Stagflation is Back

Conventional oil supplies will remain tight in the years ahead.New discoveries will not suffice.World crude-oil production nearly tripled in 1960-73 (from 21 million barrels a day to 56 million), but has grown a mere 30% since then, to around 73 million barrels per day in 2006. In fact,Persian Gulf crude-oil production stopped growing entirely after 1974,     

Stagflation is Back

Three decades ago, in a bleak stretch of the 1970s, an economic phenomenon emerged that was as ugly as its name: stagflation. It was the sound of the     

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.     

Disney''''s loss is Eisner''''s gain

HowveryconvenientforMichaelEisner.Underthebannerofcorporatereform,Eisnerandhisal-liesonWaltDisney’sboardhaveeasedouthisharshestcriticsandboughttheembattledCEOmoretimetoleadalong-overdueturnaroundatthecompany.Twodirectors-RoyDisney,alifelongcompanyexecuti…     

Medicare--where is its future?

Canadian health care policy is in a period of transition. Continuing reform is necessary to ensure quality; to evaluate health outcomes; and to promote efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness of care.     

How Much is Too Much?

In a split sample design, we examine how the number of choice sets, design of the first choice set (context dependence), and the choice of attribute levels in the cost attribute affect the precision in the elicited preferences in otherwise completely identical choice experiment surveys. These issues are investigated for Swedish households’ marginal willingness to pay to reduce power outages. Our results indicate that neither the number of choice sets nor the design of the first choice set has a significant impact on estimated marginal willingness to pay, while the effect was significant for the additive scaling of the cost vector. At the end of the article we discuss the implications of our results on future developments and applications of choice experiments.      

When is there state independence?

Whether a preference relation can be represented using state-independent utilities as opposed to state-dependent utilities may depend on which acts count as constant acts. This observation underlies an extension of Savage's expected utility theory to the state-dependent case that was proposed in this journal by Edi Karni. His result contains a condition requiring the existence of a set of acts which can play the role of constant acts and support a representation involving a state-independent utility function. This paper contains necessary and sufficient conditions on the preference relation for such a set of acts to exist. Results are obtained both for the Savage and the Anscombe and Aumann frameworks. Among the corollaries are representation theorems for state-dependent utilities. Relationships to Karni's work and extensions of the results are discussed.     

Why is child labor illegal?

We present a theory of the emergence of laws restricting child labor or imposing mandatory education that is consistent with the fact that poor parents tend to oppose such laws. We find that if altruistic parents are unable to commit to educating their children, child-labor laws can increase the welfare of higher-income parents in an ex ante sense. On the basis of an empirical analysis of Latin-American household surveys, we demonstrate that per capita income in the country of residence has the predicted effect on child labor supply, even after controlling for other household characteristics.     

How remote is the offshoring threat?

Advances in communication technology make it possible for workers in India to supply business services to head offices located anywhere. This has the potential to put high-wage workers in direct competition with much lower paid Indian workers. Service trade, however, like goods trade, is subject to strong distance effects, implying that the remote supply of services remains limited. We investigate this proposition by deriving a gravity-like equation for service trade and estimating it for a large sample of countries and different categories of service trade. We find that distance costs are high but are declining over time. Our estimates suggest that delivery costs create a significant advantage for local workers relative to competing workers in distant countries.     

Why is TFP growth sectorally concentrated?

Research shows that total factor productivity (TFP) growth is weak in European countries. This is inter alia attributed to the fact that substantial TFP growth is limited to a few industries. Because TFP growth is typically understood as technological progress, it is concluded that technology diffusion between sectors in Europe is hampered. We use EU KLEMS data sets to decompose sectoral TFP for nine European countries by means of a Malmquist approach in order to identify potential sources besides technical progress. Applying Harberger diagrams, we describe the sectoral distribution of TFP growth, efficiency gains and losses, economies of scale and technological progress. The analysis reveals that technological progress is quite evenly distributed across sectors in most European countries. The wide scattering of TFP growth is explained by deviating efficiency developments and the unused economies of scale. We conclude that the technology transfer between sectors in most European countries seems to work. Therefore, Europe in general does not need a new technology policy, but a further integration of the markets and a reduction of national market entry barriers. This requires further unification of pan-European standards in fields like trade and crafts codes or consumer protection policies.     

When is FDI a capital flow?

In this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a net capital flow across countries. For this purpose, we investigate how multinational firms finance their foreign affiliates, globally or locally. We develop a contract theoretical model in which the financing structure is used to govern the incentives of managers. We find that the investment tends to be financed locally if managerial incentive problems are large. Thus, microeconomic governance problems may have macroeconomic implications for the net capital flow to host countries. Our results are consistent with survey data on German and Austrian investment flows of firms to Eastern Europe.