Reprint to: Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

On exploiting scale economies

Indivisibilities give rise to scale economies in the provision of many local public services. Exploitation of these scale economies often requires that the activities of several communities be coordinated. In this study we analyze the game analog to a simple waste collection system in order to determine the requirements for the design of a financing system that will sustain optimal participation in a regional service system plan. We find that market based pricing in the face of scale economies created by indivisibilities will generally not support an optimal partition of communities into service districts. We also find that characterization of the game structure of local public service delivery systems is feasible and provides information for designing appropriate cost-sharing arrangements.     

Inconsequential arbitrage

We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of equilibrium. Moreover, with a slightly stronger condition of nonsatiation than that required for existence of equilibrium and with a mild uniformity condition on arbitrage opportunities, we show that inconsequential arbitrage, the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation, and compactness of the set of utility possibilities are equivalent. Thus, when all equilibria are Pareto optimal — for example, when local nonsatiation holds — inconsequential arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of an equilibrium. By further strengthening our nonsatiation condition, we obtain a second welfare theorem for exchange economies allowing short sales.Finally, we compare inconsequential arbitrage to the conditions limiting arbitrage of Hart [Hart, O.D., 1974. J. Econ. Theory 9, 293–311], Werner [Werner, J., 1987. Econometrica 55, abs1403–1418], Dana et al. [Dana, R.A., Le Van, C., Magnien, F., 1999. J. Econ. Theory 87, 169–193] and Allouch [Allouch, N., 1999. Equilibrium and no market arbitrage. CERMSEM, Universite de Paris I]. For example, we show that the condition of Hart (translated to a general equilibrium setting) and the condition of werner are equivalent. We then show that the Hart/Werner conditions imply inconsequential arbitrage. To highlight the extent to which we extend Hart and Werner, we construct an example of an exchange economy in which inconsequential arbitrage holds (and is necessary and sufficient for existence), while the Hart/Werner conditions do not hold.     

Networks vs. market methods in high-tech venture fundraising: the impact of institutional environment

This study examines how institutional environmental factors, including cultural norm, state regulatory system and venture capital market, influence the high-tech entrepreneur's choice for using network vs. market methods when approaching prospective investors at the early stage of their new venture creation. We collected comparative data through on-site interviews and questionnaire survey with 128 high-tech entrepreneurs in Singapore (a newly industrialised economy) and 250 in Beijing, China (an emerging economy). Our findings suggest that a culture emphasising the value of social obligation, the under-development of the legal/regulatory system and the immaturity of the venture capital market increased the proclivity of entrepreneurs to use network methods. Moreover, entrepreneurs who value networks higher in social obligation than in information transfer are more likely to choose personal ties instead of business ties. This study enhances our understanding of how high-tech entrepreneurs in emerging economies choose between networks and market methods in venture fundraising, and offers suggestions on how public policy makers in these economies can improve the institutional environment of their regions to promote high-tech new venture creation.     

The system of towns with spatial public goods

In this paper, we introduce a model of ‘spatial public goods’, whose provision costs depend on the size of the benefit area. It is assumed that there are many developers providing spatial public goods in their towns. Each developer chooses the area size of his/her town and the quality of its spatial public good so as to maximize profit, taking the market price system as given. Each consumer chooses the level of the public good, and hence the town that supplies it, so as to maximize his/her utility. We show that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy is efficient.     

The median voter and the median consumer: Local private goods and population composition

When a product's product provision entails fixed costs, it will be made available only if a sufficient number of people want it. Some products are produced and consumed locally, so that provision requires not only a large group favoring the product but a large number nearby. Just as local governments provide public goods appealing to individuals sharing the median voter's preferences for local public goods, product markets may provide an analogous benefit to individuals sharing living communities whose consumers tend to share his preferences in private goods. Using zip code level data on chain restaurants and restaurants overall, this paper documents how the mix of locally available restaurants responds to the local mix of consumers, with three findings. First, based on survey data on chain restaurant patronage, restaurant preferences differ substantially by race and education. Second, there is a strong relationship between restaurants and population at the zip code level, suggesting that restaurants' geographic markets are small. Finally, the mix of locally available chain restaurants is sensitive to the zip code demographic mix by race and by education. Hence, differentiated product markets provide a benefit—proximity to preferred restaurants—to persons in geographic markets whose customers tend to share their preferences.     

(Non-)Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models

This paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods. We show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions, the basic structure of multicommunity models (i.e., perfect mobility, majority rule, single crossing property) implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist. Stratification equilibria—with sorting of the population according to income classes—are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested. Mechanisms that can serve to support stratification (i.e., tight housing markets, returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods) are discussed.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

Endogenous lifetime,accidental bequests and economic growth

This paper introduces the concept of unintentional bequests in a closed economy à la Chakraborty (J Econ Theory 116:119–137, 2004) with overlapping generations. We show that scarce public investments in health can lead to poverty traps depending on the relative size of the output elasticity of capital. More importantly, the existence of unintentional bequests, rather than a market for annuities, means that health tax rates play a prominent role in determining the stability of the long-term equilibrium in rich economies. In fact, Neimark–Sacker bifurcations and endogenous fluctuations occur depending on the size of the public health system.     

Spatial equilibrium with local public goods: Urban land rent,optimal city size and the Tiebout hypothesis

This paper extends the standard model of urban land rent to consider the spatial equilibrium conditions in a local public goods market as hypothesized by Charles M. Tiebout. An analysis is made of the spatial dimensions of public goods, their degree of ‘localness’ and their impact on land values. It is shown that the optimal population size of the community (Tiebout's sixth assumption) is simultaneously derived with the optimal supply of local public goods and local taxes. It is also shown that land rent is a poor output indicator of Tiebout's equilibrium conditions and that the capitalization assumption is not the appropriate test for his hypothesis.     

Bertrand oligopoly in a spatial context: The case of quantity independent transportation costs

The theory of spatial competition [for a review, see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1985)] is usually based on the assumption of transportation costs which are proportionate to distance and quantity. In reality, however, there exist frequently considerable economies of scale, especially with respect to the conveyed quantity of goods. A good case in point is transportation cost incurred by a consumer patronizing a shopping area. Cost economies of scale will in general influence consumers' optimal choice with respect to quantities and best market places. In the extreme, consumers' outlays on transportation can be considered independent of the purchased quantity, but approximately proportionate to distance. In the present paper, the impact of this assumption on spatial competition is analysed. It will be shown, that existence and uniqueness of spatial oligopolistic equilibrium is restored. Furthermore, due to some residual monopolistic power, prices do not converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium prices when the distance between the firms shrinks to zero. In conclusion the model exhibits a fundamental difference in the market structure, when the spatial aspect is incorporated.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

Public infrastructure provision and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in developing countries

In this paper, we develop several static three-sector general equilibrium models with diverse labor market structures to investigate the effects of government provision of public infrastructure on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in developing countries. The basic full employment model shows that the production sectors' relative dependence on the public infrastructure provision plays a crucial role in determining the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Different relative dependences on public infrastructure may even result in opposite changes in the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. The above results are robust even when we extend the basic full employment model to three fundamentally different cases.     

Topics in macro-modelling of East European countries in the period of transition

Central and European former Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) entered a period of transition towards market economies. The evolution is marked by a transition from shortage- to demand-determined economies, associated with the abandonment of price control and the introduction of tight wage control. Stabilization programmes (in Poland from 1990), implementing tough deflationary fiscal and monetary policies, brought about the suppression of hyperinflation. The high adjustment costs — deep recession, high rates of unemployment — are characteristics of the early '90s. The deregulation of the public sector and the building of the private one commenced, and will be a long-lasting process.To meet the changes in economic regimes and mechanisms, the existing models had to be adequately respecified and new models constructed. The large W-5 macromodel for Poland, which covers the final and intermediate demands, had to be extended to introduce the market adjustment mechanisms and, more broadly, the financial flows. To meet the needs of short-term financial policies, new quarterly models had to be built, as, for instance, the WK macromodel for the Polish economy. The paper discusses the major problems of the models' specification under the data constraints.     

The dynamic investment and exit decisions of venture capitals

This study develops a continuous time model to examine a complete two-stage decision process for venture capitals (VCs), including investment in the private market at Stage 1 and exit through IPO in the public market at Stage 2. Optimal timings, investment terms, and exit decisions are investigated using the real options game theory under two cases: the same required returns in the public and private markets and a higher required return in the private market than in the public market. Our results indicate that the same required returns in the public and private markets generate an optimal investment decision at Stage 1 without relation to the exit decision in Stage 2. However, when the required return in the private market is higher than that in the public market, the exit decision will influence the investment decision. The size of the initial capital, ownership structure, growth rate and risk of industry, required returns in public and private capital markets, extent of lock-up period price pressure, and transaction costs of financing are important factors influencing the equilibrium results.     

基于协调的保险市场与资本市场对接模式研究

通过比较美、英、日、德四国的保险市场与资本市场对接模式,发现两市场的和谐对接是资金、产品和制度对接三方面的共融体,是金融市场自然演进与风险资本动态规制的最优范式结合。基于此,我国应在经济、金融微观制度变迁的基础上,适时选择适合我国国情的可操作性和持续性的保险市场与资本市场对接模式。     

Determinants of Capital Structure: United Kingdom Versus Continental European Countries

In this paper, we analyze how country‐specific differences influence capital structure indirectly through firm‐specific variables. We apply a system Generalized Method of Moments technique to a panel data sample of companies from five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) during the period 1998–2008. As the different financial systems of European economies (bank‐oriented or market‐oriented) may influence capital structure differently through firm‐specific variables, we first examine the determinants of capital structure for each country separately and we then analyze whether the observed differences between the United Kingdom and the continental European countries are relevant. The results show that there are substantial differences in the capital structure choices of firms across five major European countries. These differences are motivated by the type of financial systems of the countries (bank‐oriented and market‐oriented) and influence the capital structure indirectly through the firm‐specific variables. Overall, our results support the relevance of the differences in the capital structure choices of firms across five major European countries, and in particular, the singularity of the United Kingdom (a market‐oriented economy) as opposed to continental European countries (bank‐oriented economies).     

Public spending and economies of scale in partial fiscal decentralized governments: The case of Chile

This article evaluates economies of scale in local public spending in Chile, emphasizing the country's geographical features and high fiscal heterogeneity. We leverage balanced panel data for ten years and 307 municipalities in order to estimate the population level at which a reduction in the average cost of local public goods provision occurs and to differentiate between levels of market potential. We follow a theoretical model of cost efficiency that considers spatial interactions and spillover effects among neighboring jurisdictions. Our findings suggest that Chilean municipalities reach an optimum population level at around 700,000 inhabitants, which is high considering that only two cities qualify. When differentiating for levels of economies of scale according to levels of market potential, municipalities with a low potential reach their optimum at around 28,000 inhabitants, those with a medium potential reach it at approximately 124,000, and those with a high potential reach it at approximately 680,000.