Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions

This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309).     

Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments

Arrow's “impossibility” and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but “saturating” domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone “economic preferences” for private and/or public goods. For strongly saturating domains of more general utility profiles, this paper provides similar extensions of Wilson's theorem and of the strong and weak “welfarism” results due to d'Aspremont and Gevers and to Roberts. Hence, for social welfare functionals with or without interpersonal comparisons of utility, most previous classification results in social choice theory apply equally to strongly saturating economic domains.     

Random dictatorship domains

A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are “almost necessary”.     

Conditions for Sustainable Optimal Economic Development

This paper shows that, for dynamic optimizing economies with different types of natural resource, environmental, and human‐made capital stocks, a necessary and sufficient condition for permanently sustaining an optimal utility/consumption level is the stationarity of the current‐value Hamiltonian. For economies whose development is not exogenously and directly affected by time (i.e., time‐autonomous economies), this stationarity condition generalizes Dixit et al.’s (1980 ) “zero‐net‐aggregate‐investment” rule of sustain‐ability, which in turn generalizes Solow‐Hartwick’s sustainability rule. For non‐autonomous economies, the stationarity condition is not generally fulfilled, and the current‐value Hamiltonian under (over) estimates the true welfare level by an amount equal to the discounted value of the net “pure time effect.” For the non‐autonomous case of a time‐dependent utility discount rate, a general condition on the discount rate function (of which the hyperbolic discount rate function is a special case) upholds the results obtained for autonomous cases. The paper concludes with a discussion of policies that promote both optimality and sustainability objectives.     

Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences

This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo et al. (2007) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203–229) in linear production economies with classical preferences. Although secure implementability is in general stronger than the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points,” Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587–597), this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under Pareto-efficient rules in the economies. In addition, this paper characterizes securely implementable and Pareto-efficient rules in the economies when the number of agents is two.     

Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences

The restricted domains of individuals' preferences that permit the construction of Arrow social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures in which each of n voters has some power are characterized. In this context a domain is the Cartesian product of n sets of strict preference orderings. Variants of this result are obtained under the additional requirement of neutrality and in the case when alternatives are vectors whose ith components affect only the ith voter. Kalai and Muller's analogous result (J. Econ. Theory16 (1977), 457–469) concerning nondictatorial procedures is discussed and proved as a corollary to the main theorem.     

Social cooperatives,social welfare associations and social networks

We use an original data-set to study how participation in two types of non-profit organizations – i.e. social welfare associations and social cooperatives – affects individual social capital, understood as a network of cooperative relationships. Participation in both the types of organization allows members to start new social relations. However, social welfare associations seem to play a significantly greater role in the development of volunteers’ social capital, favouring the creation of weak ties that are used to exchange information and advice, and offering the opportunity to establish stronger ties entailing concrete mutual support. Within social cooperatives, workers appear to develop their individual social capital to a greater extent than volunteers. Our results suggest that the composition of the workforce, the depth of members’ involvement in the organization’s activities and the human resources strategies adopted by the management influence the creation of cooperative relations through on-the-job interactions.     

On mixed markets with asymmetric information

In asymmetric information exchange economies involving both non-negligible and negligible agents, one should expect the failure of the private Core-Walras Equivalence Theorem. This paper shows that if “large” traders are similar to each other, then they lose their market power and hence the Equivalence Theorem can be restored. We also investigate on weaker equivalences among Walrasian expectations allocations, Aubin private core and private core allocations of the original mixed economy and the atomless one associated to it, without the assumption that all atoms are of the same type. Furthermore, extensions of Hervés-Moreno-Yannelis and Schmeidler Theorems (compare Hervés et al. in J Math Econ 41:844–856, 2005a; Schemidler in Econometrica 40:579–580, 1972) are given for differential information economies in which the feasibility constraints are imposed with an equality (exact feasibility).     

On the impossibility of representing infinite utility streams

We introduce a new Pareto-type criterion for social welfare functions over infinite utility streams that is not necessarily sensitive to increments in just a finite number of components. We show that there is no social welfare function that satisfies both this criterion and Diamond’s equity condition simultaneously. With our result, we extend the impossibility theorem of Basu and Mitra. Moreover, we show that, even under a weaker version of equity related to Zame’s intergenerational equity condition, the impossibility results are obtained as well.     

Social Security Contributions and the Business Cycle

We investigate business cycle dynamics of social security contributions (SSC), by far the largest labor tax distortion in the OECD. In most countries, we find a negative covariation of SSC tax burdens with levels and growth of GDP at business cycle frequencies and lower. In detrended data, a decline of GDP of 1% is associated with a 0.05-0.2 percentage point increase in the aggregate SSC burden, measured as a fraction of the wage bill. For most countries, average marginal SSC rates exceed, but track average rates. Changes in average SSC tax burdens are largely due to adjustments in statutory tax schedules rather than cyclical shifts in earnings distributions. Our findings are consistent with Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of social welfare states. In some countries, SSC rates co-move with measures of the “labor wedge” (Chari et al. 2007, Brinca et al. 2016).     

Impossibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels: The "Extended Sympathy Approach" Reconsidered

We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity
JEL Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026     

Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation

This paper studies the design of couples’ income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses’ utilities; bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple. Information structure and labor supply decisions follow the Mirrleesian tradition. However, while the household's total consumption is publicly observable, the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable. With a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses’ marginal income tax rate includes a “Pigouvian” (paternalistic) and an incentive term. The Pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy (tax) for the high-weight (low-weight) spouse, whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low (high). The sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples. In some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low-weight spouse (who may be female) and a negative one for the high-weight spouse (possibly the male). This is at odds with the traditional Boskin and Sheshinski results. Our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions. Finally, we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model. The calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower (and possibly even negative) marginal tax rate.     

Social evaluations when populations differ in size

Assessments of “social welfare” do not usually take into account population sizes. This can lead to serious social evaluation flaws, particularly in contexts in which policies can affect demographic growth. We develop in this paper a little‐known though ethically attractive approach to correcting the flaws of traditional social evaluations, an approach that is sensitive to population sizes and that is based on critical‐level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU). Traditional CLGU is extended by considering arbitrary orders of welfare dominance and ranges of “poverty lines,” as well as values for the “critical level” of how much a life must be minimally worth to contribute to social welfare. We apply these social evaluation methods to rank Canada across 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006 and to estimate normatively and statistically robust lower and upper bounds of critical levels over which these rankings can be made.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

The legacy of R. Coase (1910–2013): toward a theory of institutional 'moving equilibrium'?

Over almost a century, Ronald Coase’s works have largely differed in their contents. Under the general umbrella of the “law and economics” field, Coase’s scientific production has indeed covered a large variety of topics and policy issues. However, Coase’s analyses reveal a common framework, if not a structured methodology. We highlight five key ingredients of the “Coasean methodology” and apply them to revisit Coase’s main contributions. The resulting picture reveals a comprehensive theory of institutional “moving equilibrium”, where the institutional design of socioeconomic transactions is affected by the dimension of transaction costs.     

The Nordic Model on the Global Market of Ideas: The Welfare State as Scandinavia’s Best Brand

This article analyses the contemporary deployment of the Nordic welfare state model as a centrepiece of Nordic competitive identity and strategic communication on the global market of ideas. First, it looks at the interrelated phenomena of global competition, competitive identity and region branding. Second, it studies the interplay between Nordic transnational public diplomacy and national public diplomacy of individual Nordic countries, in particular Sweden, on the one hand and international media outlets’ reporting on the Nordic countries on the other. In analysing this cross-fertilizing genre, the article identifies how the welfare state is being repackaged for export along with a set of “progressive values” which are coded as specifically “Nordic.” The article discusses (1) the interaction between outer images and inner visions; (2) the place and significance of the Nordic model, progressive values and the welfare state in today’s Nordic branding; and (3) the possible function of outward competitive identity as a kind of “compensatory imagination” directed inward as well as outward.     

Social network and private provision of public goods

Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the standard model of public good provision, we assume that an agent’s utility has two terms: (a) ‘ego’-utility derived from the agent’s consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network always has a positive effect on the provision of the public good. We also find that, in networks with “small world”-like modular structures, ‘bridging’ ties connecting distant parts of social network play an important role inducing an agent’s contribution to public good. Assumptions and results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms’ R&D investments.     

Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those satisfying two properties: local weak monotonicity and vortex-freeness. The first of these constrains the function values at any two sufficiently proximal points, while the second asserts that its line integrals around sufficiently small triangular loops must vanish.The characterization implies a local-to-global principle that allows one to deduce truthfulness of a function from its behavior on arbitrarily small neighborhoods of each point. Other consequences include a simple alternate derivation of the Saks–Yu Theorem that weak monotonicity characterizes truthfulness of functions having a convex domain and finite range, and a sufficient condition for constructing truthful functions by “stitching together” truthful subfunctions on different subsets of the domain.     

Analytic radicalism

Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk aversion. This note modifies this argument for “analytic conservatism” by allowing jurisdictional exit in response to institutional decline. By providing a welfare floor which limits the cost of failure, exit reverses the normative implications of Brennan and Hamlin’s argument, making risk-neutral agents quasi-risk seeking and justifying a radical disposition to reform under some circumstances.     

A social morality for mortals: A review essay of <Emphasis Type="Italic">the order of public reason: A theory of freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world</Emphasis>

This essay praises Gerald Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason as a building block for all normative explorations into the institutional foundations of human sociability. It evaluates the normative implications put forth by Gaus in terms of the Kirzner’s “finder’s keeper’s ethic.” This raises a question about the relationship between the moral order and the political order that underlies market processes. Examining the role of entrepreneurship in the market process in relation to Kirzner’s “finder’s keeper’s principle” suggests a deeper ethical foundation that underpins the institutional conditions of “social morality.”