The choice between greenfield investment and cross-border acquisition: A real option approach

The purpose of this study is to formalize the choice of market entry strategy for an individual multinational enterprise (MNE) from a dynamic perspective. It is argued that incorporating a suitable treatment of irreversibility, uncertainty and flexibility related to a MNEs investment decision gives further insights to the choice of cross-border acquisitions to greenfield investment as the preferred entry mode. In most cases, the initial entry strategy serves as a platform allowing the firm to make subsequent investments to exploit host-country advantages and capabilities. We allow for this by taking a two-step expansion strategy explicitly into account. The evolutionary process of the value of the foreign direct investment includes two stochastic elements as well as the timing that triggers the transition from export to foreign direct investment. The results suggest that uncertainty and future investment opportunities play an important role when it comes to transit from export to the first phase of the foreign direct investment commitment as well as have an impact on the choice of entry strategy.     

基于演化博弈的工程投标中的围标行为及对策分析

本文分析了工程招投标市场中的围标行为。应用演化博弈方法构建了工程项目投标过程中招投标双方的效用模型,并分析了招投标策略的动态演化过程及影响策略均衡的决定因素,同时,揭示了其演化稳定策略的特征。最后,给出了工程项目招投标规避围标行为的策略选择及改进措施。     

Estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution with leverage

Following the recent literature on intermediary asset pricing models, this paper argues that the marginal utility of wealth of financial intermediaries can be used to generate enough volatility and counter-cyclicality on the recursive preference-based stochastic discount factor. Hence, a dynamic econometric strategy of an asset pricing model with the market portfolio return and the leverage growth of financial intermediaries allows for a sensible economic estimate of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. On the contrary, the same framework with alternative measures of consumption produces extremely poor economic results.     

A dynamic analysis of moving average rules

The use of various moving average (MA) rules remains popular with financial market practitioners. These rules have recently become the focus of a number empirical studies, but there have been very few studies of financial market models where some agents employ technical trading rules of the type used in practice. In this paper, we propose a dynamic financial market model in which demand for traded assets has both a fundamentalist and a chartist component. The chartist demand is governed by the difference between current price and a (long-run) MA. Both types of traders are boundedly rational in the sense that, based on a fitness measure such as realized capital gains, traders switch from a strategy with low fitness to the one with high fitness. We characterize the stability and bifurcation properties of the underlying deterministic model via the reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists, the extrapolation rate of the chartists and the lag length used for the MA. By increasing the intensity of choice to switching strategies, we then examine various rational routes to randomness for different MA rules. The price dynamics of the MA rule are also examined and one of our main findings is that an increase of the window length of the MA rule can destabilize an otherwise stable system, leading to more complicated, even chaotic behaviour. The analysis of the corresponding stochastic model is able to explain various market price phenomena, including temporary bubbles, sudden market crashes, price resistance and price switching between different levels.     

网络市场平台与政府协同治理的策略选择与模式优化——基于“平台-政府”双层治理模式的演化博弈分析

采用演化博弈方法,以政府和电子商务平台对平台商家售卖假货的治理为例,对“平台-政府”双层治理模式进行动态演化分析。研究表明:平台与政府能否形成稳定的“平台-政府”双层治理模式取决于平台不进行假货治理时的收益损失比,当收益损失比处于较低水平时,平台倾向于同政府合作进行治理,反之协同治理将处于失效状态;消费者举报率和平台治理效率将分别对双方博弈的演化速度和平台的演化稳定策略选择产生影响。当前,应从提升技术治理效率、增强消费者权利意识、加大对平台的监管力度等角度提升网络市场治理水平,并进一步通过转变治理思维、创新合作方式和完善权力约束等方式,探索建立网络市场政企协同治理的长效机制。     

Itchy feet vs cool heads: Flow of funds in an agent-based financial market

Investors tend to move funds when they are unhappy with their current portfolio managers׳ performance. We study the effect of the size of this flow of funds in an agent-based model of the financial market. The model combines the discrete choice approach from agent-based modelling, where all capital is mobile, with the evolutionary finance framework where all growth is endogenous. Our results show that, if investors exhibit recency bias in evaluating portfolio managers׳ performance, even a small amount of freely flowing capital has a huge impact on the market dynamics and the survival of noise traders. We also find that investors׳ intensity of choice is a driving force for excess volatility and extreme price movements when the size of the flow of funds is large.     

Convergence to Walrasian equilibrium with minimal information

We consider convergence to Walrasian equilibrium in a situation where firms know only market price and their own cost function. We term this a situation of minimal information. We model the problem as a large population game of Cournot competition. The Nash equilibrium of this model is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We apply the best response (BR) dynamic as our main evolutionary model. This dynamic can be applied under minimal information as firms need to know only the market price and the their own cost to compute payoffs. We show that the BR dynamic converges globally to Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game like the Cournot model. Hence, it converges globally to the Walrasian equilibrium under minimal information. We extend the result to some other evolutionary dynamics using the method of potential games.

     

Optimal investment of variance-swaps in jump-diffusion market with regime-switching

We consider a general jump-diffusion market with regime-switching where the jump risk is modeled as a Markov-modulated Poisson random measure. In this incomplete market, we price the variance-swaps using a combination of the Esscher transform and change of measure on time-inhomogeneous Markov chains. We study the dynamic optimal investment problem of the variance-swaps and characterize the optimal feedback strategy. Moreover, a closed-form solution to the HJB PDE associated with the stochastic control problem is established and the verification theorem is proved. The numerical analysis based on a two-state Markov chain uncovers some robust features of the optimal investment strategy.     

Risk sharing and counter-cyclical variation in market correlations

I present a consumption-based dynamic asset pricing model in which international market correlations vary counter-cyclically over time. The driving force in the model is the time-varying effective risk aversion induced by external habit formation. Market returns are driven by fundamental outputs and discount rates. When risk aversion is high, the effect of discount rates on market returns rises with the market price of risk. To the extent that countries share risk, the cross-country correlation of discount rates exceeds the cross-country correlation of fundamental outputs. In bad times, market correlations rise as returns are mostly driven by discount rates. Thus, consistent with the empirical evidence, periods of high risk aversion are associated with high market correlations and high market volatility. After calibration, my model is consistent with the observed variation in market correlations, as well as other features of asset prices including the equity premium and market volatility.     

Performance of investment strategies in the absence of correct beliefs

We study an evolutionary market model with long-lived assets. We show that in the absence of correct beliefs, the strategy which is “closer” to the Kelly rule cannot be driven out of the market. This means that this strategy will either dominate or at least survive. Our techniques are borrowed from the theory of random dynamical systems.     

Budgeting for research and development: a dynamic financial simulation approach

The research and development (R&D) budgeting decision is crucial for at least two reasons: if too much is spent, short-term financial stability is at risk, while, if the budget is too small, long-term competitiveness is threatened. Nevertheless, many enterprises simply extrapolate the past without further reflection.This paper presents a computer-based dynamic stochastic simulation model that allows one to assess the impact of alternative R&D budgeting policies on corporate development. The core decisions to be evaluated concern timing and funding of investments in R&D. Our approach substantially expands earlier work by Brockhoff (R&D Manage. 19 (1989) 265). In particular, it distinguishes between product and process innovation, considers market dynamics related to technical progress via a modifiable S-curve, integrates marketing, and takes into account essential financial aspects. As a result, our model is closer to reality than previous ones. A sample application with real company data illustrates its potential usage.     

金融渗透理论与企业理财

随着市场经济的发展和经济全球化的深入,企业理财理论有必要从开放、动态的视角来分析和透视企业的理财活动。文章应用金融渗透理论重新审视了企业价值的创造过程。企业的历史沿革反映了金融渗透的互动过程。在某一特定时空条件下,金融渗透处于动态的均衡状态。金融市场的流动性创造、风险规避、资金融通、控制权市场等四项基本功能的发挥直接影响到金融渗透的程度和速度。文章进一步分析得出,宏观经济部门和市场微观组织的金融渗透与金融市场的结构密不可分。     

Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly

Investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of R&D, generating spillovers that lowers the second comer's investment cost. We show that these spillovers substantially affect the equilibrium of the dynamic game. Even for low spillover values, the leader delays her investment until the stochastic fundamental has gone past the level such that the follower's optimal strategy is to invest as soon as he attains the spillover. This bears several interesting implications. First, because the follower invests as he benefits from the spillover, in equilibrium the average time delay between the two investments is short, as it should be expected. Second, in case of a major innovation, an optimal public policy requires an intervention in favor of the investment activity; an increase in uncertainty - delaying the equilibrium - calls for higher subsidization rates. Third, numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader's and the follower's maximum value functions. Accordingly, our model can help generate realistic market betas.     

Asset pricing with loss aversion

The use of standard preferences for asset pricing has not been very successful in matching asset price characteristics, such as the risk-free interest rate, equity premium and the Sharpe ratio, to time series data. Behavioral finance has recently proposed more realistic preferences such as those with loss aversion. Research is starting to explore the implications of behaviorally founded preferences for asset price characteristics. Encouraged by some studies of Benartzi and Thaler [1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1), 73–92] and Barberis et al. [2001. Prospect theory and asset prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVI (1), 1–53] we study asset pricing with loss aversion in a production economy. Here, we employ a stochastic growth model and use a stochastic version of a dynamic programming method with an adaptive grid scheme to compute the above mentioned asset price characteristics of a model with loss aversion in preferences. As our results show using loss aversion we get considerably better results than one usually obtains from pure consumption-based asset pricing models including the habit formation variant.     

绿色供应链的演化博弈分析

以有线性需求函数的产品差异化模型作为研究基础。首先,运用演化博弈论研究了绿色供应链中制造商选择生产绿色产品的演化行为,结果表明:在市场机制下,只有生产绿色产品的利润大于生产非绿色产品的利润,市场将逐渐演化到“绿色市场”;反之,非绿色产品将把绿色产品挤出市场。在这种情况下,借助政府的补贴机制可以改变市场的演化方向。然后,分析了政府补贴机制的有效性。最后,通过数值分析证明了结论的正确性。     

Labor Market Dynamics: A Time‐Varying Analysis

This paper studies how key labour market stylized facts and the responses of labour market variables to technology shocks vary over the US postwar period. It uses a benchmark dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model enriched with labour market frictions and investment‐specific technological progress that enables a novel identification scheme based on sign restrictions on a SVAR with time‐varying coefficients and stochastic volatility. Key findings are: (i) the volatility in job finding and separation rates has declined over time, while their correlation varies across time; (ii) the job finding rate plays an important role for unemployment, and the two series are strongly negatively correlated over the sample period; (iii) the magnitude of the response of labour market variables to technology shocks varies across the sample period.     

Analysis of optimal dynamic withdrawal policies in withdrawal guarantee products

Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefits (GMWB) are popular riders in variable annuities with withdrawal guarantees. With withdrawals spread over the life of the annuities contract, the benefit promises to return the entire initial annuitization amount irrespective of the market performance of the underlying fund portfolio. Treating the dynamic withdrawal rate as the control variable, the earlier works on GMWB have considered the construction of a continuous singular stochastic control model and the numerical solution of the resulting pricing model. This paper presents a more detailed characterization of the pricing properties of the GMWB and performs a full mathematical analysis of the optimal dynamic withdrawal policies under the competing factors of time value of fund, optionality value provided by the guarantee and penalty charge on excessive withdrawal. When a proportional penalty charge is applied on any withdrawal amount, we can reduce the pricing formulation to an optimal stopping problem with lower and upper obstacles. We then derive the integral equations for the determination of a pair of optimal withdrawal boundaries. When a proportional penalty charge is applied on the amount that is above the contractual withdrawal rate, we manage to characterize the behavior of the optimal withdrawal boundaries that separate the domain of the pricing models into three regions: no withdrawal, continuous withdrawal at the contractual rate and an immediate withdrawal of a finite amount. Under certain limiting scenarios such as a high policy fund value, the time close to expiry, or a low value of guarantee account, we manage to obtain analytical approximate solution to the singular stochastic control model of dynamic withdrawals.     

ECONOMETRIC MODELLING OF UK HOUSE PRICES USING ACCELERATED IMPORTANCE SAMPLING*

We consider stochastic and dynamic extensions of a model for UK house prices proposed by Hendry (1984). Numerical integrations are carried out by means of an accelerated importance sampling technique developed by Richard and Zhang (1996a,b). We find that prices ‘perfectly’ adjust to a stochastic latent variable (‘excess demand’) whose distribution only depends upon observable characteristics of the market, not upon its own lagged values.     

Stochastic models of resonating markets

This paper describes a way to model a seasonally and irregularly peaking price dynamics, as that originated in commodity and energy markets, using a system of coupled nonlinear stochastic differential equations. The specific case of an electric power market is used to show which microeconomic features this approach is able to model. Critical point analysis is used in a simple way to show how the interaction between dynamic criticality and stochasticity can be used to develop further models, useful to explore more deeply other types of peaking price dynamics.     

Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamics

The emergence of online group-buying provides a new consumption pattern for consumers in e-commerce era. However, many consumers realize that their own interests sometimes can’t be guaranteed in the group-buying market due to the lack of being regulated. This paper aims to develop effective regulation strategies for online group-buying market. To the best of our knowledge, most existing studies assume that three parties in online group-buying market, i.e. the retailer, the group-buying platform and the consumer, are perfectly rational. To better understand the decision process, in this paper, we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration. Firstly, a three-parties evolutionary game model is established to study each player’s game strategy based on bounded rationality. Secondly, the game model is simulated as a whole by adopting system dynamics to analyze its stability. Finally, theoretical analysis and extensive computational experiments are conducted to obtain the managerial insights and regulation strategies for online group-buying market. Our results clearly demonstrate that a suitable bonus-penalty measure can promote the healthy development of online group-buying market.