From “tax state” to “debt state”

The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition.     

Transformation or Transmogrification? Ackerman, Hobbes (as in Calvin and Hobbes), and the Puzzle of Changing Constitutional Identity

In this article, I argue that Ackerman's approach to constitutional change is unable to distinguish between changes of degree and changes in kind, or between changes that transform and changes that transmogrify. As a consequence, the model Ackerman proposes fails at its most elemental purpose of illuminating questions of constitutional identity. Transformations fails to tell us who We the People really are or about what we are constituted.     

Operational Research and the environment

The discipline of Operational Research (OR) is primarily concerned with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of decision processes. These processes take place everywhere in society: industry, banking, agriculture, government, politics. Frequent use of mathematical optimization models is typical of OR. Since the early '80s these models are increasingly packaged in a user-friendly way, as Decision Support Systems. In the following we will illustrate how OR can be used to describe and solve a number of environmental problems.     

On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy

In practice one rarely observes pure forms of dictatorship that lack a council, or pure forms of parliament that lack an executive. Generally government policies emerge from organizations that combine an executive branch of government, the king, with a cabinet or parliamentary branch, the council. This paper provides an explanation for this regularity, and also provides an evolutionary model of the emergence of democracy that does not require a revolution. The analysis demonstrates that the bipolar king and council constitutional template has a number of properties that gives it great practical efficiency as a method of information processing and as a very flexible institutional arrangement for making collective decisions.     

The allocation of ideological structures

This article tries to make allocation in the sociology of knowledge more teachable. What may appear as a sectarian magic is transformed into a rational procedure to be used by teacher and student alike. Allocation requires a number of steps by which (1) the ideological structure is made part of an ideology; and (2) the ideology is related to a particular social situation of past or present either by reflecting it in symbolic expression or by reflecting the exact opposite.The old puzzle of how ideological relativism can be asserted from a theoretical position, which — by social background — cannot be anything but relative in itself, falls by the wayside. Temporarily positivism is claimed for any viewpoint which allows empirical verification. It asserts its relativisim but never reaches absolute and final truth. Relative advantages only can be claimed for the many comprehensive social theories at any given time.The term imputation is replaced by the term allocation in this article. Imputation is a direct translation of the German word Zurechnumg. Borrowed from economic theory, this term is unnecessarily complicated. We cannot do more than allocated ideologies in a manner not amenable to precise numerical imputation.     

Land use, biodiversity, and sustainability

We focus on the effects of deforestation for agricultural purposes on biodiversity. This topic has been dealt with in the recent literature where forested land and biodiversity are treated as synonyms. In contrast to that, this paper distinguishes between forested land and forest itself, the latter being interpreted as a measure of biodiversity. The regenerative capacity of forests is modeled as a function of the own stock and of the habitat size. In particular, the threat of a given minimum viable population to be achieved in the course of the reduction of habitats is taken into account. The corresponding structure of a sustainability indicator is elaborated.     

The “Dorfman Steiner” rule

Conclusion When this research was started, it was guessed that the Dorfman-Steiner rule would lose its relevance in an intertemporal setting. This belief has turned out to be false: along the optimal paths ofp (t) ands (t), and must be equal. The only difference with the Dorfman-Steiner result is that they will be different from unity.The author is chargé de cours at the Faculté Universitaire Catholique de Mons (Belgium). He has greatyl benefited from comments by M. Beuthe and J. J. Lambin.     

An Austrian Theory of the Firm

The modern Theory of the Firm uses the concept of rent and makes implicit assumptions about equilibrium. An Austrian (Market Process) Theory of the Firm should have something to say about each of these. Two strategic perspectives are analyzed, the neoclassical microeconomic perspective (using the Ricardo-Marshall approach to rent) and the Market Process perspective (using the Fetter approach to rent). In a neoclassical world, rents indicate unsolved or unexploited inefficiencies as every hypothetical outcome is viewed against the standard of perfect competition. By contrast, in the Market Process world there is no single ideal standard by which to measure any particular outcome. All action takes place in an open ended universe in which the future is continually being created, in which competition is a discovery process.     

Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good

Summary. We present a new class of rules named augmented serial rules for the provision of an excludable public good. First, we characterize this class by the four axioms of strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, access independence, and nonbossiness. Second, we identify two important subclasses by imposing an additional axiom: (i) anonymous augmented serial rules by anonymity, and (ii) Moulins serial rule by individual rationality.Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 9 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41.This paper is a substantial revision of Serial cost sharing with simple games. I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, an associate editor, and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology in Japan (Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program Microstructure and Mechanism Design in Financial Markets).     

Die Komponenten des Rückganges der Ausländerbeschäftigung

Summary During the crisis of 1974/75 the number of foreign workers in Western European countries has been reduced. This has caused a new discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of the employment of foreign workers. Whatever the attitude towards this problem may be, it is useful to decompose the reduction of foreign labour into categories. First of all a certain amount of foreign labour will be reduced due to a general decrease of overall employment. This influence may be called proportionality effect. The share of foreign workers in the different branches of the economy allows the calculation of a structural effect. Both of them measure influences, which concern foreigners as well as nationals. Only the remaining influence is specific to foreigners. It may again be split into a reduction effect and a substitution effect. The former ist concerned with that part of total reduction of foreign workers, which corresponds to the decrease of employment, i.e. employment reduction by dismissal of foreign workers. The latter pertains to that part of reduction, which exceeds the decrease of employment, i.e. by this magnitude domestic labour has been substituted for foreign labour.The application of this model to the years 1974 and 1975 shows no proportionality effect (1974 it is even positive), a limited structural effect, but a high reduction effect. The substitution effect is considerable in 1974 but of minor importance in 1975. So foreign labour in Austria served actually as cyclical buffer but mainly by reduction and only partly by substitution.     

Alternative Modelle und Hypothesen der Konsum- und Sparentscheidung(1)

Summary For the analysis of the allocation of personal disposable income to the different consumption goods and savings, an indirect-addilog-expenditure-system (IAES) has been constructed. Compared to the linear-expenditure-system (LES) the IAES to far more flexible and is not based upon the idea of minimum-consumption- or minimum-saving-quotas. On the other hand, marginal income shares are not fixed parameters. The IAES allows the derivation of a systematic savings- and consumption-function and supplies consistent income elasticities. But it will be shown that consistent demand systems are only restrictively able to consider all major determinants of the decision-problem consumption or saving. The derived system does not only neglect the effects of wealth on consumption and savings but also the results of real income fluctuations due to the business cycle. Also phenomena like unemployment and uncertainties regarding estimates of the future or inflation are neglected. With the help of an adjustment-procedure a part of these disadvantages has been eliminated. The adjustment with regard to the entire private consumption and savings supplied income elasticities which lead to an almost constant consumption- and savings-share in the period under investigation.     

Risk-Aversion in Constitutional Choice: Reply to Kyriacou

In his comment on my article on the possibility of discriminatory and non-consensual decsionmaking under Buchanan's veil of uncertainty (Müller 1998) Andreas Kyriacou proposes to take the players to be quasi-risk averse in order to secure fair and unanimous results at the constitutional level. As analytical tools of incorporating this premise into my model he not only suggests to assume that the individuals weigh losses higher than gains but also to take them as being rational maximiners. In this reply to his comment it is argued that both these points are inadequate to weaken my case against the veil's ability to guarantee unanimity and fairness of constitutional decisionmaking in view of a post-constitutional prisioners dilemma.     

A competitive general equilibrium model of technology transfer,innovation, and obsolescence

A general equilibrium production model is developed where technologies are embodied in capital goods of different vintages indexed in a continuum. A difference in the extent of existing knowledge determines a wage gap between a developed (north) and a developing region (south). With free flow of technology, relatively backward technologies move to the south. With innovation in the north, a technology cycle is created by which some of the technologies are pushed out of the north into the south. This also tends to widen the wage gap between the regions.     

Infinite-horizon competitive programs are optimal

For infinite-horizon optimal-growth problems the standard result in the literature says that a program is optimal if and only if associated with it is a sequence of present-value prices at which the program satisfies (i) a set of myopic competitive conditions, and (ii) an asymptotic transversality condition. The principal result of this paper points out the interesting and surprising fact that at least for a class of multisector models where the production side is described by a simple linear model, and there are some limiting primary factors, the competitive conditions alone characterize an optimal program.     

Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations

The word coordination has two meanings, and thesemeanings are often conflated. One meaning, associated with ThomasSchelling, is seen in situations like choosing whether to driveon the left or the right; the drivers must coordinate to eachother's behavior. The other meaning, associated with FriedrichHayek, means that a concatenation of activities is arranged soas to produce good results. Along with the Schelling sense ofcoordination comes the notion of convention, such as drivingon the right. Some conventions are consciously designed; othersemerge without design (or are emergent). Along with the Hayeksense of coordination comes the notion of social order. Somesocial orders, such as the skeleton of activities within thefirm or within the hypothetical socialist economy, are consciouslyplanned. Other social orders, such as the catallaxy of the freesociety, function without central planning (or are spontaneous).Distinguishing between the two coordinations (and, in parallelfashion, between convention and social order) clarifies thinkingand resolves some confusions that have arisen in discussionsof coordination and spontaneous order. The key distinctionsare discussed in the context of the thought of, on the one hand,Menger, Schelling, David Lewis, and the recent path-dependencetheorists, and, on the other hand, Smith, Hayek, Polanyi, Coase,and the modern Austrian economists. The paper concludes witha typology that encompasses the several distinctions.     

Is Technological Progress Pareto-Improving for a World with Global Public Goods?

This paper investigates the welfare effects of unilateral or multilateral technological progress in a world with global public goods. We focus on the consumption relation between the private and the public good, and then show that technological progress may beself-centered (benefit oneself but harm others), self-sacrificing (harm oneself but benefit others), or self-defeating (harm all) if two goods are substitutable. In addition, any type of technological progress improves every countrys welfare if the private and the public good are close complements.     

Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria

Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.Table of notation Agents' characteristics space ( ) - A Action space of each agent (aA) - Y Y = x A - Aggregate distribution on agents' characteristics - (X) Space of probability measures onX - C(X) Space of continuous functions onX - _X Family of Borel sets ofX - State space of aggregate uncertainty ( ) - x _t=1 aggregate uncertainty for the infinite game - = (₁,₂,...,_t,...) - ^{t t} (₁, ₂,..., _t) - L₁(^t,C ×A),v _t Normed space of measurable functions from ^t toC( x A) - 8o(^t,( x A)) Space of measurable functions from ^tto( x A) - X^t X^t= x _s=1 ^t X - _X ^t Borel field onX ^t - v Distribution on - v_t Marginal distribution of v on ^t - v(^t)((¦^t)) Conditional distribution on given ^t - v^t(^s)(v_t(¦^s)) Conditional distribution on ^t given ^s (wheres) - _t Periodt distributional strategy - Distributional strategy for all periods =(₁,₂,...,_t,...) - _t Transition process for agents' types - ( _t,^t,y)(P _t+1(, _t , ^t ,y)) Transition function associated with _t - u _t Utility function - V _t (, a, , ^t) Value function for each collection (, a, , ^t ) - W _t (, , ^t ) Value function given optimal action a - C() Consistency correspondence. Distributions consistent with and characteristics transition functions - B() Best response correspondence (which also satisfy consistency) - E Set of equilibrium distributional strategies - x _t=1 ( ^t , (x A)) - S Expanded state space for Markov construction - (, a, ) Value function for Markov construction - P( _t ^* , _t y)(P(, _t ^* , _t , _y )) Invariant characteristics transition function for Markov game We wish to acknowledge very helpful conversations with C. d'Aspremont, B. Lipman, A. McLennan and J-F. Mertens. The financial support of the SSHRCC and the ARC at Queen's University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was begun while the first author visited CORE. The financial support of CORE and the excellent research environment is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

On the generic nonconvergence of Bayesian actions and beliefs

Summary SupposeY _n is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in Y, a complete, separable, non-finite metric space. The probability law indexed by, is unknown to a Bayesian statistician with prior, observing this process. Generalizing Freedman [8], we show that generically (i.e., for a residual family of (,) pairs) the posterior beliefs do not weakly converge to a point-mass at the true. Furthermore, for every open setG , generically, the Bayesian will attach probability arbitrarily close to one toG infinitely often. The above result is applied to a two-armed bandit problem with geometric discounting where armk yields an outcome in a complete, separable metric spaceY _k. If the infimum of the possible rewards from playing armk is less than the infimum from playing armk', then armk is (generically) chosen only finitely often. If the infimum of the rewards are equal, then both arms are played infinitely often.     

An essay on the “New” Kaldorian macrodynamics

Conclusion Considering that employment and output are positively related, and that productivity growth and inflation are inversely related, we see that Kaldor, through the hypothesis of embodied technical progress and induced investment, has presented us with the elements of a general theory of stagflation. As such, this Kaldorian theory constitutes the only serious opposition to the various monetarist explanations (most notably Milton Friedman's 1977 Nobel Lecture) of a positively sloped Phillips curve, based on the inflationary expectations mechanism and the notion of a changing natural rate of unemployment. Not so long ago, people were talking about the so-called locomotive theory of export-led growth, with such surplus countries as Germany and Japan, or large economies as the U. S., playing the role of the engine, given that the equally surplus oil-producing countries will also maintain a strong import-demand for industrial output. Fears (perhaps legitimate ones) about inherent inflationary tendencies have caused the abandonment of this approach to pull the world economy from its vicious stagflationary circle. Contrary to the monetarists' view that a recession is needed in order to combat inflation, Kaldor's own theory can serve as a guide to those who, more optimistically, believe or simply hope that investment and output growth is the only longterm weapon against both inflation and unemployment.The importance of the writings of Professor Kaldor, influential as they have proved to be well beyond his immediate Cambridge milieu, cannot be overestimated. He is a truly great economist, one of the few who make economic theory rather than simply repeat established dogmas. All economists will be educated by reading and re-reading his collected essays.     

Strategic Reaction of Vertically Integrated Firms to Downstream Entry: Deterrence or Accommodation

The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic behavior of vertically integrated firms when there is downstream entry, taking into account the balance between competition in the market and competition for the market. This analysis can serve to explain diverse distributional structures, including the coexistence of vertically integrated firms and independent retailers. And it shows that the relative efficiency of downstream entrants and the level of competition among incumbents are two major factors in determining equilibrium configuration.