Speculation in the Oil Market

The run‐up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commodity markets and increased price co‐movement among different commodities. We assess whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a dynamic factor model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small‐scale vector autoregression is not informationally sufficient to identify the shocks. The main results are as follows. (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price fluctuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a significant role in the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. (iii) The co‐movement between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global demand shocks. Our results support the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global demand but that the financialization process of commodity markets also played a role. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The nonlinear effect of oil price shocks on financial stress: Evidence from China

This paper examines the nonlinear effects of different types of oil price shocks on China’s financial stress index (FSI). For this purpose, we use newly proposed framework by Ready (2018) to decompose oil prices into supply, demand and risk shocks. Then, we use a Markov regime-switching (MRS) model to investigate the nonlinear effects of these oil price shocks on China’s FSI. The empirical results show that the effects of three oil price shocks are nonlinear under different regimes. In particular, oil supply shocks mainly have a significantly positive effect on China’s FSI in the low-volatility state; demand shocks have negative effects on China’s FSI in different regimes, but this effect is larger in the low-volatility state; the effect of risk shocks on China’s FSI is the opposite, and it is positive in the high-volatility state but negative in the low-volatility state.     

What Drives Oil Prices? Emerging Versus Developed Economies

We explore the role of demand from emerging and developed economies as drivers of the real price of oil. Using a FAVAR model that identifies shocks from different regions of the world, we find that demand from emerging economies (most notably from Asian countries) is more than twice as important as demand from developed countries in accounting for the fluctuations in the real oil price and in oil production. Furthermore, geographical regions respond differently to adverse oil market shocks that drive up oil prices, with Europe and North America being more negatively affected than countries in Asia and South America. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Oil price shocks and credit spread: Structural effect and dynamic spillover

This study analyzes the heterogeneous response of U.S. credit spread to global oil price shocks by building an extended structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR), which can distinguish among the U.S. and non-US oil supply shocks, aggregated demand shocks and oil market-specific demand shocks behind the real oil prices. Meanwhile, a spillover index model developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) (hereafter D.Y. (2012)) is used to estimate the link between oil price shocks and the U.S. credit spread over time. The results show that (i) the credit spread does not respond to global oil supply shocks and non-US oil supply shocks, but has a negative reaction to the U.S. oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and oil-market-specific demand shocks. (ii) There exists a close connectedness between oil price shocks and the U.S. credit spread, and the link fluctuates cyclically and relates to the economic cycle and the U.S. shale oil revolution. (iii) The spillover from different oil price shocks to the U.S. credit spread shows significant heterogeneity over time. Our findings suggest that policymakers and investors can better track the U.S. credit spread changes using oil price information.     

Oil prices,stock returns,and exchange rates: Empirical evidence from China and the United States

Employing the diagonal BEKK model as well as the dynamic impulse response functions, this study investigates the time-varying trilateral relationships among real oil prices, exchange rate changes, and stock market returns in China and the U.S. from February 1991 to December 2015. We highlight several key observations: (i) oil prices respond positively and significantly to aggregate demand shocks; (ii) positive oil supply shocks adversely and significantly affect the Chinese stock market; (iii) oil price shocks persistently and significantly impact the trade-weighted US dollar index negatively; (iv) the US and China stock markets correlate positively just as the dollar index and the exchange rate does; (v) a significant parallel inverse relation exists between the US stock market and the dollar and between the China stock market and the exchange rate; and (vi) the Chinese stock market is more volatile and responsive to aggregate demand and oil price shocks than the US stock market in recent years.     

Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Oil Price Volatility

This paper shows that higher macroeconomic uncertainty causes higher oil price volatility. Regimes of low and high uncertainty are identified in a threshold VAR model in which the effects of structural oil demand and supply shocks are estimated. The results show that higher macroeconomic uncertainty, as measured by global industrial production volatility, significantly increases the sensitivity of oil prices to shocks in oil demand and supply. This occurs as uncertainty lowers the price elasticity of oil demand and supply. The difference in the estimated oil price elasticities is economically meaningful as the price impact of a similar change in oil production might double when it hits the economy in uncertain times. As such, varying uncertainty can explain why oil price volatility is typically higher during periods such as financial crises and recessions, and why oil price volatility changes over time more generally.     

The effects of oil price shocks on inflation in the G7 countries

This study examines the effects of three types of oil price shocks on inflation in the G7 countries with a new method of isolating oil price shocks. Based on monthly data from January 1997 to January 2019, we find that each oil price shock has the largest effect on U.S. inflation among the G7 countries and each country’s response to oil price shocks is different. Moreover, a rolling-window analysis shows that supply shocks, demand shocks and risk shocks have dynamic effects on inflation. The effect of supply shocks on inflation is strong before the financial crisis, but weakens during the crisis. However, the effect of demand shocks increases sharply in this time. The effect of risk shocks mainly occurs during the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. In addition, this study uses two ways to verify the robustness of the results. Our empirical results have important implications for policymakers and manufacturers, since the results provide a good explanation for the response of inflation in the G7 countries to the oil price shocks from different sources.     

THE ROLE OF INVENTORIES AND SPECULATIVE TRADING IN THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR CRUDE OIL

We develop a structural model of the global market for crude oil that for the first time explicitly allows for shocks to the speculative demand for oil as well as shocks to flow demand and flow supply. The speculative component of the real price of oil is identified with the help of data on oil inventories. Our estimates rule out explanations of the 2003–2008 oil price surge based on unexpectedly diminishing oil supplies and based on speculative trading. Instead, this surge was caused by unexpected increases in world oil consumption driven by the global business cycle. There is evidence, however, that speculative demand shifts played an important role during earlier oil price shock episodes including 1979, 1986 and 1990. Our analysis implies that additional regulation of oil markets would not have prevented the 2003–2008 oil price surge. We also show that, even after accounting for the role of inventories in smoothing oil consumption, our estimate of the short‐run price elasticity of oil demand is much higher than traditional estimates from dynamic models that do not account for for the endogeneity of the price of oil. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Oil prices,economic activity and inflation: evidence for some Asian countries

In this paper we study the oil prices–macroeconomy relationship by means of studying the impact of oil price shocks on both economic activity and consumer price indexes for six Asian countries over the period 1975Q1–2002Q2. The results suggest that oil prices have a significant effect on both economic activity and price indexes, although the impact is limited to the short run and more significant when oil price shocks are defined in local currencies. Moreover, we find evidence of asymmetries in the oil prices–macroeconomy relationship for some of the Asian countries.     

The time varying effect of oil price shocks on euro-area exports

In this paper we provide novel evidence on changes in the relationship between the real price of oil and real exports in the euro area. By combining robust predictions on the sign of the impulse responses obtained from a theoretical model with restrictions on the slope of the oil demand and oil supply curves, we identify oil supply and foreign productivity shocks in a time varying VAR with stochastic volatility. We find that from the 1980s onwards the relationship between oil prices and euro area exports has become less negative conditional on oil supply shortfalls and more positive conditional on foreign productivity shocks. Using the theoretical model we show that our empirical findings can be accounted for by (i) stronger trade relationship between the euro area and emerging economies (ii) a decrease in the share of oil in production and (iii) increased competitive pressures in the product market.     

DISENTANGLING DEMAND AND SUPPLY SHOCKS IN THE CRUDE OIL MARKET: HOW TO CHECK SIGN RESTRICTIONS IN STRUCTURAL VARS

Sign restrictions have become increasingly popular for identifying shocks in structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models. So far there are no techniques for validating the shocks identified via such restrictions. Although in an ideal setting the sign restrictions specify shocks of interest, sign restrictions may be invalidated by measurement errors, data adjustments or omitted variables. We model changes in the volatility of the shocks via a Markov switching (MS) mechanism and use this device to give the data a chance to object to sign restrictions. The approach is illustrated by considering a small model for the market of crude oil. Earlier findings that oil supply shocks explain only a very small fraction of movements in the price of oil are confirmed and it is found that the importance of aggregate demand shocks for oil price movements has declined since the mid 1980s. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

All time cheaters versus cheaters in distress: An examination of cheating and oil prices in OPEC

This paper investigates the OPEC quota share system and whether there is any pattern to “cheating”. Using threshold cointegration methods, we examine each OPEC member's cheating behavior in periods of rising and falling real oil prices. Most OPEC members behave differently in response to rising oil prices than falling oil prices. For shocks of typical historical size, most members overproduce their quotas regardless of the direction of the real oil prices in the medium to long run. However, in response to large real oil price shocks, most members conform to a “public finance argument” whereby they underproduce their quotas in response to rising oil prices and overproduce in response to falling real oil prices. In an extended model with cheating by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members, we find no statistically significant relationship between Saudi Arabian cheating and other cheating. The impulse response functions reveal that for typical shocks, neither Saudi Arabia nor other OPEC members absorb cheating by the other party. However, when there is a large incidence of cheating by other OPEC members, Saudi Arabia responds in kind: this forceful response is in line with a tit-for-tat strategy when there is “too much” cheating.     

THE ROLE OF TIME‐VARYING PRICE ELASTICITIES IN ACCOUNTING FOR VOLATILITY CHANGES IN THE CRUDE OIL MARKET

There has been a systematic increase in the volatility of the real price of crude oil since 1986, followed by a decline in the volatility of oil production since the early 1990s. We explore reasons for this evolution. We show that a likely explanation of this empirical fact is that both the short‐run price elasticities of oil demand and of oil supply have declined considerably since the second half of the 1980s. This implies that small disturbances on either side of the oil market can generate large price responses without large quantity movements, which helps explain the latest run‐up and subsequent collapse in the price of oil. Our analysis suggests that the variability of oil demand and supply shocks actually has decreased in the more recent past, preventing even larger oil price fluctuations than observed in the data. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

石油价格冲击与宏观经济

本文首先讨论石油价格冲击的传导机制,然后考察石油价格冲击对经济增长和通货膨胀的非对称性影响,并分析石油价格上升的货币政策含义,最后提出了政策建议。     

Energy prices and aggregate economic activity: an interpretative survey

In this article, we survey the theory and evidence linking fluctuations in energy prices to those in aggregate economic activity. We then examine the implications of this research for both monetary policy and energy policy in response to oil price shocks. The currently available research seems to provide relatively reliable guidance for monetary policy. Because the precise channels through which oil price shocks affect economic activity are only partially known, however, research offers less guidance about how countries should design energy policy should cope with oil price shocks.     

Risk shocks and housing supply: A quantitative analysis

This paper analyzes the role of stochastic uncertainty in a multi-sector housing model with financial frictions. We include time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in the technology shocks that affect housing production and provide estimates of the time-series properties of risk shocks by using firm level productivity data. The analysis demonstrates that risk shocks to the housing production sector are a quantitatively important impulse mechanism for understanding housing price movements. Specifically, the model can match the volatility of housing prices observed in the data. It is also demonstrated that adjustment costs are important in replicating the contemporaneous correlation of housing prices with GDP and residential investment. Critically, bankruptcy costs act as an endogenous markup factor in housing prices and are an important determinant of house price volatility. However, in comparison to housing demand shocks, risk shocks have low explanatory power for real quantities.     

Oil price shocks and unemployment in Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of oil price movements on unemployment in Central and Eastern Europe. We do this by disentangling oil prices movements by their sign and from there we analyse the separate effects of positive and negative movements of oil prices on unemployment rates. We find that, although oil prices and unemployment are not correlated very much in the short run, the effect of oil price shocks on the natural rate of unemployment goes in the same direction, so that increases or decreases in oil prices increase or decrease the natural rate of unemployment.     

OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction

Two oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973. Oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. Prices soared to $80–$100 a barrel in today’s prices. In 1960, OPEC was established and since then it has been a considerable political and economic force in the oil market. Two thirds of the world’s oil reserves belong to OPEC members. OPEC is accused of being responsible for most of the price increases due to their production cuts and market power. This paper provides a general framework to examine the role of OPEC in affecting oil prices through the extracted quantities. A mathematical model is developed to explore the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic and political considerations. The idea is that OPEC members consider both the political support of their citizens and profits when determining oil extraction rates. This support is represented by a “harm function” which was added to the objective function of OPEC. The solution of the model lends some support for inclusion of this harm function, through which OPEC benefits from the cuts in production aimed at harming the western countries. For this harm function to be meaningful empirically, OPEC members should have a high harm indicator, α_t. With high harm indicator values, OPEC harms itself financially. The results suggest that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary setbacks to appease its citizens’ taste for harming the West. At different discount rates, the monetary losses range from about 10–20%. Solving the mathematical model required estimation of the residual demand that OPEC faces plus the cost function that applies to OPEC production. This paper reports the results of these estimations.     

Oil Prices and Personal Consumption Expenditures: Does the Source of the Shock Matter?

This paper studies the effect of structural oil shocks on personal consumption expenditures (PCE). First, we estimate a nonlinear simultaneous equation model, compute impulse responses by Monte Carlo integration, and conduct a test of the symmetry of the impulse response functions. We find that aggregate PCE responds asymmetrically to positive and negative oil‐specific demand shocks. Second, we find that aggregate PCE responds negatively to positive oil demand shocks, while adverse oil supply shocks are of limited effect. Third, we find important heterogeneity in the magnitude, sign and timing of the disaggregate PCE responses to structural shocks in the crude oil market. Our results clearly indicate that the response of PCE to an unexpected oil price increase depends on the source of the oil price shock. Our findings are robust to different nonlinear transformations for the real price of oil.     

Gasoline prices,transport costs,and the U.S. business cycles

The effects of gasoline prices on the U.S. business cycles are investigated. In order to distinguish between gasoline supply and gasoline demand shocks, the price of gasoline is endogenously determined through a transportation sector that uses gasoline as an input of production. The model is estimated for the U.S. economy using five macroeconomic time series, including data on transport costs and gasoline prices. The results show that although standard shocks in the literature (e.g., technology shocks, monetary policy shocks) have significant effects on the U.S. business cycles in the long run, gasoline supply and demand shocks play an important role in the short run.