Russia's accession to the WTO: the potential for trade increase

This paper investigates the impact of institutions on trade and estimates the potential for trade increase between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the European Union (EU). The latter is computed from a gravity equation using the procedure introduced by Hausman and Taylor [1981. Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects. Econometrica 49 (6) 1377–1398]. We find that CIS trade is still characterized by a large trade diversion effect, which implies that trade with non-CIS countries could increase considerably in the long run. Another source of deepening the level of the European trade integration comes from the convergence of institutions towards the EU standards in light of Russia's application to join the WTO. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 680–699.     

Entrepreneurial Selection,Financial Markets,and Patterns of International Trade

This paper introduces entrepreneurial selection and imperfect financial markets to the 2x2x2 model of international trade. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in ability and borrow from banks who do not observe their ability. The pattern of international trade depends on (1) factor abundance, (2) endogenously determined productivity, and (3) endogenously determined financial market imperfections. We show that entrepreneurial selection results in a diminished Rybczynski effect and financial market imperfections further reduce the effect; hence differences in capital abundance imply a smaller trade volume than predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. The results help to resolve a conflict between the Heckscher-Ohlin model and data. [F11]     

The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi, T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92–97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism.     

Environmental policy in the European Union: Fostering the development of pollution havens?

A pollution haven occurs when dirty industries from developed nations relocate to developing nations in order to avoid strict environmental standards or developed nations imports of dirty industries expand replacing domestic production. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the European Union (EU) has increased its imports of “dirty” goods from poorer, less democratic countries during a period of more stringent environmental standards. Previous empirical studies such as those by Levinson and Taylor [Levinson, A., and Taylor, M.S., in press. Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect. International Economic Review.], Ederington, Levinson and Minier [Ederington, J., Levinson, A., and Minier, J., 2005. Footloose and Pollution-Free. Review of Economics and Statistics., 87: 92-99.], Kahn and Yoshino (2004), and Ederington and Minier [Ederington, J., and Minier. J., 2003. Is Environmental Policy a Secondary Trade Barrier? An Empirical Analysis. Canadian Journal of Economics., 36: 137-54.] find evidence that United States imports are responsive to changes in environmental stringency, but the effects of EU policy have not been examined as thoroughly. Our study follows Kahn [Kahn, M.E., 2003. The Geography of Us Pollution Intensive Trade: Evidence from 1958 to 1994. Regional Science and Urban Economics., 33: 383-400.] and examines the impact of industry energy intensity and toxicity, measured by an energy index and a Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) index, on imports into the EU, at the 2-digit industry level from 1970 to 1999. We use the signing of the Maastricht Treaty to signify a period of more uniform and stringent community wide environmental standards (1993-1999), and identify the level of per capita GDP within an EU trading partner. We find an increased amount of EU energy intensive trade with poorer countries during the period with more stringent EU environmental standards. This result is not robust, however, when poorer countries are defined by OECD membership and geographic region. We do not find an increased amount of EU toxic intensive trade with poorer countries although there is some evidence of increased EU imports of toxic goods from poorer OECD and non-EU European countries. For our full sample of trading partners in all regions, the evidence supports the PHH for EU energy intensive trade, but not for toxic intensive trade. Results for regional trade analysis are less clear.     

Oligopsonistic Intermediate Input and Patterns of Trade *

We examine the validities of traditional trade theorems and patterns of trade for an economy with an oligopsonistic intermediate input. Specifically, the model consists of two final goods. one intermediate good, and two primary factors. One final good and the intermediate good are produced using primary factors, capital and labor. The second final good is produced using the intermediate good and labor. All markets operate under perfect competition except the intermediate good market, which is oligopsonistic. This model reflects the real world phenomena of oligopsony power excerted by some industries (e.g., the food processing industry) in the intermediate good purchases. Our analysis shows that some of the traditional trade theorems and H.O trade pattern may be overturned if the factor intensity of the competitive sector lies between those of oligopsony and intermediate good sectors. [F12]     

How barriers to international trade affect TFP

We ask how barriers to international trade affect TFP when there are monopoly rights in the import-competing industries. Holmes and Schmitz [1995. Resistance to new technology and trade between areas. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 19, 2–17] show that without barriers to trade TFP in these industries is as large as possible. We study the general case of finite barriers to trade. We find that binding quotas lead to the use of inefficient technology in the import-competing industries. In addition, finite quotas or tariffs imply that the import-competing industries produce larger than efficient quantities, if they produce at all. For both of these reasons, barriers to international trade reduce TFP.     

Strategic policies and growth: an applied model of R&D-driven endogenous growth

We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer (1990) [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102] and Grossman and Helpman (1991) [Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge]. Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R&D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R&D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R&D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R&D, as well as to take greater advantage of global R&D spillovers. Here, we find significantly high growth effects together with sizable gains in social welfare at low incidence to tax payers.     

The core periphery model with asymmetric inter-regional and intra-regional trade costs

We generalize the model of Krugman (J Polit Econ 99(3):483–499, 1991) to allow for asymmetric trade costs between regions and for (asymmetric) trade costs that are internal to the regions. We find that industrial activity, in a region, is enhanced by higher costs of importing and lower costs of exporting (more precisely, by a higher ratio between the two trade costs). This suggests that countries may impose tariffs on imported goods and seek to remove the import tariffs in other countries (unilateral protectionism) in order to foster industrial activity. Industrial activity is also promoted by lower domestic internal trade costs and higher foreign internal trade costs (more precisely, by a lower ratio between the two trade costs).     

Union Wage Strategies and International Trade

We characterise a full set of possible international trade regimes for different combinations of wages in a two-country model of oligopoly with a homogeneous product. We show that the nature of any equilibrium trade will be either inter-industry (one-way) or intra-industry (two-way) depending on (endogenous) union choices between high and low-wage strategies. We show that intra-industry trade is the more likely the lower are trade costs, and that under intra-industry trade, falling trade costs lead monopoly unions to set higher wages, but the opposite obtains under inter-industry trade.     

Federalism, separatism and international trade

This paper explores whether countries that have a federal Constitution engage in more international trade. We identify two possible mechanisms through which political fragmentation of nation-states, namely federalism, might impact positively on trade globalization processes: domestic market fragmentation and the free trade strategy pursued by certain separatist regions in federal countries. We use a gravity equation running panel regressions to estimate the impact of federalism on trade. The Poisson estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is used to handle the null trade flows. We test our predictions on a large data set of 148 countries on the 1980–2002 period. After controlling for determinants of trade potentially correlated with federalism, a federalist system is found to increase international trade. We also find that separatism and linguistic fractionalization impact positively on trade openness.     

Trade restrictiveness indices in the presence of externalities: An application to non‐tariff measures

We extend the trade restrictiveness index approach to the case of market imperfections and domestic regulations addressing them. We focus on standard‐like non‐tariff measures (NTMs) affecting cost of production and potentially enhancing demand by reducing negative externalities. We apply the framework to the database of Kee et al. ( 2009 ) and derive ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for technical measures. About 39% of the product lines affected by NTMs exhibit negative AVEs, indicating a net trade‐facilitating effect of these measures. Accounting for these effects significantly reduces previous measures of countries’ trade policy restrictiveness obtained while constraining these NTMs to be trade‐reducing.     

Trade openness and government size of small developing countries

This paper examines the causal effect that trade openness has on government size in small developing countries (SDCs). We use the construction of the trade cost variables based on Baltic Dry Index in primary goods as instruments of trade openness to address the endogeneity issue. We find that the increase in trade openness leads to an increase in government size: a 1 percent expansion in trade openness (trade GDP ratio) raises government consumption over GDP ratio by approximately 0.1–0.2 percentage points on average. Its quantitative significance emphasizes the importance of rethinking the costs and benefits of trade openness for SDCs.     

A Two-Country Dynamic Trade Model with Multiple Groups

The paper addresses a dynamic interdependence between economic growth and trade patterns within a multi-group framework. The labor force of each country is classified into two groups, according to human capital and preferences. We show how difference in preferences and human capital of the four groups affect trade patterns and the world economy. [F11, 041].     

A further investigation of the link between trade and income

When the foreign subsidiary has minority local ownership and MNF engages in transfer pricing, it intrafirm exports are always from the country with the higher marginal cost. Further, permitting deferral from home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits changes the nature of intrafirm trade from efficient to perverse even when the foreign subsidiary is fully-owned by the MNF. Intrafirm trade differs significantly from that between unrelated buyers and sellers, and tariffs on such trade (when it is perverse) can restore global production efficiency. [F12]     

Exploring policy options in joint intertemporal-spatial trade models using an incomplete markets approach

In this paper we discuss the desirability of service trade liberlization in the presence of incompleteness of markets where there is both inter-spatial and intertemporal trade between countries. We use numerical simulation methods for insights and relate our discussion to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the WTO. We interpret the absence of intertemporal trade as an absence of intermediation services provided by both domestic and foreign service providers. For simplicity, we consider extreme cases where intertemporal intermediation services can only be provided by domestic providers, so that when intertemporal trade in services is not allowed, markets are not complete. To our knowledge, this type of models is not used in the trade literature as general comparative statics results are unavailable. We first consider the liberalization of trade in financial services in an inter-spatial and intertemporal model of two countries, and we show how services liberalization can be welfare worsening in the presence of a tariff on spatial trade in goods. We show that this can hold in an artificial world with no domestic financial services provider. We compare financial service trade autarky in which there is no intermediation to financial service trade liberalization which involves costless intertemporal intermediation provided by foreign service providers. We also consider a more complex (and realistic) world where costly intermediation services can be provided by both domestic and foreign providers. This paper draws in part on material of an earlier paper, “Financial Services Trade Liberalization in A Joint Spatial Intertemporal Multi-Country Model” by Huang et al. (2004). We acknowledge the financial support from The Centre for Intentional Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Canada and from National Social Science Foundation of China (SSFC Grant 07AJL002), National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC Grant 70825003) and “Humanities and Social Science” Major Project, Chinese Ministry of Education (Grant Number 07JJD790145).     

Stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners: does trade intensity matter?

We investigate the extent and manner of stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners and examine whether this is affected by trade intensity. Based on trade intensity, we classify Australia’s trading partners into major, medium and minor partners. We hypothesize that markets with greater (lower) trade intensity will be more (less) interdependent with Australia. We perform correlation (unconditional and conditional) analyses between Australia and its trading partners. Our results indicate that most of the markets that are highly correlated with Australia are its major trading partners. We conduct panel regression analysis to investigate whether trade intensity has any impact on the stock market correlations between Australia and its trading partners. The results show that trade intensity significantly and positively affect the correlations of Australia with its major trading partners. Thus, the results confirm our hypothesis that trade intensity drives stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners.     

Front-running dynamics

We integrate a monopolist dual trader into a dynamic model of speculation. In static settings, [J.-C. Rochet, J.-L. Vila, Insider trading without normality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 (1994), 131-152] establish an irrelevance result—expected equilibrium outcomes are the same whether the monopolist speculator sees liquidity trade or not; and Roell [Dual-capacity trading and market quality, J. Finan. Intermediation (1990), 105-124] shows that with multiple speculators, dual trading benefits liquidity traders. In dynamic settings, these results are reversed: a front-running speculator exploits knowledge of future liquidity trade, extracting greater profits by smoothing profit extraction intertemporally. Front running introduces positive serial correlation to order flow. Accordingly, market makers discount past order flow in prices, but prices retain the martingale property.     

Evaluating the Impact of the US–China Trade War

We evaluate the impact of the US–China trade war using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade. We conduct ex ante simulation analysis exploring three scenarios to understand how the trade war affects import tariffs, investment, and productivity. The escalation of the trade war reduces gross domestic product (GDP) in China and the USA by ?1.41% and ?1.35%, respectively. The trade war reduces nearly all sectoral imports and outputs in both countries. To reflect the important role of global value chains (GVCs), we modify the dynamic CGE model with agent‐specific import demands, and we explore the difference between the results for the two models relating to the trade war impacts on GDP and bilateral trade. When GVCs are accounted for, the negative impacts on bilateral trade are more widespread across countries, and world GDP in the modified model is reduced by ?$US450 billion. These results suggest that the GVCs play substantial role in determining trade responses at the disaggregated level.     

Trade networks and colonial trade spillovers

This paper provides new empirical evidence regarding the formation of international trade networks. Established trade relations may open the gate to new trade opportunities, as they allow meeting new trade partners over time. We test this prediction and its implications for aggregate trade patterns by using the experience of ancient trade linkages between former colonies and their former colonizers (colonial trade linkages). We first show, using aggregate trade data, that former colonies have more trade with former colonizer's neighbors (colonial trade spillovers). We then show that the past export and import experience of former colonies with the colonizer have an impact on the propensity to trade similar products with third countries. In particular, the trade spillover effect is negatively related to geographical distance between third countries and the colonizer, and positively affected by their degree of economic integration.     

The law of one price revisited: How do goods market frictions generate large and volatile price deviations?

This paper analyzes the role of goods market frictions in accounting for the large and volatile deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP) in a framework of flexible prices. We draw a distinction between the goods market frictions that are required to consume tradable goods (e.g., distribution costs) and those that are necessary for international transactions (e.g., trade costs). We find that trade costs generate LOP deviations by introducing a no-arbitrage band, while distribution costs cause the price to deviate from the LOP by affecting the probability that trade will occur, given the band. We then conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to show that real exchange rate volatility is positively associated with trade costs, but negatively related to distribution costs. This effect depends on the interplay of trade costs and distribution costs, as they work in opposite directions when creating arbitrage opportunities.