Optimal reinsurance and dividend for a diffusion model with capital injection: Variance premium principle

This paper considers the optimal dividend problem with proportional reinsurance and capital injection for a large insurance portfolio. In particular, the reinsurance premium is assumed to be calculated via the variance principle instead of the expected value principle. Our objective is to maximize the expectation of the discounted dividend payments minus the discounted costs of capital injection. This optimization problem is studied in four cases depending on whether capital injection is allowed and whether there exist restrictions on dividend policies. In all cases, closed-form expressions for the value function and optimal dividend and reinsurance policies are obtained. From the results, we see that the optimal dividend distribution policy is of threshold type with a constant barrier, and that the optimal ceded proportion of risk exponentially decreases with the initial surplus and remains constant when the initial surplus exceeds the dividend barrier. Furthermore, we show that the optimization problem without capital injection is the limiting case of the one with capital injection when the proportional transaction cost goes to infinity.     

The changing role of dividends: a firm-level study from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century

Abstract .  We investigate the changes in dividend policy for one of North America's oldest banks (and Canada's first bank), Bank of Montreal, over time by considering the relationships between dividends, prices and earnings for this prominent firm. In the early part of the sample we find that annual dividend and earnings changes are highly variable, with dividend changes following changes in earnings and a larger portion of investors' returns coming from dividends. Since World War II dividend policy has been characterized by more stable and gradual increases in dividends, with more of investors' returns coming from capital gains. Overall, our results suggest that investors' perception of dividends has changed over time, allowing management to pay smaller dividends and reinvest funds in the firm.     

Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation

We study the structure of optimal wedges and capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrlees economy with endogenous distribution of skills. Human capital is a private, stochastic state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we construct a tractable life-cycle model of human capital evolution with risky investment and stochastic depreciation. In this setting, we demonstrate the optimality of (a) a human capital premium, i.e., an excess return on human capital relative to physical capital, (b) a large intertemporal wedge early in the life-cycle, and (c) a non-zero intratemporal wedge even at the top of the skill distribution at all dates except the last date in the life-cycle. The main implication for the structure of optimal linear capital taxes is the necessity of deferred taxation of physical capital. The average marginal tax rate on physical capital held in every period is zero in present value. However, expected capital tax payments do not equal zero in every period. Necessarily, agents face negative expected capital tax payments early in the life-cycle and positive expected capital tax payments late in the life-cycle.     

Voluntary zero-dividend paying firms: characteristics and performance

We investigate the characteristics of ‘voluntary zero dividend paying’ firms and their subsequent performance. We define NDR_HP (no dividends or repurchases, with high profitability) firms as those with profits above the industry median and yet pay out zero dividends (including share repurchases). Signalling, agency, residual dividend, and life cycle theories explain firm characteristics and dividend payouts, to which we add the novel variables CEO overconfidence and market competition. We discover that growth opportunity, capital expenditure, and CEO overconfidence are positively related to NDR_HP. In addition, we find that the NDR_HP group outperforms all other groups in terms of future performance.     

Dividend Taxes and Income Shifting

In this paper, we analyze whether a dividend tax cut for owner‐managers of closely held corporations encourages income shifting, income generation, or both. We use rich Swedish administrative micro data from 2000 to 2011 comprising detailed firm‐ and individual‐level information. We find robust evidence of extensive income shifting across tax bases in response to the 2006 Swedish dividend tax cut. Owner‐managers of closely held corporations reclassify earned income as dividend income but do not increase total income. The response is more pronounced for owner‐managers with tax incentives and with easier access to income shifting through a high ownership share.     

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firm's managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.     

Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany

A new explanation of why dividends may be informative is put forward in this paper. We find evidence that dividends signal the severity of the conflict between the large, controlling owner and small, outside shareholders. Accordingly, dividend change announcements provide new information about this conflict. To test the rent extraction hypothesis and discriminate it from the cash flow signaling explanation, we utilize information on the ownership and control structure of the firm. We analyze 736 dividend change announcements in Germany over the period 1992-1998 and find significantly larger negative wealth effects in the order of two percentage points for companies where the ownership and control structure makes the expropriation of minority shareholders more likely than for other firms. The rent extraction hypothesis also has implications for the levels of dividends paid. We find larger holdings of the largest owner to reduce, while larger holdings of the second largest shareholder to increase the dividend pay-out ratio. Deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule due to pyramidal and cross-ownership structures are also associated with larger negative wealth effects and lower pay-out ratios. Finally, using Lintner's (American Economic Review 46 (2) (1956) 97-113) model of dividend determination we find corroborating results. The presence of a second largest shareholder with a considerable equity stake makes a crucial difference in the governance of the firm. Our results call for better minority shareholder rights protection and increased transparency in the course of European Capital Market Reform.     

Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications

An entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project. An agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers. We first study the optimal contract in discrete time. This contract can be implemented by cash reserves, debt, and equity. The latter is split between the financiers and the entrepreneur and pays dividends when retained earnings reach a threshold. To provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur, the firm is downsized when it runs short of cash. We then study the continuous-time limit of the model. We prove the convergence of the discrete-time value functions and optimal contracts. Our analysis yields rich implications for the dynamics of security prices. Stock prices follow a diffusion reflected at the dividend barrier and absorbed at 0. Their volatility, as well as the leverage ratio of the firm, increase after bad performance. Stock prices and book-to-market ratios are in a non-monotonic relationship. A more severe agency problem entails lower price-earning ratios and firm liquidity and higher default risk.     

Optimal risk and dividend control problem with fixed costs and salvage value: Variance premium principle

In this paper we study the combined optimal dividend, capital injection and reinsurance problems in a dynamic setting. The reinsurance premium is assumed to be calculated via the variance principle instead of the expected value principle. The proportional and fixed transaction costs and the salvage value at bankruptcy are included in the model. In both cases of unrestricted dividend rate and restricted dividend rate, we obtain the closed-form solutions of the value function and the optimal joint strategies, which depend on the transaction costs and the profitability in future.     

Balance of payments accounting and exchange rate dynamics

The balance of payments is an accounting identity. Many wonder how the current and capital accounts, which add up to zero, can influence exchange rates. This paper shows how payment flows arising from balance of payments imbalances affect the demands for different currencies in the foreign exchange market over time. Based on a dynamical system approach, the paper demonstrates how international payments evolve depending on the joint dynamic behaviour of different balance of payments components. It finds that international payments and exchange rates interact in fundamentally different ways depending on whether a country restricts its capital inflows and outflows, whether capital flows are accommodating or autonomous and whether the exchange rate is fixed, flexible or, say, governed by a crawling peg. Empirical evidence from major industrial countries as well as from countries hit by currency crises support the paper's theoretical predictions.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Firms’ human capital, R&D and innovation: a study on French firms

This article investigates the effects of human capital and technological capital on innovation. While the role of technological capital as measured by research and development (R&D) expenditure has been intensively investigated, few studies have been made on the effect of employee training on innovation. This article explores the relationship between innovation and firm employee training. Our methodological approach contributes to the literature in three ways. We propose various indicators of firm employee training. We build a count data panel with a long time-data series to deal with the issue of firms?? heterogeneity. We propose a dynamic analysis. Using dynamic count data models on French industrial firms over the period 1986?C1992, we find positive and significant effects of R&D intensity and training on patenting activity. Whatever the indicators of training our results show that the firm employee training has a positive impact on technological innovation.     

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

A model of the socialist firm in transition to a market economy

This paper models the dynamic adjustment path of a socialist firm in transition to a market economy by a price shock that renders old capital obsolete. The firm can adjust with investment in more productive capital equipments. The optimal time paths of investment, output, and employment are analyzed and the impact of fiscal incentives like investment subsidies and a reduced corporate income tax rate are studied. Like output, the aggregate capital stock follows a J-curve. The conditions for viability of firms and the impact of variables such as wage increases on the value of the firm are discussed.     

媒体关注与公司现金股利支付*

随着中国证监会针对上市公司现金股利支付行为的一系列政策的出台,公司的现金股利支付行为成为广受热议的重点话题。本文从媒体关注视角研究了中国上市公司的现金股利支付行为。通过实证研究,本文得到如下研究结论：（1）媒体关注的增多可以显著提高公司未来股利支付意愿和支付水平;（2）媒体关注与“铁公鸡”公司、“微股利”公司的比例显著负相关;（3）与国有控股公司相比,媒体关注对民营控股公司未来股利支付意愿和支付水平的正面影响更为显著;（4）媒体关注对第一类和第二类代理问题更严重的公司的现金股利支付意愿和支付水平的正向影响更强。进一步的研究还显示,媒体关注与现金股利支付意愿和支付水平的正相关关系在管理层持股比例低、非国际四大会计师事务所审计、分析师跟踪少的公司样本中更显著。以上结论说明媒体关注是除行政治理外,另外一种督促上市公司支付现金股利的重要机制。本文除了具有丰富媒体治理和股利政策两方面理论研究的贡献外,对监管机构规范资本市场股利支付行为和保护投资者权益具有重要政策启示。     

Optimal gradual liquidation of equity from a risky asset

We consider a problem of optimal gradual liquidation of equity from a risky asset for continuous time stochastic market model. The owner of the risky asset uses this equity as a source of steady cash flow by borrowing money permanently against this equity. At the terminal time, there is no equity for him in this asset, and the bank gains ownership of this asset. Optimal strategy is obtained explicitly.     

Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived.     

Liquidity default,liquidity management and smooth dividends policy

Our article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework. By conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm’s optimal investment, financing and dividend policies, our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk. We find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm’s behaviours, including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure. A firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious: it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low, but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough. The dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the ‘smooth dividends policy puzzle’ commonly reported in empirical research.     

Climate Policy with Tied Hands: Optimal Resource Taxation Under Implementation Lags

In this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime. At each time, the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non-compliance with the pollution limit, and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions. We derive two main results. First, we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases, while both emissions and the level of non-compliance decrease. Second, we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm’s capital investment is socially desirable. We numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount, which crucially depends on the severity of the fine. In the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine, the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied, since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment.     

Dividend taxation and intertemporal tax arbitrage

We analyze the effects of changes in dividend tax policy using a life-cycle model of the firm, in which new firms first access equity markets, then grow internally, and finally pay dividends when they have reached steady state. We find that unanticipated permanent changes in tax rates have only small effects on aggregate investment, since macroeconomic dynamics are dominated by mature firms for which dividend taxation is not distortionary. Anticipated or temporary dividend tax changes, on the other hand, create incentives for firms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage so as to reduce investors' tax burden. For example, a temporary tax cut – the type most likely to be enacted by policymakers – induces firms to accelerate dividend payments while tax rates are low, which reduces their cash holdings and makes them capital-constrained when large investment opportunities arise. This can significantly lower aggregate investment for periods after the tax cut.