舞弊三角与财务舞弊的识别——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2000~2008年因财务舞弊被处罚的上市公司为样本,基于舞弊三角理论建立了财务舞弊识别模型。研究表明,法人股比例越高、监事会会议次数越多、当年的审计意见类型为非标准审计意见的公司越容易发生财务舞弊行为,而现金再投资比率、营业毛利率与第一大股东持股比例与财务舞弊负相关。     

现代风险导向审计在内部审计中的运用

近些年来，各国政治经济领域的舞弊和腐败现象无论在规模上还是在复杂程度上都有了新的变化，如美国发生的安然、世通等财务造假丑闻和我国发生的银广厦、蓝田等财务舞弊与审计失败案，给资本市场和审计界带来了前所未有的“信誉危机”。传统风险导向审计正面临挑战，独立审计理论、实务需要适应变化的环境推陈出新。现代风险导向审计是审计领域的最新发展。     

上市公司新年度盈余预测有效性影响因素的实证研究——基于沪市A股公司2005年年报管理层讨论与分析

本文以2005年度沪市A股公司披露盈余预测利润的55家上市公司为研究样本,实证分析了年度盈余预测有效性的影响因素。结果发现:年度盈余预测有效性与公司规模正相关;与公司资产负债率正相关;与每股收益负相关;与股权集中度正相关;与独立董事占董事会比例、是否设有审计委员会关系不显著。     

超额现金持有水平对审计质量影响的实证研究

持现水平是公司重要的财务决策。近些年现金在企业总资产中的比重日益升高,但恶性财务舞弊案例频频,独立审计质量屡屡成为焦点。本文以2007—2019年深沪A股(非金融)上市公司为样本,考察了企业超额持现水平对审计质量的影响,实证显示企业超额持现水平与审计质量负相关。超额持现水平高的企业表现出更多的盈余操纵,审计风险控制难度更高,从而影响审计质量。     

基于演化博弈模型的社会审计监管对审计合谋影响研究

本文通过探究财务舞弊企业、会计师事务所与监管部门之间的博弈,阐述了博弈论在预防财务舞弊中的应用.研究结果表明,政府对于财务舞弊的处罚力度应当大于政府选择积极审计所增加的成本与上市公司的舞弊成本之和,且政府对发生审计共谋行为的参与者的处罚应当大于积极审计增加的成本与审计合谋行为的整体收益之和,这样才能有效预防审计合谋和财务舞弊行为的发生.预防财务舞弊需要完善财务违规事件与会计师事务所违规事件的披露途径,加大对会计师事务所与上市公司审计共谋行为的调查、打击与惩处,加强对发生过财务舞弊事件的公司与对应审计执行事务所的日常监管.     

基于舞弊三角理论的康得新舞弊案探析

针对2019年康得新信息披露违法违规一案,本文从舞弊三角理论角度分析其舞弊形成的机理和舞弊手法,并针对性提出反舞弊策略。巨大的融资压力和内外部监督机制失效是康得新从事财务舞弊的主要动机。建议相关部门有针对性地完善审计制度,提高舞弊成本,完善审计业务质量控制制度,并明确财务舞弊的责任主体。同时公司用优化股权结构,健全独立董事制度并完善内部审计的独立性。     

上市公司财务舞弊审计研究

上市公司财务舞弊现象的发生,不只会危害到与该公司有直接利益关系的群体,还会阻碍市场的有效运转。在此背景下,财务舞弊审计应运而生。本文首先对财务舞弊审计做出介绍,之后指出财务舞弊审计面临的问题,并提出有效的应对策略,旨在为财务舞弊的治理提供合理化建议。     

治理舞弊注册会计师任重而道远

审计发展历史表明:世界上民间审计第一次受理的是舞弊审计;世界上第一位民间审计师是舞弊审计师;世界上第一份民间审计报告是舞弊审计报告书。每一项审计准则的制定与修订均与对舞弊事件的查处有关,可见,民间审计从一开始就是与舞弊打交道。揭示舞弊,是注册会计师不可回避的责任;治理舞弊,注册会计师任重而道远!与财务审计不同,舞弊审计需要审计师有更多的思维形式而不是方法。要想成为一名优秀的舞弊审计师,就要学习舞弊行为人的思维方式,象作弊者那样刻苦钻研。如果说财务审计要求审计师有一种平常心,而舞弊审计则要求审计师就得“以小人…     

上市公司违规处罚公告对审计意见和审计费用的影响分析

本文以2009年至2012年我国A股市场中制造业上市公司为研究样本,验证了监管部门披露的处罚公告对审计意见和审计费用的影响。研究发现：监管部门出具的违规公告与公司当年的审计费用没有显著正相关,但与公司当年及后续年度审计费用整体有显著正相关;上市公司规模、净资产回报率与非标准审计意见的出具呈显著负相关,与被处罚、发生亏损、资产负债率、公司上年度审计意见类型和年报披露时间呈正相关。     

对财务报告保险制度的思考

一、引言 注册会计师应当独立于企业经营者、股东及其他相关利益者,应该不偏不倚地站在客观、公正的立场上对企业的财务报告进行评价并发表独立的审计意见。然而,事实证明独立审计的结论并非独立：客观。经过注册会计师签证过的“琼民源”、“银广夏”等一系列财务造假事件,以及安然和世通公司等财务舞弊一系列审计失败丑闻曝光后,使人们对我国的注册会计师制度安排产生了怀疑。     

基于GONE理论的LK公司舞弊动因分析与审计风险防范

继浑水发布做空报告后,LK公司于2020年4月自曝2019年年度审计期间发现相关业务数据巨额造假,引起社会广泛关注.企业战略,尤其是商业模式,已经成为管理层产生财务报表层次重大错报风险的重要诱因.文章以GONE理论作为工具来识别和预判财务舞弊的倾向和风险,解释了企业管理层进行财务舞弊的动因.做空机构基于企业战略层面的潜在风险,有针对性地采取手段并取得了有力证据.注册会计师行业应思考如何发挥职业判断在防范审计风险中的作用,尤其要克服认知偏差对保持职业怀疑的影响,同时应借鉴并改进审计程序,以有效降低审计风险.     

论财务治理相关者与财务舞弊

公司财务治理相关者与财务舞弊之间存在着密切关系。本文首先分析管理层、董事会、监事会、注册会计师等公司财务治理相关者与财务舞弊的关系,然后提出通过改变财务信息的生成方式、完善董事会结构、强化监事会功能、变革审计收费体制等措施来防范财务舞弊。     

How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case

This paper examines how the ownership structure and board of directors' features determine the managerial opportunistic behavior exemplified in the management of accounting earnings. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship of firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance systems on the earnings management in the Spanish corporate sector. Results reveal that the varying efficiency of the corporate governance systems is reflected in the way in which accounting discretion is performed. We found evidence that earnings management is reduced as the voting rights of the controlling shareholder increased and that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between insiders' ownership and the earnings manipulation. Regarding the board characteristics, we observe that larger, independent boards, those with a larger proportion of female members, and those with an audit committee compounded by a greater proportion of outside independent directors oversee managers more efficiently, constraining their capacity to manage earnings. To the contrary, board duality increases the likelihood of opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting. We found that when the institutional environment improves in the Spanish context, the discretionary power of the corporate sector to overstate the financial statements is reduced. The findings prove the necessity of reinforcing the rules and regulations toward a more transparent disclosure of the financial statements.     

遏制财务舞弊的审计制度安排

近年来全球财务舞弊大案要案不断出现,侵吞资产和欺诈性财务报告呈现出愈演愈厉之势。本文在对舞弊的动机、成因、手段分析的基础上,提出当前遏制财务舞弊应实行特种审计制度和联合审计制度。对特种审计制度、联合审计制度的组织形式、工作范围、工作方式、舞弊审计技术运用等方面作了探讨。     

审计失败上市公司之舞弊特征分析

主要研究导致事务所审计失败的上市公司舞弊特征,重点从舞弊公司的财务状况、所处行业、舞弊的时间特征、舞弊手段与舞弊金额、舞弊动机、舞弊人员等方面进行分析。研究发现:舞弊公司的规模相对较大,但盈利能力相对较低,集中于制造业,舞弊主要集中在上市时和上市后五年内,舞弊与处罚的时间间隔大多数在2年以上,舞弊具有较大的隐蔽性;虚增收入为最主要的舞弊手段;为了上市和避免亏损成为舞弊的主要动机;舞弊涉及高级管理人员、中介机构、控股股东和子公司等众多人员和机构。最后,从推进发行、退市和监督体系的改革,关注舞弊、推进风险导向审计方法以及加强审计独立性三个方面提出政策建议。     

审计委员会制度：公司治理的重要制度安排

就公司治理理论而言，审计委员会制度是两权分离所产生的权益代理问题的一种解决或补救方案，是公司内部有效保护股东利益的一种制度安排。就公司治理实务而言，审计委员会成为上市公司改善财务信息透明度的有效工具，对于上市公司管理层或大股东利用不实财务报告掩饰其经营不善或利益输送、欺诈等问题能有效予以防止。因此，审计委员会一般被认为是董事会下属的最重要的委员会之一。     

研发投资、舞弊风险与审计费用

以2007—2018年中国A股市场研发投资额大于零的非金融类上市公司为研究对象，实证研究研发投资强度对财务舞弊风险和审计费用的影响以及CPA审计治理效果。研究结果表明：研发投资强度与财务舞弊风险和审计费用均正相关，并且财务舞弊风险在研发投资强度对审计费用的影响中存在部分中介效应。使用工具变量法进行内生性分析发现，研发投资强度在前三种度量方式（研发投入额÷总资产、研发投入额÷净资产、研发投入额÷公司员工数）下具有很强的外生性，而在第四种度量方式（研发投入额÷营业收入）下是内生的。对审计治理效果进行分析发现，虽然高审计收费保证了CPA较高的执业努力程度，但与审计合谋正相关的异常审计费用的存在使得CPA审计治理效果并不佳，并且对研发投资强度大的客户、财务舞弊风险高的客户和高新技术企业收取更高的异常审计费用通常与更高的审计合谋倾向有关。     

Die Implementierung von Prüfungsausschüssen/ Audit Committees des Aufsichtsrats/Board of Directors mit unabhängigen und finanzkompetenten Mitgliedern

The agency- and stewardship theory attach great importance to the implementation of audit committees in the one tier- and two tier system. The mentioned theories can explain the corporate governance function of audit committees. In order to strengthen corporate governance, the job specification emphasises the independence and financial expertise of the committee’s members. The present article provides an overview of the historical development of audit committees and their normative affiliation in the German stock corporation law (two tier system). Moreover, their role as representatives of the one tier system in the US American capital market is being addressed. The results suggest more restrictive standards regarding the implementation and job specification of the audit committee at the US stock exchange (Sarbanes Oxley Act; New York Stock Exchange [NYSE], National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations [NASDAQ]) than in the German stock corporation law (including the German corporate governance code). In addition to the normative analysis, the present paper provides a summary of results of existing, primarily US American empirical research with regard to the influence of audit committees on selected corporate governance indicators. The results show that the vast majority of the respective studies prove a significant correlation between audit committees and the restriction of earnings management, the identification and prevention of management failures and fraud with regard to the balance sheet, the external management reporting as well as the quality of the external audit. As a consequence of differing corporate governance systems, the results of the US American corporate governance studies can be applied only to a limited extend to the German two tier system. Monitoring by the capital market is even lower in Germany. In support of the respective empirical results and in order to strengthen corporate governance in the one tier system, future research is needed regarding the implementation of audit committees in the German two tier system.     

Corporate social and environmental disclosure as a sustainable development tool provided by board sub-committees: Do women directors play a relevant moderating role?

The aim of this research is to examine the impact of three audit committee characteristics on corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR) disclosure: the existence of an audit committee, audit committee independence, and audit committee financial expertise. Moreover, this research analyzes the moderating effect of board gender diversity between these audit committees' attributes and CSR reporting. The results of analyzing 13,178 firm-year observations of non-financial companies show that the presence of an audit committee and audit committee financial expertise are positively associated with CSR disclosure. However, a higher proportion of non-executive directors in audit committees has a negative effect on the disclosure of CSR information. These findings suggest that some audit committees' features play an important role in ensuring the reporting of environmental, social, and economic information. Our evidence also indicates that the presence of female directors on boards increases the positive impact of financial expert membership of audit committees on CSR disclosure, while women directors moderate any negative effect of the percentage of independent directors on audit committees on CSR reporting by increasing the latter. In addition, female directors moderate the positive impact of the existence of an audit committee on the disclosure of CSR information by reducing the latter.     

The role of the board and the audit committee in corporate risk management

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on corporate risk-management activities in S&P 500 firms over the period 2004–2010 by measuring the characteristics of the board directors and audit committee. Our results show that the board of directors, especially the audit committee, plays an important role in the firm’s hedging decisions, including whether to hedge and to what extent. Such evidence is even stronger in high-leveraged firms with large risk-shifting incentives. These results are robust to the consideration of endogenous concerns, a board corporate governance index, and industrial effects. Our study contributes to the literature by showing the influential role of the audit committee on corporate risk management.