Cooperation,Trust and Economic Development: An Experimental Study in China

Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e. whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination of public goods, gambling game and trust game experiments, we investigate the links among cooperation, trust and economic development in four regions of China. Our results suggest that, first, there is a U‐shaped or V‐shaped relationship between cooperation and economic development. Second, on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other hand, more cooperative behaviour may be created by rewarding trusting behaviour. Third, men are more cooperative and trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used ‘GSS trust’ question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions ‘GSS fair’ and ‘GSS help’ have weak predictive power for trusting behaviour but not for cooperative behaviour.     

Revisiting the impact of impure public goods on consumers’ prosocial behavior: A lab experiment in Shanghai

In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behaviour. A within‐subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly ‘mental accounting’ mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behaviour of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed.     

Multi-family households in a labour supply model: a calibration method with application to Poland

Models of cooperative and noncooperative behaviour opened the household ‘black box’ and allowed for individual treatment of partners in couples. However, labour supply literature has so far largely ignored a broader issue – the distinction of single versus multi-family (‘complex’) households. We propose a method to account for multi-family household structure by borrowing from recent applications of the collective model to identify the degree of sharing. We assume that each household is characterized by a between-family sharing parameter, which is calibrated on estimated preferences, observed labour market status and other characteristics. We apply the method to Polish labour market data.     

现代物流企业间知识共享的博弈分析

研究了物流企业间进行知嵌共享的问题，运用博弈论的相关理论，通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型，对影响企业间知识共享条件的相关因素进行了分析，得知：知识共享安全系数与企业的最优利润值成正比；同时企业间知识共享机制的建立也受到利润分配比例的影响。     

Ideas,errors and the commercialisation of valuable knowledge

This article considers unexpected outcomes of innovation occurring during research processes. Because serendipity has often led to important discoveries, here a model is developed to analyse the conditions for a ‘market for ideas’ to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, it is shown that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. All these factors may hinder the flow of ideas among institutions, generating a loss for society as a whole.     

Absorptive capacity,knowledge sharing,and innovative behaviour of R&D employees

This study explores the interrelationship between absorptive capacity and knowledge sharing, which are innovation-specific antecedents of innovative behaviour. By differentiating the two sub-dimensions of absorptive capacity, potential and realised absorptive capacity, previous contradictory findings on the relationship between absorptive capacity and knowledge sharing are reconciled. To verify the research hypotheses, the survey responses from 138 R&D employees of a multinational electronics company are analysed through structural equation modelling. The results show that both sub-dimensions of absorptive capacity directly influence innovative behaviour. However, knowledge sharing’s effect on innovative behaviour is indirect through realised absorptive capacity. The research findings imply employees’ absorptive capacity and knowledge sharing among them should be nurtured simultaneously to facilitate innovative behaviour. In addition to providing employees with many opportunities to be exposed to external knowledge, internal communications among employees and exploratory trials exploiting external knowledge along with internal knowledge should be encouraged.     

Bargaining over loan contracts with signaling

This paper combines a sequential bargaining game between an enterprise and a fixed number of banks with a signaling game through which the enterprise reveals her project quality as well as her market-speed on the lending market. We characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium loan contracts that are supported by separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the signaling game. In contrast to existing models of lending markets, low-quality investment projects might be rewarded with more favorable equilibrium loan contracts than high-quality projects. Also in contrast to existing models, an increase in the competitive pressure between banks reduces the aggregate welfare in our model. The reason is that more favorable loan conditions come with a greater incentive for the ‘strong’ entrepreneur to distinguish herself from her ‘weak’ counterpart through socially wasteful signaling costs.     

企业知识联盟收益分享的“囚徒困境”与对策

企业知识联盟成功率不高的原因很多,其中之一是收益分享的困境问题,但很少有学者对此进行深入探讨.笔者运用博弈论,综合考虑了影响企业知识联盟收益分享的相关因素,分析了收益分享的“囚徒困境”,并提出了解决对策,包括求出了能达到联盟收益分享帕累托最优的收益分享系数与贴现因子、慎重选择联盟伙伴等.     

Search for rules for search

This paper presents the findings of some preliminary ‘laboratory’ investigations into ‘actual’ search behavior. Specifically we looked at situations in which searchers' initial information about the distributions was negligible. It seemed likely that simple ‘rules of thumb’ would be used in such situations. Our findings confirmed this view: we identified five such rules which between them ‘accounted’ for a high proportion of observed behaviour. Moreover, these rules although not ‘optimal’) appear to be reasonably good and may be fairly robust; jointly, they may constitute a better explanation (and predictor) of actual search behaviour than do the currently popular supposedly optimal rules.     

Value,sign, and social structure: the ‘game’ metaphor and modern social science

This exploratory paper, part of continued work on the history of game theory, seeks to illustrate certain links between von Neumann's theory of games and contemporaneous ideas in other fields. In particular, we claim that the emergence of the analytical metaphor of the ‘game’ in economics can be viewed as part of a general reconceptualization of theory in a range of disciplines. That methodological reconstitution may be described as the emergence of a Structuralist view, an approach to theorizing which treated its object – be that a text, a kinship arrangement, or an economy – as a self-contained system, with its own internal logic, subject to its own ‘laws’. In particular, individual texts, or observed social and economic arrangements, are now viewed as variations on an underlying logical theme, on a structural invariant. The latter is to be uncovered, in the case of linguistics, through the analysis of phonemes; in kinship analysis, through the rules governing the exchange of women because of the incest taboo; in von Neumann and Morgensterns game theory, through the possibilities for equilibrium coalition formation, based on the stable set. There thus emerged a tendency, across the intellectual spectrum, towards seeing things in combinatorialterms. Theoretical coherence was to be found in examining how objects ‘held together’ rather than analysing where they ‘came from’: nineteenth-century concerns with history, evolution and individual psychology give way to a distinctly modern emphasis on synchronic, formal structure, on analogical reasoning. Atomism gave way to holism, and formal elegance superceded immediate empirical content. Recourse to the metaphor of the ‘game’ was constitutive of this shift, which we examine by referring to Saussures General Course in Linguistics, to Formalism in mathematics and literary analysis, to Lévi-Strauss's analysis of kinship and myth, and to von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.     

Management Behaviour in Vietnamese Commercial Banks

This study identifies managerial behaviour in Vietnamese banks between the years 2000 and 2014, based on the managerial framework of banks, as identified by Rossi et al. ( 2009 ). This framework is built on the interrelationships between efficiency, risk, capital and diversification. This study uses the Z‐score to measure insolvency risk, the SFA to estimate cost efficiency, the ratio of total equity to total assets to capture bank capital and the HHI index to measure the diversification of revenue and earning assets. The results from the 3SLS estimator indicate that revenue diversification has an insignificant impact on insolvency risk, capital ratio and cost efficiency, but earning assets diversification has a negative effect on these three variables, supporting ‘classical diversification’, ‘economic capital’ and ‘monitoring’ behaviours. Moreover, a decline in cost efficiency leads to a rise in insolvency risk, implying ‘bad management’ behaviour; an increase in risk results in a reduction in cost efficiency, indicating ‘bad luck’ behaviour; and a reduction in capital ratio in the poorly capitalised banks leads to a growth in risk, suggesting ‘moral hazard’ behaviour. The results remain strongly robust when using an alternative risk measurement (the loan loss provision ratio) and an alternative SFA model.     

AN EXPERIMENT WITH ULTIMATUM BARGAINING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT*

We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects’ behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with pre‐specified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour closer to the subgame‐perfect equilibrium, in which the proposer's share is much larger than that of the responder. We have observed significant differences in the behaviour of real subjects depending on the type of “mutants” (virtual players) that were present in their environment.     

Service delivery effectiveness of microcredit-driven non-government organizations in alleviating poverty: a study on Bangladesh

This paper develops and validates a three-dimensional multi-item scale for non-government organizations (NGOs) that captures features related to ‘credibility,’ ‘confidence,’ and ‘convenience’ dimensions of effective service delivery in reducing poverty in rural Bangladesh. The methodology is based on 355 samples collected by the author from 68 randomly chosen villages in Bangladesh during September–December 2011. Results of the regional analysis show that male beneficiaries preferred to have improvement in the items related to ‘confidence and convenience’ dimensions such as worker’s skill, transparency in the transaction process, location, and business hours of NGOs. On the other hand, female beneficiaries expect to see changes in items that belong to the ‘credibility’ dimension such as speed of making decision, regularity in sharing information, and regular meeting with the managers.     

ESTIMATING THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR DIGITAL MUSIC

The general consensus among the copyright piracy literature is that economic incentives and enforcement are both effective strategies that complement one another in reducing the occurrence of piracy. Yet, the key factor underlying these strategies is the ability of the media industries to influence an individual's willingness to pay (WTP) for legal purchases when illegal versions exist. This article estimates the effects of factors influencing WTP for digital music downloads. Our results show that while income and risk perceptions play a dominant role in determining WTP, ethics are also important in influencing WTP. Our results are consistent with the growing consumer acceptance of fee-based music services that can exist alongside peer-to-peer file sharing as well as serve as a viable substitute . ( JEL O34, K42, D12)     

The experience of some OECD economies on tax smoothing

Observed random walk behaviour of a tax rate does not necessarily support the tax smoothing hypothesis though the latter implies the former. This article presents a direct test of tax smoothing by showing that if the tax smoothing hypothesis holds then the future tax rate should cointegrate with the current permanent government expenditure rate even though the tax rate is a random walk. This test is a direct and robust test of a number of ‘random walk models’ available in the literature. This procedure also enables us to differentiate among ‘strong tax smoothing’, ‘weak tax smoothing’ and ‘no-tax smoothing’, all of which are consistent with the random walk behaviour of a tax rate. Application of this test to Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the US show evidence in support of weak forms of tax smoothing.     

INCOME,CONSUMPTION AND SAVING IN URBAN AND RURAL INDIA*

The main purpose of the study is to determine the savings potential of urban and rural households in India and in the process determine the possible savings and consumption functions separately for urban and rural areas. Four different possible functions have been used for determining the savings behaviour of the households both at the aggregate level and at the per capita level. The rural households, according to the results, have an extremely low rate of saving with income elasticity of saving of less than unity. For the urban households on the other hand, the income elasticity of saving is high enough to suggest the possibilities of considerably high savings potential. To understand the consumption behaviour of these households, the long-run and the short-run marginal propensities to consume and the marginal propensities to consume out of‘permanent’ or ‘normal’ income and ‘transitory’ income have been worked out. For the urban sector none of these give encouraging enough results and the analysis has been extended to examine whether other factors like prices and household assets are of any significance. Whereas for the rural sector, Milton Friedman's theory of ‘permanent’ or ‘normal’ income is somewhat substantiated, other factors like ‘transitory’ income, prices and assets appear to inthence urban consumption behaviour though no single one of them substantially enough. A negligible effect of ‘permanent’ income on urban consumption behaviour is, on the other hand, very clearly suggested by the results. Household consumption and savings have next been projected using the above results to determine the possible levels for the next three years. The results suggest that the rate of domestic savings likely to be achieved by the end of the Third Five Year Plan (1965–66) falls short of the targets laid down.     

DOES BEHAVIOUR‐BASED PRICE DISCRIMINATION FOSTER FIRMS’ DIFFERENTIATION?

We study the impact of behaviour‐based price discrimination on the incentive of the firms to differentiate their products. We consider both ‘standard’ and ‘extreme’ behaviour‐based price discrimination: the latter always reduces the incentive to differentiate with respect to uniform pricing, while the former fosters differentiation if the consumers are sufficiently forward‐looking and/or the firms are sufficiently myopic.     

Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core

Dynamics for play of transferable‐utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto‐dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non‐empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.     

Social dilemmas,time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’ resource game may induce several ‘subjective’ games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique ‘subjective’ game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payoffs. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A sufficient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is sufficiently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.