供应链信息共享的成本与定价策略

本文提出从制造商定价与零售商信息共享的成本的角度来激励供应链中的下游企业与上游企业的信息共享。本文建立了1个制造商,n个零售商的简单二级供应链模型,在一定的零售商信息共享的边际成本条件下。来制定企业利润最大化为目标的定价策略。分析结果表明：本策略可以有效激励零售商进行积极的信息共享行为：并且随着信息共享规模的扩大,零售商与制造商的总体效益也逐渐增大。     

基于延迟支付期限的供应链回购契约研究

考虑由单一制造商和资金约束零售商组成的单级供应链系统，研究了供应链有无延迟支付期限策略条件下零售商的订货数量问题。研究结论表明，无延迟支付期限策略时，零售商的订货数量和供应链的系统利润都与制造商回购价格负相关；有延迟支付期限策略时，零售商的订货数量与制造商回购价格正相关，而供应链系统的利润与制造商回购价格负相关。最后，通过仿真算例验证了结论的适用性，为供应链管理实践提供参考。     

不对称信息的供应链激励机制研究

研究由单个制造商和单个零售商组成二级供应链,基于市场需求是线性的,且受价格与销售努力的影响。首先,研究在对称信息下,集中模式和分散模式两种情况下的供应链,求出制造商和零售商使得利润达到最优时的最优批发价及销售价;其次,研究了在信息不对称情况下,制造商的机制设计问题,得到了制造商激励批发价的表达式以及零售商的最优零售价的公式;最后利用实例仿真对模型进行分析,结果表明该激励机制对整个供应链的收益有改善作用。     

含有主从零售商的供应链Groves批发价格契约

研究了含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时的最优零售价格和服务水平。然后利用Groves批发价格契约来协调供应链,得出了Groves批发价格契约下制造商的最优决策、主导零售商和从属零售商的利润,并给出了制造商给予主导零售商的最优批发价格。最后通过一个算例进行分析和验证。     

需求分布不定的供应链网络均衡

研究了由多个相互竞争制造商以及多个相互竞争零售商组成且零售商面临分布不定的需求的供应链网络均衡。借助变分不等式理论,刻画了制造商、零售商以及消费者的最优行为,建立了供应链网络均衡模型并设计网络均衡的求解算法。数值分析了分布不定和限制性价格上限对网络均衡的影响。结果表明:与随机需求相比较,需求分布不定情形下的零售商利润将减少,制造商利润将增多且生产量更大;当存在限制性价格上限时,消费市场可能出现商品短缺,且制造商和零售商的总利润减少。     

含有主从零售商的供应链Groves批发价格契约

研究了含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时的最优零售价格和服务水平。然后利用Groves批发价格契约来协调供应链,得出了Groves批发价格契约下制造商的最优决策、主导零售商和从属零售商的利润,并给出了制造商给予主导零售商的最优批发价格。最后通过一个算例进行分析和验证。     

需求分布不定的供应链网络均衡

研究了由多个相互竞争制造商以及多个相互竞争零售商组成且零售商面临分布不定的需求的供应链网络均衡.借助变分不等式理论,刻画了制造商、零售商以及消费者的最优行为,建立了供应链网络均衡模型并设计网络均衡的求解算法.数值分析了分布不定和限制性价格上限对网络均衡的影响.结果表明:与随机需求相比较,需求分布不定情形下的零售商利润将减少,制造商利润将增多且生产量更大;当存在限制性价格上限时,消费市场可能出现商品短缺,且制造商和零售商的总利润减少.     

基于信息不对称的损失厌恶供应链博弈研究

考虑制造商不知道零售商的损失厌恶信息,基于Stackelberg博弈方法,研究损失厌恶信息不对称对企业决策、企业之间的博弈关系、企业与供应链绩效的影响。算例结果表明,如果制造商高估零售商的损失厌恶程度,导致制造商的批发价格下降、零售商的订货量增加,对零售商有利,但对制造商不利;反之,如果制造商低估零售商的损失厌恶程度,导致制造商的批发价格增加、零售商的订货量下降,对制造商与零售商都不利。所以,零售商希望制造商高估零售商的损失厌恶程度,而制造商希望准确估计零售商的损失厌恶程度,该结论符合人们的直觉判断。     

考虑消费者购买行为的新能源汽车供应链最优控制决策

面对日益激烈的市场竞争和多样化市场需求,新能源汽车除了应对传统燃油车的竞争,还面临新能源汽车企业间的竞争。因此,基于消费者心理行为驱动的新能源汽车供应链成员之间的创新和广告投入合作变得尤为重要。为此,从消费者视角,即从满意度和参考价格效应出发,分析新能源汽车制造商和零售商组成的两级供应链合作决策问题,通过建立Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈以及集中决策三种博弈模型,并运用最优控制理论得到了供应链成员的最优均衡策略。分析结果表明：参考价格效应对新能源汽车制造商的技术创新水平、广告宣传水平和消费者满意度都有正向影响,并且可以提高整个供应链的利润。新能源汽车制造商对零售商的成本分担承诺能激励零售商的广告宣传积极性,提高新能源汽车的品牌知名度,从而促进新能源汽车的销售。消费者满意度与参考价格效应之间存在交互作用,进一步强化了对新能源汽车制造商技术创新水平和零售商广告宣传水平的激励作用。     

国内工商关系三大发现

现在，零售商越来越需要与制造商紧密联系、以获得更低的采购成本和更快的订单响应。制造商也希望通过零售商了解市场需求，动态地安排生产和营销。零售商和制造商将走向供应链整合的道路。因此，了解双方彼此的需求及目前存在的缝隙是非常重要的。     

基于制造商服务的供应链竞争策略分析

本文以一个具有两家制造商和一家零售商组成的供应链结构为研究对象,探讨了制造商向顾客提供服务的重要性,并着重分析了在零售商占据市场优势的情况下,制造商的定价与服务策略,以及零售商制定产品零售价格时要考虑的主要因素,其结果对企业在供应链体系中制定经营策略具有一定的帮助。     

Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure

We investigate how the structure of the distribution channel affects tacit collusion between manufacturers. When selling through a common retailer, we find—in contrast to the conventional understanding of tacit collusion that firms act to maximize industry profits—that colluding manufacturers strategically induce double marginalization so that retail prices are above the monopoly level. This lowers industry profits but increases the profit share that manufacturers appropriate from the retailer. Comparing common distribution with independent (exclusive) distribution, we show that the latter facilitates collusion. Despite this result, common retailing leads to lower welfare because a common retailer monopolizes the downstream market. For the case of independent retailing, we also demonstrate that contract offers that are observable to the rival retailer are not necessarily beneficial for collusive purposes.     

The strategic effect of retailers' in‐store advertising services under product variety competition

We study a retailer service model of in‐store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in‐store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between‐firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.     

Optimal joint trade-in rebate strategies in a retailer-led supply chain

This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment.     

基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型

就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。     

引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制设计研究

针对引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制设计问题,首先在对称信息和非对称信息下建立由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链激励机制模型,接着分析引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制均衡结果,最后对自有品牌引入前后的均衡结果进行比较。通过分析发现,零售商在制造商品牌上的努力水平始终不超过其在自有品牌上的努力水平;在对称信息下,零售商引入自有品牌肯定会使制造商受到损失,而在非对称信息下制造商可能会从中获利。     

Creating consumer durable retailer customer loyalty through order fulfillment service operations

Manufacturers now find themselves in the position of finding new ways to remain competitive in the era of retail power. The onus rests on the manufacturer's ability to implement operational strategies that help the retailer achieve its objectives. Specifically, manufacturers that establish successful order fulfillment service can affect retailer loyalty. The overarching goal of this research, therefore, is to examine the importance to operations managers of understanding the order fulfillment needs and expectations of their retail customers and to establish the value-added role that operations management plays in developing retailer loyalty. Empirical evidence is provided on the relationships between relational order fulfillment service, operational order fulfillment service, satisfaction, affective commitment, purchase behavior, and loyalty. Such evidence not only focuses on the strategic importance of the OM discipline in manufacturer–retailer relationships, but also extends previous OM theory by taking a more complex view of the loyalty phenomenon.     

竞争制造商持股关系的供应链分析

考虑两竞争制造商通过共同零售商销售替代产品的两层供应链系统,分别研究制造商未持股和制造商单向持股情形下供应链成员的决策及其对供应链绩效的影响。对制造商单向持股存在持股方与售股方都可以接受的持股成本区间,但这会损害零售商收益和供应链整体绩效,随着持股比例的增加,对供应链绩效的损害会进一步加剧。     

Why should firms manufacture retailer brands?

For firms manufacturing convenience goods there are three branding policies available, a proprietory brand policy, a retailer brand policy and a mixed brand policy. A firm's choice depends on differences in demand and promotion costs between the proprietory and retailer brand markets. This can be analysed using a simple elaboration of the standard 3rd degree price discrimination model. But if the two markets are not independent over the long-term there may be other consequences of following the optimization rules of the model. If retailers develop consumers' preference for their own shops and their own brands, the demand advantage enjoyed by manufacturers' brands may be reduced further. The more willing are manufacturers to supply retailer brands, the more retailers win undermine the demand for manufacturers' proprietory brands.