Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition

In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination,welfare, and vertical market structure

Review of Economic Design - This paper reconsiders the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare in a vertical market. The results indicate that monopolistic downstream...     

Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly

We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.     

Mixed oligopoly and spatial price discrimination with foreign firms

This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of foreign competition in a mixed oligopoly set in a linear model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that the entry of a foreign firm often lowers domestic welfare. This results because the public firm locates largely independently of the presence of the foreign firm and because the profit earned by the foreign firm reduces domestic welfare. Privatization of the public firm typically lowers domestic welfare but can increase global welfare. Thus, domestic governments are unlikely to allow foreign entry and when they do, they are unlikely to privatize the public firm despite the potential rise in global welfare.     

Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment

In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.     

Location decisions and welfare under spatial price discrimination

The welfare effects of regulation are of crucial importance to policy makers. To this end, we present a model of n firms with differentiated costs competing in a linear market within the framework of spatial price discrimination. We prove that the Nash equilibrium locations of firms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, the distribution of consumers, firms' cost heterogeneity, the level of privatization, and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. We also provide an algorithm on how to find the unique Nash equilibrium in the case of uniformly distributed consumers.     

Profit‐raising Entry in Vertically Related Markets

We extend the standard vertical oligopoly model to allow for free entry in the upstream sector, and research and development with knowledge spillover in the downstream sector. The fact that an increase in the number of firms lowers industry profit is the common wisdom that may not hold in vertical structure of production. We provide a complementary reasoning and find that aggregate downstream profit can increase with downstream entry when the knowledge spillover effect and the entry cost are moderate. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition,innovation and regulation in the pharmaceutical industry

This article discusses the impact of regulation on competition and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Prompted by concern over attempts at regulating the industry on the European level, we discuss the two basic forms of regulation which we observe to be typical, quality regulation (licencing) and price regulation. In doing so, the analysis focuses on the research segment of the pharmaceutical industry and discusses forms of competition by innovation. Following a recent paper by Nelson, the specific characteristics of competition in the pharmaceutical industry are developed as well as their welfare implications. Regulatory behavior vis-á-vis the industry is analysed in terms of a behavioral model initially proposed by Stigler, and an attempt is made to incorporate into the analysis the experience of regulation in both Europe and the United States of America.     

Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals

I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.     

Product Line Choice in Retail Duopoly

This paper develops a successive duopoly model to identify conditions under which differentiated retailers that compete in quantities, when deciding on the range of brands to offer, will carry overlapping product lines. They will do so when retail margins on each brand are not too asymmetric. Otherwise, the less profitable brand is foreclosed from the market. It is shown that welfare increases if the upstream industry is perfectly competitive, even though fewer brands may be sold. With price competition though, exclusive dealing arises when retailers are not too differentiated and in‐store competition is sufficiently intense.     

A Model of Direct and Intermediated Sales

We examine a model in which an upstream firm can sell directly online and through heterogeneous intermediaries to heterogeneous consumers engaging in time-consuming search. Direct online sales may be more or less convenient and involve costly returns if the good fits consumers poorly. Direct selling appeals to higher-value consumers and increases the upstream firm's profits by allowing price discrimination. Competition and segmentation due to direct sales results in lower intermediary prices, making all consumers better off. Thus, entry by an upstream firm increases consumer surplus at the expense of intermediaries with the net result being an increase in social welfare.     

Spatial competition,concentration and welfare

This paper gives the general conditions under which the firm's f.o.b. mill price may rise or fall due to spatial separation of buyers and/or spatial entry of rival firms. Several theorems are proposed concerning the fundamental mechanism underlying certain paradoxical implications of two orthodox spatial competition models. A third alternative model of competition set forth elsewhere is reexamined, and is shown to generate the largest market areas for individual firms, the lowest product prices, and the greatest industry supply — the greatest consumer welfare.     

A General Equilibrium Analysis of VAT in India

Indian industry is under pricing pressure after the government cut tariffs in a phased manner as per the WTO agreements. In order to be competitive, the consensus opinion in government, academics and industry is the implementation of a VAT in India. The paper evaluates the welfare implications of a VAT in the static and a sequentially dynamic context after accounting for the political and administrative constraints facing the Indian government in implementing a VAT. Replacing the old indirect tax structure with a VAT is welfare worsening. The increase in final consumer prices on account of reduced tax base leads to higher price of essentials, causing welfare loss. Zero rating v/s exemption plays an important role on welfare, with lower welfare loss if essential commodities are exempt from VAT. Agriculture sector unambiguously plays a crucial role in welfare.     

Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm

This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals' costs when downstream competition is a la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a downstream firm whose cost is low enough. This is because by raising the input price paid by the nonmerging firms the merger shifts production away from those relatively inefficient producers in favor of the more efficient firm. Yet, there is a trade-off between the gain in productive efficiency and the loss in consumers' surplus caused by the higher downstream price that follows a higher input price. It is also shown, through an example, that this result extends to price competition with differentiated products.     

Which is better for durable goods producers,exclusive or open supply chain?

We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.     

Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organizations

A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.     

基于CGE模型天然气价格波动的传导效应

天然气在我国能源结构中有着重要的地位,天然气价格的变化会对我国经济和下游产业链产生重要的影响。论文利用CGE模型研究了我国天然气价格波动对我国宏观经济、居民福利和微观产业部门的影响,对不同的天然气价格冲击进行了情景模拟分析,研究表明:天然气价格波动对宏观经济变量和21个产业有很大的影响;在相同的价格波动下对不同产业的影响是不同的,与天然气产业关联度越大,其影响也就越大。在此基础上,对我国宏观经济政策和天然气价格改革提出了一些建议。     

Monopoly Pricing as a Consumer Exaction in the Public Utility Sector

A bstract . The many studies on the measurement of deadweight welfare loss due to monopoly pricing have largely ignored the public utility sector of the economy. For the residential customer class in the municipally-owned water industry , the useable formula for the welfare loss triangle depends on the divergence between price and long run marginal cos and the price elasticity of demand Only price is directly observable. Statistical methodology developed here and elsewhere provides unique estimates of marginal cost and elasticity for each utility. The welfare loss, as a percentage of the residential customer class's annual water bill, is 9 to 10 per cent for locally regulated water utilities and 5 to 6 per cent for state regulated utilities–a level above those reported in most of the studies on manufacturing industries. Regulation , however, can make a difference.