Wages,employment, labour turnover and the accessibility of local labour markets

In this paper, we extend a dynamic efficiency wage model to the case of multiple local labour markets that interact through migration. Firms are concerned about turnover costs. The quitting behaviour of workers is a function of local labour market conditions, non-wage income and the costs and benefits of migration to other local labour markets. A synthetic micro sample of 20,302 observations from the 1986, 1991 and 1996 New Zealand Censuses of Population and Dwellings provides evidence supporting the theory. Across subgroups, the wages of workers with relatively inelastic local labour supply and/or lower geographical mobility are relatively more responsive to changes in the local employment rate. The evidence is consistent with the notion that local employers engage in monopsonistic competition with respect to the employment of such workers.     

The effect of international firm mobility on wages and unemployment

Although the increase in international firm mobility is well documented, its effects on macroeconomic aggregates and the labour market remain controversial. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) benefit from an international outside option during wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in average wages. However, a strategic incentive to hire extra workers in a foreign (home) plant in order to reduce wages in the home (foreign) plant has an indirect positive effect on wages due to spillovers resulting from an increased demand for labour. In a framework of frictional unemployment, permitting MNEs leads to a decrease in unemployment. Abstracting from transport and plant fixed costs, MNEs lead to higher wages. Including transport and plant costs generally leads to lower wages, though the effects are small. The strategic hiring effect is important in mitigating the fall in wages.     

Land Market Restrictions,Women's Labour Force Participation and Wages in a Rural Economy

We analyse the effects of land market restrictions on the rural labour market outcomes for women. The existing literature emphasizes two mechanisms through which land restrictions can affect economic outcomes: collateral value of land, and (in)security of property rights. Our analysis focuses on an alternative mechanism where land restrictions increase costs of migration out of villages. Testable prediction of collateral channel is that wages remain unchanged, but the effects on labour force participation are ambiguous. Insecurity of property rights in land reduces labour force participation, but leaves wages undisturbed. In contrast, if land restrictions work primarily through higher migration costs, labour force participation increases, while wages decline. For identification, we exploit a natural experiment in Sri Lanka where historical malaria played a unique role in land policy. We provide robust evidence of a positive effect of land restrictions on women's labour force participation, but a negative effect on female wages. The empirical results thus contradict a collateral or insecure property rights effect, but supports migration costs as the primary mechanism.     

Spatial wage disparities: Sorting matters!

Spatial wage disparities can result from spatial differences in the skill composition of the workforce, in non-human endowments, and in local interactions. To distinguish between these explanations, we estimate a model of wage determination across local labour markets using a very large panel of French workers. We control for worker characteristics, worker fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the characteristics of the local labour market. Our findings suggest that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing spatial wage disparities with strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills. Interaction effects are mostly driven by the local density of employment. Not controlling for worker heterogeneity leads to very biased estimates of interaction effects. Endowments only appear to play a small role.     

Equilibrium search unemployment with explicit spatial frictions

Assuming that job search efficiency decreases with distance to jobs, workers' location in a city depends on spatial elements such as commuting costs and land prices and on labour elements such as wages and the matching technology. In the absence of moving costs, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium in which employed and unemployed workers are perfectly segregated but move at each employment transition. We investigate the interactions between the land and the labour market equilibrium and show under which condition they are interdependent. When relocation costs become positive, a new zone appears in which both the employed and the unemployed co-exist and are not mobile. We demonstrate that the size of this area goes continuously to zero when moving costs vanish. Finally, we endogeneize search effort, show that it negatively depends on distance to jobs and that long and short-term unemployed workers coexist and locate in different areas of the city.     

Quit behavior and the role of job protection

Job protection reduces job turnover by changing firms' hiring and firing decisions. Yet the effect of job protection on workers' quit decisions and post-quit outcomes is still unknown. We present the first evidence using individual panel data from 12 European countries, which differ both in worker turnover rates and in the level of job protection. We find that workers are less likely to quit their job in countries with more job protection, and those workers who quit receive higher wages compared to stayers. This evidence can be explained by increased mobility costs associated with higher expected risk of post-quit layoff and job mismatch.     

How do European firms adjust their labour costs when nominal wages are rigid?

Although workers' nominal wages are seldom cut, firms have multiple options available if they require adjustments in their wage bills. We broaden the analysis of relative (in)flexibility in labour costs by investigating the use of other margins of labour cost adjustment at the firm level beyond base wages. Using data from a unique survey, we find that European firms make extensive use of other components of compensation to adjust the cost of labour. Interestingly, firms facing base wage rigidity are more likely to use alternative margins of labour cost adjustment; therefore there appears to be some degree of substitutability between wage flexibility and the flexibility of other cost components. Changes in bonuses and non-pay benefits are some of the potential margins firms use to reduce costs. We also show how the margins of adjustment chosen are affected by unionisation and firm and worker characteristics.     

Discrimination,technology and unemployment

I study the interaction between discrimination and investment using a directed search model where firms decide the capital intensity of their production technologies before being matched. Discrimination makes some workers cheap to hire. As a consequence, some firms might save on capital costs adopting labour intensive technologies. This framework allows one to reconcile search models with three well-known facts regarding the labour market outcomes of minority workers: low wages, high unemployment and occupational segregation. Furthermore, the model questions the role of equal pay legislation in reducing inequality since removing this restriction, i.e., allowing firms to post type-contingent wages, eliminates the negative effects of discrimination on investment and wages.     

Paying to queue: a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages

Traditional theories of the effect unions have on nonunion wages are difficult to reconcile with firm and worker mobility. We show how differences in nonunion wages can persist in a two-city search model. Nonunion wage differences across cities are driven by transition rates into the union sector. Should union queues form in the nonunion sector, union power decreases nonunion wages as workers are willing to take lower wages to line up for union jobs. However, if queues are formed in the unemployed sector, union power increases nonunion wages as nonunion firms pay premiums to induce workers to leave the queue.     

The effects of labor supply shocks on labor market outcomes: Evidence from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Since September 2000, as a result of mobility restrictions, the supply of Palestinian workers competing for local jobs in the West Bank has increased by about fifty percent. This paper takes advantage of this unique natural experiment to study the effects of labor supply shocks on labor market outcomes. Using quarterly information on wages and employment in each city in the West Bank, the paper analyzes the short-run adjustment of labor markets to a large inflow of workers separately from the effects of political instability. The results suggest that low-skilled wages are adversely affected by an increase in the supply of low- and high-skilled workers, while high-skilled wages are only weakly negatively related to an increase in their own supply. This is consistent with a scenario in which high-skilled workers compete for low-skilled jobs, pushing the low-skilled into unemployment. This latter hypothesis is confirmed by analyzing the effects of changes in labor supply on unemployment.     

Managers and Wage Policies

Do individual top managers matter for wages and wage policies? Are there general differences in “style” among managers with respect to worker compensation? To shed light on these questions, we exploit a large panel dataset from Portugal that allows us to match workers, firms, and managers, and follow the movements of the latter across different firms over time. While accounting for the effect of worker and firm heterogeneity, we estimate the role of top manager fixed effects in determining wages and wage policies. The estimates suggest that (i) top managers have a significant influence on wages and wage policies; (ii) there exists different managerial “styles”; and (iii) managers’ (observable) attributes matter for worker compensation.     

Job Insecurity and Labour Market Lemons: The (Mis)Management of Redundancy in Steel Making,Coal Mining and Port Transport

Redundancy provisions in Britain have failed to promote organizational regeneration or labour mobility from declining to expanding firms/industries. On the contrary, as human resources are wantonly discarded through the (mis)management of redundancy, job security and X-efficiency in the internal labour market has been severely eroded. In external labour markets, many redundant workers, the so-called `lemons' of the labour market, are consigned to long-term unemployment because employers are wary of hiring a worker that another firm does not want. These deleterious outcomes are elaborated through detailed case studies from steel-making, coal-mining and port transport, where mass redundancy has proved instrumental in the process of industrial restructuring. In order to re-establish trust and security in the internal labour market, alternative methods of managing changing labour market requirements, based on reconversion rather than redundancy, are considered in the concluding section.     

Urban search models under high-relocation costs. Theory and application to spatial mismatch

We develop a search-matching model in which mobility costs are so high that it is too costly for workers to relocate when a change in their employment status occurs. We show that, in equilibrium, wages increase with distance to jobs and commuting costs because firms need to compensate the transportation cost difference between the employed and unemployed workers at each location in the city. We also show that the equilibrium land rent is negatively affected by the unemployment benefit because an increase in the latter induce firms to create less jobs, which, in turn, reduces the competition in the land market. We then use this model to provide a mechanism for the observed spatial mismatch between where black workers live and where jobs are. We finally show that a transportation policy consisting in subsidizing the commuting costs of black workers can increase job creation and reduce unemployment if the level of the subsidy is set at a sufficiently high level.     

Worker poaching in a supply chain: Enemy from within?

Worker poaching represents the primary mode by which workers change employers. We examine worker poaching between firms linked in a value chain. We find that, in a value chain, the less productive firm may offer its workers higher wages and poach workers from the more productive firm. We also find that worker flows accomplished via poaching impact supply chain management: (a) the identity of the bottleneck firm may depend on whether poaching is available; (b) poaching between linked firms may benefit both, and (c) the value chain cannot be fully coordinated without controlling wages in the labor market.     

Job hopping,earnings dynamics,and industrial agglomeration in the software publishing industry

This paper investigates the implications of industrial clustering for labor mobility and earnings dynamics in one large and increasingly important high-technology sector. Taking advantage of longitudinal employee-employer matched data, I exploit establishment-level variation in agglomeration to explore how clustering in the software publishing industry affects labor market outcomes. The results show that clustering makes it easier for workers to job hop within the sector. Higher earnings levels in more agglomerated areas are partly attributable to sorting across locations among workers and firms in the industry on the basis of observable and unobservable characteristics. Controlling for this heterogeneity, workers in clusters have relatively steep earnings-tenure profiles, accepting lower wages early in their careers in exchange for stronger earnings growth and higher wages later. These findings are consistent with theoretical models in which agglomeration improves labor market coordination and facilitates greater learning and human capital formation.     

Job hopping, earnings dynamics, and industrial agglomeration in the software publishing industry

This paper investigates the implications of industrial clustering for labor mobility and earnings dynamics in one large and increasingly important high-technology sector. Taking advantage of longitudinal employee-employer matched data, I exploit establishment-level variation in agglomeration to explore how clustering in the software publishing industry affects labor market outcomes. The results show that clustering makes it easier for workers to job hop within the sector. Higher earnings levels in more agglomerated areas are partly attributable to sorting across locations among workers and firms in the industry on the basis of observable and unobservable characteristics. Controlling for this heterogeneity, workers in clusters have relatively steep earnings-tenure profiles, accepting lower wages early in their careers in exchange for stronger earnings growth and higher wages later. These findings are consistent with theoretical models in which agglomeration improves labor market coordination and facilitates greater learning and human capital formation.     

Wages,fringe benefits and worker turnover

Linked employer–employee data from Norway are utilised to study how employers use wages and fringe benefits in managing their workforce. The analysis shows that on average across all establishments, we observe a positive correlation between wages and fringe benefits. This indicates the presence of labour market frictions and thus is not supportive of the classical frictionless hedonic wage model. Higher wages and more fringe benefits reduce the worker turnover rate. Fringe benefits have stronger negative impact on the excess worker turnover rate than indicated by the reported monetary value.     

Product market integration,wage dispersion and unemployment

International product market integration enhances both the export possibility of supplying to foreign markets and the import threat of foreign firms penetrating into domestic markets. These mechanisms affect labour markets since they amount to increased job mobility. At the same time heterogeneity may increase since it is unlikely that the opportunities and threats are uniformly distributed across different groups/sectors. In a Ricardian trade model admitting heterogeneity in the labour market, it is shown that lower trade frictions are associated with aggregate welfare gains, increased trade and specialization, but also more dispersion in wages. Structural labour market problems caused by union market power are reduced while those caused by minimum (reservation) wages are strengthened.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

Government Employment and Wages and Labour Market Performance

Government wage, benefit, and employment decisions are not taken on a profit-maximizing basis, and have a substantial impact on aggregate labour market performance and unemployment. In a two-sector labour market model with free mobility of labour, an increase in government wages or benefits reduces private sector employment, and government employment is not an effective counter-cyclical instrument. Empirical tests for Greece confirm that the expansion of the public sector in the 1980s contributed to the deterioration of labour market performance.