基于回归方程的基尼系数分解

提出了基尼系数的一个等价算法：收入份额法,该算法不仅方便基尼系数按组群分解和来源分解,而且可以进行边际效应分析。收入份额法对变量进行基尼系数的回归方程分解,可以直接利用基尼系数按来源分解的结果;同时,截距项、误差项对因变量基尼系数具有重要的影响,本文给出了综合处理截距项、误差项和回归变量关于因变量基尼系数贡献的具体计算公式,最后还给了一个应用实例。     

区位基尼系数的计算、性质及其应用

基于产业规模探索区位基尼系数的简化计算、区域分解和两位数产业分解,给出产业份额、区位商以及产业份额空间测度加权区位基尼系数的分解公式,提供相对边际效应和增量分解的计算公式。利用我国2004年、2008年的经济普查数据,计算国民经济19个字母产业的区位基尼系数,得出以产业份额计算的区位基尼系数更能反映产业聚集程度的结论,并使用产业份额区位基尼系数进行实证分析。     

适度累进税是调节收入分配的重要手段——理论逻辑的论证

文章首先论证适度累进税是兼顾公平与效率调节收入分配的重要手段之一的理论逻辑；其次论证累进税适度的判断依据---税收累进性生命周期理论，认为某个国家的税收累进性应该与其所处的发展阶段相适应，随着经济不断发展，税制改革应关注税收累进性的不断调节。     

个税改革对居民收入再分配的影响北大核心

本文研究目的是评价近十年来我国的个税改革成效。为此,本文首先分阶层计算各年度收入与个税指标,然后通过个税前后基尼系数计算出历年MT指标,从而得出结论:个税具有较弱的累进性,能在一定程度上调节收入分配;个税改革增强了其累进性功能,但仍存在进一步改革的空间。     

个人所得税税率选择与公平收入分配

本文针对单一所得税制和超额累进所得税制从平均税率、税前税后基尼系数和MT指数等方面进行了比较分析,同时比较了不同免征额和最高边际税率的单一所得税制MT指数。研究结论表明:单一所得税制由于免征额的存在不但能够发挥调节收入分配的作用,通过良好的制度设计甚至可能发挥优于超额累进所得税税制的公平分配的作用。     

收入分配的平均与平等

基尼(GINI)系数联合国规定采用一种叫基尼(GINI)系数的社会经济发展指标,来测度收入分配的平均程度。基尼系数具有如下性质:当收入分配绝对平均(即所有人收入相等)时,基尼系数的值为0(最小值);当收入分配绝对不平均(即所有收入集中在一人手中,其他人都无收入)时,基尼系数的值为1(最大值)。目前,大体上采用下面两种计算基尼系数的方法。一种方法是逐户计算法: 设户数为N,每户收入占总收入的份额为I_1,I_2,…,I_i,…,I_n,其中下角标     

浅谈税收的“速算扣除数”

采用全额累进计算的所得税额与超额累进计算的所得税额之间的差额在税收中被称为"速算扣除数"。在实际税收工作中,"速算扣除数"是按照累计进税率计算纳税人应缴税额的一种简便计算方法,既吸取了全额累进计税方便的优点,又发挥了超额累进计税合理的长处。     

我国居民收入不平等的测算与分析

文章以我国居民个人收入为研究对象,测算了三种收入不平等指数,并按收入来源法对其进行了分解。研究表明:2009年我国居民收入的不平等程度是比较高的,且基尼系数城镇低于农村;从不平等指数的分解结果来看,工资收入扩大了总收入的不平等;退休金收入减小了居民收入不平等。     

“税收陷阱”的测度模型及其应用研究

资金是影响小微企业成长的关键因素之一。在我国现行税制下,当企业利润超过税率分界点以上一定区间时,会存在纳税人应纳税总收入增加但税后净收入反而下降,即"税收陷阱"现象。文章推导和构建了测度"税收陷阱"的通用理论模型,应用该模型可以有效节税及积累资金。     

论和谐社会的利益共享

最近三十年来,随着我国经济转型,各原有阶层的利益均衡被打破,不同阶层、不同区域利益出现了巨大变化,贫富差距拉大。改革开放之前,我国的基尼系数很低,但近些年来这一指数快速上升,已超过国际公认的警戒线。根据联合国开发计划署的统计资料,我国目前的基尼系数为0．46,占全国总人口20％的最贫困人口的收入只占全国总收入的4．5％,     

Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets

All modern labour market theories capable of explaining involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon imply that increased income tax progressivity reduces unemployment, but they also imply that higher progressivity tends to reduce work effort and labour productivity. This suggests that there may be an optimal degree of tax progressivity where the marginal welfare gain from reduced involuntary unemployment is just offset by the marginal welfare loss from lower productivity. This paper sets up four different models of an imperfect labour market in order to identify the degree of tax progressivity which would maximise the welfare of the representative wage earner. Simulations with these models suggest that the optimal degree of tax progressivity could be quite large, although the results are sensitive to the generosity of unemployment benefits and to the after-tax wage elasticity of work effort.     

Ambiguous effects of tax progressivity — theory and Danish evidence

Recent tax reforms in the OECD area have aimed at reducing the progressivity of labour income taxation by reducing marginal taxes for given average taxes. Theory has shown that this reduces employment/production when workers and firms determine wages through bargaining. This paper shows that an opposite effect arises when both wages and working hours are subject to bargaining. This may reverse the traditional result and this is especially likely if the bargaining power of workers is low and if labour supply is relatively elastic. In conclusion, the overall effect of a reduction in progressivity is ambiguous. The empirical estimates for Denmark indicate that the overall effect is negative for blue-collar workers and neutral for white-collar workers.     

Income Tax Progressivity: Trends and Implications

This paper discusses how the structure of the tax system affects its progressivity. It suggests a measure of progressive capacity of tax systems, based on the Kakwani index, but independent of pretax income distributions. Using this and other progressivity measures, the paper (i) documents a decline in progressivity over the last decades and (ii) examines the relationship between progressivity and economic growth. On this relationship, regressions do not reveal a significant impact, suggesting that efficiency costs may be small – at least for degrees of progressivity observed in the sample. Finally, the paper finds that increasing tax progressivity reduces pretax inequality.     

一种离散型收入分布基尼系数精确计算方法

基尼系数问世八十多年的时间里,在度量经济不平等的基尼系数指标时,最常见的是离散型收入分布,本文设计了一种离散型收入分布基尼系数计算方法,用它可以精确地求解基尼系数。     

The long run effects of changes in tax progressivity

This paper compares the steady-state outcomes of revenue-neutral changes to the progressivity of the tax schedule. Our economy features heterogeneous households who differ in their preferences and permanent labor productivities, but it does not have idiosyncratic risk. We find that increases in the progressivity of the tax schedule are associated with long-run distributions with greater aggregate income, wealth, and labor input. Average hours generally declines as the tax schedule becomes more progressive implying that the economy substitutes away from less-productive workers toward more-productive workers. Finally, as progressivity increases, income inequality is reduced and wealth inequality rises. Many of these results are qualitatively different than those found in models with idiosyncratic risk, and therefore suggest closer attention should be paid to modeling the insurance opportunities of households.     

Union wage setting and progressive income taxation with heterogeneous labor: theory and evidence from the German income tax reforms 1986–1990

This paper analyzes the effects of tax shifting in a model with union wage setting and progressive income taxation. The setup allows for different skill levels of the workforce and accounts for the union's distributional objective of income equality. The theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested with a panel of German micro-data covering the period of the income tax reforms 1986–1990. It is shown that average taxes raise wages, whereas increasing the progressivity of the tax system reduces wages. The effect of progressivity on high-skilled labor tends to be less significant and smaller. Stronger preferences for equality compress the (pre-tax) wage distribution.     

我国新一轮个人所得税制改革存在的问题与对策

《个人所得税法》自1980年9月颁布后,历经多次调整。新近通过的税法修正案将个税改革又向前推进了一步,但仍存在免征额调整影响力有限、动态调整机制缺失、费用扣除未体现个体差异、边际税率过高、征管技术粗糙、征管信息流通不畅等问题。应在深入研究的基础上转换税制模式,增加特殊减免额;运用指数化方法确定费用扣除标准,降低边际税率;建立税务代理和税务稽查相辅相成的制度,加强高收入人群的个税征管。     

A Scheme to Determine Tax Rates Fairly and Quantitatively

A bstract .   This article discusses a scheme to quantitatively determine a personal income tax rate structure based on the principle of democratic voting. Previous attempts to apply the majority voting rule largely call for voting on predetermined tax positions. In the approach presented here, each taxpayer proposes an egocentric rate system encompassing his or her own obligation as well as all other taxpayers' under generally accepted constraints. The egocentric rate systems proposed by all taxpayers are weight-averaged to determine the actual tax obligation for all taxpayers. The weights used for the average are in general proportional to the tax contribution. The rate structure can be quantitatively determined from solving simultaneous equations if the weights are predetermined. Although there are an infinite number of choices for the weights, it is argued that the "fair" manner of averaging ranges from equal representation by all taxpayers to equal representation by all tax contributions. An appropriate rate structure should be a linear combination of the tax rates derived from the two limiting scenarios. Alternative egocentric voting schemes under equal representation by all taxpayers are also discussed. While these alternative schemes are politically more acceptable, measures need to be taken to counterbalance the confiscating nature desired by the majority of the voters. Such measures may marginalize the democratic voting process and produce rate structures less progressive than those assuming equal representation of tax contributions. Although the method discussed here allows flexibility on the marginal rate progressivity, it sets the high limit that the lowest and highest income classes ought to pay.     

EFFECT OF CROSS‐BORDER HEALTH CARE ON QUALITY AND PROGRESSIVITY OF FINANCING

In this study, we examine the effect of cross‐border health care in terms of public health insurance. We consider its effect on healthcare quality and progressivity of financing. We use a two‐country Hotelling model in which consumers are divided into two groups: high and low innate‐talent consumers. Aiming to maximize social welfare, governments impose a progressive income tax on consumers to provide healthcare services. Assuming that a payment scheme for healthcare services is based on diagnosis‐related group pricing, which has been adapted in many countries, we obtain the following results. The promotion of cross‐border health care does not influence healthcare quality or the progressivity of financing in patient‐importing countries, but does reduce healthcare quality and influence the progressivity of financing in patient‐exporting countries.