The Social Costs of Innovation Policy

Innovation policy is designed to produce social benefits by solving a market failure problem associated with private investment in new knowledge. Yet the social costs of these policy interventions are routinely ignored. We use the Djankov et al. (2003) institutional possibility frontier model to analyse the trade‐offs between the social costs of disorder and those of dictatorship that particular innovation policies impose. We show how different innovation policies impose different types of social costs. We conclude that the case for public support for innovation policies is often both distorted and overstated because of failure to account for social costs.     

Human resource management and organizational strategies in German- and US-owned companies

The development of the international economy over the past twenty years has bred considerable diversity in the form and substance of employment relations (labour-management relations, human resource management practices) throughout the world. Cases of ‘social partnership’ are today found in the ‘free market’ United States economy; some companies operating in Germany's ‘social’ market economy are rejecting traditional forms of social partnership in the name of more unilateral strategies.

This paper examines (a) the extent to which ‘strategic diversity’ – variation in human resource strategies and policies – is possible within the heavily institutionalized, co-operative and codeterminative German economy, and (b) how managers perceive the effects of different kinds of HR approaches on organizational change and industrial adjustment. It is based on empirical evidence drawn from seven large chemicals companies operating in Germany – three of them US-owned firms and four German-owned.

The main conclusions are that considerable strategic diversity is possible within the German context, and that managers perceive distinct costs and benefits to specific aspects of the typically American ‘unilateral’ style and the more German ‘negotiated’ approach to structuring the relationship with human resources. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these trade-offs for the transferability of HR strategies across international borders, giving special attention to policies to avoid some of these potential costs.     

CHALLENGES OF MIXED‐ECONOMY SOLUTIONS IN HEALTHCARE: THE EXAMPLES OF SWITZERLAND AND SINGAPORE

In the search for improved healthcare systems able to cope with rising costs, policy‐makers are likely to turn to mixed‐economy solutions. The lure of integrating ‘the best of both worlds’ generally leads to a blend of public and private providers, high regulation density as well as legal constraints on consumers based on top‐down political prerogatives. The Swiss and Singaporean healthcare systems perfectly exemplify this strategy. Both combine market features and government planning. They differ significantly, however, when it comes to the specific policies being implemented and the scope of private sector involvement in each country. This article discusses the Swiss and Singaporean healthcare systems and highlights the dissimilarities between the two countries.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

Forward guidance – what does it mean and will it work?

The Bank of England has introduced ‘state‐contingent threshold guidance’, stating that it will not consider tightening monetary policy until the ILO unemployment rate has fallen below 7%. This is a similar policy to that adopted by the Fed in the US and represents an attempt to better manage the expectations of households, firms and financial markets about future changes in monetary policy.…     

The Cost Effectiveness of the UK's Sovereign Debt Portfolio*

This paper provides a recursive empirical analysis of the scope for cost minimization in public debt management when the debt manager faces a given short‐term interest rate dictated by monetary policy as well as risk and market impact constraints. It simulates the ‘real‐time’ interest costs of alternative portfolios for UK government debt between April 1985 and March 2000. These portfolios are constructed using forecasts of return spreads based on a recursive modelling procedure. While we find statistically significant evidence of predictability, the interest cost savings are quite small when portfolio shares are constrained to lie within historical bounds.     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC MULTI‐MARKET COMPETITION

Under the assumption that a public firm provides goods or services to two markets and that a private firm provides goods or services to one market only, this study examines whether public firms should be privatized. It also investigates how the production quantity of a private firm changes when its degree of privatization increases. We find that when the market share of a duopoly market is large (small), partial privatization (nationalization) is socially preferable. We also find that the quantity produced by the private firm does not always increase along with the degree of privatization.     

Optimal monetary policy rules,financial amplification,and uncertain business cycles

This paper studies optimal monetary policy in the presence of ‘uncertainty’, time-variation in cross-sectional dispersion of firms׳ productive performance. Using a model with financial market imperfections, the results suggest that (i) optimal policy is to dampen the strength of financial amplification by responding to uncertainty (at the expense of creating mild degree of fluctuations in inflation). (ii) Higher uncertainty makes the welfare-maximizing planner more willing to relax financial constraints. (iii) Credit spreads are a good proxy for uncertainty. Hence, a non-negligible response to credit spreads – together with a strong anti-inflationary policy stance – achieves the highest aggregate welfare possible.     

The business case for equal opportunities

It has long been argued that equality of opportunity brings business benefits and that it is in employers' interest to implement policy to promote equality of opportunity. Our analysis of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 found neither large and widespread business benefits, nor large and widespread costs associated with Equal Opportunities policies amongst the establishments that implement these. Given the net benefits to society of equal opportunities policies, this suggests that public and private benefits are likely to differ substantially and points to the need for policy intervention.     

Public intervention in UK small firm credit markets: Value-for-money or waste of scarce resources?

Loan guarantee schemes are used in many countries to provide financial support to small firms by guaranteeing loans from commercial banks, but questions remain about whether public intervention in private credit markets to support entrepreneurial firms is justified. This paper examines whether the UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLG) provides value-for-money to the UK tax payer, presenting a regression based performance approach which then feeds into a formal cost–benefit analysis. Specifically, we consider whether firm performance post-investment is such that it justifies the governments’ presence in the lending market and the costs associated with it. Our findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms that are able to access new finance through SFLG achieve superior performance in the form of improved sales, job creation and exports and that this justifies public intervention in private credit markets.     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

Can the Public's Desire for Future Benefits Be Deduced form Their Private Decisions?

Abstract . How should benefits and costs occurring at different times be evaluated to decide whether to undertake tax financed public projects? What interest rate should be used? If public decisions were based on people's willingness to pay for future private income, they still could not be based on market interest rates. The benefits of public projects (except in the cases of private land values or affected fixed private capital investments) are not marketable. However, among other things, market interest rates do represent the opportunity costs of public investments. Still, many citizens are concerned about the welfare of future generations; they may have a lower time preference rate. Human capital investments are directly analogous to public investment to produce non marketable public goods. Both are illiquid; both yield returns higher than market rates. This indicates the private rates of time preference for most citizens are high.     

Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods

We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.     

基于市场利率波动测度的货币政策操作风险研究

在货币政策操作过程中,中央银行对宏观经济形势的认识偏差,货币政策工具及政策调控时机的选择不当,以及政策信息的披露不及时等,都有可能误导公众预期,增加市场不确定性,从而引致货币政策操作风险。文章通过利用中国货币市场上同业拆借和债券回购的利率数据进行实证,结果表明,中央银行政策操作透明度不高以及对宏观经济形势进行判断的前瞻性不足,是引致我国货币政策操作风险的重要原因。     

Ownership Concentration,Institutional Development and Firm Performance in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European transition economies. We focus on private, non‐listed firms that have been largely neglected by the extant literature. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find an inverted u‐shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for those firms that operate in non‐EU‐member countries as well as those firms that are situated in less developed institutional systems. We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ problem with rising ownership concentration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of an anticipated expansion in international public goods on public capital accumulation

This paper presents a generic model to include public capital accumulation and the services of international public goods provided by a neighbor country. It examines the long-run and short-run responses of private and public capital accumulation in the home country to an anticipated increase in international public goods. It is found that the home economy in effect cuts its public capital stock, but keeps an unchanged private capital stock in the long run when a neighbor commits itself to expanding the stock of public goods in the future. The key factor determining the short-run responses of the home country is the extent to which it will match its government spending with a neighbor country's policy, which is associated with the relative difference between the marginal utility of consumption and that of home public capital affected by an increase in international public goods.     

Local public goods and private suppliers: Musical suburbs replayed

This paper deals with the existence of private market suppliers in a standard local public goods model. The result of this modification can be a cycling process instigated by rich households rather than poor households. The theoretical model provides empirical implications for capitalization studies and policy implications for the provision and financing of local public goods including education.     

How does(n't) Urban Shrinkage get onto the Agenda? Experiences from Leipzig,Liverpool, Genoa and Bytom

This article discusses the question of how urban shrinkage gets onto the agenda of public‐policy agencies. It is based on a comparison of the agenda‐setting histories of four European cities, Liverpool (UK), Leipzig (Germany), Genoa (Italy) and Bytom (Poland), which have all experienced severe population losses but show very different histories with respect to how local governments reacted to them. We use the political‐science concepts of ‘systemic vs. institutional agendas’ and ‘policy windows’ as a conceptual frame to compare these experiences. The article demonstrates that shrinkage is hardly ever responded to in a comprehensive manner but rather that policies are only implemented in a piecemeal way in selected fields. Moreover, it is argued that variations in institutional contexts and political dynamics lead to considerable differences with regard to the chances of making shrinkage a matter of public intervention. Against this background, the article takes issue with the idea that urban shrinkage only needs to be ‘accepted’ by policymakers who would need to overcome their growth‐oriented cultural perceptions, as has been suggested in a number of recent writings, and calls for a more differentiated, context‐sensitive view.     

The Creation,Maintenance and Governance of Public Goods and Free Goods

The theory of public goods is largely irrelevant to their management and governance. It is highly normative but is unused in the policy area. It remains centred on highly idealized and dichotomized characteristics (non-rivalrousness and non-excludability) of public goods despite important theoretical progress in the last twenty years. It is suggested that public goods are as much social as technological constructions, but there is no explanation of how such goods come into existence. It is argued that they are often subject to evolution that changes the balance of their characteristics between being public or private goods. Present theory bears little relationship to the governmental budgetary processes assumed necessary to finance such goods, yet all management and maintenance costs, often high enough to deter such funding, are ignored. While there is recognition that the intensive use of a public good often imposes costs directly upon users, there is no corresponding recognition either that inappropriate and intensive usage can erode public goods as assets or that such usage is difficult to control. Free goods are described and mooted as specific and important types of public goods. Illustrative examples of public and free goods, mainly from Australia and the Pacific, are cited.     

Over-education for the rich,under-education for the poor: A search-theoretic microfoundation

This paper studies the efficiency of educational choices in a two sector/two schooling level matching model of the labor market where a continuum of heterogenous workers allocates itself between sectors depending on their decision to invest in education. Individuals differ in working ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and there is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education causes composition effects in the distribution of skills across sectors. This in turn modifies the intensity of job creation, implying the private and social returns to schooling always differ. Provided that ability and schooling cost are not too positively correlated, agents with large schooling costs — the ‘poor’ — underinvest in education, while there is overinvestment among the low schooling cost individuals — the ‘rich’. We also show that education should be more taxed than subsidized when the Hosios condition holds.