Artificial worlds and economics,part I

In this and a companion paper (Lane 1993), I describe a class of models, called artificial worlds (AWs), that are designed to give insight into a process called emergent hierarchical organization (EHO). This paper introduces the ideas of EHO and AWs and discusses some of the interferential problems involved in trying to learn about EHO by constructing and studying the properties of AWs. It concludes by introducing two abstract AWs that address important general problems in EHO: the relation between structure and function, and the dynamics of evolutionary processes. The companion paper will discuss several AWs expressly designed to model particular economic phenomena.     

On designing economic agents that behave like human agents

This paper explores the idea of constructing theoretical economic agents that behave like actual human agents and using them in neoclassical economic models. It does this in a repeated-choice setting by postulating artificial agents who use a learning algorithm calibrated against human learning data from psychological experiments. The resulting calibrated algorithm appears to replicate human learning behavior to a high degree and reproduces several stylized facts of learning. It can therefore be used to replace the idealized, perfectly rational agents in appropriate neoclassical models with calibrated agents that represent actual human behavior. The paper discusses the possibilities of using the algorithm to represent human learning in normal-form stage games and in more general neoclassical models in economics. It explores the likelihood of convergence to long-run optimality and to Nash behavior, and the characteristic learning time implicit in human adaptation in the economy.     

Multiple equilibria, coordination, and transitional growth

We study a small open economy with two sectors and two factors of production. In one of the sectors, external economies of scale are generated through the industry-level capital input. This leads to a divergence between private and social production possibility frontiers as well as to multiple equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem that arises is solved by agents who follow a simple trial-and-error learning rule. The growth path of the economy as agents learn lies below the production possibility frontier and may display cyclical transitional dynamics. We also show that coordination problems which may prevent the economy from attaining the “good” equilibrium may be alleviated by the temporary use of policy instruments that shape the allocation of resources.     

Relationship between ecological economics and circular economy, eco-industry, cleaner production, and other relevant categories

Eco-industry, circular economy, cleaner production, industrial ecology or industrial ecosystem and other subjects are all categories related to sustainable developinent. This paper studies the relations and differences between the four categories and sustainable development as well as ecological economics. Circular economy, eco-industry, industrial ecosystem and cleaner production were put forward during the revolution in “end treatment pattern” of traditional industrial society. Industrial ecology, eco-industry and circular economy theory are three content expansions of cleaner production. Ecological economics is of instructive function theoretically and methodologically for circular economy, eco-industrial, cleaner production and industrial ecology. Circular economy theory is easier to be accepted, compared with ecological economics theory. And circular economy in nature is the complete application of ecological economics theory.     

Economic history and history of economics

Trust, along with other influential norms of cooperation, has been traditionally viewed as an important coordination mechanism stabilizing expectations of the participants in the informal economic exchanges. Drawing on the example of the informal value transfer system called hawala, this paper, however, shows that the role of safeguard against opportunism in the informal monetary settings is much more reliably performed by the instruments of social control. Norms of control embedded in community beliefs and common social practices among the hawala members entirely replace trusting attitudes, rendering them superfluous for the purpose of protecting financial interests of clients and intermediaries in this informal system of monetary exchanges.     

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most common cost type. This conformity effect may be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.      

Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests

We analyze a class of coordination games in which the Kth player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria does not change with K. We run experiments with 15 participants and with K=3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show that the value of K affects initial submissions and convergence to equilibrium. When K is small relative to the number of participants, our experiments show that repeated play converges to or near zero. When K is large, an equilibrium is often not reached as a result of repeated play. We seek explanations to these patterns in hierarchical thinking and direction learning.      

The auctioneerless economics of Axel Leijonhufvud: the 'dark forces of time and ignorance' and the coordination of economic activity

Leijonhufvud focuses his analysis on the coordination of economicactivities. In a world tossed and torn by ever new episodesof instability, macroeconomic theory must finally admit andproperly analyse the limits of collective and individual rationality.Starting from the system's coordination, Leijonhufvud underlinesthe crucial role of information, learning and institutions.Coming to individual choice, he unremittingly rejects unboundedrationality. Methodologically, however, his use of general equilibriumas a benchmark seems to have conditioned his analysis. In bringingto light the ‘dark forces of time and ignorance’,Leijonhufvud himself seems to have fallen under the influenceof the siren represented by general equilibrium theory.     

知识互补性与专业化的局限：一个新兴古典模型

互补性知识的利用已经被作为企业创新的重要源泉甚至核心竞争力。本文将知识互补性引入具有专业化分工经济和协调费用的经济体,利用杨小凯和黄有光开创的新兴古典经济学理论对其进行超边际分析,由此得出三个命题：若企业内岗位间知识互补性程度、互补性知识积累程度和互补性知识协调效率足够高,则企业利用互补性经济的收益大于不利用的收益;互补性经济越明显,经济体的雇员-雇主人数比越大;当互补性经济明显时,与未利用互补性经济的企业相比,利用互补性经济的企业将有更高的工资/产品价格比。进而指出,为了利用互补性知识,发挥互补性经济,企业需要将锥形组织形态转变为扁平组织形态,同时创造有利于提高协调效率的组织环境。而企业间的互补性知识则需要拥有互补性知识的企业在竞争基础上的合作。     

A resilience-based framework for evaluating adaptive co-management: Linking ecology, economics and society in a complex world

Adaptive co-management brings together collaborative and adaptive approaches in pursuit of sustainable resource use and social-ecological resilience. Enthusiasm for this management approach, however, is countered by recent critiques regarding outcomes. A lack of evidence from consistent evaluation of adaptive co-management further exacerbates this situation. This paper revisits the issue of evaluation in natural resource management and recasts it in light of complex adaptive systems thinking. An evaluative framework for adaptive co-management is developed which directs attention toward three broad components: ecosystem conditions, livelihood outcomes and process and institutional conditions. Scale-specific parameters are offered for each component to facilitate systematic learning from experience and encourage cross-site comparisons. Conclusions highlight the importance of systematically incorporating evaluation into the adaptive co-management process and recognize the challenge for resource agencies and researchers to shift from a conventional to a complex adaptive system perspective.     

McCloskey, economics as conversation, and Sprachethik

In writing about the 'rhetoric of economics' - particularlyabout the standards which prevent situations where 'anythinggoes' in argument - McCloskey takes an eclectic approach totwo philosophical positions, based on Rorty and Habermas respectively.But these positions, despite sharing some common aspects, alsodifferentiate themselves from each other sharply in importantways. In this paper, it is argued that this eclecticism of McCloskeyis not coherent, as a result of her not completely graspingthe fundamental differences between these two positions, andthat this incoherence has damaging implications for her projectof the rhetoric of economics.     

Austrian themes,data, and sports economics

This paper uses data from Major League Baseball and themes from Moneyball by Michael Lewis to empirically illustrate Kirznerian entrepreneurship. While Kirzner envisioned competition in markets for profit, the sports economics literature shows that sporting competition has things in common with market competition. This is important because a strength of sports economics, namely, the abundant data, can help overcome a perceived weakness of Austrian economics, namely, the lack of empirical content. This paper describes and empirically confirms how certain front office decision makers of the Oakland Athletics were alert to opportunities that were being overlooked by other baseball executives.

Job quality and the economics of New Labour: a critical appraisal using subjective survey data

This paper assesses the record on job quality during the earlyterm of office of the New Labour government by interpreting,from a political economy perspective, changes in a variety ofsubjective measures of job quality taken from several differentdata sources. We find some improvements in job quality overthe period 1998–2004; however we argue that these improvementshave arisen not because of New Labour's policies towards theworkplace but because of low and falling rates of unemployment.Despite recent improvements, a large number of workers in Britainremain in low quality jobs and, without a radical change ofpolicy direction, sustained and substantial progress in thequality of work will remain elusive.     

Violence against women, social learning, and deterrence

We develop a simple model of sexual and domestic violence. By assumption, the potential victim’s threat to report if she is victimized is not credible, which implies that the only sequential equilibrium involves violence. However, a realistic social learning process converges to a non-sequential equilibrium without violence from all nearby states if the expected punishment for offenders whose victims report to the police is sufficiently high. A policy to increase the sentences for sexual and domestic violence convictions could therefore substantially reduce such violence in the long run, even if it is powerless to make women’s threats to report credible.

Routines and incentives in group tasks*

The artificial context “Target the Two” has been used in experiments to explore some of the features of routinization and learning. Two agents must learn to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, without being allowed to use verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance of players in two treatments. Each treatment submits players to the same sequence of starting configurations, but differs in terms of the payoff function. In the first treatment (A), the payoff is based on the number of moves required to achieve the goal, whereas in the second treatment (B) the payoff depends on the time required for completion. We observe that (1) in treatment B subjects tend to play in a more “routinized” way and (2) treatment B reduces the time spent on play, but does not decrease the resources (the number of moves) used, relative to treatment A.     

The economics of oil,biofuel and food commodities

We study the effects on the food price of introducing biofuels as a substitute for fossil fuel in the energy market. Energy is supplied by a price-leading oil cartel and a competitive fringe of farmers producing biofuel. Biofuel production shares a finite land resource with food production. A positive relationship results between energy and food prices. We establish that the equilibrium price of food will be growing as long as the oil stock is being depleted, and beyond if demand is growing. An analysis of the effects of the productivity of land use in either the food or the biofuel sectors is carried out. It is shown that, with a highly inelastic demand for food, an increase in the productivity of land in agriculture will decrease the price of food in the short-run, only to increase it in the long-run as the stock of fossil fuel is depleted.     

From necessities to imaginary worlds: Structural change,product quality and economic development

In this paper we explore how innovation and structural change affected economic development in the long run, by which we mean a period such as the one between the industrial revolution and the present. We separate the period since the industrial revolution into two sub periods, which we call ‘necessities’ and ‘imaginary worlds’ and focus on three trajectories, increasing productive efficiency, increasing output variety, and increasing output quality and differentiation. In the paper we show how a combination of the three trajectories gave rise to the transition between ‘necessities’ and ‘imaginary worlds’ and propose a mechanism of economic development which could have given rise to the type of economic system which we can observe today. To create growing output quality and differentiation higher competencies were required. These higher competencies required higher levels of education and demanded higher wages, which contributed to raise consumers' purchasing power. These phenomena, combined with the income effect of the creation of new sectors, generated the disposable income with which consumers could purchase the new, higher quality, non necessities, goods and services generated by innovation. In the paper we study the impact of several model parameters on the stability of the virtuous circle previously described.