信贷配给:从理论模型到中国实际

信贷配给是各国资金配置中常见的现象,在中国更是普遍存在"中小企业贷款难"的问题.这究竟是一种短期行为还是长期均衡现象,究竟是政府的干预造成还是商业银行自身理性行为使然?本文将利用信息经济学知识对信贷配给做出均衡分析,并进行模型的扩展,结合中国实际探讨如何减少因信息不对称带来的信贷配给.     

当代中国的信贷配给

<正>所谓信贷配给,是指商业银行在面临对贷款的超额需求时,不是通过提高利率的途径来增加存款供给,同时抑制贷款的需求来实现信贷市场的均衡;而是通过实行配给,来部分的满足借款人的信贷需求、或者只满足部分借款人的信贷需求的这样一种金融现象。信贷配给现象和对信贷配给的研究由来已久,近年来,新凯恩斯主义者基于信息不对称角度对信贷配给所做的解释得到了广泛的认同。     

对近年我国信贷配给双重性的探讨

本文首先通过对金融抑制理论和金融约束理论的简要回顾，说明了信贷配给的形成及西方经济学家对此的研究：然后对中国金融市场上存在的信贷配给现象予以考察，对中国信贷配给的双重性进行了说明和解释并提出了结论和政策建议。     

中小企业信贷配给的综合模型

本文将银行利润、银行利率、企业风险、企业规模作为内生系统变量纳入一个分析框架，建立一个竞争性市场下综合的信贷配给模型，重点研究不同风险类型的中小企业的信贷配给。模型揭示，多样性的信贷合同组合可以通过贷款利率、抵押品作为甄别机制而达到斯宾塞一莫里斯分离均衡，并分析了其存在的条件与范围，阐述了模型对中国金融系统改革悖论与中小企业信贷配给的现实启示。     

基于制度经济学的银行信贷配给问题研究

银行信贷配给是银行信贷管理的十分重要的方面,在我国转轨经济和金融的形势下更为突出。本文从制度经济学的角度对这一问题作了分析,研究了在产权不合理和不明晰下信贷配给的形成,分别从银行内与银行与企业的委托代理方面寻找了原因。并对信贷配给的产权交易市场做了均衡分析,然后针对中国目前的现实情况提出了政策建议。     

中小企业信贷配给中博弈双方的自利行为

中小企业的良性发展一直受到信贷配给的制约,而信息不对称是导致此现象发生的最主要原因之一,文章通过"囚徒困境"模型和博弈树分析了不完全信息下银行和银行间以及银行和企业间博弈双方的自利行为,阐述了信贷配给是如何形成的。并从中小企业、金融组织、社会和政府三个方面提出了相关的政策建议,以化解银行对中小企业信贷配给的问题,从一定程度上解决中小企业融资难的问题。     

论当前我国信贷配给的内在机理与现实表现

信贷配给是商业银行时常采用的一种贷款手段,近年来新凯恩斯主义基于信息不对称角度对于信贷配给所做的解释得到了广泛的认同.我国目前的信贷配给是市场机制与政府主导同时起作用的“双重信贷配给”.信贷配给降低了信贷资金的使用效率,但它的存在具有一定的现实必然性.解决我国目前信贷配给问题的出路在于更快地推进利率市场化进程.     

中小银行对于信贷配给的缓解作用分析

由于信息不完全造成的信贷市场和信贷合约的不完全是信贷配给产生的原因。在我国,由于体制上的金融抑制加剧了信贷配给,而中小银行的特殊性,如区域性、资本资产额小、组织层级少等使得它们在获取和处理信息方面具有大银行所没有的优势,能够减少违约风险,从而改变了解释信贷配给的贷款者的预期收益与承诺的贷款利率的函数,进而缓解了信贷配给。     

论信用成本与农村金融市场的信贷配给

信贷配给现象在我国农村金融市场普遍存在,并且将在可预见的一段时间内继续存在,这会严重制约新农村建设进程。本文试图在S-W模型的基础上,从信用成本的角度建立农村金融市场的信贷配给模型,研究我国农村金融市场的信贷配给机理,为缓和农村金融市场信贷配给问题、解决新农村建设过程中的资金瓶颈提供一些思路。     

信贷配给、银保协作与银行信贷效率改进——基于信贷效用熵的分析视角

文章从最优贷款利率与非市场出清视角分析了信贷配给的内生逻辑,建立了信贷效用熵理论,在此基础上,运用信贷效用熵理论揭示了银保协作改进商业银行信贷效率的机理,并以此为依据,设计了银保协作下商业银行信贷效率改进的科学路径.文章认为,信息不对称促使商业银行实施信贷配给,使得商业银行信贷资金的市场化出清程度较低,大量信贷资金被低效占用,导致信贷效率缺失.对此,建立银保协作机制,可以有效缓解银企之间的信息不对称性,促使商业银行信贷资金的市场化出清意愿及能力上升,从而降低信贷配给幅度,提升信贷效率.     

Trustworthiness and ethical considerations: a review of personal connections in China

This study is to assess the significance of guanxi or personal connections in Chinese management, its contribution to trust in business dealings, and its relation to ethical judgement in Chinese management. The paper begins with a background to the term Guanxi where it argues that personal connections would be an adequate and preferable term for guanxi, since although the phenomenon in practice is specific to China it is not unique to China. Guanxi or personal connections in China should be seen as part of China’s traditional culture, but without attaching a mystical value to the concept. Understanding of the phenomenon and awareness of how to deal with Chinese business is fundamental to trust both domestically and in foreign business dealings. However it is through a grasp of ethical considerations and a deeper awareness of morality that personal connections can be soundly based and goes beyond the rule of law to meet China’s potential for socio-economic success.     

中小企业信贷配给与融资路径选择

目前我国中小企业发展的主要瓶颈是融资困难,文章通过信贷市场上的中小企业信贷配给现象分析,探索中小企业创新型融资路径,以促进中小企业乃至整个国民经济的快速、健康发展。     

基于安全储备量的社区卫生站疫苗配给优化研究

为了确保社区卫生服务站对于儿童疫苗的安全储备量以及配给成本最低,运用存储论的经济订货批量模型对疫苗的配给进行了优化,根据基层卫生服务的宗旨,实现了特定概率下的疫苗供给,对大多数社区卫生服务站的疫苗或类似的基药配给有参考价值。     

Core equivalence and welfare properties without divisible goods

We study an economy where all goods entering preferences or production processes are indivisible. Fiat money not entering consumers’ preferences is an additional perfectly divisible parameter. We establish a First and Second Welfare Theorem and a core equivalence result for the rationing equilibrium concept introduced in Florig and Rivera (2005a). The rationing equilibrium can be considered as a natural extension of the Walrasian notion when all goods are indivisible at the individual level but perfectly divisible at the level of the entire economy.     

A novel profit cutting mechanism for Chinese Banks: Theory and Multi-dimensional evidence

As China’s macroeconomic growth faces increasing pressure from the global COVID-19 pandemic, a surprising and politically controversial phenomenon has emerged: the profitability of banks in China exceeded that of enterprises and non-financial industries. The People’s Bank of China and regulatory authorities have hence taken measures to incentivize banks to transfer part of their profits to enterprises, with the aim to stabilize enterprises and employment. This paper proposes a novel profit cutting mechanism focusing on loan structure adjustments to address the limitations of the current approach centering on lowering loan interest rates. The theoretical and empirical analysis show, at both the macro and micro level, that an increase in the proportion of credit loans can benefit the development of enterprises without weakening banks’ operating performance in the long term, leading to a Pareto improvement within enterprise-banking sectors. The findings suggest that banks in China should gradually adjust their loan structures by providing greater credit loan access to enterprises, either voluntarily or directed by policy.     

Credit rationing and macroeconomic adjustment in Latin America

This research attempts to provide an answer to the important question of whether sovereign borrowers of developing countries are credit rationed in international capital markets. After defining the type of credit rationing to be tested an econometric technique is developed and tested with the results casting doubt on the extent of credit rationing for 12 of 13 Latin American developing countries over the sample period 1965–1988. The test is limited in that it will not detect credible threats of credit rationing followed by macroeconomic adjustments to bring about an equality of domestic investment and national savings. This form of ex ante credit rationing could still be pervasive. Nevertheless it would appear that on the whole, Latin American countries are quickly able to adjust to anticipated shocks by a combination of policies to reduce the investment-savings gap.     

民营上市公司的政治关联与融资研究——基于货币政策和媒体监督的视角

利用我国民营上市公司的数据研究发现:具有政治关系的公司更容易获得长期贷款,其债务期限也相对更长;而没有政治关系的公司由于无法获得银行贷款,则会利用私人关系,获得更多的商业信用。这说明民营企业利用各种关系进行债务融资的行为确实比较普遍。进一步的研究发现:在货币政策紧缩期,民营企业利用各种关系进行债务融资的行为更为普遍;随着媒体监督的加强,利用各种关系进行债务融资的行为显著减少。本文的研究发现,我国媒体监督阻碍了关系型契约的实施,在一定程度上抑制腐败。因此,政府应通过媒体之间的竞争,提高和完善媒体的监督职能,鼓励媒体来监督、治理腐败。     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible

This paper investigates an economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the overall level of the economy. In order to facilitate trading of goods, we introduce a perfectly divisible parameter that does not enter into consumer preferences — fiat money. When consumption goods are indivisible, a Walras equilibrium does not necessarily exist. We introduce the rationing equilibrium concept and prove its existence. Unlike the standard Arrow–Debreu model, fiat money can always have a strictly positive price at the rationing equilibrium. In our set up, if the initial endowment of fiat money is dispersed, then a rationing equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium. This result implies the existence of a dividend equilibrium or a Walras equilibrium with slack.     

The measurement of rationing and the treatment of structural change in the uk mortgage market

UK mortgage markets have undergone major structural changes in the past few years, resulting in mortgages no longer being rationed. The ending of rationing has implications for the specification of empirical models of housing demand. Housing models have never adequately resolved how to incorporate unobservable mortgage rationing. Conventional proxy methods are particularly unsuitable, when rationing ceases. In this paper, we propose a new way of measuring rationing directly, which incorporates regime switching. The model of rationing is extensively tested and estimates of rationing for the period 1963–1988 are provided; these may be easily incorporated into housing demand studies.