Targeted advertising,platform competition,and privacy

Targeted advertising can benefit consumers through lower prices for access to web sites. Yet, if consumers dislike that web sites collect their personal information, their welfare may go down. We study competition for consumers between web sites that can show targeted advertisements. We find that more targeting increases competition and reduces the web sites' profits, but yet in equilibrium web sites choose maximum targeting as they cannot credibly commit to low targeting. A privacy protection policy can be beneficial for both consumers and web sites. If consumers are heterogeneous in their concerns for privacy, a policy that allows choice between two levels of privacy will be better. Optimal privacy protection takes into account that the more intense competition on the high‐targeting market segment also benefits consumers on the less competitive segment. Consumer surplus is maximized by allowing them a choice between a high‐targeting regime and a low‐targeting regime which affords more privacy.     

Internet of things (IoT) platform competition: Consumer switching versus provider multihoming

Internet of things (IoT) brings new opportunities and represents a new source of welfare and efficiency. However, the emerging consumer IoT platform competition creates the risk of monopoly power due to network effects. Overall, it is likely that both competition (incentivized through lowering consumer switching costs) and cooperation (achieved through interoperability, which enables data portability and service provider multihoming) are needed to maximize social welfare. This article aims to address how consumer switching costs and provider multihoming affect competition of emerging consumer IoT data platforms under different market conditions and regulatory schemes. It utilizes agent-based modelling that is especially suitable when decision making is distributed at a micro level while some rules are applied in a centralized fashion. The obtained findings emphasize the role of the regulator in guiding the market. It seems that when switching costs diminish at all sides of the platforms, consumers and service providers will favour the platform with a higher number of users. Further, service provider multihoming mitigates market concentration on both sides of a platform when switching costs are low. Thus, there seems to be a minimum level of interoperability needed to promote market competition. Further, although data portability gives more freedom to consumers in choosing a platform provider, it may result in a winner-takes-all situation due to strong indirect network effects.     

Customer Privacy and Competition

We analyze how different degrees of privacy protection affect industry profits, consumer welfare, and total welfare in a model with switching costs. Firms earn higher profits under weak privacy protection compared with strong or no privacy protection. The relationship between the degree of privacy protection and equilibrium profits is not monotonic. Consumer surplus and total welfare increase with the degree of privacy protection unless firms recognize consumer‐specific switching costs. In that case, pricing conditional on switching costs has favorable implications for consumer surplus and total welfare.     

Product Differentiation through Exclusivity: Is there a One‐Market‐Power‐Rent Theorem?

In systems industries, combinations of components are consumed together to generate user benefits. Arrangements among component providers sometimes limit consumers’ ability to mix‐and‐match components, and such exclusive arrangements have been highly controversial. We examine the competitive and welfare effects of exclusive arrangements among system components in a model of relatively differentiated applications that run on relatively undifferentiated platforms. We show that there is no “One‐Market‐Power‐Rent Theorem.” Specifically, exclusive deals with providers of differentiated applications can raise platforms’ margins without reducing applications’ margins, so that overall industry profits rise. Hence, for a given set of components and prices, exclusive arrangements can reduce consumer welfare by limiting consumer choice and raising equilibrium prices. In some cases, however, exclusivity can raise consumer welfare by increasing the equilibrium number of platforms, which leads to lower prices relative to the monopoly outcome that would prevail absent exclusivity.     

Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environmentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention

We consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly where consumers care about the product's “greenness.” Firms can be asymmetric: they may differ in the product's intrinsic value and may also differ in their chosen level of greenness. We examine the choice of greenness and the implications of various policy interventions. We show that (i) the choices of product greenness are strategic substitutes, (ii) the high‐intrinsic quality firm produces the greener product, (iii) the low‐quality firm's greenness may increase with the cost of its provision or decrease with consumer willingness to pay for it, (iv) a minimum quality standard (MQS) leads the greener firm to lower its environmental quality and can even reduce average quality, (v) greenness is underprovided even if consumers fully internalize the externality, and (v) an MQS can reduce welfare if the greenness of the high‐quality firm exceeds the MQS, even when environmental quality is underprovided. The effects of policy interventions on profits differ qualitatively across polices and firms: A firm that lobbies for one type of intervention may lobby against another similar one, and a firm may lobby for an intervention while its competitor may lobby against it. A subsidy for the development costs of a green product can financially hurt both firms.     

Optimal fiscal policy with robust control

This paper analyzes how consumer uncertainty affects optimal fiscal policy in the Lucas and Stokey (1983) framework. The consumers, lacking confidence in their knowledge of the stochastic environment, endogenously tilt their subjective probability model away from an approximating probability model. The government, though, is confident that the approximating probability model characterizes the stochastic environment. This confidence dichotomy reveals a range of possible objective functions for an altruistic government. I assume that the government maximizes the consumers' expected utility under the consumers' own subjective probability model. It is found that this government relies less heavily on labor taxes to absorb the fiscal shock than would be optimal if consumers were fully confident in their probability model. This policy helps mitigate the direct welfare cost associated with consumer uncertainty. I compare this policy to the one implemented by a government that maximizes the consumers' expected utility under the approximating probability model.     

How does competition among lodging sharing platforms affect welfare and profits?

We investigate the likely effect on prices, consumer surplus, and profits of intensified competition among peer‐to‐peer lodging platforms. We find that intensified competition in the sharing economy may give rise to some surprising results. For instance, intensified competition may allow platforms to charge higher fees from peer suppliers and lead, therefore, to a decline in consumer surplus. Only if the market of professional hoteliers is highly competitive, intensified competition among platforms leads to the traditional outcome that the entry of more platforms leads to lower fees charged from consumers and to enhanced consumer surplus. We also find that platforms may actually earn higher profits when there is intensified competition among professional hoteliers. In addition, while intensified competition among professional hoteliers leads to a decline in the fees that platforms can charge customers, it may actually result in higher lodging prices. We explain these counterintuitive results by the dual role that the lodging price plays in affecting the welfare of individuals active in the sharing economy. While a higher price has an adverse effect on the welfare of demanders of lodging it benefits peer suppliers of lodging because a higher lodging price raises the compensation they receive when offering lodging capacity to a platform.     

中国电力产业竞争的消费者福利分析

本文借鉴“制度—结构—行为—绩效”（ISCP）分析范式分析电力市场竞争格局,并研究电力竞争政策的运行机制。同时,运用福利经济学工具,从电力竞争政策制定及施行的角度评估其对消费者剩余的直接影响。结果表明,2003—2014年,电力竞争政策总体上使消费者剩余增加。     

Imperfect Behavior‐Based Price Discrimination

In this article, we develop a model encompassing behavior‐based discriminatory pricing as a limit case of a more general framework where firms have incomplete information about consumers’ purchase histories. We show that information accuracy has a nonmonotonic impact on profits and the worst situation for firms is when information accuracy is intermediate. We also discuss welfare and consumer surplus implications of information accuracy. Although welfare monotonically decreases with the level of information accuracy, there is an inverse U‐shape relationship between consumers surplus and information accuracy.     

When (not) to indulge in ‘puffery’: the role of consumer expectations and brand goodwill in determining advertised and actual product quality

We analyze why some firms advertise product quality at a level different from the actual quality of a product. By considering the interacting effects of product quality and advertising, we develop a dynamic model of consumer expectations about product quality and the development of brand goodwill to determine the optimal values for the decision variables. The model parameters are determined based on prior literature and we use numerical techniques to arrive at the solution. We then derive conditions under which a firm will find it optimal to overstate or understate product quality. The results suggest that quality may be overstated in markets characterized by high price sensitivity, low quality sensitivity, low brand loyalty, and high source credibility, suggesting the need for vigilance on the part of consumers, upper level managers and regulatory authorities in such market conditions. This is important because current regulatory resources are insufficient to reduce deceptive advertising practices (Davis JJ. 1994. Ethics in advertising decision‐making: implications for reducing the incidence of deceptive advertising. Journal of Consumer Affairs 28 : 380–402). Further, the law of deceptive advertising prohibits some advertising claims on the ground that they are likely to harm consumers or competitors (Preston IL, Richards JI. 1993. A role for consumer belief in FTC and Lanham Act deceptive advertising cases. American Business Law Journal 31 : 1–29). Also, Nagler (1993. Rather bait than switch: deceptive advertising with bounded consumer rationality. Journal of Public Economics 51 : 359–378) shows that deceptive advertising causes a net social welfare loss and a public policy effectively preventing deception will improve social welfare. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumer Search with Limited Product Evaluation

Consumers need not evaluate all available product information before making a purchase. This may arise because shopping environments prevent a full evaluation (e.g., online). We develop a model of simultaneous search in which consumers have limited ability in product evaluation in order to study the impact of search cost on prices, consumer surplus, and social welfare. If consumers are endowed with the ability to choose how much information to acquire from a searched product, they may choose limited product evaluation. We find that consumers may evaluate more firms, enjoy lower prices, and higher surplus despite this limited ability. This implies that prices can decrease and consumer surplus can increase in search costs. We then extend our setting to the case of multiproduct firms and find similar effects due to changes in within‐firm search costs.     

Is the environment‐friendly factor attractive to customers when purchasing electric vehicles? Evidence from South Korea

In a bid to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, several countries worldwide are implementing policies to promote electric vehicles (EVs). However, contrary to expectations, the diffusion speed of EVs has been rather slow in South Korea. This study analyzes consumer preferences for the technological and environmental attributes of EVs and derives policy and environmental implications to promote market diffusion of EVs in South Korea. We conduct a choice‐based conjoint survey of 1,008 consumers in South Korea and estimate the consumer utility function using a mixed logit model considering consumer heterogeneity. Based on the consumer utility function, we analyze consumers' willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for EV attributes such as driving range, charging method, charging time, autonomous driving function, carbon dioxide (CO₂) reduction rate, and purchase price. The results indicate that the current low acceptance of EVs is due to their relatively high price and lack of a battery charging technology that satisfies consumers' expectations of the charging method and time. One interesting finding is that Korean consumers have a relatively higher WTP for the CO₂ reduction rate of EVs than consumers in other countries; however, they do not consider CO₂ reduction over other technological attributes when choosing EVs. This implies that the rate of CO₂ reduction of EVs is not an important factor for South Korean consumers when buying EVs. We also calculate the effect of CO₂ reduction with the market penetration of EVs and find that CO₂ reduction through the diffusion of EVs depends on the country's electricity generation mix.     

Automatic‐renewal contracts with heterogeneous consumer inertia

Automatic contract renewals are a common feature in consumer markets. Since these contracts renew automatically unless a consumer actively cancels, firms can use them to exploit consumer inertia. As a source of inertia I study limited attention and investigate how firms use contract renewal to sell to consumers with different degrees of inattention. In monopolistic markets, adverse selection of more‐attentive consumers limits the exploitation of naively inattentive consumers. When signing a contract, naively inattentive consumers overestimate their future probability to make an active cancellation decision. To exploit this mistake, the monopolist wants to target these consumers with large prices after contracts renew. These back‐loaded contracts, however, adversely attract more‐attentive consumers who cancel more often when choosing these exploitative contracts. To mitigate adverse selection, monopolists focus less on exploiting naively inattentive consumers. Adverse selection induces fewer consumer mistakes and can increase efficiency. I show that competition mitigates adverse selection, which induces firms to focus more on exploitation with more back‐loaded pricing. I discuss implications for recently implemented policies on automatic‐renewal contracts.     

The importance of consumer multihoming (joint purchases) for market performance: Mergers and entry in media markets

Consumer “multihoming” (watching two TV channels, or buying two news magazines) has surprisingly important effects on market equilibrium and performance in (two‐sided) media markets. We show this by introducing consumer multihoming and advertising finance into the classic circle model of product differentiation. When consumers multihome (attend more than one platform), media platforms can charge only incremental value prices to advertisers. Entry or merger leaves consumer prices unchanged under consumer multihoming, but leaves advertiser prices unchanged under single‐homing: Multihoming flips the side of the market on which platforms compete. In contrast to standard circle results, equilibrium product variety can be insufficient under multihoming.     

Estimating the distribution of welfare effects using quantiles

This paper proposes a framework to model welfare effects that are associated with a price change in a population of heterogeneous consumers. The framework is similar to that of Hausman and Newey (Econometrica, 1995, 63, 1445–1476), but allows for more general forms of heterogeneity. Individual demands are characterized by a general model that is nonparametric in the regressors, as well as monotonic in unobserved heterogeneity, allowing us to identify the distribution of welfare effects. We first argue why a decision maker should care about this distribution. Then we establish constructive identification, propose a sample counterparts estimator, and analyze its large‐sample properties. Finally, we apply all concepts to measuring the heterogeneous effect of a change of gasoline price using US consumer data and find very substantial differences in individual effects across quantiles.     

Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short‐term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find it less attractive to exaggerate costs. This reduces the need for long‐term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. A welfare standard biased toward consumers entails, however, allocative costs arising from partial separation of the firms' cost types. A trade‐off results, which favors strategic delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.     

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GATT/WTO TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC WELFARE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This paper surveys estimates of the value of the GATT/WTO's contributions to global welfare through providing a forum for negotiating reductions in policy‐induced distortions to trade flows, including through the process of accession by new members. After reviewing measures of the price‐distorting effects of trade‐related policies, it assesses estimates from global simulation models of the welfare effects of trade liberalizations prior to the WTO's Doha round, including the net benefits and transfers associated with implementing the Uruguay Round agreement on trade‐related intellectual property rights, and then reviews estimates of the potential welfare effects of a Doha round agreement to cut tariffs and subsidies. Econometric estimates of past trade and related effects of the GATT/WTO are then examined, before turning to estimates of the benefits of WTO accession and of potential benefits from WTO‐sponsored trade facilitation. The paper concludes that while it remains difficult to attribute reforms directly to the GATT/WTO, the overall body of evidence presented supports the economic profession's consensus that this institution has contributed substantially to global economic welfare.     

The economic consequences of environmental regulation in China: From a perspective of the environmental protection admonishing talk policy

Environmental regulation may lead to undesired economic consequences. China has tightened its environmental policies to deal with severe environmental pollution in recent years, but existing studies pay little attention to the economic consequences of China's environmental policies. Using the panel data of 211 prefecture‐level and above cities in China from 2003 to 2016, we for the first time estimate the economic impact of the environmental protection admonishing talk (EPAT) policy, a newly implemented environmental regulation policy in China. We use the difference‐in‐differences strategy to identify the economic effects of the EPAT policy combined with the propensity score matching method to control a potential selection problem. The results show that a relative decline occurs in gross domestic product per capita in target cities after the implementation of the EPAT, and the negative impact is exerted on the secondary industry rather than the tertiary industry. Furthermore, we find that target cities respond to the environmental protection requirements of higher authorities through a one‐size‐fits‐all approach of limiting the production activities of industrial enterprises. Meanwhile, the EPAT policy does not improve environmental efficiency. Such findings are instructive for policymakers who need to trade off economic welfare and environmental quality when formulating and implementing new environmental policies.     

Welfare targeting in networks

This paper investigates welfare targeting for public goods in networks. First, we show that a tax/subsidy scheme (not necessarily budget-balanced) affects each consumer only insofar as it affects his neighbourhood. Second, we show that either a Pareto-improving income redistribution can be found or there exist Negishi weights, which we relate to the network structure. Third, in the case of Cobb–Douglas preferences, we show that a Law of Welfare Targeting holds and links two well-known notions of the comparative statics of policy interventions: neutrality and welfare paradoxical effects. Collectively, our findings uncover the importance of the $-1$ eigenvalue to economic and social policy: it is an indication of how consumers absorb the impact of income redistribution.     

Should charity promotions appeal to altruism?

To be competitive with rivals, charitable organizations must rely on carefully formulated promotion programs. The literature, however, provides mixed advice on the effectiveness of charitable appeals. As a result, there is a need for research to identify their prevalence and effectiveness. The present research conducts a content analysis of charitable promotions and finds that more than 55% appeal to selfless consumer motives (i.e., altruism). A subsequent experiment reveals that appealing to more selfless (i.e., altruism) versus less selfless (i.e., reputation) consumer motives results in consumers having a more favorable attitude toward the charitable organization. Furthermore, consumer involvement is found to moderate this effect; more (vs. less) selfless appeals promote a more positive attitude among consumers with low, but not for those with high, involvement with a charitable cause (e.g., animal welfare). Managers should consider appealing to altruism in their charitable promotions, especially when targeting low‐involvement consumers.