Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer

If, for all prices, income distribution is optimal for a planner with a social welfare function, then aggregate demand is the same as that of a single “representative consumer” whose preferences over aggregate consumption are the same as the planner's. This paper shows that the converse is false. Aggregate demand may be the demand function of a representative consumer although the income distribution is not optimal for any social welfare function. The representative consumer may be Pareto inconsistent, preferring situation A to B when all the actual consumers prefer B to A. We give conditions under which existence of a representative consumer implies that the income distribution satisfies first order conditions for optimality. Satisfying the first order optimality conditions for an additively separable social welfare function is essentially equivalent to aggregate demand for every pair of consumers having a symmetric Slutsky matrix.     

Low-income consumers and payment choice

Low-income consumers are not only constrained with spending, but also with the type and variety of payment methods available to them. Using a representative sample of the U.S. adult population, this short article analyzes the low possession (adoption) of credit and debit cards among low-income consumers who are also unbanked. Using a random utility model, I simulate the potential consumer welfare gains associated with policy options suggested in the literature to provide unsubsidized or subsidized debit cards, or subsidized prepaid cards to this consumer population. Simulation results show the relative improvement in consumer welfare among all three policy options.     

Bundling, product choice, and efficiency: Should cable television networks be offered à la carte?

We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling’s impact on a monopolist’s pricing and product choices and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television markets. Existing theory is ambiguous: for a given set of products, bundling likely transfers surplus from consumers to firms but also encourages products to be offered that might not be under à la carte pricing. Simulation of “Full À La Carte” for an economic environment calibrated to an average cable television system suggests that consumers would likely benefit from à la carte sales. If all networks continued to be offered, the average household’s surplus is predicted to increase by $6.80 (65.6%) under à la carte sales (despite a total bundle price that almost doubles) and reduced network profits would have to be such that 41 of 50 offered cable networks have to exit the market to make her indifferent. Simulation of a “Theme Tier” scenario provides intermediate benefits. The incremental marginal costs to cable systems of à la carte sales and its impact in the advertising market and on competition are important factors in determining consumer benefits.     

‘Just one of us’: consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets

Consumer cooperatives represent a highly successful example of democratic form of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually medium to large-scale companies competing with the profit-maximizing firms in the retail sector. This paper describes this situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer cooperatives maximize the utility of consumer-members and, in return, refund them with a share of the profits corresponding to the ratio of their individual spending to the cooperative’s total sales. We show that when consumers possess quasi-linear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically differentiated goods, and companies operate using a linear technology, the presence of consumer cooperatives positively affects total industry output, as well as welfare. The effect of cooperatives on welfare proves to be even more significant when goods are either complements or highly differentiated, and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.     

Advertising,learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: an empirical examination*

This article empirically analyzes different effects of advertising in a nondurable, experience good market. A dynamic learning model of consumer behavior is presented in which I allow both “informative” effects of advertising and “prestige” or “image” effects of advertising. This learning model is estimated using consumer level panel data tracking grocery purchases and advertising exposures over time. Empirical results suggest that in this market, advertising's primary effect was that of informing consumers. The estimates are used to quantify the value of this information to consumers and evaluate the welfare implications of an alternative advertising regulatory regime.     

动物福利认知与居民食品安全

农场动物福利不仅是伦理问题,还关乎食品安全。文章将农场动物福利纳入食品安全议题之内,考察了消费者的农场动物福利认知对其支付意愿及政策诉求的影响。研究表明,尽管当前我国消费者对农场动物福利认知还不充分,但仍有81.42%的消费者对农场动物福利存在一定的支付意愿,平均支付溢价达19.24%,消费者关于农场动物福利的认知对其农场动物福利支付意愿及政策诉求存在显著影响。这一结论表明,我国已存在通过市场激励手段或是政府规制手段改善农场动物福利,进而提升居民食品安全的基础条件。     

Why are credit card rates sticky?

Summary This paper investigates credit card rate stickiness using a screening model of consumer credit markets. In recent years, while the cost of funds has fallen, credit card rates have remained stubbornly high, spurring legislators to consider imposing interest rate ceilings on credit card rates. The model incorporates asymmetric information between consumers and banks, regarding consumers' future incomes. The unique equilibrium is one of two types: separating (in which low-risk consumers select a collateralized loan and high-risk consumers select a credit card loan), or pooling (in which both types of consumers choose credit card loans). I show that a change in the banks' cost of funds can have an ambiguous effect on the credit card rate, so that the credit card rate need not fall when the cost of funds does. Usury ceilings on credit card rates are detrimental to consumer welfare, so would be counter to their legislative intent.I thank George Mailath, Paul Calem, Gerhard Clemenz, Sally Davies, George Kanatas, Leonard Nakamura, Tony Santomero, Tony Saunders, participants in the 1990 Financial Management Association Meetings, and co-editor Michael Woodford for helpful comments.The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

Should Mobile Marketers Collect Data Other Than Geo‐Location?*

We take today's mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third‐degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo‐location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality. We show that, depending on consumer heterogeneity, higher‐quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns. In equilibrium, both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality, while only one acquires data if the data quality is low. Firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and/or when data are precise. Although social welfare (weakly) improves, consumers can be harmed.     

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.     

Is there an economic system based on sovereignty of each consumer?

Conclusion One could add to these examples and show that systems based on consumer sovereignty can range from some historical realizations oflaissez-faire all the way to certain conceivable forms of (Lange) socialism. In every case an analysis of the individual incentive systems that fuel and of the welfare rationale that shapes the economic and political structures would be required before actual systems could be classified in a welfare relevant sense.Pareto optimality and actual or planner-simulated perfect competition certainly cannot be mandatory if systems based on consumer sovereignty are to exist. Freedom of consumers as a group regarding their choice of political and economic constitution and freedom of action for each individual who is protected by the Pareto criterion within some statistical confidence interval under each constitution suffice for consumer sovereignty. As long as the government remains demonstrably representative of the qualified majority in constitutional questions and respectful of all voters in its parliamentary processes, the consumer-predilected scope of government activities may differ from case to case, but the welfare basis is the same.In a second-best world, consumers and their representatives may even choose to delegate many or most allocative decisions to the executive branch of government, if they see no superior and feasible alternative. Extreme caution is justified if it is feared that such voluntary delegation of powers may prove irreversible; yet systems based on consumer sovereignty can take varying forms. In general, ideological labels, or terms based on characteristic details, institutional parameters, or formal organization are therefore insufficient for systems classification on the welfare basis which may well be regarded as the single most important respect in which economic systems can differ.     

Regulating misinformation

Governments have responded to misleading advertising by banning it, engaging in counter-advertising and taxing and regulating the product. In this paper, we consider the welfare effects of those different responses to misinformation. While misinformation lowers consumer surplus, its effect on social welfare is ambiguous. Misleading advertising leads to over-consumption but that may be offsetting the underconsumption associated with oligopoly outputs. If all advertising is misinformation then a tax or quantity restriction on advertising maximizes welfare, and other policy interventions are inferior. If firms undertake quality improving investments that are complementary to misinformation, then combining taxes or bans on misleading advertising with other policies can increase welfare.     

Consumer misperception of eco-labels,green market structure and welfare

Eco-labels are essential for informing consumers about products’ environmental characteristics. However, the many different labels consumers encounter can be confusing, which makes assessing environmental quality associated with each label difficult. How does consumer misperception of competing eco-labels affect market structure and welfare? This article provides theoretical insight into this issue by using a double-differentiation model in which three products compete: an unlabeled product and two distinctly eco-labeled products, one with a medium and one with a high level of environmental quality. The study investigates the effects of consumers’ imperfect information when they perceive all eco-labels as a sign of the same high environmental quality and consider each label as a unique product. This misperception can weaken the firm that provides the greenest product, though paradoxically this situation is not always detrimental to social welfare. However, depending on the certifying organizations, consumer misperception can induce firms to use a greenwashing strategy and encourage nongovernmental organizations and regulators to introduce less stringent standards.     

Counterfeiting, enforcement and social welfare

This paper uses a vertical product differentiation model to discuss the influences caused by counterfeiting on prices and outputs of original products, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also explore the impact of the government??s enforcement on counterfeiting and social welfare. We find that as counterfeiting may occur, sales of the original product could either increase or decrease. The welfare effects of government enforcement are shown as follows. First, a strict enforcement on counterfeiting by government may either increase or decrease welfare. Second, when counterfeiting emerges, welfare under a stricter enforcement is not necessarily larger than that without enforcement. Last, a strict enough enforcement can still improve welfare even if there is a relatively high enforcement cost.     

Consumer well-being in a future of accelerating novelty

Novel goods and ideas are introduced to today’s consumers with increasing frequency. This phenomenon is perhaps most notable in the apparel industry, which in recent decades has seen the rise of “fast fashion” and an accelerating rate of novel style introductions from semi-annual to semi-weekly. In this paper I study the potential for this type of accelerating novelty to have a negative impact on consumer well-being. I analyze a simple theoretical model of consumer behavior in which consumers with a preference for novelty decide how fast to replace their fashion goods before and after an innovation which accelerates the rate at which new goods become available. In the basic model, where consumers update their goods based on their intrinsic preference for novelty, the novelty-accelerating innovation is not welfare-decreasing. However, when the model is extended in realistic ways, I find that there are at least three conditions under which the innovation may decrease welfare by increasing the extent of sub-optimal replacement: if there are external costs of updating to a newer good; if the consumers are boundedly rational and exhibit present bias; or if consumers’ replacement decisions reflect an arms race for social status. My results in these model extensions provide an economic foundation for rising popular concern about undesirable social effects of “fast fashion.” I also discuss the implications of these results for future patterns of consumption, which are likely to reflect still more accelerated novelty and possibly the expansion of fashion behavior to a broader range of consumption settings.     

WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY

The recent globalization of world economies has led the retail markets of developed countries towards increasing levels of integration and strategic interdependence. A non negligible share of retail and food markets is currently served by co‐operative societies. Consistently with this trend, the consumer cooperatives have recently experienced increasing levels of integration. The main aim of this paper is to study the welfare effects of coordination among consumer cooperatives competing in quantities in a mixed oligopoly against profit‐maximizing firms. We show that, in absence of agency problems, under increasing or constant returns to scale a higher output coordination of the consumer cooperatives does not affect the total welfare as long as a nonnegative profit constraint holds in these firms. On the other hand, under decreasing returns to scale, the consumer cooperatives contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers. This is because, by coordinating consumers’ preferences, these firms can reduce their market output, thus helping the market to come closer to the first best. All together these results seem to provide an argument in favour of the recent process of integration involving consumer cooperatives in many developed countries.     

Consumers' Surplus As an Exact and Superlative Cardinal Welfare Indicator

This article shows that the Bennet-Bowley consumer surplus measure is an exact measure of Allais' disposable surplus if the consumer's utility function is of the translation-homothetic generalized quadratic form. The Bennet-Bowley consumer surplus measure, therefore, is a superlative cardinal welfare measure for the entire class of translation homothetic preferences. Because the exactness results in this article apply for cardinal welfare measures, they can be meaningfully aggregated across consumers to make aggregate welfare comparisons.     

THE IMPACT OF LARGE CONTAINER BEER PURCHASES ON ALCOHOL‐RELATED FATAL VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

Using a fixed effect weighted least square model, we examine how changes in the share of beer purchases from large containers (>12 oz.) impact alcohol‐related fatal accidents. We find that, after holding beer purchases and overall alcohol‐consumption constant, an increase in total beer purchases from containers greater than the standard size of 12 oz. increases alcohol‐related fatal accidents. We confirm our results persist across several investigations of robustness, as well as the use of instrument variables methods. Outcomes suggest that policy makers should consider differential excise taxes for the purchase of larger than standard size beer containers. Such a policy would likely reduce the number of alcohol‐related fatal vehicle crashes and help to internalize the negative externalities associated with drunk driving. At the very minimum, these results suggest that individuals prone to dangerous levels of drunk driving are the consumers that most prefer large container size consumption. This is consistent with the idea that binge drinkers and beer drinkers are much more likely to drive while legally intoxicated. (JEL I18, K4)     

Quantity,quality and the welfare effects of US airline deregulation

In this paper we employ a method for estimationg quality-adjusted demand to calculate measures of the change in consumer suruplus due to US airline deregulation. The quality-adjusted estimates of the price elasticity of demand indicate that consumers are from 25% to 50% more sensitive to changes in air fares than unadjusted estimates would suggest. Changes in unadjusted consumer surplus overstate the net welfare gains from deregulation by roughly a factor of two, strongly suggesting that adjustments for quallity of service are essential to welfare analysis of regulatory changes in this industry     

从爱国消费到习惯形成:平台经济背景下电商中介效应对国货销售的影响研究

随着华为Mate60 Pro的回归,国内消费者对国货的热情再度被激发。与此同时,近年来各大电商平台上的国货销售量快速增长。国潮活动、网店预售和直播销售成为消费者购买国货的重要方式。然而,如何利用平台经济和电商的力量将消费热情转化为消费习惯,并促使消费者形成常态化的购买意愿,是亟需深入研究和探讨的课题。本研究采用扎根理论和偏最小二乘定量分析方法,验证了电商平台在促进国货消费习惯形成中的中介作用。研究认为,电商平台在开展国货销售活动时应更加注重以中国文化为基础,重点满足消费者对精神追求的需求。这一研究为未来的实践奠定了理论基础,同时也填补了相关研究的不足和空白。