国有企业外部董事建设中的差异化问题*--基于对相关披露信息的大样本分析

作为我国经济体制改革的重要组成部分,国有企业改革备受关注,而其中一项重大突破是外部董事制度的建设。文章对中央及各地方国有企业外部董事的相关披露信息进行了大样本统计,从外部董事制度实施、任职情况和个人特征三方面分析了国有企业外部董事制度的建设和发展现状,以期为进一步深化国企改革提供借鉴。     

基于信息搜寻的外部董事选聘研究

外部董事制度是国有企业董事会改革的一项重要举措,从中央企业到地方国有企业都进行了很多有益的探索。外部董事制度已经在国有企业中得到深入的推广,但是该制度的实施并未达到预期效果。究其原因,外部董事的选拔与聘用是关键所在。近年来,对于外部董事问题的研究主要集中于外部董事职责的界定、考评与激励方面,作为外部董事制度最为基础的选聘研究较少,文章旨在结合信息搜寻理论,通过建立外部董事搜寻模型,研究外部董事的最佳人选、搜寻成本和最优搜寻次数,对现行的外部董事制度提供参考与建议。     

宝钢试点外部董事制度的经验与启示

作为深化国有企业改革的一项措施，宝钢外部董事制度试点具有很强的示范和带动作用。文章在总结宝钢试点外部董事制度成功经验的基础上，着重分析了宝钢试点外部董事制度对上海国有企业的若干启示。     

国有企业执行外部董事制度的几点思考

国有企业外部董事制度设立的目的是为了避免董事会与经理层的重合,实现决策权与执行权的分离和相互制衡。引入外部董事制度对完善国企董事会职能起到积极的作用,但该制度的广泛推行还需要逐步解决实践中的突出问题,并从制度本身及内外经济环境进一步的完善和提高。     

外部董事制度的前景

为了解决中国企业独特的治理问题和提升制度竞争力,外部董事制度建设应采取符合中国企业治理情境的发展方向。外部董事制度的引入是当前中国公司治理的重要变革之一。作为近年中国企业治理变革的亮点,外部董事制度的生存前景取决于在何种程度上解决了中国企业独特的治理问题和降低制度适应成本。     

浅谈新时代国有企业独立董事制度的建设与实践

随着中国特色社会主义进入新时代,我国国有企业的治理越来越规范化和多元化。在党的领导不断加强的同时,现代公司化治理也稳步推进,独立董事制度作为现代企业董事会建设的重要方式,在独立决策、权力制衡方面将起到越来越重要的作用,本文旨在研究国有企业如何加强和改进独立董事制度建设,以及独立董事如何指导企业管理实践。     

论我国国有独资公司董事会制度建设

随着国务院国资委2004年开始实行国有独资公司董事会试点工作以来,国有企业董事会建设成为国有企业改革实践的重点及理论研究的热点.本文在对我国国有企业董事会历史沿革分析的基础上,通过对董事会试点企业的调查研究,总结了国有企业董事会试点工作中的主要举措、董事会试点工作的成效,并对董事会试点工作存在的问题进行了深入分析,进一步论证了外部董事制度在国有企业董事会试点中的不可替代性.     

不同控股主体下独立董事制度与公司业绩关系的实证研究

本文通过对我国国有股控股和非国有股控股上市公司独立董事制度,与公司业绩相关性的实证分析后发现,独立董事制度对提升国有股控股公司业绩的作用不显著,而对非国有股控股上市公司中具有一定的显著性。这种差异说明独立董事制度在改善公司治理质量方面的效用程度,受不同控股权性质所导致的公司代理关系特征的影响,同时与外部市场制度差别和独立董事产生机制相关。因此,实现独立董事制度目标,首先需要在国有企业中改革国有资产受托责任关系制度,建立起有利于独立董事发挥作用的制度基础。     

不同控股主体下独立董事制度与公司业绩关系的实证研究

本文通过对我国国有股控股和非国有股控股上市公司独立董事制度,与公司业绩相关性的实证分析后发现,独立董事制度对提升国有股控股公司业绩的作用不显著,而对非国有股控股上市公司中具有一定的显著性。这种差异说明独立董事制度在改善公司治理质量方面的效用程度,受不同控股权性质所导致的公司代理关系特征的影响,同时与外部市场制度差别和独立董事产生机制相关。因此,实现独立董事制度目标,首先需要在国有企业中改革国有资产受托责任关系制度,建立起有利于独立董事发挥作用的制度基础。     

论独立董事制度的几个相关法律问题

一、建立独立董事制度是对我国上市公司治理结构的一大制度创新 在美国公司法中,董事可分为内部董事与外部董事.在采取两分法的情况下,外部董事与独立董事有时互换使用.如果采取三分法,董事可以分为内部董事、有关联关系的外部董事与无关联关系的外部董事.其中,只有无关联关系的外部董事才可被称为独立董事.     

上市公司独立董事制度实施效果实证研究

董事会是公司治理结构的重要内容之一,独立董事作为董事会的重要组成部分,其职能和工作效率也成为人们关注的重点。本文试图从独立董事总体工作情况、同城异地独立董事工作情况以及个别独立董事薪酬与工作情况关系的角度,考察我国独立董事制度对上市公司治理效果的影响,结果发现,实施独立董事上市公司治理结果有所改进,独立董事异地任职独立作用大。     

Outside Directors on Korean Boards: Governance and Institutions

Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines the factors that pressured Korean firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. While this practice could be considered to be a management innovation in Korea, in the Anglo‐American corporate governance system it has long been used as one of several mechanisms to mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders. As such, this response by Korean firms, following the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia, could be seen as an example of corporate governance convergence on the Anglo‐American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the board are the norm. We examine the antecedents of having a higher proportion of outside directors on Korean boards. Our findings indicate that larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of outside directors on the board. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of outside directors and business group affiliation, poor prior firm performance, higher levels of debt and foreign ownership.     

Outside director compensation and firm performance

Compensation given to outside directors has come under increasing scrutiny. However, little empirical work exists which examines outside director compensation. A study of more than 225 major corporations over a five-year period indicates that the number of board meetings and the size of the company are major factors in outside director compensation levels, while organization performance and Chief Executive Officer remuneration do not appear to be significantly related. These findings suggest that market-driven compensation systems are the dominant form used by large organizations to pay outside directors, with a major goal being the attraction and retention of these directors.     

Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors

ABSTRACT Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are ‘stretched’ by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and non‐overboarded outside directors.     

Shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another

Officers of large corporations, having demonstrated expertise in managing complex organizations, would appear to be ideal additions to the boards of directors of other corporations. Shareholder wealth effects are examined for 124 announcements in which an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another. The results indicate that the values of nonfinancial firms that send directors to other firms decline significantly, while those of financial senders increase significantly. Receiving firms of both types do not gain. The results suggest that for nonfinancial firms the added duties of an outside directorship distract corporate officers from managing their own firms or are signals to the market that managers are available to other firms. For financial senders, the benefits of networking appear to strongly outweigh any drawbacks. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that prediction errors are higher for receiving firms if they have performed poorly prior to the announcement and less negative for sending firms if they have performed well prior to the announcement. Abnormal returns are negatively related to the size of the sender, adding support for the notion that busy executives are less valuable as outside directors.     

Board independence and market reactions around news of stock option backdating

This study focuses on whether board independence explains stock price reactions to backdating and factors that explain backdating decision. Consistent with previous studies, we find negative stock returns around backdating news. Although our findings show that board independence variables fail to explain the incidence of backdating, our regression results show that stockholders consider these variables to be important. Abnormal stock returns around news of backdating are higher when firms have higher proportion of outside directors and when outside directors have lower stock ownership in the firm.     

法人治理及其在首创集团的实践

现阶段，规范和完善公司法人治理结构是国有企业改革的主要任务。本文根据首创集团建立法人治理结构的实践。从建立规范有效的董事会到外部董事制度的探索两方面做了深入的分析，提出了有针对性的建设性意见。     

Recruiting outside board members in the small family business: an ideological challenge

The focus of this paper is to explore how contrasting ideologies influence the selection process of outside directors in the small family business. Small family businesses donot just represent smallscale economic activity but they are the outcome of entrepreneurial ambition and family involvement. This means that willpower and emotional commitment blend with calculative considerations. As emotional as well as cognitive constructs the family, management and entrepreneurship each represent an ideology: paternalism, managerialism and entrepreneurialism. The proposed ideological framework is positioned against alternative approaches to the study of board selection processes. Two sets of data are presented. A piloting survey of 12 family businesses is used to substantiate the theoretical assumption that entrepreneurial firms avoid having outside directors and managerial firms welcome outside directors, leaving paternalistically-run family businesses ambivalent. Repeated in-depth interviews in two family businesses, one founder-managed and entrepreneurial, the other established and traditional, reveal how the professionalization of the board enforces managerialism, challenging thus far dominating ideologies, entrepreneurialism and paternalism. The outcome of this ideological contest, if properly orchestrated, is an energized and more competitive family business.     

Antecedents of New Director Social Capital

Prior research shows that firms benefit from the social capital of their boards of directors but has not explored the antecedents of new director social capital. We argue that firms can attract directors with social capital by offering more compensation. We also argue that more complex firms (firms with a greater scale and scope of operations) are more attractive to such directors because of the greater experience and exposure that such directorships provide. Similarly, we argue that firms with high‐status directors on their current boards will be more attractive to directors with social capital. We analyse the social capital of new outside directors added to boards of semiconductor firms between 1993 and 2007. Surprisingly, we find no support for the hypothesis that higher compensation is associated with adding directors with high status or board ties. However, firm complexity is associated with the ability to add new directors who have social capital, and the status of current board members is associated with the ability to add new directors who also have high status.