Democracy in the neighborhood and foreign direct investment

The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been extensively studied. Even though there is extensive research in the area, most of it is based on analyzing the effects of host country characteristics on FDI flows, and yet there is little research on how neighboring country characteristics play a role in facilitating FDI flows to host countries. This paper analyzes the association between the democracy level in neighboring countries and FDI flows to host countries. Using bilateral FDI flows from the OECD countries, with a large host country sample, we find that countries surrounded by democratic countries attract higher FDI flows. Furthermore, we find evidence that countries that are surrounded by neighboring countries with good institutions tend themselves to have better institutions, experience lower civil conflict, and have higher political stability and hence indirectly attract higher FDI flows. Our findings suggest that if neighboring countries act in such way as to become more democratic, FDI flows to these countries would be higher since not only does improving the quality of democracy attract more FDI inflows, but also being surrounded by neighboring advanced democratic countries will also lead to higher FDI flows to them.     

Unbundling institutional determinants of multinational investments

Previous studies often examined how a broad-based institution affects foreign direct investment (FDI) flows across countries. However, analysis of differential impacts of two or more constituent institutions within a broad-based institution appears to be more useful for policy decision-making. There is a paucity of studies on how constituent institutions within a broad measure of institution affect FDI across countries. Our article constitutes the first attempt in bridging this gap. In this article, we examine the relative effects of property rights institution (PI) and contracting institution (CI) on investment flows. Our results show that PI is much more important than CI in determining the cross-border flows of FDI and affiliate sales. Moreover, PI is found to be more important for FDI than for affiliate sales, indicating that final goods are less of a concern for being expropriated by governments and powerful elites than capital goods. Through unbundling a broad-based institution and examining how the constituent institutions affect investments flows, our article provides practical location decisions for investments in FDI, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and affiliate sales.     

International migration,foreign direct investment,and development stage in developing economies

The existing empirical results on the relationship between FDI and migration are rather mixed. This study reevaluates, both theoretically and empirically, how inward FDI relates to emigration in developing countries. Our model illustrates that the relationship between inward FDI and emigration flows depends on the development stage of a developing country, that is, there is a positive association between inward FDI and emigration flows for relatively less‐developed countries but a negative association between these two variables for relatively developed countries. We confirm the empirical validity of our model prediction using the panel data of 21 OECD and 51 non‐OECD countries during the period from 2003 to 2012. Our results argue that as economic development proceeds in a developing country, the home effect of inward FDI associated with intensified labor demand would dominate the linkage effect that induces the brain drain problem through enhancing the socioeconomic ties with migrant networks.     

Determinants of Chinese direct investments in the European Union

This article analyses the determinants of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) activities in the European Union (EU). Evidence is based on panel Poisson models drawing on two investment monitors at the individual project level. Greenfield investments (GI) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are distinguished. The findings indicate that market size and bilateral trade are the main factors for Chinese investment in the EU. In contrast, business-friendly institutions do not foster FDI. Probably, Chinese investors are risk averse, and prefer regions with less competitive markets. The striking difference between GIs and M&As is related to unit labour costs. Higher costs make the host country less attractive for the establishment of new firms, but do not affect the involvement in existing firms. The sectoral dispersion of Chinese FDI in the EU did not change much since the global financial crisis. Most relevant shifts have occurred in research and development (R&D), where low-income EU countries have become increasingly attractive.     

Labor Training and Foreign Direct Investment

Evidence shows that most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developed to developed countries (North–North) in skilled labor‐intensive industries. This paper builds a model that incorporates labor training into the proximity–concentration tradeoffs to analyze the entry mode of multinationals to a foreign country. Production requires both skilled labor and unskilled labor.. A multinational pursuing FDI needs to provide training to some workers in the host country to equip them with skills that are specific to the production of the firm. Labor training and skill specificity lead to contract friction. It is shown that in skilled labor‐intensive industries, FDI increases along with the economic development level of the host country, whereas in unskilled labor‐intensive industries, the reverse is true. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings on the prevalence of North–North FDI in skilled labor‐industries and North–South FDI in unskilled labor‐intensive industries.     

Determinants of foreign direct investment

Empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity show substantial differences in specifications with little agreement on the set of included covariates. We use Bayesian statistical techniques that allow one to select from a large set of candidates those variables most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. The variables with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. There is little support for multilateral trade openness, most host‐country business costs, host‐country infrastructure and host‐country institutions. Our results suggest that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not robust.     

Institutional Efficiency,Monitoring Costs and the Investment Share of FDI*

This paper models and tests the implications of institutional efficiency on the pattern of FDI. We posit that domestic agents have a comparative advantage over foreign agents in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions. Under these circumstances, FDI is more sensitive to increases in enforcement costs. We then test this prediction, comparing institutional efficiency levels for a large cross‐section of countries in 1989 to subsequent FDI flows through the period of 1990–99, finding that institutional efficiency is positively associated with the ratio of subsequent foreign direct investment flows to both gross fixed capital formation and to private investment.     

Corporate transparency, cream-skimming and FDI

We develop a simple information-based model of Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. On the one hand, the relative abundance of “intangible” capital in specialized industries in the source countries, which presumably generates expertise in screening investment projects in the host countries, enhances FDI flows. On the other hand, host-country relative corporate-transparency diminishes the value of this expertise, thereby reducing the flow of FDI. The model also demonstrates that the gains for the host country from FDI [over foreign portfolio investment (FPI)] are reflected in a more efficient size of the stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. These gains are shown to depend crucially (and positively) on the degree of competition among FDI investors. We provide also some evidence on the effects of corporate transparency indicators, such as accounting standards, on bilateral FDI flows from a panel of 24 OECD countries over the period of 1981-1998.     

新兴经济体FDI流入的决定因素及中国的应对策略

吸引FDI流入是新兴经济体促进经济发展的重要手段,但FDI活动深受东道国区位因素的广泛影响。利用1995-2009年的面板数据,对新兴经济体吸引FDI流入的决定因素进行实证分析,结果表明:FDI与东道国聚集效应、市场规模、基础设施、资源禀赋、经济开放度显著正相关,但与东道国人力资本和政治风险负相关。因此,中国应该强化FDI的区域聚集效应、行业聚集效应和特定投资来源地聚集效应,保持经济稳定、持续的增长,加大对落后地区的基础设施建设的投入,构建全方位的对外开放体系和引资战略,实现经济持续快速发展。     

Gradualism In Tax Treaties With Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment*

Bilateral tax treaties govern host country taxation for most of the world's foreign direct investment (FDI). To explain why the tax rates used under these treaties are gradually falling we consider two‐way capital flows with irreversible FDI. The extent of irreversibility determines the magnitude of initial tax reductions. When Pareto‐optimal taxes are not initially self‐enforcing, more modest tax reductions generate an increase in irreversible bilateral FDI so that further tax reductions become self‐enforcing. Depending on the extent of irreversibility and asymmetry, Pareto‐optimal tax rates may be obtainable in the long run.     

THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS ON AUSTRALIA'S INWARD FDI FLOWS

International trade and investment agreements are one of the primary instruments of global financial liberalisation. They are enacted to enhance the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) between signatories by reducing regulatory barriers to investment; promoting stable host investment environments; and guaranteeing investors against non‐commercial risk. As a net capital importer, Australia has sought to attract FDI through participation in such accords since the early 1980s. This paper examines the determinants of Australia's inward FDI flows—focussing specifically on the effects of trade and investment agreements. Using panel data, we find that both bilateral trade and bilateral and multilateral investment agreements attract FDI flows into Australia, thereby indicating that the policy of enticing FDI through participation in these accords is quite possibly effective.     

Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth

This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich to poor nations in the context of a two-country model, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across nations.     

Taxes,institutions and foreign diversification opportunities

Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The worldwide tax regime employed by the US potentially distorts this choice by penalizing FDI, relative to FPI, in low-tax countries. On the other hand, weak investor protections in foreign countries may increase the value of control, creating an incentive to use FDI rather than FPI. By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflects these incentives to bypass home and host country institutional regimes. The results suggest that the residual tax on US multinational firms' foreign earnings skews the composition of outbound capital flows — a 10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings by approximately 10%, controlling for effects on FDI. Investor protections also seem to shape portfolio choices, though these results are not robust when only within-country variation is employed.     

A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows

International capital flows from rich to poor countries can be regarded as either too small(the Lucas paradox in a one-sector model)or too large(when compared with the logic of factor price equalization in a two-sector model).To resolve the paradoxes,we introduce a non-neoclassical model which features financial contracts and firm heterogeneity.In our model,free trade in goods does not imply equal returns to capital across countries.In addition,rich patterns of gross capital flows emerge as a function of financial and property rights institutions.A poor country with an inefficient financial system may simultaneously experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of FDI,resulting in a small net flow.In comparison,a country with a low capital-to-labor ratio but a high risk of expropriation may experience an outflow of financial capital without a compensating inflow of FDI.     

Trade, Multinational Sales, and FDI in a Three-factor Model

The overwhelming importance of multinational activities as well as the coexistence of exporters and multinationals within the developed countries demand for theoretical models which provide a convincing explanation of simultaneous two‐way trade and horizontal multinational activities. We present a model with three factors of production to disentangle the two‐fold role of headquarters for their affiliates into a know‐how (headquarters services) and a capital‐serving part (FDI). We simulate the model to derive predictions about the impact of trade costs, plant set‐up costs, fixed multinational network costs, relative country size and factor endowments on exports, multinational sales and FDI. The effects are not uniform for multinational sales and FDI. Whereas exports and affiliate sales increase with the similarity in country size, FDI is more likely to increase monotonously with the sending country's size.     

The determinants of foreign direct investment into European transition economies

Using a panel dataset of bilateral flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), we study the determinants of FDI from Western countries, mainly in the European Union (EU), to Central and Eastern European ones. We find the most important influences to be unit labor costs, gravity factors, market size, and proximity. Interestingly, host country risk proves not to be a significant determinant. Our empirical work also indicates that announcements about EU Accession proposals have an impact on FDI for the future member countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 775–787.     

Ethnic Networks in FDI and the Impact of Institutional Development

Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs are known for their active business networking practices, particularly in Southeast Asia. This paper empirically investigates the role of ethnic Chinese networks in promoting foreign direct investment (FDI). We further evaluate whether the effectiveness of networking activities are affected by the level of economic and institutional development of the source and the host countries. Using a standard gravity model, we find that ethnic Chinese networks are significant in facilitating cross‐border investment between countries. The strength of ethnic Chinese networks between country pairs, approximated by the product of the numbers of ethnic Chinese in both countries, is positively correlated with the cumulative amount of their reciprocal FDI. More importantly, this significant relationship is not limited to countries in Southeast Asia, but is applicable to other country pairs included in the study as well, regardless of whether the investment is originated from industrial countries or developing economies. Finally, the analysis finds no evidence that ethnic networks are only effective in countries where economic and legal institutions are under‐developed. Ethnic Chinese networks have played a significant role in promoting FDI to countries with a relatively higher bureaucratic quality, much more so than to countries with a lower bureaucratic quality.     

Fire‐sale FDI? The Impact of Financial Crises on Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze the evolution of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to developing and emerging countries around financial crises. We empirically examine the Fire‐Sale FDI hypothesis and describe the pattern of FDI inflows surrounding financial crises. We also add a more granular detail about the types of financial crises and their potentially differential effects on FDI. We distinguish between mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investment, as well as between horizontal (tariff jumping) and vertical (integrating production stages) FDI. We find that financial crises have a strong negative effect on inward FDI in our sample. Crises are also shown to reduce the value of horizontal and vertical FDI. We do not find empirical evidence of fire‐sale FDI; on the contrary, financial crises are shown to affect FDI flows and M&A activity negatively.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.