On the spatial economic impact of global warming

We propose a dynamic spatial theory to analyze the geographic impact of climate change. Agricultural and manufacturing firms locate on a hemisphere. Trade is costly, firms innovate, and technology diffuses over space. Emissions from energy used in production contribute to the atmospheric stock of carbon, which increases temperature. Warming differs across latitudes and its effect on productivity varies across sectors. We calibrate the model to analyze how climate change affects the spatial distribution of economic activity, trade, migration, growth, and welfare. We assess quantitatively the impact of migration and trade restrictions, energy taxes, and innovation subsidies.     

Spatial equilibrium with local public goods: Urban land rent,optimal city size and the Tiebout hypothesis

This paper extends the standard model of urban land rent to consider the spatial equilibrium conditions in a local public goods market as hypothesized by Charles M. Tiebout. An analysis is made of the spatial dimensions of public goods, their degree of ‘localness’ and their impact on land values. It is shown that the optimal population size of the community (Tiebout's sixth assumption) is simultaneously derived with the optimal supply of local public goods and local taxes. It is also shown that land rent is a poor output indicator of Tiebout's equilibrium conditions and that the capitalization assumption is not the appropriate test for his hypothesis.     

How should heavy-duty trucks be taxed?

This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating optimal taxes on the fuel use and mileage of heavy-duty trucks in the United States, accounting for external costs from congestion, accidents, pavement damage, noise, energy security, and local and global pollution. The analysis allows for endogenous fuel economy, increased auto travel in response to reduced truck congestion, and distinguishes driving by truck type and region. We estimate the optimal (second-best) diesel fuel tax at $1.12 per gallon and implementing it increases welfare by $1.34 billion per annum. Optimizing over both fuel and mileage taxes, and differentiating mileage taxes by vehicle type and region, yields progressively higher welfare gains. The most efficient tax structure involves a diesel fuel tax of 69 cents per gallon and charges on trucks that vary between 7 and 33 cents per mile; implementing this tax structure yields estimated welfare gains of $2.06 billion.     

Why truck distance taxes are contagious and drive fuel taxes to the bottom

This paper analyzes the way in which countries with international and local truck traffic decide to switch from a simple fuel tax system to a dual system of fuel and distance charge taxes. We show what drives a country to switch and how this affects the level of fuel taxes as well as incentives for other countries to also adopt the dual system. The model is partially able to explain the gradual extension of kilometer charging for trucks in Europe. The model also shows that, in the absence of diesel cars, the gradual introduction of kilometer charges will make fuel taxation for trucks virtually disappear and will lead to a system where truck use is (1) taxed mainly based on distance, (2) is taxed too heavily, and (3) where highest distance taxes are expected in transit countries with a strong market position. When the fuel tax must in addition serve as an externality tax for diesel cars, the introduction of distance charges for trucks will give rise to diesel taxes that are lower than the external cost of diesel cars. For trucks, this leads to a sum of diesel taxes and distance charges that are higher than the external cost of trucks.     

Land use dynamics and the environment

This paper builds a benchmark framework to study optimal land use, encompassing land use activities and environmental degradation. We focus on the spatial externalities of land use as drivers of spatial patterns: land is immobile by nature, but local actions affect the whole space since pollution flows across locations resulting in both local and global damages. We prove that the decision maker problem has a solution, and characterize the corresponding social optimum trajectories by means of the Pontryagin conditions. We also show that the existence and uniqueness of time-invariant solutions are not in general guaranteed. Finally, a global dynamic algorithm is proposed in order to illustrate the spatial-dynamic richness of the model. We find that our simple set-up already reproduces a great variety of spatial patterns related to the interaction between land use activities and the environment. In particular, abatement technology turns out to play a central role as pollution stabilizer, allowing the economy to reach a time-invariant equilibrium that can be spatially heterogeneous.     

Abatement,R&D and growth with a pollution ceiling

The consequences of the 2 °C climate target and the implicitly imposed ceiling on CO₂ have been analyzed in several studies. We use an endogenous growth model with a ceiling and an abatement option to study the effect of the ceiling on the allocation of limited funds for R&D, abatement and capital accumulation. It is found that the advantagenousness of abatement rises with the cost advantage of fossil fuel versus backstop. If the cost advantage is sufficiently large at some point in time it outweighs the costs of abatement and the gains of R&D and capital accumulation. The reallocation of production towards abatement may cause an increase or decrease in long-run consumption. In the latter case, abatement allows an intertemporal consumption trade-off which may even justify the disregard of everlasting growth. In case of stock dependent fossil fuel costs, an abatement induced speed-up of technology development may cause an increase in fossil fuel stock left in situ.     

国外环境税问题研究进展

对国外学者关于环境税收问题研究的新成果进行综述。诠释最优环境税定义及探寻不同条件假设下最优环境税率的确定,从一般均衡的视角考察环境质量对劳动供给决策的影响,探讨税收相互作用的效应和分析学者重点研究的双重红利及其存在条件。最后根据发达国家环境税政策运行的经验,分析将环境税作为环境管制措施引入发展中国家的可行性。     

Social security and retirement across the OECD

Employment to population ratios differ markedly across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, especially for people aged over 55 years. In addition, social security features differ markedly across the OECD, particularly with respect to features such as generosity, entitlement ages, and implicit taxes on social security benefits. This study postulates that differences in social security features explain many differences in employment to population ratios at older ages. This conjecture is assessed quantitatively with a life cycle general equilibrium model of retirement. At ages 60–64 years, the correlation between the simulations of this study׳s model and observed data is 0.67. Generosity and implicit taxes are key features to explain the cross-country variation, whereas entitlement age is not.     

Monetary general equilibrium with transaction costs

Commodity money arises endogenously in a general equilibrium model with separate budget constraints for each transaction. Transaction costs imply differing bid and ask (selling and buying) prices. The most liquid good—with the smallest proportionate bid/ask spread—becomes commodity money. General equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient. If zero-transaction-cost money is available then the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Fiat money is an intrinsically worthless instrument. Its positive price comes from acceptability in paying taxes, and its use as a medium of exchange is based on low transaction cost.     

Spatial agglomeration and endogenous growth

This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with spatial interactions in which a human capital externality is the centripetal force towards agglomeration. The resource cost of transportation is, on the other hand, the main centrifugal force, preventing a city from growing unboundedly. A central feature of our analysis is the dynamic interaction between (perpetual) economic growth and (bounded) city growth. We examine the socially optimal and the decentralized growth rates as well as city sizes. In the decentralized environment, individuals under-invest, whereas cities are under-populated. We show how public policies may enable a decentralized city to attain the socially optimal allocation.     

Quality and Location Choices under Price Regulation

In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator. If the regulator can commit to a price prior to the choice of locations, the optimal (second-best) price causes overinvestment in quality and an insufficient degree of horizontal differentiation (compared with the first-best solution) if the transportation cost of consumers is sufficiently high. Under partial commitment, where the regulator is not able to commit prior to location choices, the optimal price induces first-best quality, but horizontal differentiation is inefficiently high.     

Public housing units vs. housing vouchers: Accessibility,local public goods,and welfare

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.     

General equilibrium and optimal taxes

It is shown that if subsidies are not excessive, there exists a general competitive equilibrium in the presence of a complex tax structure. Furthermore, under certain continuity assumptions, a tax structure which is optimal from the social point of view can be determined. Procedures maximize quasi-concave after tax profit functions. Consumers have convex budget sets reflect- ing their income from sales and profits minus taxes on fixed income and progressive sales taxes. Their preferences are interdependent, intransitive and incomplete. The government provides public goods and determines the optimal tax regime on the basis of its preferences on the final competitive consumption allocation.     

The effect of business taxation on the location of industry

A theoretical and econometric model is specified which permits the estimation of the effect of local taxes on economic activity in a locality. A location elasticity of ?0.35 is found for manufacturing activity in New York City with respect to business taxes, while no significant elasticity is found for nonmanufacturing activity. The deadweight losses and revenue effects of the tax are analyzed and calculated, as are the optimal second-best taxes for a locality.     

Diffusion and spatial equilibrium of a social norm: voting participation in the United States, 1920–2008

Social conformity can spread social norms and behaviors through a society. This research examines such a process geographically and over time for voting, which is strongly influenced by the norm that citizens should vote. A mathematical model for the spread of voting participation under the influence of social conformity is developed based on the diffusion equation, and predictions are tested with spatial analysis of state-level voter turnout in American presidential elections from 1920 to 2008. Results show that voter turnout has converged to a stable equilibrium in its geographical distribution across the states—but it is an equilibrium that results in persistent differences at the state level. Results are compared to individual-level and agent-based models. The model may be applied to other types of social diffusion that depend on specific geographical location.     

Optimal disinflationary paths

This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy in the context of a general equilibrium model with optimizing agents and staggered price setting. Starting from a steady state with positive inflation, a rapid disinflation is desirable when announcements of future monetary policy are fully credible. Disinflationary policy yields substantial losses in output and employment when the monetary authority lacks credibility; nevertheless, the benefits of disinflation still exceed the costs. Disinflation often fails to be welfare-improving, however, when lost seignorage revenues must be replaced using other distortionary taxes.     

Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium

This paper considers optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved job search effort. The Planner chooses unemployment benefits, taxes and job creation subsidies to maximise a Utilitarian welfare function. Optimal policy involves a trade-off between higher employment taxes (which finance more generous unemployment benefits) and greater market tightness (which reduces the average unemployment spell). Optimal UI implies the initial UI payment equals the wage, thus ensuring consumption is smooth across the job destruction shock, and UI payments then fall with duration.     

General competetive equilibrium of the spatial economy

The spatial economy is analyzed in the general equilibrium framework by considering the production and the utility functions depending on spatial distribution and sets. The geometric constraint between the location and the extension of goods supplies the equilibrium condition for space. The existence of an equilibrium is demonstrated by extending the Gale-Nikaido theorem to the case under examination. Consequently, the competetive equilibrium exists, under the assumptions of the theorem, although each point of space is heterogeneous with any other point (because of the different location): the existence is allowed by the perfect partibility of space.     

Locational efficiency in a federal system

A number of recent studies have concluded that differing local government tax and expenditure packages necessarily create incentives for households to locate in a non-optimal fashion. This paper shows, on the contrary, that the locational equilibrium may be optimal. For example, if migration produces no congestion costs, then as long as localities tax the locationally-fixed commodity, land, the equilibrium will be optimal. In fact, there are only two reasons why non-optimality may result: local taxes may be distortionary (by taxing the mobile rather than immobile factor), or there may be non-internalized externalities.     

Productivity and Welfare

Technical change is generally characterized by a rate and biases, both evaluated for given producer prices. This paper examines the potential discrepancy between this rate and the corresponding rate of consumer welfare change as measured by Allais distributable surplus. We postulate a general equilibrium context with various market failures (taxes, quotas, imperfect competition, and “poorly priced” commodities), and use comparative statics to express the rate of welfare change in terms of the rate and biases of the technical change. An elementary simulation model of a taxed economy suggests that the rate of welfare change may differ from the rate of technical change by as much as 50% under plausible circumstances.