周期性订货策略中的牛鞭效应分析与控制

利用随机变量数学期望理论,在由一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的周期订货供应链系统中,建立了延迟需求信息和即时需求信息下的制造商日平均库存模型,并分析影响两者库存量差异变动的因素,提出库存策略中牛鞭效应的产生主要是由制造商的周期服务水平(CSL)以及零售商和制造商的订货时间差所导致。     

三级供应链系统的信息共享价值分析

提出并研究了一种多级复杂供应链系统的信息价值共享问题。以一个制造商,多个互异的分销商以及多个互异的零售商组成的复杂供应链系统为研究对象,建立了供应链系统库存成本模型,导出了各个企业信息共享价值的计算公式,并和信息不共享方式进行了对比,其结果表明供应链成员间信息共享可显著降低供应链的平均成本。     

需求受库存水平影响三级供应链协调策略研究

在一个由制造商、分销商、零售商组成的三层供应链系统．研究需求受库存水平影响的供应链协调问题。首先在非合作的情况下确定各个参与者的利润和零售商的最优订购量;然后用收益共享契约来对供应链系统进行协调。得出一个协调策略．研究结果证明该模型不仅能提高零售商的利润．还能提高分销商和制造商的利润。通过研究分析给出各个协调参数的有效值域;最后。给出一个数值算例。     

信息共享在供应链管理中的价值--Zipkin模型以及拓展

在供应链组织系统中，信息共享是它具有强大生命力的主要原因之一，是供应链管理研究最具有研究价值的一个课题之一。但是，由于供应链类型复杂多样，使得其信息共享的类型以及程度的研究变得异常困难。对于两阶段供应链（一个供应商，多个零售商，多种商品），共享库存信息，库存检查/补充策略为零售商采用补充到目标库存S的策略，顾客需求各期服从泊松分布，零售商提前期（即排队等候时间）满足排队论的算地时，信息共享满足Zipkin模型。当条件变得更符合实际情况时，我们可以考虑双层——回声模型，在赋予供应链成员一定主动性的基础上建立信息共享的模型，并且利用遗传算法解决这个复杂模型。     

基于信息共享的供应链双源渠道Stackelberg博弈分析

对于双源渠道供应链系统中零售商和制造商的信息共享问题,引入市场需求不确定信息作为信息共享的重要影响因素,利用Stackelberg主从对策,构建了四个考虑信息共享的双源渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了零售商和制造商在是否分享市场不确定信息和是否运用于商务活动的博弈过程。研究结果显示:零售商和制造商都会尽可能去获取市场需求不确定信息,并且制造商会把此信息充分运用到电子商务市场来提高自己以及供应链整体利益。     

供应链信息共享的成本与定价策略

本文提出从制造商定价与零售商信息共享的成本的角度来激励供应链中的下游企业与上游企业的信息共享。本文建立了1个制造商,n个零售商的简单二级供应链模型,在一定的零售商信息共享的边际成本条件下。来制定企业利润最大化为目标的定价策略。分析结果表明：本策略可以有效激励零售商进行积极的信息共享行为：并且随着信息共享规模的扩大,零售商与制造商的总体效益也逐渐增大。     

基于信息共享的供应链定价策略及利润增值研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的供应链系统,在非线性市场需求的前提下,应用博弈理论对供应链系统的定价策略进行了分析,分别得出信息共享时的博弈均衡解和信息不共享时的博弈均衡解;进一步分析了信息共享程度的大小与批发价、零售价以及双方利润之间的关系,得出信息共享程度越高,制造商和零售商的利润越大,信息共享实现了帕累托改进。最后,通过实例对结论进行了验证。     

需求受服务水平影响的卖方消费信贷协调机制研究

在零售商的信贷消费需求受金融企业的信贷服务水平影响的情形下,研究了由一个制造商、一个零售商和一个金融企业组成的卖方消费信贷系统的协调问题。运用动态博弈理论分别建立了集中式决策模型、分散决策模型、收益共享契约模型以及收益共享与成本共担的联合式契约模型,研究表明所设计的收益共享与成本共担的联合契约有效解决了传统的收益共享模型无法实现系统协调的问题,并给出了实现系统协调时的收益共享比率与努力成本分担比率,以及实现系统利润在零售商和制造商之间任意分配的参数范围。最终通过数值分析验证了所提出的协调契约模型的有效性。     

资金约束条件下考虑信用风险的供应链商业信用决策研究

研究了需求依赖于库存及信用风险条件下,制造商的商业信用决策问题。在单个零售商和单个制造商构成的供应链中,制造商决定采取延期支付还是提前支付的商业信用政策,零售商根据制造商的信用政策确定最优的采购批量。分别给出了延期支付与提前支付政策下,零售商的订货决策和制造商的期望利润,最后利用数值算例对比了制造商在不同情形下的期望利润,进而确定其商业信用政策的选择。     

供应链管理需要 建设快速反应的物流系统

快速反应的实施 快速反应（QR）是零售商及供应商之间密切合作的策略。它要求供应链中的零售商和制造商为了实现共同的目标，建立战略伙伴关系。其方法是运用POS系统的单品管理功能，及时掌握每一种商品的销售状况和库存状况，同时对于在零售阶段获得的销售信息在上下游企业中共享。     

不对称成本信息下的供应链收益共享契约研究

讨论了在需求具有价格敏感性的情况下,且零售商的销售成本信息不对称时,供应商如何设计契约参数以最大化供应链总利润的问题,并通过数值算例,分析了不对称情况下供应链各成员收益的变化情况。     

信息共享对供应链牛鞭效应减弱效果分析

首先讨论了供应链中由于信息的不共享性而产生的牛鞭效应。其次讨论在两级供应链中下游零售商,在面临需求平稳时,采用指数平滑法进行短期需求预测,量化分析了一个供应商和一个零售商的简单供应链中零售商和供应商在需求信息预测阶段和信息处理阶段的牛鞭效应,得出建立供应链企业信息共享系统,可以显著减弱牛鞭效应带来的负面影响。接着对案例企业构建企业信息共享系统作出讨论,对构建策略进行了一定的探索。     

非对称信息下双渠道供应链定价策略研究

针对需求信息非对称的环境下双渠道供应链中零售商和制造商的追求利益最大化的问题,研究了双渠道供应链的定价策略。通过构建数学模型求得了最优解,并且做了相应的数值分析。结果表明:同一渠道需求弹性系数对定价的影响大于交叉渠道需求弹性系数对定价的影响;双渠道供应链各参与者之间需求信息的共享更加有利于制定合理的定价,并取得更高的收益。     

非对称信息下的协调供应链研究

针对m个供应商与n个零售商构成的分布型供应链,其中供应商作为主导者确定批发价,零售商确定各自的零售价,市场需求量由零售商的价格弹性需求决定的问题,利用逆向归纳法的方法研究具有Stackelberg博弈特征的定价决策,同时给出由信息非对称分散控制供应链转化为信息对称集中控制供应链的协调条件。研究表明,在信息非对称条件下,当零售商利润占总利润比例在一定区域范围内时,零售商可以和供应商信息共享,从而达到供应链系统协调下的“双赢”。最后通过实例验证给出了结论。     

基于收入共享契约的供应链协调研究

主要研究了收入共享契约对供应链的协调。在市场需求不确定下,分别建立了对称信息下与非对称信息下的供应链收入共享契约协调模型,分析了在此模型下供应商与零售商的决策行为,及其参数的约束条件。由此,得到了供应链的最佳利润。最后,通过算例分析,验证了收入共享契约对供应链的协调作用。     

Economics of information examples in location and land-use theory

In many contexts a decision taken by one economic agent reveals valuable market information to other agents. Two such examples are displayed. In the first case, the location of a retailer reduces locally the uncertainty in the spatial variation of demand, thereby attracting other retailers. In the second case, the change in the quality of rental housing in a homogeneous neighborhood reveals consumer demand which may invite other landlords to follow suit causing capid neighborhood change.     

Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market

Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why should firms manufacture retailer brands?

For firms manufacturing convenience goods there are three branding policies available, a proprietory brand policy, a retailer brand policy and a mixed brand policy. A firm's choice depends on differences in demand and promotion costs between the proprietory and retailer brand markets. This can be analysed using a simple elaboration of the standard 3rd degree price discrimination model. But if the two markets are not independent over the long-term there may be other consequences of following the optimization rules of the model. If retailers develop consumers' preference for their own shops and their own brands, the demand advantage enjoyed by manufacturers' brands may be reduced further. The more willing are manufacturers to supply retailer brands, the more retailers win undermine the demand for manufacturers' proprietory brands.     

Pre-positioning hurricane supplies in a commercial supply chain

Inventory control for retailers situated in the projected path of an observed hurricane or tropical storm can be challenging due to the inherent uncertainties associated with storm forecasts and demand requirements. In many cases, retailers react to pre- and post-storm demand surge by ordering emergency supplies from manufacturers posthumously. This wait-and-see approach often leads to stockout of the critical supplies and equipment used to support post-storm disaster relief operations, which compromises the performance of emergency response efforts and proliferates lost sales in the commercial supply chain. This paper proposes a proactive approach to managing disaster relief inventories from the perspective of a single manufacturing facility, where emergency supplies are pre-positioned throughout a network of geographically dispersed retailers in anticipation of an observed storm's landfall. Once the requirements of a specific disaster scenario are observed, supplies are then transshipped among retailers, with possible direct shipments from the manufacturer, to satisfy any unfulfilled demands. The manufacturer's pre-positioning problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic programming model which is illustrated via a case study comprised of real-world hurricane scenarios. Our findings indicate that the expected performance of the proposed pre-positioning strategy over a variety of hurricane scenarios is more effective than the wait-and-see approach; currently used in practice.     

Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies

We revisit the choice of product differentiation in the Hotelling model, by assuming that competing firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products' characteristics. The “principle of differentiation” does not hold because retailers with private information about their marginal costs produce less differentiated products in order to increase their information rents. Hence, information asymmetry within vertical hierarchies may increase social welfare by inducing them to sell products that appeal to a larger number of consumers. We show that the socially optimal level of transparency between manufacturers and retailers depends on the weight assigned to consumers' surplus and trades off two effects: higher transparency reduces price distortion but induces retailers to produce excessively similar products.