中国式财政分权与混合所有制改革

以中央与地方、政府与企业关系变迁为切入视角,在中国式分权和市场化改革的背景下探究地方政府发展混合所有制经济的激励动因。研究发现,地方财政压力对非国有经济规模的影响关系是倒U型的;政府财政压力在一定范围内促进混合所有制经济发展,但财政压力过大容易产生负向效应。换句话说,中国式分权和市场化改革是地方政府推动混合所有制经济发展的重要动因。此外,地方政府竞争、市场化进程对财政压力与非国有经济规模的关系产生正向调节作用。市场制度环境较完善的地区,有助于地方财政压力发挥对混合所有制经济发展的促进效应。     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

地区间竞争与中国国有企业的民营化

中国的经济改革是从地方分权化而非民营化开始的。但在过去的２０年中,特别是从９０年代初起,中国的民营化进程在速度和广度上都有所深化。本文的基本结论是：８０年代初的地方分权政策导致了地区间竞争,地区间竞争又反过来引发了民营化。由于产品市场上的地区间竞争非常激烈,每一个地区都必须尽可能降低生产成本以保持生存所需的最小市场占有份额。为了促使经理降低生产成本,地方政府就必须让渡全部或部分股份给经理。一般地说,产品竞争越激烈,引发的民营化程度也就越高。另一方面,如果中央政府直接控制国有企业,给地方政府设定一个固定的税后剩余分享份额,或者两个地方政府能够完全合谋以获取联合收入最大化,则民营化就不可能发生     

分权体制下省级市场化进程影响因素探析——基于空间面板模型的实证研究

利用空间面板模型实证检验了分权体制下省级政府推动市场化进程的因素,并将财政分权、FDI和人均GDP对市场化进程的效应分解成直接效应和间接效应。研究发现,中央政府营造了一种较好的竞争氛围,促使省级政府加快市场化进程,省级政府市场化空间溢出效应显著为正。省级财政分权和省以下财政分权对省级市场化进程的影响显著为正,地方政府为了竞争FDI有动力推动市场化改革,同时,经济发展水平越高的地区,对市场化制度需求越强。     

地区竞争与市场化进程的趋同性——中国是否会出现"一个国家,两种经济"

本文通过一个不对称资本竞争模型分析地区竞争对市场化进程地区差距的影响,并讨论地区间市场化进程趋同的可能性.分析表明,如果地区间技术水平差距过大,地区竞争不仅导致不发达地区非国有经济发展滞后,而且会抑止不发达地区国有经济的市场化改革进程,导致地区间市场化进程差距的扩大.在长期中,只有避免不发达地区进入"技术进步陷阱"或"改革成本陷阱",才能保证地区市场化进程的趋同,避免出现"一个国家,两种经济".     

我国地方政府政策的空间互动关系——基于财政竞争与政府效率的视角

地方政府的财政竞争引起地方公共品供给效率的空间互动的理论与实证分析表明,我国省级地方政府效率存在显著的空间互补性,即一个地方政府效率及其经济发展水平、居民受教育水平、财政分权和对外开放度对相邻地区政府效率的提高均具有显著的正外部性。可从改革户籍制度、加强官员交流与激励、建立服务型政府等方面着手,促进地方政府效率及其影响因素发挥正外部性作用。     

税收分成、财政激励与企业异地投资——基于增值税五五分成的准自然实验

财政激励作为调节政府间财政分配关系的重要手段,深刻影响着地方政府决策行为。税收分成改革呈现不同的财政激励效果,引发地方税收竞争并传导至企业,对区域经济协调发展有至关重要的影响。将2016年增值税五五分成改革作为财政激励的外生冲击变量,通过构建强度差分模型,实证检验税收分成改革带来的激励效应如何影响企业异地投资。研究表明：增值税分成比例提高会激励地方政府积极扶持本地企业留住税源,并抑制企业异地投资。进一步研究发现,无论是对高财政自给率地区还是低财政自给率地区,增值税分成比例变化均表现了强烈的抑制效应,且在低组别的抑制效应更大;地方政府更倾向于对直接控股的地方国有企业和异地投资比例较高的企业进行管控;改革带来的激励变化会促进企业信贷的获得和政府补助的提高。因此,建议提升流动税基的中央集中度,弱化地方政府对企业异地投资的干预动机;建立“赋权—控权”的财政激励机制,抑制地区间过度税收竞争及市场分割现象;推进地方政府从管理型向服务型政府转变,减少对企业异地投资的干预和控制。     

中国地方政府税收竞争对FDI地域选择的实证分析

在中国式财政分权的背景下,以GDP为主的绩效考评促使地方政府普遍存在强烈的引资冲动,加剧了中国地方性税收激励政策竞争的激烈程度。这种地方政府间税收竞争加剧了FDI在中国区域分布的不均衡,并直接影响到中国区域经济的非均衡发展。本文在理论上分析了政府间税收竞争对FDI地域分布的影响机理,实证研究表明,自从2008年以来我国实行的内外资统一税制正在发挥应有的公平功能。今后在合理引导与高效利用FDI方面,应该坚持税制公平原则、弱化地方政府的恶性税收竞争动力并着力优化FDI的软环境。     

我国公用事业的改革

1.稳步推进民营化改革。公用事业民营化 改革的主要目的应是引入非国有经济成分以加 强公用事业部门,尤其是非自然垄断环节或部门 的竞争,而不是以非国有经济成分来取代国有资 本。同时,公用事业的民营化改革是一个渐进过 程。即在公用事业产业逐渐增加民营经济的比 重,扩大民营企业的经营范围,相应减少国有经 济的比重,缩小国有企业的经营范围的过程。     

中国地方政府财政能力的检验与评价——基于因子分析法的省际数据比较

地方政府财政能力是地方政府汲取资源、有效供给公共品的能力.分税制改革以来,中国地方政府因各自拥有的资源禀赋和制度环境差异,导致地方政府之间的财政汲取能力强弱不同,地区间的公共品供给能力也存在巨大差异.本文运用因子分析方法,选取中国30个省级政府作样本.从财政汲取能力和公共品供给能力两个层面设定23个评价指标,对地方政府财政能力进行实证分析.分析结果表明,中国地方政府之间的财政能力参差不齐、弱者居多,不利于公共品特别是基本公共品在地区之间的大致均等化供给,对此本文给出提升地方政府财政能力的政策建议.     

Interregional infrastructure,competition for capital,and local public expenditure policies: Evidence from China's high-speed rail network

Interregional infrastructure promotes market integration and enhances the mobility of capital, thereby intensifying fiscal competition among local governments. Exploiting the expansion of China's high-speed rail (HSR) network as plausibly exogenous shocks, this study examines how Interregional infrastructure affects the fiscal competition among local governments. We find that after connecting with the HSR network, city governments tend to dedicate a lower proportion of public spending to consumption goods, which benefit immobile households, and invest more in productive inputs, which attract mobile firms. We also find that the negative effect of HSR connection on the proportion of consumption goods is more pronounced in peripheral cities than core cities because periphery cities face a larger increase in capital mobility due to the core–periphery effects of trade integration induced by HSR. Our findings indicate that the behavioural responses of local governments should be accounted for when assessing the social welfare of interregional infrastructure.     

汇率波动与FDI区位分布——基于辖区间财政竞争视角的研究

为了获取相对的竞争优势,辖区政府会通过策略性财政政策影响砌的区位分布.文章利用中国省级面板数据,实证分析人民币汇率波动通过改变辖区政府的财政竞争策略,从而影响FI)I区位分布的实际效应.研究表明,人民币汇率升值会弱化FDI流入量与辖区政府财政支出竞争程度两者的正向关系,此时依靠财政支出结构偏向基本建设的竞争策略将收效甚微.     

Risk sharing and industrial specialization in China

We investigate how risk sharing shapes industrial specialization across prefecture-level cities in China. By unbundling the mechanisms of risk sharing, we find that ex ante risk sharing generates a first-order stimulant effect on the geographical concentration of manufacturing industries, particularly for non-state-owned enterprises and cyclical industries. Ex post risk sharing matters only for state-owned enterprises. This result remains robust to instrument variable estimation and controlling for other determinants of industrial specialization. Finally, we show that interregional labor migration (special fiscal transfers) plays an important role in promoting interregional ex ante (ex post) risk sharing. The study implies that much more risk sharing and efficiency gains from industrial specialization would be achieved if capital markets and credit markets are better developed.     

转移支付与地方财政支出扩张——基于异质性与空间外溢视角的分析

本文通过构建空间计量模型实证检验地方政府在转移资金分配中的策略竞争行为,从新的视角对地方财政支出扩张进行解读。研究发现转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”受到地区间竞争的制约,一般性转移支付对地区间竞争存在显著制约,但专项转移支付的影响不明显;地方政府的竞争,不仅“患寡”,也“患不均”。要完善转移资金的使用效率,须考虑转移支付实施的结构差别,尤其应注意转移资金分配的非均衡效应对地方政府扩张的差异化激励。     

From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style

In 1995, China began a profound reform of its state-owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state-owned enterprises at the county level and mass lay-offs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments have initiated these reforms, which are proceeding in economically and politically sensible ways. We then argue that privatization, Chinese style, rests on an adequate economic and political foundation - federalism, Chinese style. We suggest a range of incentives that propel local governments toward state-owned enterprise reform, including their harder budget constraints and increased competition from the non-state sector. In this sense, federalism, Chinese style, has induced privatization, Chinese style.
JEL classification: H7, L30, P3.     

政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究

公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。     

Institutional environment,ownership and firm taxation

This paper examines how ownership type and institutional environment affect firm taxation. Using a sample of Chinese‐listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we find that private firms enjoy a lower effective tax rate than local state‐owned enterprises. In addition, the preferential taxation of private firms is associated with local government incentives to promote local economic growth. We find that private firms located in regions with a lower level of privatization receive preferential tax treatment. Our results also suggest that decentralization and interjurisdictional competition lead to financial interdependence between local governments and private firms.     

Local governments’ fiscal balance and privatization in transition countries1

Several transition economies have undertaken fiscal decentralization reforms over the past two decades along with liberalization, privatization and stabilization reforms. Theory predicts that decentralization may aggravate fiscal imbalances, unless the right incentives are in place to promote fiscal discipline. This study uses a panel of 20 transition countries over 19 years to address a central question of fact: Did privatization help to promote local governments’ fiscal discipline? The answer is clearly ‘no’ for privatization considered in isolation. However, privatization and subnational fiscal autonomy along with reforms to the banking system – restraining access to soft financing – may prove effective at improving fiscal balances among local governments.     

The effects of vertical and horizontal incentives on local tax efforts: evidence from China

Tax effort is a measure of a government’s effort to collect taxes. This study explores what impacts both vertical and horizontal incentives have on local governments’ tax efforts in China. For consistency with the literature, we first include typical economic and institutional factors in our analysis. We find that the effects of economic factors on local tax efforts are significant, but the effects of institutional factors tend to be weak. Fiscal decentralization, as a vertical incentive, has a significantly positive effect on tax efforts at the provincial level. Meanwhile, fiscal interaction, as a horizontal incentive, is also taken into account in a spatial specification to explain tax competition among local governments. The results show that local tax effort in China also depends on the horizontal incentive. Hence, to improve local tax effort, the central government should let the locals have more autonomy in collecting taxes and evaluate local tax effort by referring to tax collection in adjacent provinces simultaneously.     

Subsidy competition,industrial land price distortions and overinvestment: empirical evidence from China’s manufacturing enterprises

In China, offering inexpensive industrial land is a major means for local governments to participate in interregional subsidy competition, which caused regional industrial land price distortions. This article examines the effect of regional industrial land price distortions on the overinvestment of Chinese manufacturing enterprises. Chinese industrial enterprises data and land price monitoring data of 49 major cities in China between 1998 and 2007 are employed. This article has found that industrial land price distortions will significantly stimulate the overinvestment of manufacturing enterprises. Such a promoting effect varies among manufacturing enterprises of different ownership and industry attributes. Industrial land price distortions have the most significant promoting effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested firms, followed by private firms, while state-owned enterprises are the least affected. Compared with private heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of private light-industry firms. Compared with foreign-invested heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested light-industry firms. This study represents a positive exploration and supplement to the existing studies on the effects of subsidy competition on corporate investment behaviours and the studies on Chinese-style subsidy competition.