Similarities and differences between stockpiling and reference effects

The correlation of past prices and demand is commonly attributed to reference effects. Although reference dependence is robust, support for loss aversion is mixed; some find demand more sensitive to price increases, consistent with loss aversion, others find no difference or greater sensitivity to price decreases. Stockpiling offers an explanation for these mixed findings. Combining theory, analytical models and simulations, stockpiling and reference dependence predict similar effects and the more stockable the product, the greater sensitivity of demand to price decreases, the opposite of loss aversion. We show that a model combining stockpiling and reference effects best aligns with previous findings and under what conditions each effect should dominate. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal pricing for new and remanufactured products

This work investigates the optimal pricing of new and remanufactured products using a model of consumer preferences based on extensive experimentation. The experimental investigation reveals two distinct segments of consumers. One segment is relatively indifferent between new and remanufactured products and displays high sensitivity to price discounts. The second segment shows strong preferences for new products—with an accompanying aversion to remanufactured products—and realtively low sensitivity to price discounts. The pricing analysis examines several scenarios involving a new product manufacturer, ranging from a simple monopolist scenario to a more complex scenario involving competition with third-party remanufacturers. In contrast to the usual finding that new product prices should decrease when competitive remanufactured products enter the market, the introduction of market segments reveals a robust finding across all scenarios: when remanufactured products enter the market, the optimal price of the new product should increase. Through appropriate pricing of new products, the OEM can mitigate the effects of cannibalization and increase profitability.     

Dynamic Competition with Experience Goods

This paper considers dynamic competition in the case in which consumers are only able to learn about their preferences for a certain product after experiencing it. After trying a product a consumer has more information about that product than about untried products. When competing in such a market firms with more sales in the past have an informational advantage because more consumers know their products. If products provide a better-than-expected fit with greater likelihood, taking advantage of that informational advantage may lead to an informational disadvantage in the future. This paper considers this competition with an infinite horizon model in a duopoly market with overlapping generations of consumers. Two effects are identified: On one hand marginal forward-looking consumers realize that by purchasing a product in the current period will be charged a higher expected price in the future. This effect results in reduced price sensitivity and higher equilibrium prices. On the other hand, forward-looking firms realize that they gain in the future from having a greater market share in the current period and compete more aggressively in prices. For similar discount factors for consumers and firms, the former effect is more important, and prices are higher the greater the informational advantages. The paper also characterizes oscillating market share dynamics, and comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to consumer and firm patience, and the importance of the experience in the ex post valuation of the product.     

Strategic Quality Decisions under Heterogeneous Resource Endowments

The literature on product competition advocates a differentiation strategy assuming firm homogeneity in resources. However, firm heterogeneity in resource endowments has long been recognized in economics. Merging these two perspectives, we show that the increase in consumer preference for quality leads to firms' aggressive price competition instead of quality differentiation. As consumers look for higher quality, the cost advantage arising from superior resources increases and makes head-to-head competition more profitable than accommodating a less efficient rival. When consumers are highly concerned about quality, even a small resource difference leads a more efficient firm to initiate cutthroat price competition for market dominance.     

The impact of corporate social responsibility associations on trust in organic products marketed by mainstream retailers: a study of Italian consumers

This paper investigates the determinants of consumer attitudes toward organic products marketed by mainstream retailers under a private label. Since organic products are credence goods, consumers cannot directly verify whether these products comply with official standards. Organic labels are the primary source of consumer trust in organics, but these labels must be noticed and understood before consumers will actively seek them out. In that some consumers may not prioritize product labels when they shop, it is sometimes up to retailers to strengthen consumer trust. Within the antecedents of this trust, we isolated the contribution of the corporate social responsibility associations held by consumers about retailers. We surveyed Italian customers interested in organics and found that they are more likely to trust the private‐label organic products sold by a retailer when it is considered socially responsible. Our results also show that consumer trust translates into brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a premium price for organic products. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

How does competition among lodging sharing platforms affect welfare and profits?

We investigate the likely effect on prices, consumer surplus, and profits of intensified competition among peer‐to‐peer lodging platforms. We find that intensified competition in the sharing economy may give rise to some surprising results. For instance, intensified competition may allow platforms to charge higher fees from peer suppliers and lead, therefore, to a decline in consumer surplus. Only if the market of professional hoteliers is highly competitive, intensified competition among platforms leads to the traditional outcome that the entry of more platforms leads to lower fees charged from consumers and to enhanced consumer surplus. We also find that platforms may actually earn higher profits when there is intensified competition among professional hoteliers. In addition, while intensified competition among professional hoteliers leads to a decline in the fees that platforms can charge customers, it may actually result in higher lodging prices. We explain these counterintuitive results by the dual role that the lodging price plays in affecting the welfare of individuals active in the sharing economy. While a higher price has an adverse effect on the welfare of demanders of lodging it benefits peer suppliers of lodging because a higher lodging price raises the compensation they receive when offering lodging capacity to a platform.     

When (not) to indulge in ‘puffery’: the role of consumer expectations and brand goodwill in determining advertised and actual product quality

We analyze why some firms advertise product quality at a level different from the actual quality of a product. By considering the interacting effects of product quality and advertising, we develop a dynamic model of consumer expectations about product quality and the development of brand goodwill to determine the optimal values for the decision variables. The model parameters are determined based on prior literature and we use numerical techniques to arrive at the solution. We then derive conditions under which a firm will find it optimal to overstate or understate product quality. The results suggest that quality may be overstated in markets characterized by high price sensitivity, low quality sensitivity, low brand loyalty, and high source credibility, suggesting the need for vigilance on the part of consumers, upper level managers and regulatory authorities in such market conditions. This is important because current regulatory resources are insufficient to reduce deceptive advertising practices (Davis JJ. 1994. Ethics in advertising decision‐making: implications for reducing the incidence of deceptive advertising. Journal of Consumer Affairs 28 : 380–402). Further, the law of deceptive advertising prohibits some advertising claims on the ground that they are likely to harm consumers or competitors (Preston IL, Richards JI. 1993. A role for consumer belief in FTC and Lanham Act deceptive advertising cases. American Business Law Journal 31 : 1–29). Also, Nagler (1993. Rather bait than switch: deceptive advertising with bounded consumer rationality. Journal of Public Economics 51 : 359–378) shows that deceptive advertising causes a net social welfare loss and a public policy effectively preventing deception will improve social welfare. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumer Stockpiling and Price Competition in Differentiated Markets

In many storable-goods markets, firms are often aware that consumers may strategically adjust purchase timing in response to expected price dynamics. For example, in periods when prices are low, consumers stockpile for future consumption. This paper investigates the dynamic impact of consumer stockpiling on competing firms' strategic pricing decisions in differentiated markets. The necessity of equilibrium consumer storage for storable products is re-examined. It is shown that preference heterogeneity generates differential consumer stockpiling propensity, thereby intensifying future price competition. As a result, consumer storage may not necessarily arise as an equilibrium outcome. Economic forces are also investigated that may mitigate the competition-intensifying effect of consumer inventories and that, hence, may lead to equilibrium consumer storage.     

Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.     

Consumer adoption of access-based product-service systems: The influence of duration of use and type of product

Access-based product-service systems (AB-PSS) are business models that can potentially decouple the satisfaction of consumer needs from environmental impacts. Hence, they have been promoted for the circular economy. Their sustainability potential has not yet been realised because consumer adoption is lagging. Although this challenge has been studied for two decades, knowledge to identify and address AB-PSS adoption barriers that matter to consumers is lacking. We hypothesise that the duration of use, the time a consumer obtains exclusive access to a specific product (short-term vs. long-term) and the type of product (bicycles vs. clothing) moderate the importance of AB-PSS adoption barriers to consumers. We compared several adoption barriers across four AB-PSS and found that the duration of use and the type of product significantly moderated the importance of some AB-PSS adoption barriers. More specifically, the Effort to access has a higher influence on consumer preference for short-term AB-PSS, whereas Product quality has a higher influence on consumer preference for long-term AB-PSS. We also found that Effort to access and Product characteristics were more important for bicycle AB-PSS, whereas Contamination and Product quality were more important for clothing AB-PSS. These insights help companies to identify and design out key AB-PSS consumer adoption barriers.     

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

We embed the principal–agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for nonloyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is nonmonotonic in valuations such that some low-valuation consumers get higher surplus than high-valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher-quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.     

Consumer Feelings and Equilibrium Product Quality

This paper considers the possibility that a firm can invest not only in the true product quality, but also in activities such as merchandizing and store atmospherics that influence consumer perception of the product quality. Consumers make their purchase decisions based on the signal (perception) of quality they experience, where the signal is influenced by both the true product quality valued by the consumer and the affect of the consumer at the time of the signal formation. In this situation, a firm finds it optimal to invest in both product quality and in variables inducing affect, even though rational consumers, in equilibrium, correctly solve back for the true product quality. We uncover an asymmetry in the effects of the cost of producing quality and the cost of inducing affect. As a firm's cost of quality decreases, the firm will find it optimal to invest more both in the true quality and in the affect inducement, even if it does not have a lower cost of inducing affect. Conversely, if a firm finds it easier to induce affect, then the product quality decreases but affect-inducing activities increase.
Under competition, we find that the firm investing more in quality also invests more in affect creation. An implication of this is that in a competitive environment, consumers can rationally associate an up-lifting store atmosphere, affect inducing merchandizing, or mood-creating communication with high quality products even when the firm has no need to signal their private cost of quality information, and when there is no consumption externality of the affect. We also analyze the case in which firms might have different costs and consumers are uncertain about the costs incurred by a given firm. Here again we show that the perceived quality production is positively correlated with both the true quality and the affect inducing activities.     

A limit to price-increasing competition

Differentiated entry may cause an incumbent firm to increase its price if the entering brand attracts price-sensitive consumers. This paper generalizes from the known cases with one-dimensional and two-dimensional products, showing for a finite number of attributes that there is scope for price-increasing competition, depending on the entrant’s product positioning. The extension is critical because it leads to a reversal that has not been considered. The highest possible duopoly price converges to the monopoly price as the dimensionality increases. Intuitively, when the product is more complex, tastes in the intersection of two brand markets (at any prices) are more specific and less frequent. This thinning of the fringe diminishes the effect of competitive entry.     

Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider a duopoly market with heterogeneous consumers. The firms initially produce vertically differentiated standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on quality. The firms first choose whether to customize their products, then engage in price competition. We show that the low‐quality firm never customizes alone; customization becomes more likely as the difference between the firms’ qualities increases; and less likely as the fixed cost of customization increases. We extend the base model by relaxing two important assumptions—uniform pricing and exogenous quality. The main conclusions with uniform pricing continue to hold when price customization is allowed. In the second extension the firms’ qualities are endogenously determined. We show that the firms choose to be either substantially differentiated in quality or nondifferentiated.     

Firm entry,product repositioning and welfare

We show that the entry of a second firm in a horizontally differentiated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and consumer’s surplus possibly decrease. We first derive the price and the consumer’s surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the market. When a second firm enters the market the first firm repositions and the two firms locate at their equilibrium points. Although competition adds to variety and increases consumer’s surplus, the post entry increase in price may outweight the gains from extra variety and make consumers worse off.     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

中间产品竞争的品牌经济策略研究——以莱卡为例

莱卡品牌用成功证明中间产品需要品牌。而品牌策略的正确与否又是决定消费者对该品牌需求的关键因素之一。一直以来莱卡在激烈的市场竞争中处于绝对领先地位,它的成功归因于品牌建设过程中一系列策略的创新运用。本文运用品牌经济学原理对莱卡品牌策略进行分析。莱卡以时尚单一情感利益点为品类,降低消费者选择成本;通过单点策略、占先策略、终点策略及传播策略等策略创新,影响消费者选择行为,确立在整个供应链的掌控力和优势地位,并通过品牌拉力拉动整个产业链物流和资金流的循环。     

Is the environment‐friendly factor attractive to customers when purchasing electric vehicles? Evidence from South Korea

In a bid to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, several countries worldwide are implementing policies to promote electric vehicles (EVs). However, contrary to expectations, the diffusion speed of EVs has been rather slow in South Korea. This study analyzes consumer preferences for the technological and environmental attributes of EVs and derives policy and environmental implications to promote market diffusion of EVs in South Korea. We conduct a choice‐based conjoint survey of 1,008 consumers in South Korea and estimate the consumer utility function using a mixed logit model considering consumer heterogeneity. Based on the consumer utility function, we analyze consumers' willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for EV attributes such as driving range, charging method, charging time, autonomous driving function, carbon dioxide (CO₂) reduction rate, and purchase price. The results indicate that the current low acceptance of EVs is due to their relatively high price and lack of a battery charging technology that satisfies consumers' expectations of the charging method and time. One interesting finding is that Korean consumers have a relatively higher WTP for the CO₂ reduction rate of EVs than consumers in other countries; however, they do not consider CO₂ reduction over other technological attributes when choosing EVs. This implies that the rate of CO₂ reduction of EVs is not an important factor for South Korean consumers when buying EVs. We also calculate the effect of CO₂ reduction with the market penetration of EVs and find that CO₂ reduction through the diffusion of EVs depends on the country's electricity generation mix.     

A theory of multihoming in rideshare competition

We examine competition among ridesharing platforms, where firms compete on both price and the wait time induced with idled drivers. We show that when consumers are the only agents who multihome, idleness is lower in duopoly than when consumers face a monopoly ridesharing platform. When drivers and consumers multihome, idleness further falls to zero as it involves costs for each platform that are appropriated, in part, by their rival. Interestingly, socially superior outcomes may involve monopoly or competition under various multihoming regimes, depending on the density of the city, and the relative costs of idleness versus consumer disutility of waiting.     

Sources of downward bias in estimating the demand income elasticity for urban housing

Housing demand studies, whether relying upon individual or grouped data, have limited their observations to similar housing units and/or similar housing consumers to help control for product heterogeneity. Yet similar housing units tend to locate in clusters; tenants tend to segregate by race and income. The unintended results may be: (1) for grouped data, selection of a product subgroup with a supply price elasticity small enough to matter; (2) for individual data, selection of a consumer subgroup possessing a lower income elasticity than all housing consumers. Evidence is given that the supply price elasticity is sometimes small enough to matter when grouped data are used.