Preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with affiliated values

This paper extends Fishman's (1988) model of preemptive bidding in takeover auctions to auctions with affiliated values. It shows that preemptive bidding transfers wealth from the seller to the first bidder without affecting the profit of the second bidder and social welfare. It also shows that higher correlation between bidders’ values leads to higher preemption rates but has an ambiguous effect on the size of the opening bid. Finally, it shows that in auctions with affiliated values, even infinitesimal entry costs may lead to a preemptive jump bidding that allows the reallocation of the entire surplus from the seller to the first bidder.     

Can preemptive bidding in takeover auctions be socially optimal? Yes it can

This paper analyzes a model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auctions with entry costs. It shows that when the second bidder owns a fraction of the target firm preemptive jump bidding leads to a higher social surplus, improves the expected profit of both bidders and reduces the expected final price. Such a toehold also leads to higher jump bids. The model implies that preemptive bidding hurts the minority shareholders but benefits the large shareholder of the target firm.     

Preemptive bidding in common value takeover auctions: Social surplus and the target’s revenue

This paper develops a model of preemptive jump bidding in common value takeover auctions. It shows that, in a case of common values, jump bidding increases the social surplus and, under certain conditions, can lead to a higher expected target’s revenue. It also demonstrates that an increase in investigation costs may improve social efficiency even if it leads to larger direct social costs. Based on the results, the paper provides several implications related to legal fees and the length of the takeover contest.     

Competitive bidding and proprietary information

We consider the sale of an object by sealed-bid auction, when one bidder has private information and the others have access only to public information. The equilibria of the bidding game are determined, and it is shown that at equilibrium the informed bidder's distribution of bids is the same as the distribution of the maximum of the others' bids. The expected profit of the informed bidder is generally positive, while the other bidders have zero expected profits. The equilibrium bid distributions and the bidders' expected profits are shown to vary continuously in the parameters of the bidding game.     

Customer Privacy and Competition

We analyze how different degrees of privacy protection affect industry profits, consumer welfare, and total welfare in a model with switching costs. Firms earn higher profits under weak privacy protection compared with strong or no privacy protection. The relationship between the degree of privacy protection and equilibrium profits is not monotonic. Consumer surplus and total welfare increase with the degree of privacy protection unless firms recognize consumer‐specific switching costs. In that case, pricing conditional on switching costs has favorable implications for consumer surplus and total welfare.     

浅谈如何控制投标单位在公路工程投标中的风险

参加公路工程投标对于投标单位来说存在很大风险,文章从几个方面阐述了投标单位在公路工程投标中应如何控制风险,具有一定的参考价值和借鉴意义。     

浅谈如何控制投标单位在公路工程投标中的风险

参加公路工程投标对于投标单位来说存在很大风险,文章从几个方面阐述了投标单位在公路工程投标中应如何控制风险,具有一定的参考价值和借鉴意义。     

Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids

We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner’s curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The effect of the winner’s curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller’s expected revenue. Two novel features of equilibrium jump bids are derived. First, the jump bid may fail to hide completely the value of the common value component. Second, a bidder with a higher type might jump bid less frequently than a bidder with a lower type.     

A model of selective tendering: Does bidding competition deter opportunism by contractors?

Under contractual incompleteness, a bid-taker is obliged to depend on a self-enforcing contract where a winning bidder puts his reputation at stake. In this case the winning bidder will renege on contractual obligations if any one-shot gain from opportunism is greater than a long-term gain from maintaining his reputation. Since the long-term gain is decreasing in the number of competing bidders, excessive bidding competition may provoke the winning bidder's opportunism. We derive an optimum number of bidders which ensures the self-enforcing contract at the lowest expected procurement cost. We also show how excessive bidding competition leads to the phenomenon of cost overruns.     

An option pricing approach to optimal bidding in construction projects

Reaching an optimal mark‐up value in the context of construction projects' bidding competitions has been a research topic for more than 40 years. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by applying a real options approach. The proposed model has a pure theoretical nature and is based on a maximization problem, whose outcome is the optimal price, that is, the price that should be included in the bid proposal. The model is later extended to accommodate the existence of penalty costs if the selected bidder refuses to enter into contract. Results reached using a numerical example demonstrate that the optimal price is higher when penalty costs are considered.     

谈投标决策的影响因素

随着我国工程项目招投标制的全面推行,投标报价是招标人选择中标人的主要标准,也是招标人和中标人签订承包合同的主要依据。工程项目招投标活动由于受多种因素的影响,投标往往错综复杂,本文论述了投标决策的影响因素,以利于提高中标率。     

从博弈论角度分析招投标对建筑企业低利润率的影响

中国建筑企业的产值增加而利润率走低是一个不争的事实,而招投标中各方的博弈是导致这种现象的一个很重要的原因。通过建立不完全信息静态博弈模型来分析招标方、投标企业和监督机构三者之间的博弈行为,得出均衡:在招标方低价中标原则下,投标企业会通过降低自己的利润空间来获得低价竞标的优势。这就带来了许多不良后果。为了消除不良后果,提出采用固定成本加酬金的招标方式,由此形成了新的规范的均衡:招标方得到工期和质量保证,投标企业得到理想的利润,从而实现了招投标双方的共赢。     

Optimal decisions in foreign exchange bidding markets

I characterize optimal bidding decisions in bidding markets where each agent does not perceive she can significantly affect the market outcome. Using a foreign exchange bidding framework to provide a micro-foundation for the shape of a bidder's payoff function, I show that (1) in a discriminatory auction a bidder bids for a price that equals the value of the marginal product of her bid quantity, and (2) in a competitive auction a bidder bids for a price that equals the value of the average product of her bid quantity. An example illustrates the comparative properties of these solutions.     

浅析工程投标招标中的清单计价规范

随着我国招标投标制度逐渐驶入国际轨道,清单计价也逐渐体现着它的重要性。它消除了传统计价因设计图纸缺陷、理解不一,计算出的工程量不同,业主方的标底和投标方的投标价十分不一致,可能会产生纠纷的缺陷。     

浅析工程招标中存在的问题及对策

评标是工程招投标程序中的一项关键的工作,也是工程合同管理的开始,其目的是为招标人选择一家报价合理、响应性好、施工方案可行、发包人投资风险最小的合格投标人中标。中标人的投标应能够最大限度地满足招标文件中规定的各项综合评价标准;或能够满足招标文件的实质性要求,并且经评审的投标价格最低,但是投标价格低于成本的除外。本文简单的介绍了在工程中标中存在的一些问题及其对策。     

Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety

This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.     

The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

In this paper, we explore bidders' incentives to gather information in auctions, when there is one bidder with only public information and another with some private information. We find that the bidder with only public information makes no profit at equilibrium, while the bidder with private information generally makes positive profits. Moreover, the informed bidder's profits rise when he gathers extra information, and the increase in greater when the information is collected overtly than when it is collected covertly. When the uniformed bidder can observe some of the better-informed bidder's information, he prefers to make his observations covertly. If the seller has access to some of the better-informed bidder's information, or if he has affiliated information of his own, he can raise the expected price by adopting a policy of making that information public. However, there are cases where a policy of publicizing his information would lower the expected price. The distinguishing feature of these latter cases seems to be that the seller's information is complementary to the information of the better-informed bidder.     

基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究

为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益，就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下，文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中，建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型，提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平，进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性，更符合招投标实际操作的结论。     

An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

不平衡报价在工程招投标中的应用

本文详细介绍了不平衡报价法及其在工程招投标中的应用,对于投标方如何在工程投标中应用不平衡报价法获取最大收益,对于招标方如何在工程招标中防范不平衡报价法降低工程风险都具有重要意义。