Aqui No Se Habla Agencia.* An Examination of the Impact of Adverse Selection and Framing in Decision‐Making: a US/Mexico Comparison

US companies seeking cheaper labor or extraordinary returns have often seen foreign direct investment as a panacea. However, many of these companies founder on the horns of a control dilemma. While raw economic data such as labor rates prove to be true, productivity and decision‐making styles are so different that companies fail to maximize their investment returns. This situation is worsened as companies attempt to impose culturally inappropriate home country controls on their foreign investment. This study examines one of the potential sources of failure, escalation of commitment, which occurs when decision‐makers over‐commit incremental resources to failing investments without reasonable probability of recovery. This behavior has been widely documented in US domestic literature (see Whyte and Hook, 1997 , for a summary). However, there is also some evidence that such behavior is culturally bounded ( Chow et al., 1997; Sharp and Salter, 1997; Greer and Stephens, 2001 ). This study extends previous findings on cross‐cultural differences in decision‐making among managers by comparing the responses of managers in the USA and Mexico to an escalation of commitment exercise. The cross‐cultural validity of two US based theories, agency (adverse selection) and framing (prospect theory), is tested. The results indicate that at base Mexican managers were more risk seeking. However managers from the more individualistic USA were significantly more likely than Mexican managers to escalate in the presence of agency (adverse selection) based incentives. Negative framing among managers was universal in escalating commitment.     

The Manager’s Notepad: Working Memory,Exploration, and Performance

This study builds upon March and Simon’s proposition that individual‐level differences must be considered when explaining decision‐making performance. We extend their discussion on the importance of decision‐makers’ attention to explain heterogeneous patterns of exploration and exploitation within the same uncertain environment. We develop a model of decision‐making under uncertainty in which ‘working memory’ – i.e., the ability to hold multiple elements in mind to actively process them – explains the emergence of heterogeneity in exploration‐exploitation choice patterns. We validated the model in a laboratory study and two replications involving 171 individuals. Our findings show that differences in working memory allow us to identify individuals who are more likely to choose exploration over exploitation appropriately, and thus achieve higher performance. We discuss the implications for management theories, and re‐propose the work of March and Simon as a unifying framework that still can be used to generate and test managerially relevant hypotheses.     

Towards a Social Theory of Agency

We challenge critics of agency theory who suggest that agency theory's value does not extend outside a narrow context dominated by egocentric agents seeking only to maximize wealth at the expense of the principal. Instead, we argue that agency theory's flexibility allows for its application to a variety of non‐traditional settings where the key elements of agency theory, such as self‐interest, information asymmetry, and the mechanisms used to control agency costs can vary beyond the narrow assumptions implied in traditional agency‐based research. We suggest that extending agency theory to diverse settings using a deductive approach can be accomplished by formally recognizing and incorporating the institutional context surrounding principal–agent (P–A) relations into agency‐based models. Thus, criticisms that agency theory fails to acknowledge the social context in which P–A relations occur provides not a barrier but an opportunity for extending our understanding of P–A relations to a variety of diverse contexts.     

Interorganisational project dynamics: A longitudinal study of perceptual distance and client-contractor collaborative relationships

Despite the importance of good collaborative relationships in interorganisational projects, clients and contractors often develop adversarial relationships due to perceptual distance about key project issues. In this case study research, we investigated how perceptual distance emerges and changes over time, and how the collaborative relationship between client and contractor develops alongside these dynamics. In this exploration, we built upon agency theory and stewardship theory as complementary perspectives for understanding client-contractor collaborative relationships. We gathered quantitative and qualitative data in two projects, conducting three assessments in about one year. We found that perceptual distance increased and decreased over time, and that a reduction was typically associated with the collaborative relationship being characterized by stewardship rather than agency. These findings suggest that a regular assessment and evaluation of partners’ perceptions of critical project issues is warranted to timely detect and counteract perceptual distance. Moreover, partners would best adopt a stewardship orientation to reduce perceptual distance, although this may take considerable effort given the distributive nature of many pre-project negotiations.     

Boards of Directors and Shark Repellents:Assessing the Value of an Agency Theory Perspective

Because shark repellents decrease the vulnerability of firms (and their incumbent managers) to the market for corporate control, the decision to adopt these devices represents an excellent test of agency theory. In this empirical study, we examined the relationships between the adoption of shark repellents and several mechanisms that, according to agency theory, should align the interests of corporate board members and shareholders and/or make directors more effective monitors of management behaviour. Of the variables included, only board stock ownership (especially by employee directors) was linked to a reduced propensity to adopt shark repellents in the predicted manner. Two variables not immediately as- sociated with agency theory — the proportion of inside directors appointed by the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) and a lower ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of other top executives — were linked to higher rates of shark repellent adoption. Given that agency theory explains relatively little of the variance in shark repellent adoption, we advocate serious consideration of other theoretical formulations for corporate governance, including two approaches — stewardship theory and agent morality — that take the moral ('other regarding') obligations of directors seriously.     

Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends

It is a common belief that CEOs must delegate to be successful. We hesitate to support this generalization and investigate how the distribution of responsibility within top management teams (TMTs) can influence the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Consistent with an agency theory perspective, our results indicate that CEOs may choose not to delegate their responsibilities to other executive TMT members, so as to benefit from an increased information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the board of directors. Taking the resource‐based view as a complementary theoretical perspective, we find that non‐delegating CEOs benefit from their greater firm‐specific knowledge, which the board of directors considers as a valuable resource that should be retained. Our work also demonstrates that a more intense CEO–TMT interaction weakens the relation between non‐delegation and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In sum, our research shows that the CEO’s delegation decision does not necessarily lead to a competence distribution that is in the firm's best interest; rather, it reflects a complex interplay between the potentially opportunistic career interests of the CEO, the involvement of other TMT members and the board of directors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations

By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.     

Otra Empanada en la Parilla: Examining the Role of Culture and Information Sharing in Chile and Australia

One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share “bad news” (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross‐cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information‐sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision‐makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision‐makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision‐makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.     

The importance of input control to work performance under the agency theory framework

In the agency theory literature, output and behavioral controls have been quite thoroughly explored. However, input control (IC) that emphasizes personnel selection and staffing has only been discussed theoretically. Literature outside the agency theory, nonetheless, corroborates IC when competitions increase. With an empirical approach to strategic human resource management, this study explored the relationships between controls and work performance under the influences of two agency factors: principal–agent relationship and task programmability. Results show that controls are generally associated with work performance but more important are their moderating effects with the two contingent agency factors. Furthermore, hierarchical regression analyses reveal that IC is a vital factor for work performance. These findings suggest that IC deserves more attention under the conditions of increased competition.     

An exploratory study of stewardship for Chinese nonprofit organizations

This study examined how Chinese nonprofits practice stewardship and how stewardship principles influence nonprofit–donor relationships and donor retention. Fifteen qualitative in‐depth interviews were conducted with experienced fundraisers in China. Results showed that Kelly's stewardship principles were applicable in China; Chinese fundraisers practiced stewardship principles of reciprocity, responsibility, reporting, and relationship nurturing to maintain relationships with major gift and annual donors. Besides, practitioners also utilized a variety of communication channels, ranging from face‐to‐face, telephones, emails, to digital shared media such as WeChat and Weibo, in communicating with individual and general public donors. Finally, interviewees also provided evidence on the positive role of quality nonprofit–donor relationships in retaining donors. This study illustrated the current status of nonprofit fundraising practice in China and expanded the explanatory power of the stewardship theory. The findings are implicative for Chinese nonprofits professionals on how to develop their unique stewardship practice in managing relationships with donors.     

Risk aversion in Entrepreneurship Panels: Measurement Problems and Alternative Explanations

In this study, we investigate the pitfalls associated with measuring risk aversion within studies of entrepreneurial behavior. First, we raise substantial concerns as to whether standard questions employed can be used to infer risk aversion among nascent entrepreneurs. In our work we show that the US, Canadian and Swedish panel study datasets do not offer evidence that entrepreneurs are more risk averse than non‐entrepreneurs. In fact, we show that the measurements used for risk aversion in these studies are not compatible with classic expected utility theory. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that probability weighting may even counteract the respondent's risk attitude. Therefore, inferring the respondent's risk attitude from choices in the panel study datasets can be misleading in the presence of probability weighting. We therefore suggest that alternative theories of decision making under risk, like prospect theory, are relevant and should be taken into account in future studies on entrepreneurship. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Commissioning Process in the NHS: The theory and application

The concept of ‘capacity building’ is explored, through illustration and critique of the concept's development in the international, national and local community literature. Theoretical strands where the concept belongs partially include community development theory, agency theory and stewardship theory. The concept is examined in the context of new public management thinking, and its discovery by professionals to enhance their community roles is highlighted. Findings from micro-level case study research among local community organizations are reported, suggesting organizational scepticism about its meaning and outcomes, and producing a preliminary typology of organizations' responses to the concept. The article concludes that the concept appears theoretically homeless. It emphasizes the need for clarification of the concept's multiple meanings, so that the chances of useful evaluation of publicly funded capacity building programmes may be enhanced.     

Examining the Relationships Between Monitoring and Incentives in Corporate Governance*

abstract Agency theory focuses on monitoring and incentives as two solutions to agency problems. Prior research suggests that monitoring and incentives may act either as substitutes or as complements, and that the context of the agency relationship plays a major role in determining the direction of the relationship between them. In a corporate governance setting, we contend that board information and boards' usage of CEO control mechanisms are best viewed as complements. Thus, we hypothesize that boards' information gathering behaviour will be positively related to boards' usage of CEO control mechanisms. Using primary and secondary data from 149 US firms, we find that increases in boards' information gathering are associated with increases in boards' usage of managerial controls. These findings suggest that information and managerial control mechanisms act as complements in the governance context, and that boards take a variety of actions to protect the interests of shareholders.     

Experimental Study of Firm Bounded Rationality and the Pattern of Trade

This paper describes an experiment and simulation with features of a spatially explicit trading environment. Decision makers repeatedly make decisions about firm headquarters, input demands, and export patterns. A goal of this research is to determine if subjects’ management decisions reflect profit maximization, learning, or heuristic decision making. It also considers what impact decision makers’ bounded rationality has on the aggregate pattern of trade. Results indicate that bounded rationality in the form of learning and heuristic decision making are ubiquitous features of subjects’ decisions. This manifests as under‐reaction to trade‐driver stimuli and produces Trefler's missing trade, suggesting a behavioral basis for this anomaly.     

Performance Measurement and Compensation Practices in Hospitals: An Empirical Analysis in Consideration of Ownership Types

Against the background of regulatory initiatives that put hospitals under increasing financial pressure, we explore performance measurement and compensation practices in hospitals through a multiple case study. We extend previous research by comparing practices among different ownership types (i.e. public, non-profit, and private) and by providing initial evidence on compensation schemes for the clinical staff. Our empirical investigation is embedded in the ‘stewardship–agency axis’ that allows the development of theoretical arguments about the interdependencies between ownership and performance measurement systems (PMS). We distinguish two primary levels of analysis – the types of measures implemented and their linkage with compensation and decision-making. Our findings suggest that the types of measures are primarily affected by regulatory pressures, while powerful internal actors considerably influence the linkage between these measures and compensation. Consistent with our theorised patterns, cross-case analyses indicate differences between ownership types concerning the performance dimensions that are prioritised and the linkage of performance measures with compensation of the clinical staff. Together, these findings provide evidence on the interdependent effects of the regulatory environment, the type of ownership and internal actors on a hospital's PMS. We also provide some tentative explanations for these findings based on insights from institutional and behavioural theory.     

Integrated environmental policy instruments driven river water pollution management decision system

Market-based approaches and command and control regulations are the two main tools that policy/decision makers use to implement environmental protection goals; however, these alone have proven to be somewhat ineffective or counterproductive in some cases. Therefore, this study proposes a hybrid environmental policy tool to guide river basin environmental management decisions. The river basin authority and regional Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as the two leading decision makers, and policy makers and implementers of river basin management, make decisions sequentially in a process similar to a Stackelberg game. This decision making can be mathematically represented using a bi-level optimization model. The proposed model addressed the conflicting equitable resource allocation and economic efficiency objectives to achieve coordinated development of the whole river basin. To verify the model effectiveness, the most considerable pollutant emissions limits and water quality standards were set, and incentive measures (pollution chargers and subsidies) were applied to assess these hybrid instruments' impact on the decision outcomes. The results from a Minjiang river basin case further illustrated that the trade-off between social equity and cost-efficient environmental goals could efficiently achieve, proving that a combination of instruments could be influential in pollution decision-making and delivery of environmental policy. Given the model's proven effectiveness, several proposals are given for solving complex pollution problems that also need to consider the related socioeconomic issues.     

Psychological ownership and stewardship behavior: The moderating role of agency culture

This study investigates whether employees’ psychological ownership results in stewardship behavior and whether this relationship is affected by an employee’s perception of the organization’s agency culture. A survey of the financial managers of 129 firms in Germany generally confirms these expectations. In addition, and surprisingly, our findings suggest a negligible effect of an agency culture on the relationship between psychological ownership and stewardship behavior when managers perceive high psychological ownership. Thereby, our study enriches the literature on the consequences of psychological ownership by providing insights into the boundary conditions of such outcomes at the manager level.     

Structuring residual income and decision rights under internal governance: results from the Hungarian trucking industry

The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income and decision rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying the property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate residual surplus. The more important the truck driver's intangible knowledge assets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. Second, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the variable proportion of the driver's income should be higher where monitoring costs are higher. Third, we investigate the relationship between residual income and residual decision rights under internal governance. If the contractual relation is governed by an employment contract, residual decision and residual income rights may be substitutes because, under fiat, a certain incentive effect of the governance structure may result either from the allocation of high‐powered incentives or the transfer of residual decision rights to the driver. These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The data provide partial support for the hypotheses. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can beneficial antecedents to self‐employment be detrimental to entrepreneurial performance?

We hypothesize that risk aversion, plasticity, stability, and locus of control have different effects on a person's decision to enter entrepreneurship and the person's entrepreneurial performance. Empirical results reveal that plasticity and risk tolerance have positive effects on selection but negative effects on income derived in entrepreneurship. Stability, on the other hand, deters entry but has an inversely u‐shaped relation with income. Locus of control has a positive impact on the decision but an insignificant effect on entrepreneurial income. These new insights may guide policy makers on how to help aspiring entrepreneurs overcome the negative effects of their personality traits.     

Reason,Intuition, and Time

We study the influence of reason and intuition on decision‐making over time. Facing a sequence of similar problems, agents can either decide rationally according to expected utility theory or intuitively according to case‐based decision theory. Rational decisions are more precise but create higher costs, though these costs may decrease over time. We find that intuition will outperform reason in the long run if individuals are sufficiently ambitious. Moreover, intuitive decisions are prevalent in the early and late stages of a learning process, whereas reason governs decisions in intermediate stages. Examples range from playing behavior in games like chess to professional decisions during a manager's career. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.