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1.
本文将投标人平行串谋问题与招标人公开保留价定价策略相结合,研究了第二价格密封招标方式下投标串谋联盟的串谋报价及利润分配机制,分析了串谋联盟的存在对非串谋联盟中成员的投标策略和期望利润的影响,揭示了串谋联盟成员人数与串谋联盟总收益之间的关系,探讨了招标人公开保留价定价策略、串谋联盟成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系,指出了招标人应通过降低公开保留价的方式来防止或减少投标人平行串谋行为的发生。  相似文献   

2.
本文将拍卖中有关进入成本的研究内容进行扩展,将进入成本与最优公开保留价策略结合,对标准招标中存在同质和异质进入成本时的最优公开保留价定价问题进行了研究.经过研究,发现在公开保留价的情况下,不同进入成本对招标人的期望支出、投标人的期望效用以及社会净支出方面的影响是不同,从而招标的最优公开保留价定价策略也是不同的.当投标人之间存在同质进入成本时,招标公开保留价应与招标人的真实估价相同;当投标人之间存在异质进入成本时,招标最优公开保留价不应小于标准招标模型中的最优公开保留价.  相似文献   

3.
第二价格密封招标中串谋预防机制研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
杨颖梅 《价值工程》2012,31(9):98-100
第二价格密封拍卖和招标机制作为一种可以使投标人"说真话"的机制受到理论界的广泛关注。本文研究了第二价格密封招标中,如何采用公开保留价机制对投标人平行串谋进行预防。首先建立了第二价格密封招标的串谋组织报价及利润分配机制,然后分析了存在串谋时招标人应采用的公开保留价定价机制,最后研究了串谋组织成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系。  相似文献   

4.
招标最低限价与公开保留价对防范串谋的共同作用   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
杨颖梅 《价值工程》2012,31(11):140-142
本文从防范投标人串谋的角度出发,将招标中的最优公开保留价和最低限价两种方式结合起来,通过一个离散的博弈模型,分析了第二价格密封招标中最低限价和公开保留价在防范串谋中的共同作用,经过研究发现最优公开保留价和最低限价对防范串谋方面所起作用,依赖于投标人的价值分布以及出现的可能性,另外还与投标人进行平行串谋时的成本有关。  相似文献   

5.
周蓉  吴淳 《上海管理科学》2004,(5):64-64,F003
在线性合同的假设前提下,论文通过建立模型,求解博弈的贝叶斯均衡得到了风险中性的理性招标人的最优合同形式以及投标人的最优报价策略。最后,论文通过引入招标成本函数,进一步提出了对于招标人控制投标人数从而达到自身目标最优的策略。  相似文献   

6.
串通投标,是指招标人与投标人串通或者投标人之间相互串通,以共同提高或压低工程报价等形式达到中标目的。其实质是一种不正当竞争行为,不仅严重扰乱了公平、公正、公开的招投标秩序,而且也损害了招标人和大多数投标人的正当利益。串通投标最常见、最严重的后果是因各投标人哄抬报价导致中标价格超出  相似文献   

7.
工程建设领域是腐败的高发地,招投标工作又决定着工程的发包.因此很容易产生各种违规行为,滋生腐败现象。对拦标价实施审计。不仅易于发现苗头问题,而且有利于遏制工程建设人员的腐败行为。一、拦标价基本概念及审计内容拦标价指招标人在招标过程中向投标人公示的工程项目总价格的最高限价.是招标人期望的价格,要求投标人投标报价不能超过它.否则为废标。它的编  相似文献   

8.
投标报价在工程建设中有着承上启下的作用,在投标报价过程中招标人肯定会优先把招标合同给予那些符合招标条件且投标价格较低的公司。通过了解企业成本对投标报价的决策影响从而掌握基本建设工程投标报价策略与技巧才能在激烈的竞争中取得最大的经济利益。  相似文献   

9.
地铁工程招标中的价格联盟行为严重阻碍了我国地铁行业的顺利发展。本文建立了价格联盟行为的博奔模型,并进行了经济分析。广州地铁针对招标过程中投标人的价格联盟行为,采用了包括建立诚信评分企业库并调整诚信得分比例、调整技术经济标的分值比例、调整投标基准价下浮率、制定最优报价原则等在内的不同评标策略,对投标人起到一定的引导和限制作用。  相似文献   

10.
招标控制价是《建设工程量清单计价规范》(GB50500-2008)修订中新增加的专业术语。招标控制价是指招标人根据国家或省级、行业建设行政主管部门颁发的有关计价依据和办法,按设计施工图纸计算的,对招标工程限定的最高工程造价,也可称其为拦标价、预算控制价或最高报价。对招标人来说,它是招标人控制工程造价,保障招标成功的有效手段。对投标人来说,它是其投标报价的上限,直接关系到投标人采取什么样的报价策略。所以说,招标控制价编制的科学与否,准确与否,直接关系到招投标活动的成败。以致可以影响整个建设项目的成效。下面从以下几个方面就招标控制价做一些肤浅的论述。  相似文献   

11.
Auctions with endogenous participation   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999  相似文献   

12.
This paper analyzes the entry decision of rational bidders who expect to experience auction fever in English auctions. It shows that nonparticipation decision reduces seller's expected profit and this effect may outweigh the positive effect of the auction fever. We analyze the choice between English and second‐price sealed‐bid auctions and the optimal reserve price in English auctions. We show that it might be optimal for the seller to set a reserve price below her own valuation of the object. Finally, we show that the order in which bidders place their bids matters and the first bidder always has an advantage. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

13.
We study a variation of Myerson’s (1981) model in which we allow for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In our set-up, an appropriate reserve price in a standard auction maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue. However, entry fees can be optimal only under some special conditions. Basically, there must be some homogeneity in bidders’ beliefs about the number of bidders and the auctioneer must know, to some extent, these beliefs.  相似文献   

14.
Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers nk gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner.  相似文献   

15.
This paper develops a model of takeover auctions with a two‐step information acquisition process. It shows that the threat of extra information acquisition allows the existence of the signaling jump‐bidding equilibrium even when the seller is able to change its reserve price on the basis of the bidding history. The paper shows that although a higher cost of the secondary information leads to a higher expected price, the precision of the preliminary information has an ambiguous effect on the target's expected profit and that such an effect depends on the number of potential acquirers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

16.
This paper analyzes a model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auctions with entry costs. It shows that when the second bidder owns a fraction of the target firm preemptive jump bidding leads to a higher social surplus, improves the expected profit of both bidders and reduces the expected final price. Such a toehold also leads to higher jump bids. The model implies that preemptive bidding hurts the minority shareholders but benefits the large shareholder of the target firm.  相似文献   

17.
High efficiency is one of the important goals of public procurement (PP); however, research on PP efficiency is still not sufficient, especially in the context of developing countries. With a focus on the purchasing phase, this study measures three aspects of procurement efficiency of public authorities: price, time and intellectual efficiency. The relevant factors of these three aspects are explored and examined. 838 PP contracts in Chengdu city, China were collected in the first half of 2018 using a web crawler programme. Regression method is used to analyse the data. This study finds that the price efficiency of PP is negatively associated with the implementation of green public procurement (GPP) but is positively associated with the evaluation method (the weight of bidding price during evaluation) and the number of bidders. Time efficiency is negatively associated with GPP implementation. Intellectual efficiency is negatively associated with the size of the procurement. This study accomplishes the following: I. extends research to a still relatively unexplored context: developing countries; II. adds to the studies on public procurement efficiency; and III. investigates the influence of GPP implementation on PP efficiency in a developing country.  相似文献   

18.
在独立私有价值的多单位网上英式拍卖中,诚实的竞标者能够采用对抗性的竞标策略来降低卖者参与托投标的激励,然而即使考虑了诚实竞标者对于托投标的策略性响应,托投标对于卖者而言依然是有利可图的。更为有效地阻止托投标的措施可能包括吸引更多的潜在竞标者,并限制在单次拍卖中销售的物品数量。同时考虑了卖者对于这种对抗性竞标策略的策略响应,求解了卖者的最优托投标,结论表明无论最优的托投标是唯一的还是多重的,卖者的最优策略是在开始使用低的托投标,在观察到之前的竞标信息之后通过动态调整将托投标设定到最优水平。  相似文献   

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