Macroeconomic and financial stability in a monetary union: The case of Lithuania

In this paper, we study the implications of macroprudential policies in a monetary union for macroeconomic and financial stability. For this purpose, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. We consider two different scenarios for macroprudential policies: one in which the ECB extends its goals to also include financial stability and a second one in which a national macroprudential authority uses the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as an instrument. The results show that both rules are effective in making the financial system more stable in both countries, and especially in Lithuania. This is because the financial sector in this country is more sensitive to shocks. We find that an extended Taylor rule is indeed effective in reducing the volatility of credit, but comes with a cost in terms of higher inflation volatility. The simple LTV rule, on the other hand, does not compromise the objective of monetary policy. This reinforces the “Tinbergen principle”, which argues that there should be two different instruments when there are two different policy goals.     

Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis

This study compares a central bank’s leaning against the wind approach with a mix of monetary and macroprudential policies under parameter uncertainty in an estimated DSGE model with two financial frictions. We show that uncertainty of the economic environment is an essential constituent in properly designing macroprudential policy. Although coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies minimizes the policymakers’ Bayesian risk, coordination and non-coordination risks threaten the goals of both authorities. The former describes the situation where the authorities partly resign from implementing the monetary policy objectives to stabilize macroprudential risk. The latter is when conducting a non-coordinated macroprudential policy induces higher total Bayesian risk than when only the central bank minimizes the expected total welfare loss. The robust Bayesian macroeconomic rules show that when financial shocks shrink the banks’ or entrepreneurial net worth, a contractionary macroprudential policy should be combined with an expansionary monetary policy. However, if capital adequacy ratio or risk shocks strike the economy, such a conflict in macroeconomics policy instruments disappears, thus synchronizing both policies.     

Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy: New Evidence from a World Panel of Countries

The event of the recent financial crisis raises the question of whether policy makers could have done more or something different to prevent the build‐up of financial imbalances. This paper contributes to the field of regulatory impact by tackling the debate on whether central banks should ‘lean against the wind’, while in case the response is positive, how macroprudential policies should be combined with monetary policy. Using an augmented Taylor rule and a sample of 127 global economies, the results provide evidence on the importance of macroprudential issues for the implementation of an effective monetary policy. They also document that the type of adopted macroprudential instrument has a substantial effect on such effectiveness, with this policy mix being less ‘integrated’ when the monetary rule aims at primarily safeguarding inflation stability. The results survive robustness checks under alternative assets.     

Supervisory frameworks and monetary policy

One issue that the crisis has pushed to the forefront is the relationship between macroeconomics and finance, and how we think about the footings of financial stability. My comments this evening will focus briefly on this intersection of monetary policy and supervisory and regulatory issues. I am convinced that promoting financial stability requires a comprehensive approach that uses both macroprudential tools and the examination of individual firms, relying on the judgment of experienced examiners. In addition, I am skeptical of a clean “separation principle” that places financial stability squarely in the purview of the supervisors. Instead, I think monetary policymakers also need to maintain a careful eye on the financial system and how interest rate policy affects incentives for financial markets and institutions.     

MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY – A LITERATURE REVIEW

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to go beyond a purely micro approach to financial regulation and supervision. As a consequence, the number of policy speeches, research papers and conferences that discuss a macro perspective on financial regulation has grown considerably. The policy debate is focusing in particular on macroprudential tools and their usage, their relationship with monetary policy, their implementation and their effectiveness. Macroprudential policy has recently also attracted considerable attention among researchers. This paper provides an overview of research on this topic. We also identify important future research questions that emerge from both the literature and the current policy debate.     

Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

Monetary Policy and the Stock Market: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This paper gives a comprehensive review of the literature on the interaction between real stock returns, inflation, and money growth, with a special emphasis on the role of monetary policy. This is an area of research that has interested monetary and financial economists for a long time. Monetary economists have been interested in the question whether money has any effect on real stock prices, while financial economists have investigated whether equity is a good hedge against inflation. Empirical studies show that money can be helpful in predicting future stock returns. Empirical evidence also suggest that equity is not a good hedge against inflation in the short run but may be so in the long run. The short-run negative relation between stock returns and inflation can easily be explained by theoretical models. If the central bank conducts a countercyclical monetary policy this will result in a negative relation between inflation and stock returns, while if it conducts a procyclical policy we could observe a positive relation. According to both theoretical and empirical studies investors receive an inflation risk premium for holding equity.     

The policy mix in the US and EMU: Evidence from a SVAR analysis

We use a SVAR approach to the effects of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as their interactions (policy mix) for the US and the Euro Area (EMU). Overall, our results show that these two cases are different from each other. First, while in the case of the US there is evidence of Keynesian monetary policy, the same is not true in the case of the EMU. Second, considering the effects of the global economic and financial crisis, there is evidence of non-Keynesian fiscal policy in the case of the EMU (expansionary fiscal consolidation), while it does not hold in the case of the US. Third, there is evidence supporting the traditional inverse relationship between monetary policy interest rates and inflation in the case of the US, whereas in the case of the EMU there is a price puzzle (frequent in SVAR studies). Fourth, the baseline model seems to be robust in the case of the US, when considering the effects of the economic and financial crisis 2007–2009, while the opposite holds in the case of the EMU. However, in both cases, the policies seem to act as complements. Another similarity appears when analysing the relationship between public spending and taxation, where there is evidence supporting a fiscal retrenchment.     

税收规避能够提升企业价值吗？——基于货币政策视角的研究

基于我国特殊制度环境,本文考察了不同货币政策下企业税收规避对其价值的影响机理。研究发现：不同的外部经济政策环境会改变企业税收规避影响企业价值的作用途径。具体而言,货币政策宽松时期,投资者将企业税收规避行为视为存在代理问题的信号,由此对企业价值给予较低评价;货币政策紧缩期,合理的税收规避行为可作为一种替代性的内源融资方式缓解企业潜在的融资约束问题,并且投资者将实际税负的降低解读为一种企业价值增加的信号;进一步的分析表明货币政策通过影响企业融资约束程度进而影响企业税收规避和企业价值的关系。     

Financial conditions and monetary policy in the US

We examine the FED’s monetary policy rule with financial stability considerations and under asymmetry. We use the National Financial Conditions Index constructed by the Chicago FED in order to test whether financial stability concerns enter monetary policy formulations in the US. We model nonlinearity in monetary policy by a Markov regime-switching model. The results show that the monetary policy implemented by the FED can be characterized as a two-state Markov process and financial instability significantly increases the likelihood of regime-switching from a “tranquil” to a “distressed” regime. Moreover, the likelihood of a switch in the FED’s monetary policy regime between tranquil and distressed seems to increase when a certain threshold level of the financial conditions index is reached. Finally, our results seem to be robust to alternative specifications of the reaction function and different forms of non-linearity.     

Bank equity and macroprudential policy

This paper proposes an alternative macroprudential policy in the framework of Gertler et al. (2012). In their model, the central bank subsidizes bank outside equity, where the subsidy rate is determined by the shadow cost of the deposit. We find that the alternative rule in which the subsidy rate responds to the aggregate bank outside equity ratio is welfare improving because it has a better stabilization effect on the bank asset deterioration after a financial shock. We disentangle different channels through which macroprudential policies affect the economy and demonstrate that the better stabilization in the post-crisis economy has a positive effect on the economy in normal times through security prices.     

Optimal monetary policy rules,financial amplification,and uncertain business cycles

This paper studies optimal monetary policy in the presence of ‘uncertainty’, time-variation in cross-sectional dispersion of firms׳ productive performance. Using a model with financial market imperfections, the results suggest that (i) optimal policy is to dampen the strength of financial amplification by responding to uncertainty (at the expense of creating mild degree of fluctuations in inflation). (ii) Higher uncertainty makes the welfare-maximizing planner more willing to relax financial constraints. (iii) Credit spreads are a good proxy for uncertainty. Hence, a non-negligible response to credit spreads – together with a strong anti-inflationary policy stance – achieves the highest aggregate welfare possible.     

The impact of credit and fiscal policy under a liquidity trap

This study examines the interaction of non-conventional credit policy and fiscal policy when adverse financial conditions drive the economy to a deep contraction and conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective as the policy interest rate reaches its effective lower bound. Consistent with other studies, under counter-cyclical financial intermediation costs, credit easing policies aimed at reducing credit spread ameliorate the response of the economy and lead to a faster recovery. More importantly, I find that expansionary fiscal policy during an episode of liquidity trap is associated with a large multiplier effect that prevents an otherwise deeper and longer recession. Moreover, the large impact of expansionary fiscal policy is maintained even if credit policy is already in place.     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

The role of financial intermediaries in monetary policy transmission

The recent financial crisis has stimulated theoretical and empirical research on the propagation mechanisms underlying business cycles, in particular on the role of financial frictions. Many issues concerning the interactions between banking and monetary policy forced policy makers to redefine economic policies, and motivated macroeconomists to focus on the implications of financial intermediation constraints for asset price fluctuations, the behavior of non-financial firms, households, governments and in turn for real macroeconomic performance. This paper surveys research on the role of financial intermediaries and financial frictions in the transmission of monetary policy and discusses how to design both the new banking regulatory and supervisory structures and monetary policy in order to stabilize the economy. It also serves as an introduction to this special issue.     

Optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with animal spirits and financial markets

This article presents a macro-finance-interaction model that integrates a NKM with bounded rationality and an agent-based financial market model. We derive four interactive channels between the two sectors where two channels are strictly microfounded. We analyze the impact of the different channels on economic stability and derive optimal (conventional and unconventional) monetary policy rules. We find that coefficients of optimal Taylor rules do not significantly change if financial market stabilization becomes part of the central bank׳s objective function. Additionally, we show that rule-based, backward-looking monetary policy creates huge instabilities if expectations are boundedly rational. Our model is externally validated by showing that it generates fat tailed output growth rates.     

货币区建设与货币政策的独立性：一个分析框架

美国次贷危机引发了全球性金融危机,这凸显了以美国为核心的“金融资本主义模式”和以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系的制度性缺陷,改革现行的以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系势在必行,建立货币区是较为现实的选择。但在现行货币政策框架下,货币区不可避免会出现“三元悖论”困境。本文提出的贷款准备金政策框架模型,能够解决货币区在保证其内在要求的资本自由流动和汇率稳定基本前提下,区内各个成员保持货币政策的独立性问题。     

MONETARY POLICY IN A NON‐REPRESENTATIVE AGENT ECONOMY: A SURVEY

It is well known that central bank policies affect not only macroeconomic aggregates, but also their distribution across economic agents. Similarly, a number of papers demonstrated that heterogeneity of agents may matter for the transmission of monetary policy to macro variables. Despite this, the mainstream monetary economics literature has so far been dominated by dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with representative agents. This paper aims to tilt this imbalance towards heterogeneous agents setups by surveying the main positive and normative findings of this line of the literature, and suggesting areas in which these models could be implemented. In particular, we review studies that analyse the heterogeneity of (i) households’ income, (ii) households’ preferences, (iii) consumers’ age, (iv) expectations and (v) firms’ productivity and financial position. We highlight the results on issues that, by construction, cannot be investigated in a representative agent framework and discuss important papers modifying the findings from the representative agent literature.     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Fiscal and monetary policies in complex evolving economies

What is the most appropriate combination of fiscal and monetary policies in economies subject to banking crises and deep recessions? We study this issue using an agent-based model that is able to reproduce a wide array of macro- and micro-empirical regularities. Simulation results suggest that policy mixes associating unconstrained, counter-cyclical fiscal policy and monetary policy targeting employment is required to stabilise the economy. We also show that “discipline-guided” fiscal rules can be self-defeating, as they depress the economy without improving public finances. Finally, we find that the effects of monetary and fiscal policies become sharper as the level of income inequality increases.