Vergleich zweier Operationscharakteristiken

Summary We compare the OC-curvesL _n.c (p) (1) andL _n.c ^* (p) (2). The first is founded on the binomial distribution, the latter relates to the Poisson distribution and is often used as approximation. These OC-curves occur in Statistical Quality Control as probabilities for the acception of a lot as approximations for such probabilities; they are regarded as functions of the fraction defectivep. It is shown that the two OC-curves have exactly one intersection point between 0 and 1, if the acceptance numberc is 1 and the sample sizen is >c+1.Forp between 0 and the intersection pointp _s we have thenL _n.c.(p)>L _n.c ^* (p); from p _s <p1 followsL _n.c(p)n.c ^* (p).An interval is given which coversp _s and with an example it is shown how one might use the results of this paper for the construction of sampling plans.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: The asymmetric case

We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game between two types of firms differing in extraction costs. We show that (i) there almost always exists a phase where both types of firms supply simultaneously, (ii) when the high cost mines are exploited by a number of firms that goes to infinity the equilibrium approaches the cartel-versus-fringe equilibrium with the fringe firms acting as price takers, and (iii) the cheaper resource may not be exhausted first, a violation of the Herfindahl rule, that may be detrimental to social welfare.     

Structural instability of the core

Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q)= 2q-n+1 and let W be a smooth ‘policy space’ of dimension w. Let U(W)^N be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown that there exists an ‘instability dimension’ w^*(σ) with 2w^*(σ)w(n,q) such that:

1. (i) if ww^*(σ), and W has no boundary, then the core of σ is empty for a dense set of profiles in U(W)^N (i.e., almost always),

2. (ii) if ww^*(σ)+1, and W has a boundary, then the core of σ is empty, almost always,

3. (iii) if ww^*(σ)+1 then the cycle set is dense in W, almost always,

4. (iv) if ww^*(σ)+2 then the cycle set is also path connected, almost always.

The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point belongs to the core, then certain generalized symmetry conditions in terms of ‘pivotal’ coalitions of size 2q−n must be satisfied. Secondly, it is shown that these symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied when either W has empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q) or when W has non-empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q)+1.     

The mediating role of natural and social resources in the corporate social responsibility—corporate financial performance relationship

Failure to obtain definitive results regarding the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on corporate financial performance (CFP) has prompted scholars to investigate mechanisms behind this relationship. This paper follows the same path and distinguishes two dimensions of CSR (social and environmental) to expand the pool of potential mediators on the basis of natural‐ and social resource‐based view (RBV) of the firm. In a unique dataset comprising seven potential mediators for 300 companies, a direct relationship only existed between environmental CSR and CFP, in contrast to the “new road” from social CSR to CFP that goes through external reputation and innovativeness—variables that form an opposing mediation.     

Walking and Talking Corporate Social Responsibility: Implications of Firm Size and Organizational Cost

In this paper we address two interrelated research gaps in the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) literature. The first results from a lack of understanding of different patterns of CSR engagement with respect to CSR talk (impression management and the creation of symbolic images and documentation) and CSR walk (substantive implementation of CSR policies, structures and procedures). Related to this, the second gap concerns limited knowledge about the influence of firm size on CSR engagement. We develop a conceptual model that explains differences in CSR talk versus walk based on organizational cost and firm size. This allows us to theorize the antecedents of what we call the large firm implementation gap (large firms tend to focus on communicating CSR symbolically but do less to implement it into their core structures and procedures) and vice versa the small firm communication gap (less active communication and more emphasis on implementation). Our model expands a new theoretical understanding of CSR engagement based on as yet underemphasized firm‐level antecedents of CSR, and opens up several new avenues for future, and in particular comparative, research.     

When Necessity Becomes a Virtue: The Effect of Product Market Competition on Corporate Social Responsibility

We test whether Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is driven by strategic considerations by empirically studying the link between competition and firms' social performance. We find that firms in more competitive industries have better social ratings. In particular, we show that (i) different market concentration proxies are negatively related to widely used CSR measures; (ii) that an increase in competition due to higher import penetration leads to superior CSR performance; (iii) that firms in more competitive environments have a superior environmental performance, measured by firm pollution levels; and (iv) that more product competition is associated to a larger within‐industry CSR variance. We interpret these results as evidence that CSR is strategically chosen.     

Nonparametric regression function estimation using interaction least squares splines and comlexity regularization

Let (X, Y) be a pair of random variables withsupp(X)⊆[0,1] ^l andEY ²<∞. Letm ^* be the best approximation of the regression function of (X, Y) by sums of functions of at mostd variables (1≤d≤l). Estimation ofm ^* from i.i.d. data is considered. For the estimation interaction least squares splines, which are defined as sums of polynomial tensor product splines of at mostd variables, are used. The knot sequences of the tensor product splines are chosen equidistant. Complexity regularization is used to choose the number of the knots and the degree of the splines automatically using only the given data. Without any additional condition on the distribution of (X, Y) the weak and strongL ₂-consistency of the estimate is shown. Furthermore, for everyp≥1 and every distribution of (X, Y) withsupp(X)⊆[0,1] ^l ,y bounded andm ^* p-smooth, the integrated squared error of the estimate achieves up to a logarithmic factor the (optimal) rate      

Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcomep _c and the bilateral bargaining outcomep _b are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost larger thanp _c −p _c to the seller of changing partner,p _c is the unique outcome, otherwise no restriction expires. In the second variation the seller makes anε-binding preannouncement of whether he will change buyer after disagreement. Ifε is small there are equilibrium prices close top _c . But for anyε, if the discount factor is close to 1, the unique equilibrium price isp _c . The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

The cost of Corporate Social Responsibility: the case of the Community Reinvestment Act

A Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) cost minimization model is employed to estimate the cost to thrift institutions of achieving a rating of ‘outstanding’ under the anti-redlining Community Reinvestment Act, which is viewed as an act of voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). There is no difference in overall cost efficiency between ‘outstanding’ and minimally compliant ‘satisfactory’ thrifts. However, the sources of cost inefficiency do differ, and an ‘outstanding’ rating involves annual extra cost of $6.547 million or, 1.2% of total costs. This added cost is the shadow price of CSR since it is not an explicit output or input in the DEA cost model. Before and after-tax rates of return are the same for the ‘outstanding’ and ‘satisfactory’ thrifts, which implies a recoupment of the extra cost. The findings are consistent with CSR as a management choice based on balancing marginal cost and marginal revenue. An incidental finding is that larger thrifts are less efficient.

Cooperation with a multiproduct corporation in a strategic managerial delegation

We consider an industry composed of a multiproduct corporation that adopts corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a strategic managerial delegation and examine the profit-incentive to form a cooperative group. We find that competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability and yields the highest CSR, which is increasing in the degree of substitutability. We also show that full cooperation is an equilibrium for lower substitutability but induces no CSR, whereas partial cooperation with one uniplant firm is an equilibrium for higher substitutability but yields lower CSR than that under competition. Therefore, cooperation might reduce strategic CSR activities, whereas competition will encourage higher CSR but yield lower industry profits.     

Mixed oligopoly, foreign firms, and location choice

We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms which are all profit-maximizing. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign private firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among the foreign firms. Regardless of n and m, agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We provide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social welfare. We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public firms, inefficiency of the public firm, and entries by private firms. We obtain some additional implications of welfare and equilibrium locations.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Notes and Comments:</Emphasis> The numeraire portfolio in financial markets modeled by a multi-dimensional jump diffusion process

In continuous time, we study a financial market which is free of arbitrage opportunities but incomplete under the physical probability measure P. Thus one has several choices of equivalent martingale measures. In the present paper, the (unique) martingale measure P ^* is studied which is defined by the concept of the numeraire portfolio. The choice of P ^* can be justified by a change of numeraire in place of a change of measure. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 90A09, 91B28, 91B62, 93E20, 62P05 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G10, G12, G13     

Voluntary Assurance of Voluntary CSR Disclosure

We study a firm's decisions to engage in socially responsible activities, voluntarily report on them, and purchase external assurance of the report. In our signaling model, neither firm type nor the level of activity is observed. We show that if voluntary assurance is not too expensive, the firm that engages in more socially responsible activities purchases external assurance and thus “selects” a separating equilibrium. As a result, CSR reports can be used to infer the level of activity and this causes all firms to engage in more socially responsible activity. Further, when voluntary assurance is required to support a separating equilibrium, greater monitoring by social activists increases the chosen quality of voluntary assurance—voluntary assurance and monitoring by social activists are complements, not substitutes.     

Index of authors

In most developing countries (particularly in the Pacific) land ownership is dominated by traditional ‘landowners’ who often represent selected families in the community. It is frequently argued by commentators, that such a traditional approach to land ownership hinders economic and social development of communities and nations. As one observer expressed the problem, it is desirable for traditional landowners to change from being rentiers to that of producers. ^{* 1}Rodney V. Cole. ‘Creating a Climate for Investment in Fiji’, A Paper presented at the 6th Fiji Employer's Consultative Association Annual Conference, November 1988.

Against this background of traditional land ownership including the concept of monopoly ownership of land, this paper has as its objective, to demonstrate that this apparent constraint on the use ofland can be used in a positive way as a catalyst, to develop small enterprises in a national sense and using Fiji as a case study demonstrates how landowner cpmpan:ies are currently acting as a learning medium for, and a catalyst in small enterprise development.

In specific terms, the objectives of the paper are:

(a) to demonstrate how an apparent barrier to small enterprise dc:velopment (monopoly land ownership) can be converted to a program of small enterprise expansion;

(b) to identify key factors in the process of utilizing landowner companies to act as a catalyst for non-agricultural small enterprise development;

(c) to use Fiji as a case study to identify initial problems assoc:iated with landowner companies and strategies applied to overcome such problems;

(d) to describe the link between successful landowner companies and their development and new small enterprises in retail, service and processing sectors.     

A discrete replacement model for a two-unit parallel system subject to failure rate interaction

In this paper, a repairable two-unit parallel system with failure rate interaction between units is studied. Failure rate interaction between units is described as follows. Unit-1 failure whenever occurs can increase the failure rate of unit-2 of some amount, while unit-2 failure can induce unit-1 into simultaneous failure. We consider a discrete replacement policy N based on the number of unit-1 failure. The system is replaced at the instant of the N-th failure of unit-1 or on simultaneous failure of the system. Our problem is to determine an optimal replacement policy N ^* such that the expected cost rate per unit time is minimized. The explicit expression of the expected cost rate per unit time is derived by introducing relative costs and the corresponding optimal number N* is also verified finite and unique under some specific conditions.     

Quantity and price controls by the firm under demand uncertainty and welfare implications

A monopoly facing an uncertain demand can affect its profit distribution through the choice of ex ante controls. This paper compares two modes of behavior - price-setting and quantity-setting - in the context of a mean-variance model. The main results are: (a) With nonlinear cost, the monopoly will not be indifferent between the two modes. In the particular case of quadratic cost, conditions for the dominance of price-setting over quantity-setting behavior are derived. (b) Whereas it is well-known that the risk averse, quantity-setting monopoly will produce less under uncertainty than under certainty (or risk neutrality), the price-setting monopoly increases its expected output when faced by uncertain demand, possibly exceeding even the competitive output under uncertainty. (c) Using expected social surplus as a welfare criterion, price-setting emerges as the welfare-dominant behavior when there is a conflict between the privately and the socially preferred modes. (d) Finally, there exist conditions where price-setting monopolies welfare-dominate a competitive industry facing the same random demand.     

A mechanism for reducing small-business customer waiting-line dissatisfaction

This paper presents a technique whereby a small business (i.e. a one-cash register operation) can reduce customer waiting-line time dissatisfaction in the purchase stage of the consumer decision process. When the queue length reaches or exceeds critical value N^*, another employee is temporarily transferred to the role of ‘server assistant’ to increase the effective service rate; when the queue length eventually decreases to a second critical value N_*, the server assistant returns to primary duties. An optimal customer-reneging decision model is utilized to model the reneging character of the queue. Simulation experiments confirm key hypotheses concerning the behaviour of the queue and compare the effectiveness of a computed (N^*, N_*) policy with that of alternatives.     

The optimality of (s,S) inventory policies in the infinite period model*

Summary The infinite period stationary inventory model is considered. There is a constant lead time, a nonnegative set-up cost, a linear purchase cost, a holding and shortage cost function, a fixed discount factor β, 0 < β < 1, and total backlogging of unfilled demand. Both the total discounted cost (β < 1) and the average cost (β= 1) criteria are considered. Under the assumption that the negatives of the one period holding and shortage costs are unimodal, a unified proof of the existence of an optimal (s.S) policy is given. As a by-product of the proof upper and lower bounds on the optimal values of s and S are found. New results simplify the algorithm of Veinott and Wagner for finding an optimal (s, S) policy for the case β< 1. Further it is shown that the conditions imposed on the one period holding and shortage costs can be weakened slightly.