基于产权会计理论对国企低效原因回顾与思考

产权会计理论者初始就认为产权改革是国企改革的重点所在,但是在国企改革推行数十年的今天处境依旧尴尬,深化改革势在必行。在产权理论中,国有产权下的国有企业低效运行存在交易费用虚高、财务报表信息失真及审计不作为等问题,而解决这些问题、进行国企市场化的前提是厘清产权。文章旨在从产权会计理论角度对国企低效进行相关分析,并对国企发展提出建议。     

“最佳产权清晰度”的经济学分析

本文以巴泽尔的产权理论为基础,提出了"最佳产权清晰度"的概念,并为此建立理论框架模型。当人们为一项交易签订并履行契约时,使外生交易费用和内生交易费用总和最小的"产权清晰度"为"最佳产权清晰度"。外生交易费用取决于产权清晰度、交易的信息不对称程度和度量、测算和控制交易对象的各种属性技术要求度;内生交易费用取决于产权清晰度、交易的频率和潜在的可谈判数目。根据框架模型,本文分析了"最佳产权清晰度"的决定及变动,得出了一些有意义的结论与启示。     

二元产权机制与会计创新：劳动者权益会计

产权经济学派以交易费用为中心，从产权与资源配置效率之间的关系这一角度再次论证了“生产关系必须适应生产力发展的要求”这一基本规律，即作为生产关系范畴的“产权机制”必须以能否优化资源配置、提高社会效率作为其评价的合理性标准。本文认为，现有的产权机制并不能适应知识经济时代社会生产经营特点，必须做出相应的变革，建立新的产权机制。同时，“产权与会计之间存在着一种天然的联系。任何时期的会计都是建立在一定的产权关系上；任何一种类型的会计都要维护特定的产权制度”。因此，新的产权机制的建立又将呼唤新的会计模式的出…     

农村土地征用的新制度经济学分析

<正>一、新制度经济学理论观点(一)交易费用理论交易费用的思想是科斯在1937年《企业的性质》中提出的,他认为市场和企业是不同的交易机制。科斯认为,交易费用应包括度量、界定和保障产权的费用,发现交易对象和交易价格的费用,讨价还价、订立合同的费用,督     

从产权经济学看会计的基本目标

会计目标是会计系统运行所期望达到的目的或境界,它作为会计理论研究的起点,一直是各国会计学家研究的热点,并形成了“受托责任学派”和“决策有用学派”两大学派。但是,当前的会计目标理论都是根据具体环境而提出具体会计目标,并没有涉及到会计内在的基本目标。本文拟从产权经济学的角度对会计的基本目标进行讨论。按照产权学派的观点,产权实质上是人们围绕财产而建立或发生的一种经济关系,具有排他性。企业就是由所有对企业具有任何形式排他性的某种权利的产权主体所构成的;组成企业的每个产权主体都为企业的生产过程提供某种投入(人工、…     

建立现代企业制度是培养企业家资本角色的必然选择

一、私有产权的形成及交易费用理论 根据科斯的交易用理论,企业及其制度的产和是个必然。一个形象的比喻是:当生产力发展到人类只有通过合作才能生产某种产品时,占有生产资料的个体可以通过每天都从市场招募劳动力合作共同生产,显然这样做的交易成本极高,但这个费用完     

内部控制制度的产权因素分析

企业产权发轫于企业资源的外部性．为了尽可能的减少负外部性带来的损失，就需要合理的安排好产权结构．而产权安排和遵循的制度规定就形成了内部控制制度．内部控制制度是产权维护的工具。同时维护产权需要支付交易费用，交易费用制约了内部控制制度存在的可能性和完善程度．     

物权、物权法与会计目标

本文在回溯物权制度演进的基础上,界定了物权内涵、物权与产权的关系,探讨了物权与会计目标的内在一致性,分析了物权法的颁布与实施对实现会计目标的积极作用。认为强化整个社会的物权意识、全面落实物权法的有关规定,有利于实现会计降低交易费用、保护相关产权主体权益和优化资源配置的目标。     

从契约理论分析现代会计的功能与角色定位

本文试图以交易费用经济学及代理理论为基础．考察交易费用经济学和代理理论对会计理论研究的理论意义和影响，从而为人们从制度与机制设计的角度认识会计系统的性质与功能提供新的视野。     

会计准则的性质：基于产权论视角的分析

会计与产权之间历来存在着密切联系，本文从会计的产权出发，引入产权的基本原理，从产权论的视角重新审视会计准则的性质。认为会计准则是有助于降低交易费用、提高产权效率和有助于规范会计信息披露的产权制度，并对其进行了具体分析。     

Determinants of property rights institutions: survey of literature and new evidence

Why do some countries have better institutions than others? More specifically, what accounts for variation in the quality of property rights institutions in different countries? In this paper, I empirically assess four different theories relating to the determinants of property rights institutions: (1) the economic approach, which maintains that property rights institutions are created when the benefits of their creation exceed their costs; (2) the cultural approach, which stipulates that institutional variation reflects the differences in the beliefs of political leaders about what institutions create benefits for society; (3) the historical approach, which contends that cross-country differences in property rights institutions are the by-product of historical accidents; and (4) the political approach, which defends the premise that institutions are voluntarily chosen by the individuals who control political power, and these individuals choose institutions with the objective to maximize their personal payoffs rather than the benefits of the society as a whole. In order to test the veracity of these theories, I undertake a cross-sectional analysis of 142 countries (including 116 developing and 26 developed countries) over the period 1970–2005. The results of this analysis provide several interesting insights. Firstly, they indicate that the political approach appears to be the most relevant explanation for cross-country variation in property rights institutions: not only is this approach the most statistically robust, it also provides the best fit with the property rights index. The results of non-nested hypothesis test à la Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) confirm this analysis. Secondly, regardless of econometric specification and country sample, democracy is positively and significantly linked to property rights institutions. Thirdly, the data also reveal that while legal origin does significantly affect property rights institutions in developing countries, it appears to have no effect in developed countries. Fourthly, my analysis demonstrates that, in contrast to the full sample case, an increase in GDP per capita does not significantly contribute to the improvement in the quality of property rights institutions in Africa.     

Property rights theory,transaction costs theory,and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management

Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource‐based theory. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Property rights,transaction costs,and the limits of the market

Economics of Governance - To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the design of the property rights on either a good whose consensual transfer...     

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: THE IDEA OF THE COROLLARY OF THE COASE THEOREM AND A POSSIBLE APPLICATION

Extant theories on the application of the Coase Theorem to the development market have focused on the effects of zoning on the environment or upon property prices. As an original contribution to the Coasian research on the interface between the development market and the statutory planning machinery, this article seeks to develop a Coasian proposition informed by what has been called the corollary of the Coase Theorem, which allows for an empirical examination of the impact of property prices on decisions to use resources under different institutional arrangements. Our proposition is that the procedural steps taken to consume resources are not contingent on property prices unless the associated transaction costs are positive or property rights ambiguous.     

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE? AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE COROLLARY OF THE COASE THEOREM

Applying the corollary of the Coase Theorem to the development market developed in Lai et al. (2007a) , we evaluate the proposition that procedural steps to use resources are not contingent on property rights assignment, unless the associated transaction costs are positive or property rights are ambiguous. Using aggregate statistics regarding planning applications for residential use, property prices, construction costs, share prices, interest rates, and application success rates in Hong Kong from 1985 to 2005, we evaluated, using regression techniques, the null hypothesis that there was no change in the relationship between readiness for submission of planning applications and property prices in response to changes in the time limits imposed on planning permissions . The relationship was more pronounced or strengthened (less obvious or weakened) when time limits were first imposed and shorter (longer). This can be explained in terms of the transaction costs of switching resource allocation according to the time limit.     

Uncovering the hidden transaction costs of market power: A property rights approach to strategic positioning

A central construct in competitive strategy research is market power, the ability to raise price above marginal cost. Positioning research focuses on attempts to build, protect, and exercise market power. However, this approach contains hidden assumptions about transaction costs. Parties made worse off by the exercise of market power can negotiate, bargain, form coalitions, and otherwise contract around the focal firm's attempts to appropriate monopoly profits—depending on transaction costs. We build on property rights economics to explain how transaction costs affect positioning and offer propositions about successful positioning in an environment with transaction costs.     

全球化:会计理论发展的探讨

全球化是大家共同关注的一个话题。它具有两重性:既给世界提供了机遇和可能,又带来了更多的风险和挑战。对会计而言,全球化的冲击是全面的。在全球化的影响下,会计理论发展的目标是跟踪和达到国际前沿,会计“难题”与“热点”问题是否处于国际前沿尤其值得关注。在此基础上,我们要创新发展会计理论,重视会计理论“自主知识产权”。     

New Institutional Economics in the Post-Socialist Transformation Debate

The paper suggests that there is a tension between the basic tenant of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the manner in which it has been applied in the debate on post-socialist transformation. This tension is explored in the context of four main perspectives on NIE: (i) property rights, (ii) transaction costs economics, (iii) new economic history, and (iv) evolutionary economics. There are two main arguments. The first is that the transformation phase should be seen as 'open-ended' rather than a 'closed process' where the 'pure market' is the inevitable end result. The second is that, although the NIE literature touches on most of the issues which are relevant to post-socialist transformation, the insights that it offers are still too general for policy guidance.     

POVERTY,INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMICS: HERNANDO DE SOTO ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT1

Hernando de Soto's analysis of the high cost of establishing, protecting and trading in property rights in his home country of Peru and other developing nations demonstrates the centrality of institutions to economic analysis and outcomes. The effective denial of property rights to hundreds of thousands of poor people means that their economic potential and that of their countries is largely untapped. De Soto's Peruvian think‐tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, has worked for 20 years towards the implementation of reforms to clear property titles and reduce the excessive regulation that stifles developing world entrepreneurship.     

公司治理机制对会计稳健性影响之实证研究

本文研究了债务、股权性质、董事会结构等公司治理机制对会计稳健性的影响,以期对会计准则制定、投资者对会计报表数据的判断及其他利益相关者的决策提供一定的经验证据。研究发现债务比重高的公司相对债务比重低的公司而言,其会计政策之选择更趋稳健;国家股一股独大的公司会计稳健性较低;目前我国上市公司独立董事比例对会计稳健性无影响。