Research of two-period insurance contract model with a low compensation period under adverse selection

The phenomenon of adverse selection caused by asymmetric information dominates the insurance market. In this paper, based on principal-agent theory, we establish a two-period dynamic insurance contract model with a low compensation period. This model introduces the tools of a low compensation period and the increase and decrease in the bonus to identify the risk types of policyholders. We prove that this model can achieve a strict Pareto improvement relative to the two-period static insurance contract model with a low compensation period. Moreover, we also graphically analyze the conclusion, which can help insurance companies to design more comprehensive insurance contracts.     

企业创新与模仿的博弈分析

本文通过构建不同创新成本的企业创新选择的博弈模型,分别讨论了一般两人对称与非对称博弈的复制动态和进化稳定策略,分析了政府行为对企业创新选择的影响,并对如何促进我国企业技术创新和稳定技术市场发展提出了自己的建议。     

基于知识共享的供应链企业间协同创新行为研究

运用演化博弈论建立供应链企业间知识共享行为演化博弈模型,分析供应链企业间知识共享行为的演化路径和影响知识共享行为的影响因素。研究结果表明,供应链企业间选择知识共享的策略受到自身的知识水平、知识的吸收转化系数以及系统内知识共享的创新成果分配系数的影响,当企业间的知识类别和知识量越互补、企业的知识吸收转化系数越高以及创新成果分配系数越高时,企业会选择知识共享策略;而知识共享的成本、知识共享的风险越高时,企业间知识共享的意愿越低。     

Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing.     

不同市场结构下技术创新对产品利润影响研究

技术创新作为改进或创造产品、生产过程或服务方式的技术活动,分为工艺创新和产品创新两种类型。在不同的市场结构下,两种创新类型对需求曲线、成本曲线和边际成本曲线的作用不同,表现为产品成本、价格和销量的变动差异,因而产品的最终利润也不同。目前,我国不少企业在进行技术创新时,常常忽视创新类型与市场结构对需求和供给曲线的作用,导致技术上的成功无法转化为利润的实现,增加了企业的财务风险。     

Convergence to Walrasian equilibrium with minimal information

We consider convergence to Walrasian equilibrium in a situation where firms know only market price and their own cost function. We term this a situation of minimal information. We model the problem as a large population game of Cournot competition. The Nash equilibrium of this model is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We apply the best response (BR) dynamic as our main evolutionary model. This dynamic can be applied under minimal information as firms need to know only the market price and the their own cost to compute payoffs. We show that the BR dynamic converges globally to Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game like the Cournot model. Hence, it converges globally to the Walrasian equilibrium under minimal information. We extend the result to some other evolutionary dynamics using the method of potential games.

     

Pricing policy and coordination for a two-layer supply chain of duopolistic retailers and socially responsible manufacturer

This paper explores channel coordination and profit distribution in a two-layer socially responsible supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and two competitive retailers. In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting, the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility and the retailers play Cournot and Collusion games. Besides comparing the optimal decisions of the retailers two game behaviours, the paper analyses the effects of social responsibility on the optimal decisions. It is found that two-part tariff contract resolves channel conflict and provides win–win outcome for a specific range of the franchise fee and it is always possible to find a particular profit split using Nash bargaining product. With increasing social responsibility of the manufacturer, the coordinated wholesale prices of the manufacturer may be both decreasing or ‘U’ shaped and decreasing when the market potentials of the retailers are almost the same or significantly different. Also, at least one coordinated wholesale price is less than the manufacturer's marginal cost. The proposed model is illustrated by a numerical example.     

Supplier relationship-specific investments and the role of safeguards for supplier innovation sharing

The vast majority of the supplier innovation literature has focused on how buying firms can effectively “pull” innovations from their suppliers. Yet, we know remarkably little about the factors that contribute to a supplier voluntarily “pushing” innovations to its customers. The present study addresses this research gap in the context of industrial buyer–supplier relationships and with a specific focus on relationship-specific investments. Drawing on theory from the relationship-marketing literature and on transaction cost theory, we devise and test a proposed theoretical model that links the level of a supplier's relationship-specific investments to its sharing of innovative ideas regarding products and processes with customers. The model also considers the role of contract length, relationship age, and buyer–supplier cooperation as possible safeguards. The empirical results suggest that a supplier's relationship-specific investments encourage a supplier to suggest ideas of process innovations but to refrain from suggestions about product innovations. The latter effect, however, can be attenuated by appropriate formal and informal safeguards.     

Growth and the dynamics of trade liberalization

This paper develops a model of ongoing trade liberalization as a self-enforcing equilibrium in a game between governments. Economic growth is a critical ingredient in successful trade liberalization. But differences in national growth rates have profound differences on the sustainable tariff equilibria of the game. If international technology spillovers are not concentrated in high-growth sectors, faster growing countries will be more protectionist, setting higher tariffs and liberalizing trade at a later date. But with spillovers more concentrated in high-growth sectors, faster-growing countries may be less protectionist. Differences in growth rates lead the process of trade liberalization to be far from reciprocal. A sustainable trade liberalization may actually involve one country pursuing a unilateral policy of free trade, even though its trading partner imposes tariffs against it.     

集群企业捆绑式合作创新的动力机制——基于演化博弈视角

在知识经济和网络经济时代,集群企业捆绑式合作创新是常见和有效的创新模式。为描述和分析捆绑式合作创新的动力机制,本文基于演化博弈视角,建立了相应的演化博弈模型,分析了模型的演化结果、稳定性及演化路径,并通过参数分析,针对性地提出了相关政策建议。     

Economic geography with tariff competition

A simple two-country model of economic geography is constructed in order to examine the effect of tariff competition on the spatial distribution of manufacturing activities as well as on welfare. We show that when the transport cost is small, tariff competition with firm migration leads to a core-periphery economy, where one of the two countries imposes no tariff in Nash equilibrium. We also show that when the transport cost is sufficiently large, both countries impose a positive tariff, which decreases the welfare of both countries.     

引进、吸收、创新——武汉长飞的三阶段技术创新路径

技术创新是企业赖以生存的支柱及持久发展的动力。本文介绍了武汉长飞光纤光缆有限公司成长和发展路径,重点剖析了其递进式技术升级路径,即技术引进战略、技术吸收战略、自主创新展露三阶段技术创新路径。最后,分析了其通过技术创新改善工艺,从而大幅度降低生产成本,提高了市场竞争力。     

Competitive equilibrium fraud in markets for credence-goods

This is a study of the nature and prevalence of persistent fraud in a competitive market for credence-quality goods. We model the market as a stochastic game of incomplete information in which the players are customers and suppliers and analyze their equilibrium behavior. Customers characteristics, idiosyncratic search cost and discount rate, are private information. Customers do not possess the expertise necessary to assess the service they need either ex ante or ex post. We show that there exists no fraud-free equilibrium in the markets for credence-quality goods and that fraud is a prevalent and persistent equilibrium phenomenon.     

Project financing,entrepreneurial activity,and investment in the presence of asymmetric information

We analyze a two-period signaling model in which a representative entrepreneur in a regional economy has a project that generates a random cash flow and that requires investment that the entrepreneur raises from a competitive market. The project's type is known to the entrepreneur but not to the investors. Further, the entrepreneur is restricted to issuing debt only or equity only. We first show that there is no separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) contract involving the issuance of equity only, that there exists a pooling PBE contract involving the issuance of equity only, and that a debt contract is preferred to an equity contract by our entrepreneur. Next, we suppose that the entrepreneur incurs a non-pecuniary cost of financial distress F > 0 whenever he is unable to make a repayment at time t = 1. We provide conditions on F under which a pooling PBE contract with debt exists and a separating PBE contract with debt and equity exists. Finally, we examine whether a high type entrepreneur will prefer a setting with a cost of financial distress (F > 0) or a setting in which there is no such cost (F = 0).     

Vertical differentiation,product innovation,and dynamic competition

This paper presents an infinite horizon dynamic model in which two firms compete in a market vertically differentiated by the qualities of their products and consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Given the product qualities offered, the firms engage in price competition that segments the market. In each period each firm can spend on product innovation that if successful increases the quality of its product. Three types of Markov perfect equilibria are identified. A running–coasting equilibrium exhibits increasing quality dominance with one firm undertaking innovation and the other coasting to free ride on the innovation by the first firm. The firm that coasts can have the larger dynamic payoff, so quality dominance does not imply payoff dominance. A second is a leap‐frog equilibrium in which the trailing firm undertakes innovation to leap into the lead. The trailing firm never innovates solely to narrow the gap with the leader, so catch up strategies are never used. In the third both firms undertake innovation, but if both have innovation successes, product differentiation remains the same and profits are reduced by the cost of innovation. The rivalry between Intel and AMD in microprocessors for personal computers provides a motivating example.     

Licensing and innovation with imperfect contract enforcement

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.     

高校科技成果转化问题的博弈模型

建立了高校科技成果转化的完全信息博弈模型与演化博弈模型,分析结果发现:系统的均衡结果及演化方向与博弈双方的博弈收益矩阵相关,且受到系统初始状态的影响;认为科技成果转化概率、企业预期收益、企业自主创新成本等是影响科技成果转化的关键因素。     

基于博弈视角的证券市场监管方式改进研究

监管行为和违规行为是证券市场中的一对矛盾体,两者互相博弈。本文通过建立证券市场中监管行为与违规行为的博弈模型,分别得出纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡。结果表明:均衡点与监管成本、违规行为处罚力度和违规收益等因素有关。最后提出了规范我国证券市场发展的若干政策建议。     

基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链信息共享策略研究

基于Stackelberg博弈,以单一零售商与供应商为研究对象,构造了一个信息共享模型,分析了零售商与供应商是否共享信息的三种情况,结果显示零售商收集市场需求信息需花费的成本与供应商给予的价格折扣同时满足一定条件时,双方获益最大。此时,信息共享有利于增加整条供应链的价值。     

考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链契约分析及优化研究

以政府、供应商和制造商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,探讨政府补贴和供应链契约对绿色供应链绩效的影响。构建了批发价格契约、收益共享契约和数量折扣契约模型,比较分析了不同契约下各主体效益及契约选择偏好,设计了收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约来提高供应链绩效。研究发现:消费者绿色偏好越强烈,产品绿色度和供应链各主体效益越高;当产品绿色度相等时,制造商更倾向于选择批发价格契约,而供应商和政府更倾向于选择收益共享契约或数量折扣契约;相较于其他契约,设计的收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约可以提高产品绿色度和企业效益。本文为考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链企业决策及选择合理的合作契约提供了理论支持。