收购与反收购:矛与盾的较量

<正> 企业反兼并与反收购行为主要出现在敌意兼并与收购中。敌意兼并、收购,指兼并、收购行为遭到目标公司经营者的抗拒仍强行并购,或者没事先与目标公司经营者商议而大量购人目标公司股份。在敌意并购行为中,并购双方展开激烈的商战,并购方挑起进攻,目标公司被迫奋起防御,产生许多进攻战略——兼并、收购对策和防范、抵抗战略——反兼并、收购对策。并购公司的进攻策略当并购公司在股票市场上吸纳一定比例的目标公司股份时,并不知道目标公司管理层对此采取什么态度。如目标公司管理层拒绝收购,这种收购称     

敌意收购的理论基础及其价值分析

敌意收购作为公司要约收购的一种形式,是指收购人未与目标公司管理层协商或者未达成共识,面临着目标公司管理层反对甚至采取反收购措施的情况下而进行的收购。它的主要特点是收购者在通过收购目标公司股东手中所持的股份,取代其目标公司的投资者地位而成为目标公司的股东,因此在法律上的效果即引起了股权关系的变更。通过敌意收购,可以更换不称职的管理层来降低代理成本。同时,敌意收购形成了规模经济,产生了协同效应。但是,敌意收购也不可避免的加剧了市场的动荡,它本身是一种中性行为,它只是实现优胜劣汰的方法和手段之一。     

谁让你敌意收购国有上市公司？

敌意收购的风险本就很高,即使换了民间大股东,也不会轻易把公司控制权拱手让人,各种毒丸计划的推出,会让收购代价很高。     

上市公司管理层收购的利弊分析

管理层收购（MBO，即ManagementBuy－outs）又称经理层收购，起源于美国７０年代的金融创新，是杠杆收购（LBO，gpLeverangedBuy－outs）的一种，即目标公司的管理层或经理层以自有资金和外部融资购买本公司的股份，从而改变公司所有权结构、控制权结构和资产结构，进而达到重组本公司的目的并获取预期收益的一种收购行为。从发达国家的经验看，MBO在实践中主要应用于集团公司实现对子公司或分支机构的剥离、防御敌意收购、经营者的创业尝试、公营部门的私有化等方面。它有利于企业调整资产结构，降低代理成本、激励管理层的经营积极…     

基于面板数据的协议收购和要约收购绩效差异性研究

公司并购是资本市场上一种主要的资产重组方式。协议收购和要约收购是我国证券市场上两种主要的公司并购方式。公司并购绩效主要受到并购方式、产权性质、期末总资产、资产负债率、第一大股东持股比例、总资产周转率、应收账款周转率、并购规划有效性等因素的影响。基于沪深A股上市公司的样本数据,借助于多元回归分析方法,本研究发现我国上市公司协议收购的效率高于要约收购的效率,同时发现民营上市公司的协议收购绩效最高,国有上市公司的协议收购绩效次之,民营上市公司的要约收购绩效再次之,国有上市公司的要约收购效率最低。检验结果为证监会、公司股东、经理层、监事会、投资者及相关利益者的行为决策提供了现实性的理论借鉴。     

对上市公司收购中存在问题的几点思考

我国上市公司收购是在企业改革和经济体制改革不断深入的背景下产生的。８０年代,我国企业兼并主要以非公司制的企业通过产权交易市场进行拍卖、招标,或通过双方协商的方式进行。进入９０年代以后。我国企业兼并的证券化日趋加强,１９９３年９月－１０月间的“宝延风波”揭开了我国公司通过国内证券市场收购上市公司的序幕,它标志着我国股市发展已进入一个新的阶段,同时,也标志着国内企业兼并活动走向更高级的形式──上市公司收购。一、上市公司收购简介上市公司收购是指在现代企业制度下,一家公司（收购公司）通过证券市场购买另一…     

后股权分置时代应对敌意并购的策略探析

敌意并购是指并购方事先不与目标公司沟通,也不顾及目标公司利益,而在市场上公开收购目标公司股票,最终达到控制目标公司的一种收购方式.敌意并购有悖于我们通常谈到并购能优化资源配置、实现双赢格局的特征的.到2006年年底股权分置改革基本完成,新的制度安排为我国真正意义上的并购拉开了帷幕,也为可能即将出现的敌意并购提供了机会.在资本市场的新纪元,如何防范敌意并购,保持我国资本市场的持续健康发展已成为我国政府和上市公司面临的一个重大课题.     

被收购公司董事会报告书

公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第 18号　证监发 [2 0 0 2 ]85号第一章　总　则　　第一条　为规范上市公司收购活动中的信息披露行为 ,促使上市公司董事会切实履行诚信义务 ,保护投资者合法权益 ,根据《证券法》、《上市公司收购管理办法》(以下简称《收购办法》)及其他相关法律、法规及部门规章的规定 ,制订本准则。第二条　被收购公司董事会 (以下简称董事会 )应当按照本准则的要求编制被收购公司董事会报告书 (以下简称董事会报告书 )。第三条　本准则的规定是对董事会报告书信息披露的最低要求。不论本准则是否有明确规定 ,…     

并购支付方式与收购公司短期并购绩效研究

并购方式的采用是企业并购行为的一个重要特征,不同的并购方式会对收购企业的绩效产生不同的影响,分别表现在税务因素、信息不对称因素以及信号因素上。长期的股权分置格局,导致我国的并购市场中支付方式十分单一,主要以现金支付为主。2005年中国资本市场启动了股权分置改革,为以股权为主的支付方式推广扫清了障碍,非现金的支付方式也得到了越来越多的运用。文章以329家2004～2007年发生并购的沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,采用事件研究法和单因素分组检验考察不同支付方式对收购公司短期并购绩效的影响。实证结果表明,无论是采用现金支付还是非现金支付,收购公司在短期内均获得显著为正的累积超常收益,但采用非现金支付的收购公司短期并购绩效要明显好于采用现金支付方式的收购公司。     

收购公司股票绩效研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

文章以中国上市公司间的并购为样本,收集了近八年收购公司的经验证据,研究收购公司在股票市场上的反应。研究内容从两方面进行讨论,一是研究了收购公司股票宣告日前后若干天内的短期股票绩效问题,二是研究了收购公司并购后三年内的长期股票绩效。同时,还研究了进行横向合并的收购公司的股票绩效问题,并对收购公司长期股票绩效与短期股票绩效的相关性进行了研究。     

R&D investment as a signal in corporate takeovers

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects that takeover threats have on firms' preacquisition R&D intensity. Critics of takeovers usually argue that takeover threats may reduce target firms' R&D investments. However, I find that target firms may increase R&D investment in order to signal their compatibility with the acquiring firm. The identity of the acquired firm depends on the market size and target firms' efficiency and compatibility. Through R&D investments, target firms may affect this result, signaling potential outsiders the kind of competition they may face, and forcing them to accept lower takeover offers. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An analysis of foreign takeovers in the United States

Using a sample of 96 US companies taken over by foreign companies during the period 1975-87, we assess foreign takeovers in two stages: pre-takeover and takeover. We find evidence that foreign firms target US firms whose operations are related to their own operations and that have low market-to-book ratios, suggesting foreign bidders acquire firms that provide a greater opportunity for market entry and synergistic gains. The synergistic gains appear to result from the foreign buyer using its own intangible assets (e.g. managerial skills) to improve the target. We also find that foreign takeover activity is aimed primarily at US industries that themselves make high levels of foreign direct investments, implying that the bidders use takeovers as a quick way to counteract rival firms' moves. We find evidence that foreign takeovers take place in relatively mature, low-growth industries and that foreign targets are, on average, smaller than the non-targets. The wealth effect on the announcement of a takeover is significantly higher for foreign takeovers than for takeovers by domestic firms. Also, we find that foreign bidders pay a slightly higher premium for targets whose operations are related to their own.     

Corporate takeovers,bargaining and managers' incentives to invest

This paper analyzes the impact of potential takeovers on the investment decisions of managers. The takeover involves bargaining over the potential surplus between the acquiring firm, the target manager, and shareholders of the target firm. The anticipation of future takeover gains will influence the decision‐makers to invest ex ante. Interestingly, both over and underinvestment might prevail, depending on the relative bargaining powers of the parties. The model encompasses specific cases documented in the empirical literature and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) practice. It is, therefore, particularly suited to focus on the desirability of anti‐takeover legislation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Determinants and Consequences of Abandoned Takeovers

Takeover activity has attracted a great deal of academic attention over the past three decades. Much of this interest has focused on the study of completed takeovers with a particular interest in seeking to understand the impact of takeover activity on the wealth of both shareholders in acquired and bidding firms. Unlike their completed counterparts, abandoned takeovers have received relatively little academic attention. This is surprising since a significant proportion of takeover bids are unsuccessful. This paper seeks to address the imbalance by providing a comprehensive survey of the takeover failure literature. The paper focuses on two aspects of the literature: First, we discuss and review the factors likely to influence takeover outcome. Second, we examine the consequences of takeover abandonment from the perspective of targets and bidders. We also identify a number of areas where future research may seek to improve further our understanding of the causes and consequences of takeover abandonment.     

广西中烟企业文化建设探究

企业文化是企业的价值体系和行为规范,它内聚力量,外塑形象。优秀的企业文化对企业的发展具有重要指导意义。文章通过对广西中烟企业文化的探究,分析该公司企业文化的一些特点,希望对国有企业文化的建设起到借鉴作用。     

以战略行动推动新创企业公司品牌构筑——以四川嘉熙实业有限公司及谭鱼头股份有限公司个案比对为例

公司品牌在如今的企业竞争中扮演着日益重要的角色,因此也亟须深入的有关企业战略行动与公司品牌关系的研究,尤其是新创企业如何通过战略行动来构建公司品牌已成为该领域的一个重要问题.本文通过对嘉熙和谭鱼头两家企业的案例研究,对比分析了新创制造企业和服务企业的公司品牌管理,发现企业战略行动会推动公司品牌建设,而新创企业公司品牌的...     

Corporate Control Through Board Dismissals and Takeovers

This paper examines some policy issues related to the interaction between internal and external corporate control mechanisms—board dismissals and takeovers—by focusing on the information aggregation and other effects related to this interaction. We model the functioning of corporate control mechanisms as an example of a multilayered principal-agent relationship in which shareholders delegate the task of monitoring management quality to the board and rely on the external takeover market to provide additional disciplining of the manager as well as of the board. This gives rise to two effects: (1) a substitution effect, whereby the takeover market partially substitutes for board dismissal of the manager, leading to greater lenience toward the manager by a board acting in the shareholders' best interest, and (2) a kick-in-the-pants effect, whereby the board is stricter with the manager because it may be dismissed by a successful acquirer who views it as lax. The interaction of these two effects leads to various implications about the behavior of boards and potential acquirers. In particular, a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not obviate the need for external control (takeovers). Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively, there may be a greater incidence of takeovers when the internal control mechanism is working well than when it is not.     

Institutional investors, antitakeover defenses and success of hostile takeover bids

In this study we investigate the question of whether institutional investors enhance or reduce efficiency in the market for corporate control. In particular, given unequivocal evidence that target stockholders gain in successful takeover bids, we investigate the impact of institutional ownership in target firms on the adoption of the type of antitakeover defense as well as the outcome of takeover bids. We find that target firms are more likely to adopt value-reducing antitakeover defenses and successfully thwart takeover bids when a higher percentage of target common stock is owned by ‘pressure-indeterminate’ investors (investment counsel firms in particular). On the other hand, the probability of a successful takeover rises with the ownership of both ‘pressure-sensitive’ and ‘pressure-resistant’ investors. The above findings support the view that institutional investors do not play a homogeneous role in the market for corporate control.     

Value Added and Corporate Control in the U.S.

This paper examines the ability of value added to assess the differences between target firms and their industries and to explain target firms' abnormal returns during the takeover period. In a sample of 234 completed takeovers over the period 1977 to 1989, takeover targets have lower value added to total assets ratios than other firms in their industries in the year preceding the year in which the takeover is completed. Target firm abnormal returns observed during the takeover period are positively related to the difference between target Firm and average industry value added to total assets. This suggests that while acquired firms are on average underperformers, acquiring firms value the access to, and possibly the ability to redistribute, the resources of target firms.     

Defensive acquisitions in the banking industry: The takeover premium hypothesis

We define defensive acquisitions as takeovers made by a firm so as to become so large that it becomes an unattractive target itself. A sample of defensive acquisitions in the banking industry is used to test the takeover premium hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the defensive acquirers lose because a takeover premium that previously existed in their prices is deflated while the takeover premium increases for smaller competitors because they become more likely targets. We find that the defensive acquirers experience significant negative abnormal returns on the announcement day, and that smaller competitors have positive abnormal returns on the announcements of defensive acquisitions. In contrast, larger competitors do not react to the announcements. The results are consistent with the takeover premium hypothesis.