Layoff victim's employment relationship with a new employer in Korea: effects of unmet tenure expectations on trust and psychological contract

Existing studies of psychological contract have largely focused on the effects of contract breach on employees' attitudes and the contract itself involving the same employer. Given that both workforce mobility and downsizing activities are increasing, it is important to understand how individuals' past employment experiences shape their relationships with their employers. The present study focuses on the effect of prior layoffs on relationships with new employers. We posit that furloughed workers experience layoff as a breach of the psychological contract of job security they have entered into with their employer. Longitudinal data collected from individuals who were re-employed following a layoff revealed that unmet tenure expectations in an employment relationship result in reduced trust in a new employer, which in turn negatively impacts the quality of psychological contracts with the new employer. The results also show that the relationship between unmet tenure expectations and trust was moderated by individual attributions regarding the cause of the layoff. The present findings suggest that the negative impact of contract breach experienced with one organization may carry over to subsequent organizational contexts.     

Understanding the Determinants of Who Gets Laid Off: Does Affective Organizational Commitment Matter?

Whereas prior research has focused on structural, demographic, and human capital factors to predict who gets laid off, the current study examines affective organizational commitment as an additional attribute related to an employee's layoff chances. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between affective organizational commitment and an individual's layoff chances, as well as whether this relationship differs between high and low performers. Event history analysis is conducted using survey data with matched personnel records from 3,057 employees across 563 Australian bank branches. After controlling for numerous predictors of layoffs, the results demonstrate that affective organizational commitment decreases the likelihood of an employee being laid off. Further, the effects of affective organizational commitment on an individual's layoff chances are greater for lower performers than higher performers. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Inter-firm governance and structural power in industrial relationships: the moderating effect of bargaining power on the contractual safeguarding of specific assets

In the basic model of transaction cost analysis (TCA), neither market power nor power based on resource-dependence plays a significant role. In this article, we extend the TCA-perspective by combining resource-dependence theory (RDT) and TCA, and examine whether the buyer's bargaining power influences the alignment of the contractual safeguarding of buyer-specific and supplier-specific investments. Data from a survey of 160 industrial purchasing relationships provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions.The empirical findings demonstrate that the buyer's bargaining power does interfere with the safeguarding of relations-specific assets. As the buyer's relative bargaining power increases, the safeguarding of buyer-specific assets is substantially reinforced. On the other hand, the contractual protection of supplier-specific assets is significantly relaxed as the buyer's bargaining power grows.Our findings indicate that there is a tension between the alignment of contractual safeguarding arrangements and structural power in inter-firm business, and that resource-dependence considerations offer an important complement to TCA when we consider the transacting parties’ ability to provide contractual safeguards for assets at risk.Further, the findings indicate that the establishment of relational ties in long-term relationships is an important antecedent to governance structure. The empirical findings demonstrate that the longer a business-to-business relationship lasts, the more the contractual governance is relaxed.     

Wage curve, unemployment duration and compensating differentials

In this study unemployment effects on individual pay are investigated following the study on ‘wage curves’ by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). In bargaining models, higher unemployment should lower wage pressure; due to compensating wage differential arguments, on the other hand, workers who take jobs with higher layoff risks should be rewarded. In a cross-sectional study on Austrian data, a negative wage curve is confirmed. Contrary to the results by Blanchflower and Oswald no U-shape is found, also long-term unemployment seems to be important. No conclusive evidence of compensating differentials has been determined.     

Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment insurance system and labour market turnover. This study assumes the incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system have a heterogeneous impact, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job entrances) and on a worker's attachment to the labour market (gender and type of contract). The layoff hazard rate increases as workers qualify for unemployment benefits, whilst the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment inflow increases sharply after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of the exit differ between recalls and new job entry and depend on a worker's attachment to the labour market. The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and both firms' and workers' decisions seem to matter.     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

MATERNAL EDUCATION AND CHILD ATTAINMENT IN JAMAICA: TESTING THE BARGAINING POWER HYPOTHESIS†

In a bargaining model of household decision-making, any variable reflecting the outside opportunities of household members will influence household demand patterns. Mother's education has been found to be an important determinant of children's education and health outcomes. This paper argues that within a bargaining framework, mother's education may influence children's health and education by shifting bargaining power within the household. An empirical strategy is developed and applied to data on teenage grade attainment and school enrolment in Jamaica. The results support the bargaining power hypothesis, and imply a broader role for mother's education than has previously been considered.     

Temporary layoffs and split population models

This paper develops and estimates a split population model for the duration of temporary layoffs in the German labour market; the population being split according to whether a layoff is temporary or permanent. A flexible piecewise constant hazard is employed and the recall propensity is used to condition the duration of a temporary layoff. The distinction between factors that influence the recall propensity and factors that influence the duration of a temporary layoff is shown to be of empirical significance. The results of the paper are used to evaluate implicit contract and search theories of temporary layoffs. The paper suggests that implicit contracts can explain the behaviour of unemployed workers with high worker–firm attachment whilst search can explain the behaviour of workers with low worker–firm attachment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Job auctions and hold-ups

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which firms need to invest in capital before they can post a vacancy. This assumption creates a natural scope for hold-up problems, but the innovation of our study is that we allow for competition among the applicants who apply for the same job. In our economy all applicants are paid their actual marginal product. Nonetheless, with random search there exists a hold-up problem, leading to underinvestment in capital. On the contrary, if workers can direct their search towards firms with different capital levels, the equilibrium is efficient. This result contrasts sharply with the predictions of models with ex-post bargaining that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an environment with non-contractible investments.     

What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?

When boards hire CEOs, the board and successor CEO have an opportunity to redesign the predecessor's compensation contract. The CEO's relative bargaining power will influence the outcome of compensation negotiations. Analyzing 508 successions, we find that total compensation of successor CEOs increases by 69% over their predecessor, but the structure of successor compensation is heavily influenced by the predecessors’ contracts. When the board's bargaining power is large, successors have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of salary. When the CEO's bargaining power is large, there is a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk and relatively greater proportion of salary.     

Shaping the bargaining agenda. The Audit Commission and public service reform in British local government

This article examines the role of the Audit Commission (AC) in local government collective bargaining. While the AC has no official role in such bargaining, it has a role in monitoring the performance of local government services. In this role the AC has a clear potential, in the context of the government's ‘modernization’ agenda – as manifested in its ‘Best Value’ regime, for influencing both the content of collective agreements, and the process of collective bargaining, where these are seen to conflict with other Best Value objectives – particularly in relation to external competition. The research conducted involved a content analysis of AC inspection reports on human resource services and longitudinal case studies of two local authority union branches' experiences of Best Value and the role of the AC. The findings from the inspection reports indicate that, while the AC is actually acting to promote activities that could be seen as supportive of union bargaining agendas, notably in relation to equality type issues, they are also supporting service externalisation and thereby acting to limit the scope of their impact. The reports also indicate that, despite there being prescribed ‘best practice’ for local government employment relations (‘social partnership’ with unions), the AC is not promoting any such engagement with unions. Evidence from the case studies add weight to these observations: the AC, in one case, was deeply suspicious of an attempted union management agreement on procurement, while in the other, the AC made no criticism of the costly effects that externalization had on union-management relations.     

Distributive justice and organizational commitment revisited: moderation by layoff in the case of Korean employees

Research supports the conclusion that organizational commitment is affected more by procedural justice than by distributive justice, and this is especially true in collectivistic societies. The present research examines the effects of distributive justice on organizational commitment levels of Korean employees under layoff situations. It focuses on the moderating effects of two layoff variables: layoff experience and layoff perception. Data were collected from HR managers from 14 companies and 411 employees. It was found that layoff perception significantly moderated the effect of distributive justice on organizational commitment, while there was no significant effect found in the case of layoff experience. Additional analyses show that employees perceive a high level of distributive justice even in the case of layoffs when training on the appraisal methods are provided. Implications of these findings are included in the discussion. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

中国房地产交易真的是卖方市场吗？——基于双边随机边界模型的实证研究

科学测算房地产交易市场买卖双方议价能力对市场价格形成的影响作用，是当前政府制定“因地施策”宏观调控机制的重要前提。采用双边随机边界模型，考察房地产交易环节中买卖双方议价能力的差异,结果表明：（1）买卖双方讨价还价因素对商品房销售价格的最终形成存在显著影响；（2）从全国平均水平看，对于整体市场以及住宅、写字楼和商铺等细分市场，卖房者议价能力在双方讨价还价过程中占主导地位，但买方议价能力的影响作用也不容忽视；（3）从一线、新一线、二线和三线城市角度看，除了一线城市商铺市场以及三线城市总体城市、住宅市场和写字楼市场外，其他均处于卖方市场阶段。     

Collective bargaining: crisis and its consequences for American society

The term ‘collective bargaining’ was first used extensively and developed in full form by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. As the intellectual father and mother of British industrial relations and through their multiple contributions to research, government and policy making, and university affairs, the Webbs served as role models for multiple generations of British scholars. Willy Brown, scholar, educational leader and active public servant, stands as our generation's Webbs' equivalent. In all three domains he has carried on the Webbs' legacy with the highest distinction. So it is fitting that one essay in this collection honouring Willy be devoted to an examination of the current state of this institution the Webbs called collective bargaining. I am honoured to present an analysis of collective bargaining, albeit one limited to its effects, the consequences of its decline and its potential future in the United States.     

Optimal nonlinear pricing by a regret-averse monopoly

This paper examines the optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist who sells a good to two types of buyers with high and low valuation. The monopolist's preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. Regret aversion is shown to affect the rent extraction-efficiency tradeoff. When buyers are more likely to have high (low) valuation, the regret-averse monopolist reduces (enlarges) the downward distortion on the second-best quantity offered to low-valuation buyers, thereby resulting in lower (higher) unit prices paid by all buyers. The regret-averse monopolist always earns a lower expected profit.     

The impact of HRM practices on service quality,customer satisfaction and performance in the Indian hotel industry

This article reviews findings from a first survey of employers' views on collective bargaining reform that now forms the centrepiece of post-apartheid South Africa's experiment with 'democratic corporatism'. Using factor analysis, three constructs have been identified that inform employer attitudes to a revised system of sectoral bargaining: 'autonomous capacity'; 'conditional association'; 'external threat'. Despite the potential for anomie, these factors appear significant in the way they consistently explain an employer's orientation towards associational membership and, by proxy, sectoral bargaining. Moreover, at least two-thirds of responding firms identified strongly with each of the three factors but, typically, firms with weak capacity and in need of collective protection from the other actors are most likely to associate. Regression analysis further reveals company well-being, foreign ownership and union presence to have a significant impact on these three factors to varying degrees. Equally, two of the factors (autonomous capacity and external threat) impact significantly on an employer's tolerance of free-riding in others and on the temptation to do so for oneself. Overall, for this sample of firms, employer bodies are to be viewed more as 'political devices' than as 'economic agents' in the immediate aftermath of political liberation. In this sense, they are different from their European counter-parts. However, there is an increasing likelihood of this changing as the flexibility agenda looms ever larger in employers' minds and as issues of 'political insecurity' correspondingly fade.     

Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard

This paper combines the shirking and the matching approaches of equilibrium unemployment in order to endogenize the wage formation process as a function of labour market conditions. The steady-state equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no-shirking condition is binding or not. It is demonstrated that the efficiency wage approach is relevant when the unemployment rate is above a certain threshold. Furthermore, an efficiency wage is more likely when the disutility of effort is high, recruiting costs and workers' bargaining power are low, inspections are unlikely and the workers' productivity is weak.     

Must Sell

Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better off.