Location incentives in the low-income housing tax credit: Are qualified census tracts necessary?

The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) is the largest project-based housing subsidy in the United States. Within the program, private developers receive a subsidy in exchange for constructing apartment units that rent for a predetermined affordable rate. Because the subsidy requires apartment buildings to charge a lower rental rate, the opportunity cost of developing subsidized housing in a location is the market rent that a developer could have charged if he had not received the subsidy. This study characterizes how profit incentives motivate location decisions within the LIHTC program by showing that opportunity cost causes more LIHTC development in locations with low market rent. This result implies that additional financial incentives, like the qualified census tract, may not be necessary to promote construction of subsidized housing in low-rent areas.     

Low-income housing development and crime

This paper examines the effect of rental housing development subsidized by the federal government’s Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program on local crime. Under the LIHTC program, certain high-poverty census tracts receive Qualified Census Tract (QCT) status, which affects the size of the tax credits developers receive for building low-income housing. Changes in federal rules determining QCT status generate quasi-experimental variation in the location of LIHTC projects. Exploiting this variation, we find that low-income housing development in the poorest neighborhoods brings with it significant reductions in violent crime that are measurable at the county level. There are no detectable effects on property crime.     

Does the low-income housing tax credit increase the supply of housing?

The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) was originated in conjunction with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) to provide incentives for private sector production of low-income housing. In this note we examine whether these units have added to the existing stock or merely substituted for unsubsidized units that otherwise would have been built. We explicitly control for effects of the number of other supply-side (e.g., public housing, Section 8 New Construction, Section 236 housing) and demand-side (vouchers and Section 8 Certificates) subsidies. From estimations of a simple cross-state model of the determinants of the stock of housing per 1000 population, we find no significant relationship between the number of LIHTC units (and other subsidized units) built in a given state and the size of the current housing stock, suggesting a high rate of substitution. However, our test is not sufficiently powerful to reject some alternative null hypotheses that suggest a lower rate of substitution, and we make some suggestions for future research.     

The impact of the low income housing tax credit program on local schools

The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program has developed over two million rental homes for low-income households since 1986. The perception of deterioration in school quality has been a main reason for community opposition to LIHTC projects in middle- and upper-income areas. In this paper, we examine the impact of LIHTC projects on the nearby school performance using data on all LIHTC projects and elementary schools in Texas from the 2003–04 through 2008–09 academic years. We employ the longitudinal structure of the data to control for school fixed effects and estimate the relationship between the opening of nearby LIHTC on campus-level standardized test scores and performance ratings. We address the potential selection biases by controlling for preexisting trends in school performance prior to the study period. We find no robust evidence that the opening of LIHTC units negatively impacts the performance of nearby elementary schools.     

Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in France

In this paper, I show that in-kind benefit such as a housing benefit program may have a significant impact on the price of the subsidized good. I use a French housing benefit reform to evaluate the impact of the subsidy on the level of rents. The results indicate that one additional euro of housing benefit leads to an increase of 78 cents in the rent paid by new benefit claimants, leaving only 22 cents available to reduce their net rent and increase their consumption. This large impact of housing benefit on rents appears to be the result of a very low housing supply elasticity. I show that the housing benefit reform induced additional demand, not only from low income households but also from students who used the benefit to become independent. Unfortunately, this increase in demand was unmatched by increasing housing supply in the short and middle term. The only possible effect of the reform is a small increase in housing quality. These results raise questions about the use of such in-kind transfers when the supply of the subsidized good is almost inelastic. It is therefore very important to estimate the incidence of the subsidy when assessing the efficiency of such welfare programs.     

美国的廉租住房保障措施及借鉴

美国廉租住房保障的措施主要包括:以政府的直接支出开发公共住房、政府资助开发私有出租房、要求或鼓励开发商提供廉价(租)住房以及向租住家庭提供租金补贴以扩大其住房需求。分析了这些措施的优势和不足。认为我国应建立以中央政府为主导的廉租住房保障机制;在建设和保有一定量的公共廉租住房的同时依靠优惠政策吸引私人投资,扩大廉租住房的供给;进一步完善廉租住房货币补贴保障机制;要求或鼓励开发商在建设经济适用房、普通商品房的同时配建廉租住房。     

创新住房保障模式 解决“夹心层”住房问题

为解决现有住房保障模式下存在的“夹心层”住房问题,本文从住房保障对象识别、保障方式选择、住房补贴标准确定、补贴金额计算等方面构建了一种新型的住房保障模式,该模式以货币补贴替代目前的实物补贴,实现了“收入越高补贴越少”的反向递减补贴效果,实现了住房保障的垂直公平,解决了现有模式下的“夹心层”问题,并进行了实证分析。     

How should heavy-duty trucks be taxed?

This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating optimal taxes on the fuel use and mileage of heavy-duty trucks in the United States, accounting for external costs from congestion, accidents, pavement damage, noise, energy security, and local and global pollution. The analysis allows for endogenous fuel economy, increased auto travel in response to reduced truck congestion, and distinguishes driving by truck type and region. We estimate the optimal (second-best) diesel fuel tax at $1.12 per gallon and implementing it increases welfare by $1.34 billion per annum. Optimizing over both fuel and mileage taxes, and differentiating mileage taxes by vehicle type and region, yields progressively higher welfare gains. The most efficient tax structure involves a diesel fuel tax of 69 cents per gallon and charges on trucks that vary between 7 and 33 cents per mile; implementing this tax structure yields estimated welfare gains of $2.06 billion.     

创新住房保障模式 解决“夹心层”住房问题

为解决现有住房保障模式下存在的夹心层住房问题,本文从住房保障对象识别、保障方式选择、住房补贴标准确定、补贴金额计算等方面构建了一种新型的住房保障模式,该模式以货币补贴替代目前的实物补贴,实现了收入越高补贴越少的反向递减补贴效果,实现了住房保障的垂直公平,解决了现有模式下的夹心层问题,并进行了实证分析。     

Do subsidized housing units depreciate faster than unsubsidized ones?

The economics literature provides considerable evidence on the performance of low-income housing programs. One issue that has not been adequately addressed by previous studies is the relative depreciation rates of subsidized and unsubsidized housing units. Simple economic theory suggests that subsidized projects should depreciate more quickly than unsubsidized units, as the rents received by owners of these projects do not depend directly on the condition of their units provided that they meet minimum housing standards. However, many government programs aimed at modernizing subsidized housing projects exist. Whether there is a difference between the depreciation rates of subsidized and unsubsidized housing units is therefore an empirical question. Using panel data from the American Housing Survey, I find that there is no significant difference in the depreciation rates of subsidized and unsubsidized housing units over the period from 1985 to 2005.     

Innovation subsidy under duopoly

Innovation plays extremely important roles in the society, and underinvestment in innovation popularly exists. This article aims to capture innovative subsidy with game theory model. First, unilateral subsidy stimulates both innovation and outputs of subsidized firms, while it deters those of opponents. Second, under innovation subsidy, relationship between subsidized firm's innovation and product substitutability satisfies a U shape. For opponents, it is also a U-shaped relationship. Third, under unilateral subsidy, subsidizing high-efficiency firms yields more innovation than subsidizing low-efficiency firms. Finally, bilateral subsidy stimulates more innovation than unilateral subsidy. This study supports theory to subsidize innovation efficiently.     

On Optimal Taxation of Housing

This paper studies the question of optimal taxation of housing, when the set of tax instruments at the government's disposal is not artificially restricted. There are two groups of persons, who differ in earning abilities and in tastes, and two types of housing goods (high- and low-quality). The paper characterizes the Pareto-efficient allocations that are attainable through the tax policy. It demonstrates that optimality calls for differential tax treatment of housing and that the required tax rates are nonlinear. It derives conditions under which consumption of housing by the poor must be subsidized. It also notes the circumstances under which taxation, rather than subsidization, is the required policy.     

经济适用房不同补贴方式的效果

通过数学模型,分析政府对经济适用房生产商或购买者实施补贴对购买者的效用影响、对生产商行为的影响、对政府补贴成本的影响,及至对经济适用房成交量、成交价格和净社会福利的影响。研究结果表明：对经济适用房生产商采用降低土地价格的补贴方式不如对其按单位价格补贴或按成交价的一定比例补贴,这后两种方式都更有效率,能够降低政府补贴成本,减少政府腐败行为,促进房地产商开发适合低收入者所需要的住房并提高销售效率。     

The housing question in Japan

This article first examines how bad housing conditions are in Japan based on international comparisons. The next question is whether the extremely high land prices in Japan can be explained by economic logic. We then turn to more specific housing policy questions that are peculiar to or important in Japan, such as the tax advantages of owning land that have caused under-utilization of land and the reasons why the average size of Japanese rental housing is so small.     

Is there an S in urban housing supply? or What on earth happened in Detroit?

This article examines the substantial housing stock declines between 2000 and 2010 in many major US central cities. It updates an analysis first formulated in the 1970s, of an S-shaped housing supply curve, to explain decreases in absolute housing stocks. Explanatory variables include Metropolitan Statistical Area standardized rents, center city prior occupancy rates, regional unemployment rates, and a set of regional and state dummy variables. The analysis provides strong evidence of a lower tail of the S, and more tentative evidence of an upper tail. Market fundamentals explain a considerable portion of the large housing stock losses, but in several cities loss of dwelling units and housing abandonment were worse than could be explained by the fundamentals.     

城市化进程中流动人口的住房保障问题研究——兼谈推行公共租赁住房制度

目前在中国已经建立起以住房公积金制度、经济适用房制度和廉租房制度为主要内容的住房保障体系.但是,现行的住房保障体系只关注了城市中户籍居民的住房问题,而忽视了现代社会发展的人口流动性所带来的住房保障问题,这已经成为我国城市化进程存在的一个突出问题.迫切需要推行公共租赁住房制度,构建一个阶梯式多层次住房保障系统结构和模式,解决城市不同群体的住房特殊问题.     

The spillover effects of infill developments on local housing prices

This paper examines the spillover effects of infill developments, which involve developing vacant or under-used parcels within existing urban areas that are largely developed, on local housing prices. Employing a difference-in-difference specification on a sample of 275 new developments and 55,887 sale transactions of houses in Singapore, we find that infill developments have a positive and persistent impact on local housing prices. The contagion effect is larger for infill developments that are built on teardown sites. The spillover effect can also be traced to the overpricing of new homes by developers. Overall, the evidence indicates that developers act as price leaders and contribute significantly to price discovery in the local housing market.     

The Effect of Public Social Housing on Households' Consumption in France

The French public social housing sector offers rents which are more than 60% below market levels. The “loss” of the public sector landlords, estimated from the rent they could get for their apartments at market prices, amounts to 37 billion Francs per year for the 3 million public social apartments in France. This allows the social sector tenants to consume 10% more housing services and 11% more of other goods. The corresponding surplus gain is around 34 billion Francs. The surplus loss for the collectivity due to these transfers is thus 3 billion Francs, 8% of the transferred sums. As compared to personal housing subsidies, which represent half this amount for the same tenants, the surplus gains are much less concentrated on the poorest part of the population.     

Housing, taxation and retirement provision

This paper considers the tax treatment of housing and the issue of savings for retirement in the context of a simplified model that still allows key aspects of the household context to be realistically represented. A model is developed in which both housing and financial assets can be used as vehicles for household saving. Individuals face perfect capital markets and choose between owner-occupied and rented accommodations. For the model developed, it is shown that the tax advantage of owner-occupied housing is not fully removed even if imputed rents are subject to income taxation. However, deferred income taxation for both housing and savings in the form of financial assets would result in an equal treatment of tenants and owner-occupiers.     

The Kornai effect with partial bailouts and taxes

The model examines Kornai's observation that in the presence of bailouts, firms' demand for inputs will be greater than would otherwise be the case. This conjecture is examined in a model in which both revenue and cost uncertainty are present and in which firms making losses are partially subsidized and firms making positive profits are partially taxed. The Kornai effect is more prevalent the greater the subsidy rate, the smaller the tax rate and the greater the variance of the random variables through which uncertainty manifests itself. In the case of strongly positively correlated cost and revenue uncertainty, the absolute incidence of the Kornai effect is small.