an eight variable structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model of the UK economy based upon that of Kim and Roubini [Kim, S., Roubini, N., 2000. Exchange rate anomalies in the industrial countries: a solution with a structural VAR approach. J. Monet. Econ. 45(3), 561–586] for the purpose of investigating the role of the housing market in the transmission of monetary policy. Retail sales fall by just under 0.4% following a temporary positive 100 basis points shock to short-term domestic interest rates; inflation is also lowered. House prices fall by 0.75%. House price shocks increase consumption, the price level and interest rates. Combining the central estimates for interest rate and house price shocks suggests that house price movements can explain about one-seventh of the fall in consumption following an interest rate shock. A counterfactual simulation comes to a similar figure.     

A dymimic model of housing price determination

This paper presents and estimates a model of the resale housing market. The data are a cross-section of monthly time series obtained from the multiple-listing service for a suburb of San Diego. The model is specified and estimated as a dynamic multiple indicator multiple cause system of equations where the capitalization rate is taken to be an unobservable time series to be estimated jointly with the unknown parameters. These are estimated by maximum likelihood using an EM algorithm based upon Kalman filtering and smoothing.The specification of the model features hedonic equations for each house sale and a dynamic equation for the capitalization rate which is constrained to make the expectation of prices equal the present value of the net returns to home ownership whenever the economic variables stabilize at steady state values. Out of steady state, the capitalization rate slowly adapts to new information.The model attributes a large portion of housing price increases of the 1970's to a fall in the capitalization rate which in turn was driven by rental inflation, tax rates and mortgage rates. Post-sample simulations indicate an initial flattening of housing inflation rates and later a fall brought on by the increase in steady state capitalization rates. In-sample simulations show that although both Proposition 13 and the inflation induced rise in the marginal income tax rates provided partial explanations for the fall in capitalization rates, the single most important factor was the acceleration in price of housing services which interacted with the tax treatment of home ownership to produce an amazing 18% average annual rate of price increase over the last seven years of the 1970's.     

Catching-up and inflation in Europe: Balassa–Samuelson, Engel's Law and other culprits

This study analyses the impact of economic catching-up on annual inflation rates in the European Union with a special focus on the new member countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Using an array of estimation methods, we show that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not an important driver of inflation rates. By contrast, we find that the initial price level and regulated prices strongly affect inflation outcomes in a nonlinear manner and that the extension of Engel's Law may hold during periods of very fast growth. We interpret these results as a sign that price level convergence comes from goods, market and non-market service prices. Furthermore, we find that the Phillips curve flattens with a decline in the inflation rate, that inflation is more persistent and that commodity prices have a stronger effect on inflation in a higher inflation environment.