Monetary policy and bank performance: The role of business models

This paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and bank performance in a multiple-instrument environment, particularly highlighting the conditioning role of bank business models. Employing a unique dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2019, we display that banks react to monetary policy changes, either when the central bank increases policy rates or injects money into the economy through open market operations, by decreasing overall returns and increasing financial instability. Additionally, we document that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves benefits bank outcomes, contrasting to open market operations, albeit the central bank uses both of these policy instruments to alter money supply in the economy. Our key analysis of interest reveals that business models considerably matter in the effects of monetary policy on bank performance. Collectively, our findings demonstrate that banks’ business models that yield more non-interest income or diversify more into different income sources may mitigate the pass-through of monetary policy to bank performance. This finding holds across all interest- and quantitative-based monetary policy indicators and across all the functions of risk-taking behavior, earning-profit capacity, and financial stability. Furthermore, while plotting the marginal effects of monetary policy, we realize that they are insignificant for banks whose business models heavily rely on non-traditional segments.     

Monetary policy,financial uncertainty,and secular stagnation

A monetary policy framework describing how to cope with a financial crisis might alleviate a recession; however, it might also result in subsequent secular stagnation. Based on an empirical New Keynesian model with financial uncertainty, this study investigates how monetary policy can avoid sluggish economic recovery in response to financial shocks. The results show that a protracted sluggish response of an output gap to a financial shock is triggered by inflation targeting, without considering interest rate variations. In such a policy, the uncertainty causes additional sluggish behavior after a sharp reduction in the output gap. In contrast, in a speed limit policy, the output gap recovers rapidly, regardless of the central bank’s approach to interest rate variations, and the uncertainty mitigates reductions in the output gap. Finally, the results are robust under several alternative settings.     

Combining monetary policy and prudential regulation: an agent-based modeling approach

This paper explores the interaction between monetary policy and prudential regulation in an agent-based modeling framework. Firms borrow funds from the banking system in an economy regulated by a central bank. The central bank carries out monetary policy, by setting the interest rate, and prudential regulation, by establishing the banking capital requirement. Different combinations of interest rate rule and capital requirement rule are evaluated with respect to both macroeconomic and financial stability. Several relevant policy implications were drawn. First, the efficacy of a given capital requirement rule or interest rate rule depends on the specification of the rule of the other type it is combined with. More precisely, less aggressive interest rate rules perform better when the range of variation of the capital requirement is narrower. Second, interest rate smoothing is more effective than the other interest rate rules assessed, as it outperforms those other rules with respect to financial stability and macroeconomic stability. Third, there is no tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stability associated with a variation of either the capital requirement or the smoothing interest rate parameter. Finally, our results reinforce the cautionary finding of other studies regarding how output can be ravaged by a low inflation targeting.

     

On credit and output: Is the supply of credit relevant?

The consensus that changes in the supply of credit were irrelevant to making monetary policy decisions existed among macroeconomists during the second half of the twentieth century. Transmission of shocks to the real economy through changes in the supply of credit, however, played an important role in the recent U.S. financial crisis. This paper explores the extent to which policymakers should consider changes in the supply of credit when making forecasts and monetary policy decisions. More specifically, it considers whether a measure of real credit balances offers consistent and stable information, beyond that of a real interest rate and real money balances, about future output gaps during the U.S. post-war era. Results yield evidence that changes in real credit balances are the only variable, among those considered, to provide consistent and stable information about future output gaps over the entire sample period. Each information variable, however, provides relatively little value added for forecasting future output gaps, beyond a simple autoregressive model. To improve upon forecasts and monetary policy decisions, policymakers therefore should consider a broader range of information variables and occasionally reassess the relative weightings assigned to each.     

Does transparency of central banks communication affect credit market? Empirical evidence for advanced and emerging markets

This study examines the effect of the transparency of central banks communication on credit market. In particular, this study investigates how central banks’ effort to provide more detailed information about their objectives regarding the price stability (monetary policy transparency) and financial stability (financial stability transparency) policies are able to mitigate information asymmetry on credit market, through the net interest margin charged by the banks to engage in financial intermediation (credit spread). The findings denote central bank transparency is able to reduce the credit spread. Additionally, the evidence suggests the effect of central bank transparency on the credit spread is greater in emerging markets, where there is less information available on credit market. In brief, transparency in central banks communication is an important tool to mitigate the information asymmetry in the credit market.     

Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis

This study compares a central bank’s leaning against the wind approach with a mix of monetary and macroprudential policies under parameter uncertainty in an estimated DSGE model with two financial frictions. We show that uncertainty of the economic environment is an essential constituent in properly designing macroprudential policy. Although coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies minimizes the policymakers’ Bayesian risk, coordination and non-coordination risks threaten the goals of both authorities. The former describes the situation where the authorities partly resign from implementing the monetary policy objectives to stabilize macroprudential risk. The latter is when conducting a non-coordinated macroprudential policy induces higher total Bayesian risk than when only the central bank minimizes the expected total welfare loss. The robust Bayesian macroeconomic rules show that when financial shocks shrink the banks’ or entrepreneurial net worth, a contractionary macroprudential policy should be combined with an expansionary monetary policy. However, if capital adequacy ratio or risk shocks strike the economy, such a conflict in macroeconomics policy instruments disappears, thus synchronizing both policies.     

Unconventional government debt purchases as a supplement to conventional monetary policy

In response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and many other central banks have adopted unconventional monetary policy instruments. We investigate if one of these, purchases of long-term government debt, could be a valuable addition to conventional short-term interest rate policy even if the main policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound. To do so, we add a stylised financial sector and central bank asset purchases to an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Asset quantities matter for interest rates through a preferred habitat channel. If conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments are coordinated appropriately then the central bank is better able to stabilise both output and inflation.     

Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

Are central banks really breaking the (policy) rules?

• ? Looking at the strength of the global economy, it's no surprise that simple policy rules suggest that interest rates in some advanced economies are much too low and/or that several rate hikes would be needed in 2018 to avoid falling further behind the curve. Nonetheless, we expect central banks to respond cautiously and we see a slower pace of tightening than the consensus view .
• ? Policy rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have long been considered a useful guide to the potential path for policy rates. But while it suggests that current US, Eurozone and Australian central bank rates are broadly appropriate, it signals that UK, Canadian, and Swedish rates should be substantially higher. Based on our economic forecasts, Taylor Rules suggest that the central banks in the US, Eurozone, Canada and Australia will all need to raise intertest rates by around 100bps by end‐2018.
• ? However, there are several reasons not to draw strong conclusions from such point estimates. First, the Taylor Rule requires estimates of two unobservable variables – the output gap and the natural rate of interest – which cannot be estimated precisely.
• ? Second, using models that were designed to predict US policy responses in the 1990s to forecast central banks' behaviour today is likely to be misleading. Meanwhile, inferring central banks' reaction functions from recent policy rate moves to assess the future policy path is fraught with difficulties. Not only have interest rates been broadly unchanged for the bulk of the post‐financial crisis period, but policymakers have provided other forms of policy support.
• ? Third, outside the US at least, Taylor Rules have historically pointed to persistently different policy rates from those observed, yet inflation has been well anchored.
• ? The upshot of all this is that we expect central banks in the advanced economies to err on the side of caution and anticipate interest rates rising less quickly than the consensus amongst economists.

     

Optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with animal spirits and financial markets

This article presents a macro-finance-interaction model that integrates a NKM with bounded rationality and an agent-based financial market model. We derive four interactive channels between the two sectors where two channels are strictly microfounded. We analyze the impact of the different channels on economic stability and derive optimal (conventional and unconventional) monetary policy rules. We find that coefficients of optimal Taylor rules do not significantly change if financial market stabilization becomes part of the central bank׳s objective function. Additionally, we show that rule-based, backward-looking monetary policy creates huge instabilities if expectations are boundedly rational. Our model is externally validated by showing that it generates fat tailed output growth rates.     

Robust monetary policy in a small open economy

We study how a central bank in a small open economy should conduct monetary policy if it fears that its model is misspecified. Using a new-Keynesian model of a small open economy, we solve analytically for the optimal robust policy rule and the equilibrium dynamics, and we separately analyze the consequences of central bank robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, output, and the exchange rate. We show that an increase in the preference for robustness makes the central bank respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification.     

The operating efficiency of financial holding and nonfinancial holding banks—Epsilou‐based measure metafrontier data envelopment analysis model

Previous bank efficiency studies assumed that the same efficient frontier system exists in different types of banks, but the conventional radial data envelopment analysis (DEA) model slacks are not counted in efficiency scores, and nonradial DEA models do not consider radial features. This paper develops an Epsilou‐based measure meta‐DEA approach for measuring the efficiencies and technology gaps of different bank types. The results are as the follows: The average efficiency and technology gaps of nonfinancial holding banks are better than those of financial holding banks. The nonfinancial holding banks are more efficient than financial holding banks in investment and other income.     

The federal funds market,excess reserves,and unconventional monetary policy

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, interbank borrowing and lending dropped, whereas reserve holdings of depository institutions skyrocketed, as the Fed injected liquidity into the U.S. banking sector. This paper introduces bank liquidity risk and limited market participation into a real business cycle model with ex ante identical financial intermediaries and shows, in an analytically tractable way, how interbank trade and excess reserves emerge in general equilibrium. Investigating the role of the federal funds market and unconventional monetary policy for the propagation of aggregate real and financial shocks, I find that federal funds market participation is irrelevant in response to standard supply and demand shocks, whereas it matters for “uncertainty shocks”, i.e. mean-preserving spreads in the cross-section of liquidity risk. Liquidity injections by the central bank can absorb the effects of financial shocks on the real economy, although excess reserves might increase and federal funds might be crowded out, as a side effect.     

Monetary policy and asset prices in an open economy

This paper examines whether central banks should respond to asset price fluctuations in a two-country sticky price model. We compare a monetary policy rule that targets both domestic asset prices and foreign asset prices with several alternative monetary policy rules. This paper shows that this policy rule can produce preferable outcomes because the domestic central bank incorporates important information that both domestic and foreign asset prices possess into its monetary policy. Our model suggests that central banks should consider both domestic and foreign asset prices in a two country framework with asset price fluctuations.     

A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies

This study examines the quantitative properties of optimal sustainable monetary policies using a monetary model with a stabilization bias. As in Kurozumi (2008), the optimal sustainable policy is a strategy considered in the absence of commitment technologies; however it is implemented following an optimal quasi-sustainable policy derived by assuming that the commitment technologies are present. This study finds that solving for the policy function of the optimal quasi-sustainable policy yields a result basically identical to the Ramsey-optimal commitment policy under a set of parameters commonly used in the literature. The simulation shows two further results: policymakers have incentive to deviate from the Ramsey-optimal commitment policy when the lagged output gap is large and the optimal quasi-sustainable policy endogenously diminishes the steadfastness of policymakers׳ commitment.     

Financial crises and economic growth

This paper constructs a simple yet robust model of financial crises and economic growth where financial markets affect real economic activity. Financial markets increase real output by facilitating investment through the borrowing/lending of capital. However, the borrowing of capital is risky due to randomness in the firms’ production. Financial crises occur when output and liquid capital are insufficient to meet required loan payments and systemic defaults occur. In this model, a financial crisis caused by systemic defaults can shift the economy from an equilibrium with positive borrowing/lending to an equilibrium with no borrowing/lending. In this no-lending equilibrium, neither traditional fiscal or monetary policy tools are effective in increasing output. Fiscal and monetary policy can only increase the likelihood of the equilibrium evolving to a borrowing/lending equilibrium.     

Central bank disclosure as a macroprudential tool for financial stability

The Basel Capital Accord (pillar 3) states that disclosure of information (transparency) is essential to financial stability. This study analyzes, through inflation reports, the disclosure of information from the Central Bank of Brazil concerning the credit market. We consider credit risk and capital buffers as measures of financial stability in this analysis. Furthermore, in order to measure the perception of the monetary authority on the credit market, we built two indices based on the central bank’s communication on credit development. We performed a panel data analysis based on a sample of 125 banks for the period from June 1999 to September 2014 (7000 observations). The findings suggest that central bank communication regarding expectations concerning the credit market contributes to financial stability. Therefore, this kind of communication of central banks (about credit development) may constitute an important macroprudential tool to improve financial stability.     

浅谈银行如何有效防范地方政府融资风险

在94年国家进行分税制改革之后,财政收入向中央政府集中,这加剧了各地方政府事权与财权不平衡的局面,政府融资平台为地方政府拓宽了融资渠道。进入2008以来,受国际金融危机的影响,我国实施了宽松的货币政策和积极的财政政策,推动了各地方政府融资平台飞速发展,在应对金融危机方面起到了重要作用。但是地方政府融资债务疯狂增长下其隐藏的风险已经逐渐凸显出来,值得我们关注。本文从银行的角度浅析了银行如何防范来自地方政府融资的风险。     

金融危机背景下美联储的非常规货币政策操作

面对金融危机，关联储不仅非常规地使用传统货币政策工具，而且还采取大量激进的非常规措施，通过购买各种证券向市场注入流动性以及运用信息沟通引导市场预期降低长期借贷成本的方式缓解金融市场紧缩局面。非常规货币政策是应对非常时期的非常措施，随着经济的复苏，各国经济刺激政策如何寻找安全退出路径是这一时期全球央行的主要任务。     

A retrospective on the subprime crisis and its aftermath ten years after Lehman’s collapse

This paper reviews the interactions between policymaking, the financial system and the U.S. economy before, during and after the subprime crisis, with particular attention to current controversies about the policy decisions that led to Lehman’s downfall and their lessons for the future. The first part of the paper documents and analyzes the interactions between policy, financial markets and the economy during the acute and subsequent moderate phases of the crisis as well as during the later gradual exit from the zero lower bound and the extremely slow reduction in high powered money and bank reserves. The remaining parts develop alternative aspects of the thesis that mutual uncertainties inflicted by financial institutions on policymakers and by the latter on financial markets were at the root of the non-negligible surprises that the crisis inflicted on everybody. In particular, it discusses the political economy of bailout operations, reviews and evaluates recent controversies about the reasons for not rescuing Lehman Brothers, and informally presents the structure and policy lessons from a general equilibrium model of the financial sector highlighting the consequences of policy actions that have raised (Knightian) bailout uncertainty. The last section takes a brief look ahead and discusses some longer term consequences of the crisis.