Law and Preferences

Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people.When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via aprocess of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affectingthe market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation.Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should thereforego beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It shouldalso include an analysis of their effect on the distributionof preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claimby considering a simple market game in which individuals mayhave preferences that include fairness concerns. We show thatdifferent legal rules change not only the pattern of trade ina market game, but also individuals' fairness concerns. Thatis, different rules may eventually make individuals care more(or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggeststhat enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibriumpreferences for fairness.     

Integrating econometrics: A modern undergraduate economics capstone experience

Angrist and Pischke (2017) call for a pedagogical paradigm shift by pointing out that econometrics courses often do not align with modern empirical approaches employed by economists. This article's authors propose a modern capstone experience, designed to address these concerns by integrating econometrics into the traditional capstone approach. They couple a full econometrics course with a traditional capstone course by weaving a cohesive econometrics-heavy research paper through the two courses. They feel this approach addresses the lack of econometrics skills among economics majors while simultaneously making some necessary improvements to undergraduate econometrics content. They hope this article will be a valuable resource for programs changing course requirements or revamping their curriculum to better fit the increasing demand for data analysis skills in the job market.     

Capitalism and evolution

In this paper I to ask an old fashioned question, “Why do capitalist economies evolve in the way that they do?” The answer will lie, in the nature of human curiosity and the corresponding growth of knowledge and in the particular instituted rules of the game that induce the self transformation of each particular economic order. The essential idea is this; the manner of self transforming is contingent on the manner of self-ordering, so that different instituting frames have different dynamic consequences. The notion of order provides the bridge to the systemic properties of the economy, the nature of its parts and the manner of their interconnection, while the notion of transformation provides the link with evolution and the open-ended, essentially unpredictable, development of capitalism. From my perspective capitalist economies are ignorance economies, in which highly specialised individuals and teams know a great deal about very little, so that the productive strength of the system, its collective knowing, depends on how the pools of specialised, narrow understandings are connected. Connectivity requires organisation and organisation depends on rules of the game and on belief and trust so that we can rely upon the testimony and actions of others. Failure of trust leads to failure of connectivity and a corresponding loss of system coherence. Order is central to the notion of economic evolution and, in practice, economic configurations demonstrate immense richness and subtlety but order is not equilibrium. Systems in equilibrium do not evolve. That the day to day structures of capitalism are the product of ordering processes in the epistemic as well as the material realm seems to me self evident and it is equally self evident that these structures are restless, that their development is open-ended and unpredictable.     

How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Variable factors and eficiency in the US seel idustry: a Production Frontier Analysis

In an efficient NFL beting market, point spreads incorporate all relevant information contained in past game outcomes. Efficiency implies that trading rules based on past game outcomes should not be able to produce a consistent pattern of winners over losers. This study identifies 15 trading rules based on historical game outcomes and, using simulated gambling, tests them over the 1984–1986 NFL seasons. The study's main finding indicates that the NFL betting market is efficient, but does identify a small set of profitable trading rules over this time period.     

Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

We analyse and empirically examine a multi-level common-pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective-choice level game and an operational-level game. In the collective-choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.     

Sharing Rules in Teams

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D2, C72, J54.     

Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules

A deterministic learning model applied to a game with multiple equilibria produces distinct basins of attraction for those equilibria. In symmetric two-by-two games, basins of attraction are invariant to a wide range of learning rules including best response dynamics, replicator dynamics, and fictitious play. In this paper, we construct a class of three-by-three symmetric games for which the overlap in the basins of attraction under best response learning and replicator dynamics is arbitrarily small. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions on payoffs for these two learning rules to create basins of attraction with vanishing overlap. The necessary condition requires that with probability one the initial best response is not an equilibrium to the game. The existence of parasitic or misleading actions allows subtle differences in the learning rules to accumulate.     

囚徒困境的均衡辨析

传统的 《博弈论》 分析最终结果是两个囚徒均会坦白，但这并不是两个囚徒的最好结局，如何才能达到最好结局？本文从 《博弈论》 中“理性人”的假设出发，对传统的 （坦白，坦白） 均衡提出质疑。本文指出理性人不会满足于传统的均衡，理性人会积极寻找双方利益最大化的均衡，并达到此均衡。本文给出了新的均衡：广义均衡，并给出广义均衡的求解过程。通过对引入公共支付函数的概念，公共支付函数表达了两个人的共同利益。通过公共支付函数的最大化，使两个囚徒公共利益最大化，以求得囚徒困境的新的均衡，让两个囚徒的结果达到最好———即两人均抵赖。本文还将公共支付函数运用于其他 《博弈论》 案例，并指出广义均衡比纳什均衡更具有社会意义，因为前者体现了公共利益。文中还对囚徒困境的机制设计问题做了分析，指出囚徒困境中机制的设计会诱导囚徒作出不正确的选择，从而没有达到双方利益的最大化。     

Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints

This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not lose by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers every Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules that assign non-negative payoffs for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential communication to be as efficient as simultaneous communication in implementing these allocation rules when the player with unbounded payoffs moves first.