Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard

This paper combines the shirking and the matching approaches of equilibrium unemployment in order to endogenize the wage formation process as a function of labour market conditions. The steady-state equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no-shirking condition is binding or not. It is demonstrated that the efficiency wage approach is relevant when the unemployment rate is above a certain threshold. Furthermore, an efficiency wage is more likely when the disutility of effort is high, recruiting costs and workers' bargaining power are low, inspections are unlikely and the workers' productivity is weak.     

Are shirking and leisure substitutable? An empirical test of efficiency wages based on urban economic theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.     

Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of an Equilibrium Search Model

We specify and estimate an equilibrium job search model with productivity differences across labour market segments. The model allows for two types of unemployment: frictional unemployment due to search frictions and structural unemployment due to wage floors. Wage floors exist because of high unemployment benefits or binding minimum wages. The productivity distribution is estimated semi-nonparametrically along the lines of Gallant-Nychka, using Hermite series approximation. We decompose the total unemployment rate and we examine the effects of changes in the minimum wage.     

Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium

This paper considers optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved job search effort. The Planner chooses unemployment benefits, taxes and job creation subsidies to maximise a Utilitarian welfare function. Optimal policy involves a trade-off between higher employment taxes (which finance more generous unemployment benefits) and greater market tightness (which reduces the average unemployment spell). Optimal UI implies the initial UI payment equals the wage, thus ensuring consumption is smooth across the job destruction shock, and UI payments then fall with duration.     

Search frictions,real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance

In this paper, we study the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme when the economy is subject to labor market imperfections characterized by real wage rigidities and search frictions. The US unemployment insurance financing is such that firms are taxed proportionately to their layoffs to finance unemployment benefits. Using DSGE methodology, we investigate how policy instruments should interact with labor market imperfections. It is shown that wage rigidities in a search and matching environment cause welfare costs, especially in the absence of an incentive-based unemployment insurance. This cost is mainly due to the distorting effect of wage rigidities which generate inefficient separations. We show that the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme – corresponding to the Ramsey policy – offsets labor market imperfections and allows implementation of the Pareto allocation. The second-best allocation brings the economy close to the Ramsey allocation. The implementation of the optimal policies clearly highlights the role of labor market institutions for short-run stabilization.     

Involuntary Unemplyment in Imperfectly Competitive General Equilibrium Models

This paper is about 'involuntary unemployment' in general equilibrium models with imperfect competition. It surveys papers written after the seminal work of d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard‐Varet (1984). This unemployment is called involuntary because it exists at any wage. It results from imperfect competition in the product markets, more specifically from firms' excessive market power. These papers have focussed their attention on the conditions required for involuntary unemployment. In our presentation, we characterise this form of unemployment through three elements: consumers' preferences, price expectations and Ford effects. Each element is important because it influences the demand for the good and hence its price elasticity, the latter being central in the definition of firms' market power. JEL Classification. D43, E24.     

Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen

In a common market with costless mobility of all factors regional governments can attract mobile firms by granting subsidies which they must finance out of wage taxes on mobile labour. Firms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, forcing government ‘in the splits’ (double Bertrand-type tax competition). Initially, there is unemployment in the economy. Regional governments then behave like middlemen in the labour market, and the fiscal game takes the form of competition among strategic intermediaries. Results from the theory of intermediation are applied to this framework. It is shown that government size may increase rather than decline in a fiscal competition, that industrial clustering may emerge from tax competition, and that tax competition may alleviate the unemployment problem.     

Flexibility bites back: the multiple and hidden costs of flexible employment policies

Flexible labour markets are increasingly regarded as the answer to a wide spectrum of labour market and societal challenges from creating jobs to reducing segmentation and welfare dependency, improving public finances and supporting workforce diversity and innovation. The contention is that, contrary to these claims, flexible labour markets generate fundamental contradictions and unsustainable long‐term trends. The jobs miracle is exaggerated and based on low productivity jobs, outsiders often lose most from competition, claimants must work flexibly but still secure a full‐time wage, low‐wage employment is shrinking the fiscal base, jobs are not being adjusted to accommodate workers' changing needs and capacities and the disposable labour model is undermining long‐term productivity.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing under labour market imperfections

We study the effects of international outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment in a high-wage economy with labour market imperfections. We demonstrate, consistent with empirical results, that the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of outsourcing. Furthermore, we show that a production mode with more outsourcing reduces the negotiated wage in a high-wage country with labour market imperfections if the relative bargaining power of the labour union is sufficiently high. Under such circumstances outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we characterize the optimal production mode showing that stronger labour market imperfections induce a production mode with more outsourcing.     

Desired and actual labour supply of unmarried men and women in the Netherlands

Desired and actual working hours of unmarried adults are analyzed. A discrete structural neoclassical model is used to explain desired hours, which depend on gross wage rates, tax and benefit rules, other income, and some background variables. The model takes account of fixed costs of working and of prediction errors in wage rates of nonworkers. Actual hours are explained from desired hours and hours restrictions. Deviations between actual and desired hours are used to identify equations for involuntary unemployment and the lack of part-time jobs. The model is estimated using cross-section data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. We find larger wage elasticities of desired hours of work for women than for men. Involuntary unemployment and a lack of part-time jobs appear to be important sources of hours restrictions. Individuals with (potential) wages below the minimum wage have a significantly larger probability of involuntary unemployment than others.     

Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work

This paper discusses the effect of tax progression on wage setting and employment in a unionised labour market. Recent contributions to this field argue that tax progression paradoxically enhances employment if wage setting is subject to collective bargaining. In this literature, individual hours of work are usually assumed to be exogenously given. We show that the positive employment effect of tax progression can be generalized to a model with a positive labour supply elasticity of individual workers. However, the wage-moderating effect of tax progression does not unambiguously carry over to a world where the union may fix both wages and individual hours of work. In this framework, the union reacts to tax progression by cutting individual working time. The wage rate, however, may decrease or increase. If the wage rate increases, the number of employed workers may decline despite the reduction in hours of work.     

Wage changes through job mobility in Europe: A multinomial endogenous switching approach

This paper presents evidence on the relationship between job mobility and wage mobility for various European countries using the European Community Household Panel (1994–2001). While much of the earlier research uses least-squares regression to predict wages for individuals with different labour market experience, we have found that it is important to take into account the possible non-random selection between job movers and stayers and between voluntary and involuntary movers. In this paper we focus on the effects of an unemployment spell on subsequent wages by estimating a multinomial endogenous switching model composed of two selection equations and three wage equations. Our results indicate that job mobility through unemployment has negative returns in all the analysed economies. As regards stayers, these losses range from 8% in Portugal to 21% in Germany while losses with respect to voluntary movers vary from 14% in Spain to 31% in Portugal.     

LOCAL PAY DETERMINATION

Abstract. Theoretical models of local pay are reviewed, ranging from neoclassical perspectives, unemployment/wage trade-off models, and segmented labour market approaches. The empirical work on U.S. North-South differentials is discussed. For the U.K., studies of the extent of and trends in geographical pay differentials are considered, as well as behavioural explanations focusing on the role of excess demand. The issue of adjustment processes is then discussed, both in theory and in relation to empirical work for the U.S. and U.K. This discussion focuses largely on geographical spillover effects, in terms of origins, evidence, and issues of identification. Finally, the impact of certain impediments in the adjustment process are considered, specifically in relation to the U.K. These concern the role and influence of national wage bargaining, as well as factors inhibiting labour migration, stemming from the housing market and the climate of the national labour market.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

Wage Formation,Regional Migration and Local Labour Market Tightness*

Empirical studies of regional wage formation and interregional migration routinely include the regional unemployment rate as indicator of local labour market tightness. However, these studies are usually motivated by economic theories that emphasize transition probabilities between unemployment and employment, and the unemployment rate is an imperfect proxy for these probabilities. We use a large micro data set to compute estimates of the rate of outflow from unemployment for 90 Norwegian travel‐to‐work areas. The outflow rates perform better than traditional measures of regional labour market tightness in panel data analyses of regional wages and interregional migration.     

税收累进性测度的改进：方法、比较和应用

提出判断税收累进性的边际效应方法：当总收入基尼系数的税收边际效应大于0时,该税收具有累进性特征;并将税收边际效应作为测度指数。边际效应指数与K指数具有完全相同的符号,不同税种具有可加性,它比K指数更为稳健,且赋予了税收累进性新的经济含义：税收对总收入基尼系数贡献率大于平均税率。同时还着重讨论几种测度税收累进性指数的关系,对各种测度指数进行了实证,发现S指数存在一定程度的缺陷。     

Ambiguous effects of tax progressivity — theory and Danish evidence

Recent tax reforms in the OECD area have aimed at reducing the progressivity of labour income taxation by reducing marginal taxes for given average taxes. Theory has shown that this reduces employment/production when workers and firms determine wages through bargaining. This paper shows that an opposite effect arises when both wages and working hours are subject to bargaining. This may reverse the traditional result and this is especially likely if the bargaining power of workers is low and if labour supply is relatively elastic. In conclusion, the overall effect of a reduction in progressivity is ambiguous. The empirical estimates for Denmark indicate that the overall effect is negative for blue-collar workers and neutral for white-collar workers.     

Equilibrium Unemployment Dynamics in a Panel of OECD Countries

We focus on the equilibrium unemployment rate as a parameter implied by a dynamic aggregate model of wage and price setting. The equilibrium unemployment rate depends on institutional labour market institutions through mark‐up coefficients. Compared with existing studies, the resulting final equation for unemployment has a richer dynamic structure. The empirical investigation is conducted in a panel data framework and uses OECD data up to 2012. We propose to extend the standard estimation method with time dummies to control and capture the effects of common and national shocks by using impulse indicator saturation (WG‐IIS), which has not been previously used on panel data. WG‐IIS robustifies the estimators of the regression coefficients in the dynamic model, and it affects the estimated equilibrium unemployment rates. We find that wage co‐ordination stands out as the most important institutional variable in our data set, but there is also evidence pointing to the tax wedge and the degree of compensation in the unemployment insurance system as drivers of equilibrium unemployment.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.