信用违约互换在合成证券化中的应用

随着金融全球化趋势扩展与金融市场波动性的加强,信用风险已成为当今金融市场的主要风险,故资产证券化这种信用风险转移产品也就应运而生.其中,应用信用违约互换的合成证券化,既是一种创新金融工具,又是金融机构改善金融资产质量,分散信用风险,释放资本金,提高资本充足率和金融系统安全的创新金融技术.现今合成证券化已被一些发达国家广泛应用,但我国在这方面的研究尚属探索阶段.     

消费信贷资产证券化业务的创新与监管——以“蚂蚁金服”为例

基于金融科技创新的资产证券化作为一种新型融资方式与互联网金融深度融合,一方面,资产证券化化解了互联网金融企业的部分资金压力,另一方面,因复杂的基础资产构成又引发了许多新的风险.本文在介绍我国消费信贷资产证券化发展现状的基础上,指出创新与监管相互促进、相互推动的关系,以蚂蚁金服为实例,分析了消费信贷资产证券化过程中存在的创新与风险,并重点从破产隔离、风险自留和功能监管等方面提出监管应寻求创新与稳定之间的平衡.     

论我国开展资产证券化面临的问题

资产证券化已成为当今世界资本市场发展最快的金融产品之一。发展资产证券化,有利于我国分散过度集中于银行的金融风险,保障金融稳定;构建多层次资本市场,拓宽投融资渠道;为基础设施筹集建设资金。我国资产证券化存在着规模小、基础资产种类和发行模式单一等问题,应完善资产证券化的法规体系,规范信用评级制度,制定合理的会计处理方式和税收政策,对资产证券化活动进行系统性、全过程监管,使之成为一项有助于我国金融体系健康发展的融资工具。     

资产证券化初探

资产证券化是近几十年来国际金融领域最重要的一种金融创新，由此发行的资产支持证券是当今国际资本市场中发展最快、最具活力的金融产品。在深化金融改革的今天，我国如何借鉴、引入资产证券化这一创新已成为人们日益关心的问题，本文从资产证券化的结构和流程出发，分析适合证券化的资产种类，并说明了资产证券化对我国的现实意义。一、资产证券化的结构与流程资产证券化是将企业（卖方）不流通的存量资产或可预见的未来收入构造和转变成为资本市场上可销售和流通的金融产品的过程。在该过程中存量资产被卖给一个特设交易载体（SpecialPu…     

资产证券化监管套利动机、影响及对策

自1988年《巴塞尔资本协议I》公布以来,监管套利成为资产证券化爆炸性增长的主要动因之一,银行通过资产证券化释放资本,规避资本金要求,同时也加大了银行风险。文章研究了资产证券化资本套利的动因、方式与影响,并试图提出监管当局限制资本套利,加强银行风险监管的对策。     

资产证券化发起人会计确认方法的国际比较

本文以资产证券化发起人的会计确认作为研究对象,对国外资产证券化会计确认规范,特别是金融合成分析法与后续涉入法予以较为深入的剖析。结果表明金融合成分析法所依托的“控制权转移”标准,符合资产证券化基本原理,具有会计理论基础,我国现阶段应该选择“控制权转移”作为终止确认的主要标准,以适应国内证券化二级市场的发展。     

银行不良资产证券化的治理结构与风险管理

作为结构融资手段之一的资产证券化具有两个基本功能:即提高流动性、拓宽融资渠道;转移风险、改善财务报表.因此,资产证券化成为一些国家解决银行体系不良资产问题的重要手段而受到理论界和实践部门的关注.不良资产证券化与正常资产证券化相比,有其独特的治理结构,本文将深入分析不良资产证券化的治理结构,并进一步分析不良资产证券化过程中的潜在风险,提出风险控制手段以供借鉴.     

浅析资产证券化

资产证券化作为近四十多年来全球金融领域最重要的金融创新之一,迄今为止,己迅速成为发达国家资本市场的主流融资工具.本文拟介绍资产证券化,我国不良资产证券化,以及资产证券化在我国的发展.     

论我国不良资产证券化交易结构的选择和设计

不良资产证券化是一项高度技术化的金融创新业务,完善和规范不良资产证券化的技术支持体系,是保证资产证券化顺利推行的必不可少的环节。能否顺利实施资产证券化来处置不良资产,其技术支持体系意义就在于如何根据不良金融资产的资产特性,通过设计合理的证券化交易结构,解构原有失效的金融契约,建构新的金融契约,即根据证券化的交易结构,整合并构建不良资产池,形成不良资产现金流与证券化现金流的相互匹配机制:通过基础资产的选择满足一定的现金流要求;采取结构分层和倾斜式现金流分配技术,控制对特定证券的支付现金流;在现金流短缺时提供内、外部信用支持和流动性支持。从而在市场上顺利售出证券化产品,实现同不良资产投资者的收益共享和风险分担。     

浅析我国信贷资产证券化的制度创新效应

近年来,我国信贷资产证券化的试点工作发展迅速。这项金融创新在我国的应用,不仅仅体现在技术工具的创新,而是重在制度体系的创新。本文立足于资产证券化基本理论,从金融创新和金融生态理论的视角,分析探讨了资产证券化给我国现阶段金融法律法规、制度、市场环境等诸方面带来的创新效应。     

Credit risk securitization and bank soundness in Europe

Using a unique sample of 749 cash and synthetic securitization transactions issued by 60 stock-listed bank holdings in the EU-13 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2007 this paper provides empirical evidence that credit risk securitization has a negative impact on the issuing banks’ financial soundness. Baseline findings hold even when controlling for likely reverse causality by employing instrumental variable techniques and substituting the accounting-based z-score ratio by market-based indicators of bank risk. Moreover, investigating the relationship between credit risk securitization and single z-score components in order to evaluate significant transmission channels proposed by relevant theoretical literature, we find a negative impact of securitization on bank profitability and capital environment as well as a positive relationship between securitization and the issuing bank's return volatility. Against the background of our empirical results we underline that the decision by the Basel Committee to enhance the new Basel III framework in the field of securitization is a step in the right direction.     

银行开展中小企业信贷资产证券化模式探讨

对银行中小企业信贷资产证券化可行性及开展该项业务的意义进行了阐述,深入探讨中小企业贷款证券化模式,建议银行在有效的风险控制下平稳健康开展中小企业信贷资产证券化业务。     

金融生态环境、债务治理效应与现金持有价值

文章将现金持有价值作为衡量企业资本配置效率的指标,系统考察了银行信用和商业信用两种债务融资的治理效应。实证检验发现,银行信用比例与现金持有价值呈负相关关系,在短期银行信用比例较高的企业中这一负相关关系尤为明显,特别对处于金融生态环境较差地区的企业,银行信用不仅不具有债务治理效应,反而会阻碍资本的有效配置。较之银行信用,商业信用并没有显示出显著更优的资金效率治理功能,并且其治理效应不受金融生态环境地区差异的影响。     

Central bank disclosure as a macroprudential tool for financial stability

The Basel Capital Accord (pillar 3) states that disclosure of information (transparency) is essential to financial stability. This study analyzes, through inflation reports, the disclosure of information from the Central Bank of Brazil concerning the credit market. We consider credit risk and capital buffers as measures of financial stability in this analysis. Furthermore, in order to measure the perception of the monetary authority on the credit market, we built two indices based on the central bank’s communication on credit development. We performed a panel data analysis based on a sample of 125 banks for the period from June 1999 to September 2014 (7000 observations). The findings suggest that central bank communication regarding expectations concerning the credit market contributes to financial stability. Therefore, this kind of communication of central banks (about credit development) may constitute an important macroprudential tool to improve financial stability.     

Does transparency of central banks communication affect credit market? Empirical evidence for advanced and emerging markets

This study examines the effect of the transparency of central banks communication on credit market. In particular, this study investigates how central banks’ effort to provide more detailed information about their objectives regarding the price stability (monetary policy transparency) and financial stability (financial stability transparency) policies are able to mitigate information asymmetry on credit market, through the net interest margin charged by the banks to engage in financial intermediation (credit spread). The findings denote central bank transparency is able to reduce the credit spread. Additionally, the evidence suggests the effect of central bank transparency on the credit spread is greater in emerging markets, where there is less information available on credit market. In brief, transparency in central banks communication is an important tool to mitigate the information asymmetry in the credit market.     

Lending attitude as a financial accelerator in a credit network economy

In existing literature, commercial banks are often considered mere financial intermediaries that facilitate the flow of credit in an imperfect credit market. However, as demonstrated in the history of financial instability, the behavior of financial institutions plays an important role. This paper examines how lenders’ attitudes affect macroeconomic performance. In our analysis, the economy is composed of multiple borrowers (firms) and one lender (bank). Each borrower is directly connected to the lender through its credit contract. At the same time, each borrower is indirectly connected to all the other borrowers within the credit network. Using this model, we execute computer simulations to examine the economic consequences of lending attitudes. The results of the simulations demonstrate that the bank’s lending attitude functions as a financial accelerator; that is, it significantly affects the dynamics of the economic system through the credit network. Consequently, the same level of exogenous shock generates completely different outcomes depending on the different lending attitudes. The results also show that there exists an optimal lending attitude that leads to high economic growth and a stable growth path.     

Accounting enlightenment in the age of reason

We scrutinize the role financial reporting for fair values, asset securitizations, derivatives and loan loss provisioning played in the Financial Crisis. Because banks were at the center of the Financial Crisis, we focus our discussion and analysis on the effects of financial reporting by banks. We conclude fair value accounting played little or no role in the Financial Crisis. However, transparency of information associated with asset securitizations and derivatives likely was insufficient for investors to assess properly the values and riskiness of bank assets and liabilities. Although the FASB and IASB have taken laudable steps to improve disclosures relating to asset securitizations, in our view, the approach for accounting for securitizations in the IASB's Exposure Draft that would require banks to recognize whatever assets and liabilities they have after the securitization is executed better reflects the underlying economics of the securitization transaction. Regarding derivatives, we recommend disclosure of more disaggregated information, disclosure of the sensitivity of derivatives' fair values to changes in market risk variables, and implementing a risk-equivalence approach to enable investors to understand better the leverage inherent in derivatives. We also conclude that because the objectives of bank regulation and financial reporting differ, changes in financial reporting needed to improve transparency of information provided to the capital markets likely will not be identical to changes in bank regulations needed to strengthen the stability of the banking sector. We discuss how loan loss provisioning may have contributed to the Financial Crisis through its effects on procyclicality and on the effectiveness of market discipline. Accounting standard setters and bank regulators should find some common ground. However, it is the responsibility of bank regulators, not accounting standard setters, to ensure the stability of the financial system.     

Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

Canada's Housing Bubble Story: Mortgage Securitization,the State,and the Global Financial Crisis

Canada's experience during and after the financial crisis appears to distinguish it from its international peers. Canadian real estate sales and values experienced record increases since the global financial crisis emerged in 2008, rather than declines, and Canada did not witness any bank failures. The dominant trope concerning Canada's financial and housing markets is that they are sound, prudent, appropriately regulated and ‘boring but effective’. It is widely assumed that Canadian banks did not need, nor receive, a ‘bailout’, that mortgage lending standards remained high, and that the securitization of mortgages was not widespread. The truth, however, does not accord with this mainstream view. In fact, the Canadian financial and housing markets reveal marked similarities with their international peers. Canada's banks needed, and received, a substantial ‘bailout’, while federal policies before and after the financial crisis resulted in the massive growth of mortgage securitization and record household indebtedness. This article documents the growth of Canada's housing bubble, the history of mortgage securitization, and of government policies implemented before and after the crisis. Instead of making the Canadian financial and housing sectors more resilient and sustainable, the outcomes of state responses are best understood as regressively redistributive.     

Bank competition,financial development and macroeconomic stability: Empirical evidence from emerging economies

In this study, we investigate the potential contribution of bank competition to macroeconomic stability, and the interactive role of financial development. We classify macroeconomic stability into economic and financial stability. Economic stability is represented by the volatility of actual and unexpected output growth, whereas financial stability is assessed by the aggregate Z-score and volatility of the private credit-to-gross domestic product ratio. We employ two structural and two non-structural measures of bank competition in our analysis. Applying a two-step dynamic panel system (GMM) to macroeconomic data from 48 developing nations from 1999 to 2018, we find a bell-shaped relationship between bank competition and macroeconomic stability. The findings imply that a higher level of bank competition promotes macroeconomic stability by reducing output growth volatility, fluctuations in private credit, and the probability of bank default. There is an optimal level of bank competition beyond which it may foster economic and financial instability. Moreover, financial development enhances bank competition’s positive impact on macroeconomic stability.