Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages*

In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low‐skilled, whereas the high‐skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high‐skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low‐skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self‐selection constraint, which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.     

Redistributive taxation as social insurance

The modern literature on nonlinear optimal taxation treats differences in income as being due to unobserved differences in ability. A striking result of this assumption is that high income agents should face a zero marginal tax rate. In this paper I assume that differences in observed income are due to exogenous differences in luck. Hence the optimal redistributive tax involves trading off the benefits due to ‘social insurance’ with the costs due to reduced incentives. I derive the optimal forms for linear and nonlinear taxes, and compute some algebraic and numeric examples. Typically high income individuals will face quite high marginal tax rates.     

EFFECTS OF TAXES AND BENEFITS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KOREA

This paper examines the redistributive effects of Korea's fiscal policies, including consumption taxes and in‐kind benefits. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2007, we find that taxes and transfers reduce income inequality in Korea by 13.8 percent. Contrary to the popular belief that direct taxes are the key tool for redistribution, in‐kind benefits, direct taxes, and social security contributions all decrease the Gini coefficient by 6.7, 4.7, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. The redistributive effect of consumption taxes is small and negative (?0.5 percentage point). Policy simulations indicate that education spending financed by the personal income tax has a positive redistributive effect and that the lower 70 percent of households enjoy positive net benefits. Spending targeting the poor has a strong redistributive effect, which implies low popularity because the majority of households face net losses.     

Interregional Migration of Human Capital and Unemployment Dynamics: Evidence from Italian Provinces

Since the mid‐1990s interregional migration flows in Italy have dramatically increased, especially from the South to the North. These flows are characterized by a strong component of human capital, involving a large number of workers with secondary and tertiary education. Using longitudinal data for the period 2002–2011 at NUTS‐3 territorial level, we document that long‐distance (i.e., South‐North) net migration of high‐skill workers has increased the unemployment at origin and decreased it at destination, thus deepening North–South unemployment disparities. On the other hand, long‐distance net migration of low‐skill workers has had the opposite effect, by lowering the unemployment at origin and raising it at destination. Further evidence also suggests that the diverging effect of high‐skill migration dominates the converging effect of low‐skill migration. Thus, concerns for an ‘internal brain drain’ from Southern regions look not groundless.     

Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules: Can Pigouvian tax redistribute income?

This paper studies pairwise majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who differ in privately observable skills and make consumption comparisons, which creates a negative positional externality. It shows that the tax schedule preferred by the median skill type will win the voting contest. Given a reference consumption defined as the average consumption in the population, all skills face the same Pigouvian tax rate in the utilitarian optimum, whereas in selfish optima high skills face a Pigouvian tax rate larger than that facing low skills, generating a novel income redistributive effect. Under a constant elasticity of labor supply, two more results are obtained. First, for Pareto, Champernowne, Weibull, and lognormal skill distributions, the selfishly optimal tax schedule facing high (low) skills tends to be more progressive when the bottom‐skill's (top‐skill's) status concern intensifies. Second, it identifies the conditions under which, in the voting equilibrium, high skills face higher marginal tax rates while low skills face lower ones than what they face in the utilitarian optimum.     

Skill distribution and income disparity in a North‐South trade model

Abstract. What are the impacts of free trade agreement on the welfare of different types of workers in a developed country? What is the impact of free trade on a developed country's income disparity? What is the effect of free trade on the skill distribution of a developed country? The objective of this paper is to address the above questions in a two‐sector general‐equilibrium North‐South trade model in which both countries produce one final good and one high‐tech intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high‐tech intermediate input and unskilled workers. Horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce the high‐tech intermediate input. Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers with differential potential ability. Workers in the North and South can acquire skills by investment in training or education. Thus, skill distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self‐selection process. I characterize two different types of equilibria: a closed‐economy equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium. Then, I investigate the impact of free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each country, income disparity, and social welfare. JEL classification: D63, F10, J31     

The demand for skills and labour costs in partner countries

We analyse the consequences of trade integration in Europe (1995–2005) detecting how the labour costs in partner countries affect the domestic demand for high‐ and low‐skilled labour in ‘Old’ (EU‐15) and five ‘New’ EU member states. In general, independently of the skill level of workers, the results suggest complementarity between domestic and foreign labour. However, when we take into account the typology of sectors, the demand for the high skilled in low skill intensive sectors in ‘New’ EU members is boosted by the increase of the average labour cost in ‘Old’ EU members. Thus in low skill intensive sectors, the high skilled in ‘New’ member countries can substitute for employment in EU‐15 countries.     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.     

农民工职业技能培训供求矛盾的成因分析

农民工培训是实现统筹城乡一体化发展、缩小收入差距的引擎。从企业和农民工两个微观视角,通过问卷调查,发现农民工职业培训意愿主要受年龄、人均收入、教育培训兴趣、教育培训效果、教育培训地点交通便利性、同乡受教育培训者比例、预期收益的获取等七个因素对农民工的教育培训决策有显著影响。通过不断扩大农村中高等职业教育的办学规模,实行指导企业培训、校企联合培训、＂订单培养＂等多种培训模式可在一定程度上缓解企业与工人的供需矛盾。     

Individual preferences for public education spending: Does personal income matter?

Standard redistributive arguments suggest that the impact of household income on preferences for public education spending should be negative, because wealthier families are likely to oppose the redistributive effect of public funding. However, the empirical evidence does not confirm this prediction. This paper addresses this ‘puzzle’ by focusing on the role of the inclusiveness of the education system and the allocation of public spending between tiers of education in shaping the impact of income on preferences. By using data from the International Social Survey Programme (2006), we show that, when access to higher levels of education is restricted (low inclusiveness) and when the share of public spending on tertiary education is high, the poor are less likely to support public education spending. This result suggests that reforming the education system towards greater inclusiveness might contribute to increase political backing for public investment in education from the relatively poor majority of the population.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

Persistent income gaps in an occupational choice model with multi‐goods

In this study, we propose a theory to explain why income gaps persist. We model a simple overlapping‐generations economy with three consumption goods and two types of workers. We find that high‐skilled workers have comparative advantage in skill‐intensive jobs and low‐skilled workers in less skill‐intensive jobs. This pattern of comparative advantage determines occupational choices by workers. Combined with human capital accumulation, the occupational choices widen income gaps between families. At the same time, the relative price of skill‐intensive goods declines owing to productivity improvement. The decline holds back income gaps from exploding. The implications of skill‐biased technological change are also examined.     

Career Paths,Unemployment, and the Efficiency of the Labor Market: Should Youth Employment Be Subsidized?

This paper studies the implications of learning‐by‐doing on youth unemployment and market efficiency when workers benefiting from this kind of training experience search (while on the job) for a higher skill job. Firms with low‐skill jobs suffer from a poaching behavior by firms with high‐skill jobs, causing a shortage of low‐skill jobs and excessive youth unemployment. An optimal policy, consisting of taxing the output of high‐skill jobs and subsidizing the output of low‐skill jobs, restores market efficiency and reduces youth unemployment.     

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN URBAN CHINA BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM—AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME

This study investigates the redistributive effect of social security reform in urban China using the nationally representative urban household surveys of 1995 and 2002. The main findings are as follows. First, public pension is the main income for the elderly in urban China. The majority of people aged 60 and over (72% in 1995 and 82% in 2002) receive a pension. Second, the social security system in urban China has increased the income of low‐income and older age groups and reduced the relative poverty rate. However, the redistributive effect did not offset the expanding income inequality, which resulted in the Gini coefficient of redistributed income in 2002 being higher than that in 1995. Third, during 1995 and 2002, both low‐income and high‐income groups received a positive net benefit from the social security system, but the net benefit increased with income. The Chinese social security system lacks progressivity in contribution, and does not favor the poor in terms of benefits. Fourth, assuming that the reformed policy was applied to public sector employees, the long‐term redistributive effect of the pension system for the working population, calculated using their lifetime income, is larger. (JEL D31, H55, I38)     

Leaving state sector employment in Russia

I analyse the reallocation of labour and human capital from the state sector to the non‐state sector and non‐employment in Russia. I use a nationally representative household dataset, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, to study sectoral mobility in early transition using summary measures of mobility and multivariate discrete choice models. The results show that sectoral mobility varies between different skill groups, and in particular that those with university education, with supervisory responsibility and in white‐collar occupations are less likely to leave state jobs for both non‐state employment and non‐employment. The results suggest that in the early stages of transition in Russia mismatch of skills across state/non‐state employment was significant and that non‐state employment consisted mostly of low skill, ‘bad’ jobs.     

A Barrier to the Diffusion of Tacit Knowledge

The paper examines the impact of skill transfer on economic growth. Even if there are the benefits of backwardness and the ability to absorb them, the South may not exploit them, because the skilled workers in the North are not willing to come to the South owing to their high opportunity cost. It is shown that if the South's relative income is low, the South cannot offer high wages to attract skilled workers from the North, and stays in the low rank. But if its relative income is high enough, exploiting the benefits of backwardness, it attains high growth and converges to a relatively higher position. This prediction is consistent with the evidence that the world distribution of relative income has two peaks. The study also shows that an increase in human capital in the North increases the minimum requirement for human capital in the South to soar.     

Optimal Redistribution with Endogenous Social Norms

In this paper, we examine the effect of social norms on redistributive policies, where social norms are reflected in the degree of work participation among the different skill classes. Participation is driven both by the material incentives and heterogeneous preferences for leisure of each skill class, and by an endogenous social norm. Results for optimal redistributive taxation show that when the social norm enters as a benefit or cost for participants, participation taxes are generally lower than in its absence. Multiple participation equilibria can occur, and an engineered shift from a low‐ to a high‐participation equilibrium can be Pareto‐improving in the long run.     

Capital–Skill Complementarity and Inequality in Sweden

Income inequality increased in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s, as did the returns to higher education. The main conclusion of this study is that increased income inequality between high‐ and low‐skilled workers is demand driven and is due to the presence of capital–skill complementarity in production. Increased investments in new, more efficient capital equipment, along with a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, have raised the ratio of effective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capital–skill complementarity mechanism.     

我国农村弱势群体非农就业的现状、问题与对策——以湖南省16个贫困县(市)为例

农村弱势群体是指在农村社会生活中,由于各种内在或外在原因造成经济水平低下,竞争处于弱势地位的农村居民的集合体。在我国目前农村中还占有较大的比例。农村弱势群体弱势的形成,与其自身的文化素质有关,更与他们接受职业教育特别是非农职业教育状况密切相关。调查结果表明,由于他们的基础文化素质差,非农职业教育水平低,导致了其非农就业水平和个人收入低以及家庭生活贫困。只有通过大力宣传非农职业培训、构建科学的培训信息系统、提高培训质量和完善培训保障体系等措施,才有可能让更多的农村弱势群体接受非农职业培训,实现非农就业,尽快脱贫致富。     

Skills,Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

The scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.